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Abstract 
 
This thesis compares the evolution of urban planning systems and related laws that 
operate within Taiwan and Hong Kong. By conducting a historic review, this thesis 
studies how planning laws and urban plans have been made, shaped and written, as 
well as their effects on spatial development. Borrowing from Patrick McAuslan’s 
“Ideologies of planning law” concept, this thesis observes that planning laws are 
compromised products of domestic and foreign socio-political forces beyond planners’ 
control, with three competing ideologies (private property, public interest and public 
participation) dominating at various stages of the respective planning systems. On the 
surface, the private property and public interest ideologies appear to contradict each 
other. However, historically examining the implementation of urban planning by the 
developmentalist states of Taiwan and Hong Kong reveals that both ideologies have 
and still do serve the interests of certain power blocs and property developers. While 
the public interest ideology was upheld, the racial factor and sanitation syndrome 
present in the urban regularisation resulted in spatial apartheid and the ideology 
serving the interests of the colonial forces occupying each territory; while the private 
property ideology was upheld, the betterment of certain people’s property right was 
built on less privileged people’s losses. Researching the interaction between building 
violations and informal housing concludes that laws can be arbitrary and fluid in 
practice, with the line of legality having to be drawn and redrawn. With disadvantaged 
people living in informal housing, building violations eased government responsibility 
in relation to the burden on housing and intervening in the property market. While 
the first two ideologies sustain the existing capitalist system with an emphasis on a 
functional property market, the third ideology has the potential to become an 
oppositional ideology to the status quo if planners acknowledge that planning law is 
not apolitical but an arena for challenging the existing administration. 
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Preface 
 
Situated in the south-eastern coast of mainland China, Taiwan and Hong Kong are both 
societies of immigration. Chinese migrants from mainland China who moved during 
various historical periods comprise the majority of the respective populations of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan.1 However, for most of the time, both areas developed in isolation 
from the mainland Chinese political regimes or as virtually separate from the 
mainland’s economic influence. Taiwan for example, originally the subject of the 
Chinese Ching dynasty, was ceded in full sovereignty to the Empire of Japan in 1895. 
When Japan surrendered in 1945 at the end of the Second World War, the Chinese 
Nationalist government of the Republic of China assumed control of Taiwan. After the 
Chinese Communist Party founded the People’s Republic of China and the Chinese 
Nationalist government had retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the two governments 
continued in a state of war. The movement of people and goods, including by post and 
telecommunications, ceased between the PRC-controlled Mainland China and the 
Chinese Nationalist government-controlled Taiwan, until 1987, when the Chinese 
Nationalist government began to allow some Taiwanese habitants, originally from 
Mainland China, to visit their relatives in the Mainland.2 Economic exchanges between 
Mainland China and Hong Kong hardly stopped, though it had been isolated from 
Mainland Chinese regime’s political rule much longer than Taiwan under British 
colonial rule which lasted between 1842 and 1997, except for four years of Japanese 
occupation during the Second World War. The only exception to this continuation of 
exchange is seen with the US’s implementation of an embargo that forbade economic 
transactions with communist China between 1951 and 1954. For the most part of 
Hong Kong's economic history, it has consistently been a commercial centre for 
                                                          
1 G. B. Endacott, Government and People in Hong Kong 1841-1962: A Constitutional History (Hong Kong 
University Press 1964); Chen Shu-juo and Duan Hong-kuan ‘Plains Indigenous Ancestors and Taiwan 
Blood Nationalism’ (2008) 72 Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies 145. 
2 Imperial Japanese Army General Staff Office (ed) Sino-Japanese War, 1894-1895 (Tokyo Press 1904); 
Lin Hen-tao, History of Taiwan (Jong Wen Books 1988); Hsueh Hua-yuan (ed) Timeline of Taiwanese 
History: After the War (1) (Institute for National Policy Research, Chang Yung-fa Foundation 1993); Hsu 
Chieh-lin, History of Taiwan after the Second World War (Wen Ying Tang Publisher 1996); Denny Roy, 
Taiwan: A Political History (Cornell University Press 2003); Mainland Affairs Council (ed) Twenty Years 
of Cross Strait Relations (2011) 5. 
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China's global and regional trade, and this is still the role it has today.3 Capitalism 
developed separately under the Japanese imperial government, the authoritarian 
Chinese nationalist government in Taiwan and the British colonial government in Hong 
Kong.4 In terms of their political systems, differences and similarities persist in the 
comparison of Taiwan and Hong Kong: Taiwan was governed under the Martial Law 
Order between 1949 and 1987.5 While the people of Taiwan were deprived of the right 
to freedom of speech and the right of forming political parties was also prohibited, 
people in Hong Kong enjoyed the lifestyle of “freedom without democracy”.6 The 
influx of socio-political movements in the 1980s transformed Taiwan’s political system 
into a democracy and the regime changed for the first time in 2000.7 In Hong Kong, 
the transfer of sovereignty to the People’s Republic of China in 1997, placed the 
nomination of the Chief Executive of Hong Kong government under China’s control. 
Another important difference, for our purposes here, is that while the legal system in 
Taiwan is continental, Hong Kong has a British common law system. The continental 
legal system in Taiwan was originally imported by the nationalist government from 
Mainland China:8 the English common law that remained in Hong Kong is now merged 
                                                          
3
 Ho Y-P, Trade, Industrial Restructuring and Development in Hong Kong, (Macmillan London 1992); D. 
R. Meyer, Hong Kong as a Global Metropolis (Cambridge University Press 2000); C. R. Schenk, Hong 
Kong as an International Financial Centre: Emergence and Development, 1945-65 (Routledge London 
2001). 
4 See Yanaihara Tadao, Taiwan under the Japanese Imperialism (Iwatami Shoten Tokyo 1929); Chen 
Shi-meng , Lin Chung-Cheng, Chu C. Y. Cyrus, Chang Chin-his, Shih Jin-ji and Liu Jin-tein, Deconstructing 
the KMT State Capitalism (Taipei Society 1991); D. R. Meyer, Hong Kong as a Global Metropolis 
(Cambridge University Press 2000); C. R. Schenk, Hong Kong as an International Financial Centre: 
Emergence and Development, 1945-65 (Routledge London 2001). 
5
 Martial Law Order of Taiwan was proclaimed on 19th May 1949 and lifted on 15th July 1987. 
6 I. S. Thomas Leung, ‘Crises and Transformation’ in Charles Burton (ed) Politics and Society in Hong 
Kong Towards 1997 (University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia Pacific Studies 1992). 
7  Yang Du, The Collapse of Authoritarian Control (Yuan-Liou Publishing 1988); Wang Jenn-hwan, 
‘Opposition Movements and Political Transition in Taiwan’ (1989) 2 (1) Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in 
Social Studies; Wang Jenn-hwan and Chien Sechin Yeong-Shyang, ‘Toward a New Country? The 
Formation of Populist Authoritarianism’ (1995) 20 Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies; Chen 
Shui-bian, Taiwan Stands Up: Toward the Dawn of a Rising Era (2000) President Chen Shui-bian’s 
Inaugural Speech 20th May 2000 <http://www.fas.org/news/taiwan/2000/e-05-20-00-8.htm> accessed 
1st November 2014. 
8 Wang Tay-sheng, Introduction to History of Law in Taiwan (3rd edn, Angle Publication 2012). 
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with the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s 
Republic of China (Hong Kong Basic Law) imposed by Beijing.9  
 
Despite the differences outlined above, the economies of Hong Kong and Taiwan took 
off in the 1960s and consistently had two-digit GDP growth throughout the 1960s, 
1970s and 1980s. 10  The rapidly growing economies attracted the attention of 
development scholars and researchers.11 Accompanied by the studies of the Newly 
Industrialised Countries (NICs) and the Four Asian Tigers, research on Taiwan and 
Hong Kong became a popular subject in the 1980s and 1990s and various perspectives 
                                                          
9
According to Article 8 of the Basic Law: “The laws previously in force in Hong Kong, that is, the common 
law, rules of equity, ordinances, subordinate legislation and customary law shall be maintained, except 
for any that contravene the Basic Law and subject to any amendment by the legislature of the HKSAR.” 
Also see Peter Wesley-Smith, The Sources of Hong Kong Law (Hong Kong University Press 1994). 
10
 Taiwan consistently saw double digit GDP growth for almost 38 years between 1955 and 1993 with 
the exception of 1975, 1982, 1985 and 1988.  Between 1962 and 1987, there were 12 years of double 
digit GDP growth in Hong Kong. See Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics (Taiwan), 
Historical Principal Figures <http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=14616&CtNode=3566&mp=1> 
accessed 1st November 2014; Census and Statistics Department, Hong Kong Social and Economic Trends 
1982-1992 (Hong Kong Government Printer 1993); Census and Statistics Department, Estimates of 
Gross Domestic Product 1961 to 1994 (Hong Kong Government Printer 1995). 
11
 Stephen Wing-kai Chiu, Kong-chong Ho and Tai-lok Lui, City-States in the Global Economy: Industrial 
Restructuring in Hong Kong and Singapore (Westview Press 1997) 1; Richard P. Appelbaum and Jeffrey 
William Henderson, State and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim (Sage Publications, London 1992); 
Frederic C. Deyo, The Political Economy of the New Asian Industrialism (Oxford University Press, New 
York 1987); M. Douglass, ‘The ‘Developmental State’ and the Newly Industrialised Economies of Asia’ 
(1994) 26 (4)  Environment and Planning A 543-566; Theodore Geiger and Frances M. Geiger, Tales of 
Two City-States: The Development Progress of Hong Kong and Singapore (National Planning 
Association, Washington D.C. 1973); Helen Hughes, Achieving Industrialization in East Asia (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 1988); Keun Lee, New East Asian Economic Development: The Interacting 
Capitalism and Socialism (M. E. Sharpe, Armonk 1993); Andrew Maclntyre, Business and Government 
in Industrializing Asia (Cornell University Press, New York 1994); Dwight H. Perkins,  ‘There Are At Least 
Three Models of East Asian Development’ (1994) 22 (4) World Development 655-661; Robert Wade, 
Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization 
(Princeton University Press, Princeton 1990); William C. Johnson, ‘Citizen Participation in Local Planning 
in the U.K. and U.S.A.: A Comparative Study’ (1984) 21 (3) Progress in Planning 149, 221; Ann Louise 
Strong, Planned Urban Environments: Sweden, Finland, Israel, the Netherlands, France (Johns Hopkins 
Press, Baltimore 1971); Thomas, D. and Tvrdý, M., Flexibility and Commitment in Planning: A 
Comparative Study of Local Planning and Development in the Netherlands and England (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1983); Paul M. White, ‘Urban Planning in Britain and the Soviet Union: A 
Comparative Analysis’ (1979) 70 Research memorandum (Centre for Regional, Urban and Local 
Government Studies University of Birmingham,  Birmingham)  44, 56. 
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were introduced to analyse this phenomenon of rapid growth.12 Mainland Chinese 
academic publications also reflected world-wide interest.13 Although the popularity of 
the subject declined in the 2000s in Western academic circles,14 in mainland China, 
accompanied by the surge of exchange activities between Taiwan and mainland China 
in 2008 and Hong Kong and mainland China in 2003,15 there has been no such decline, 
and Chinese Mainland scholars in public research institutions are encouraged to keep 
working on the issues of the “Phenomenon” of Taiwan” and “Phenomenon of Hong 
Kong”.16 Motivated by the mainland Chinese government's need to see “what insights 
Taiwan and Hong Kong can offer to mainland China”, many researchers focused on 
                                                          
12 Chiu, Ho and Lui categorised this complex literature into four conceptual strands: the Neo-Modernist 
version which focuses on people, culture and value; the free-market advocates who suggest that 
liberalisation was the driving force behind economic development; the statist version which focuses on 
the role of the state in guiding the development and those who saw the economic growth enjoyed by 
the NICs as a process of capitalist development worked itself out. See Stephen Wing-kai Chiu, Kong-
chong Ho and Tai-lok Lui, City-States in the Global Economy: Industrial Restructuring in Hong Kong and 
Singapore (Westview Press 1997) 5, 7. 
13
 See Gu Yuanxiang, Zhou Shenkui and Tan Shihzhong (eds), The Whole Story of Four Asian Little 
Dragons’ Taking Off (Economic Science Press 1992); Li Xiaoman (ed), The Inspiration of Four Asian 
Dragon’s Economic Development (Shanghai People’s Publishing House 1993); Ye Weiping, Tracing the 
Mysterious Four Asian Little Dragons (Beijing University of Technology Press 1994); Fan Aijun, Research 
on Taiwan Economy (Jinan Press 1995); Zhao Chuenming, From Myth to Reality: the Rising of East Asia 
and it’s Modernisation (Wuhan Press 1997); Luo Rongqu, The Modernisation of East Asia: the New 
Model and New Experience (Beijing University Press 1998)  
14
 Amount of academic articles published about Asian Tiger economies declined sharply in 2001. See 
Joe C. Davis and Jorge G. Gonzalez, Scholarly Journal Articles about the Asian Tiger Economies: Authors, 
Journals, and Research Fields, 1986-2001 (Trinity University 2002) 9.  
15
 For example, since the opening policy to allow tightly controlled mainland Chinese tour groups to 
visit Taiwan in 2008 and the opening in 2011 to individual tourists who met certain criteria, the numbers 
of mainland Chinese tourists visiting Taiwan each year has increased from 0 in 2007 to 3,987,152 in 
2014. See ‘The Growth of Foreign Tourists in the Last Ten years’, Bureau of Tourism, Ministry of 
Transportation and Communication <http://admin.taiwan.net.tw/public/public.aspx?no=315> 
accessed 26th January 2015. In Hong Kong, the tourism market was open to mainland Chinese 
individuals who reside in certain cities in 2003 which allowed them to travel to Hong Kong without 
being part of an organized tour group. Hong Kong has been the top travel destination for people from 
mainland China. Between 2012 and 2013 Hong Kong attracted nearly 35 million mainland Chinese 
visitors each year. See Press release from Hong Kong’s Information Services Department (2nd 
September 2013) <http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201309/02/P201309020621.htm> accessed 
26th January 2015. 
16
 Press release from All China Taiwanese Association (8th January 2009); also see The National 
Development and Reform Commission (China), Preface in ‘Outlines of Pearl River Delta Area Reform 
and Development Plans’ (2009) 
 <http://59.36.241.88:1980/b5/yea.jiangmen.gov.cn/show.aspx?id=238&cid=7>  accessed 26th January 
2015. 
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the economic development of the two areas. 17 Nevertheless, in the research field of 
urban planning and planning law, comparative studies Hong Kong and Taiwan are 
scarce. Most of comparative studies on urban planning concern Western countries.18 
To compare urban planning mechanisms that operate within Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
one would need to examine the fundamental differences of the Continental legal 
system of Taiwan and the combination of the contractual planning and common law 
system of Hong Kong. Besides that, Taiwan’s multi-layered government structure and 
its local governments’ relationships and respective special interests and the fact that 
the Hong Kong government itself is the largest landlord in Hong Kong would be a 
challenge to researchers as well. 
 
With a view to filling this gap, this thesis wishes to make a contribution to comparative 
studies on Taiwan and Hong Kong with regard to urban planning and planning laws. 
By making a historic and comparative review in the thesis’s perspective, this study will 
try to understand the development of urban planning and planning laws in Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. Since this thesis is primarily interested in the spatial aspect of these 
developments, it differs from previous research, which has been concentrated on the 
development of the economy19. It will mainly consider the roles of states and the 
power blocs consisting of states affected spatial development of both areas. Therefore, 
this study will focus on planning law and planning, rather than urbanism or urban 
problems. This is a study of how planning laws and urban plans were made, shaped 
and written, and in turn, how they made, shaped, and wrote spatial development.  
 
 
                                                          
17
 See Overview of Relations with Taiwan and Hong Kong (Global Times Beijing 2014) 3. 
18
 Philip Booth, Controlling Development: Certainty and Discretion in Europe, the USA and Hong Kong. 
UCL Press (London 1996) 8; J Barry Cullingworth, The Political Culture of Planning: American Land Use 
Planning in Comparative Perspective (Routledge 1993); Andreas Faludi, The Study of Comparative 
Planning, ‘Centre for Environmental Studies’ (London 1975). 
19 See page 7, footnote 15 
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Structure 
 
Chapter 1 of this thesis introduces the relationship of modern urban planning to 
industrialisation, followed by a brief outline of the importation of urban plans as 
colonies and their relationship to colonisation, which was the historical background to 
implementation of the earliest urban plans in both Taiwan and Hong Kong. In this 
chapter, Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s urban planning and their respective legal 
authorities are introduced and criticised. The critique points out that in both Taiwan 
and Hong Kong cases, urban planning has failed to deliver what it planned to achieve. 
The chapter then introduces Patrick McAuslan’s three ideologies of planning law 
concept, which will be the main approach this thesis adopts to examine planning laws 
in action. As McAuslan reveals there are three competing philosophies (the ideology 
of private property, the ideology of public interest and the ideology of public 
participation) dominating planning law and in conflict with each other at various 
points in the planning system. This chapter will argue that law itself is a major 
contributory factor to the chaos in urban planning.20 The chapter then notes that since 
McAuslan’s research on planning ideologies is based on English town and country 
planning, his observations are not fully compatible to be applied to urban planning in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong. Other theories and concepts concerning sanitation syndrome, 
racial factors, power blocs and informal sectors will be used in later chapters of this 
thesis when arguing about the causes of disarray in the planning systems in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong. 
 
Chapter 2 is concerned with the importation of urban regularisation in Taiwan, the 
importance of building and development control in colonial cities, and its relation to 
the emergence of imperial powers. This chapter borrows from Maynard Swanson’s 
concept of “sanitation syndrome” to argue that building and planning regulations 
were established to supply infrastructure and attract colonial settlers, rather than for 
                                                          
20 Patrick McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press 1980). 
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the welfare of locals.21 City walls and houses in town centres were demolished to give 
way to the development of new Japanese districts and separate Japanese settlers 
from the Taiwanese. Urban regularisation resulted in the replacement of Chinese old 
towns by new city landscapes, accompanied by a centralised system of development 
control in the name of public interest that met very little local resistance. During the 
urban regularisation implementation process, public interest ideology overpowered 
private property interest; however, this definition of the ‘public’ only included the 
colonists and not Taiwanese locals. 
 
Chapter 3 deals with the emergence of urban regularisation in Hong Kong. Sanitation 
syndrome is considered here as the primary reason for the initiation of the early phase 
of land-use control. Sanitation rules were the principle motivation for interventions 
concerning private property rights, with contractual planning forming the crucial 
mechanism for regulating land use at that time. Since all of Hong Kong’s land belonged 
to the British crown, the leasehold system as a land management measure attained 
development control via land sales and contracts. Besides contractual planning, British 
administrative machinery was also introduced to deal with land-use and set up 
sanitation rules. Sanitation concerns continued throughout the nineteenth century in 
Hong Kong, with this chapter highlighting that the early history of town planning in 
Hong Kong is a history closely associated with public health concerns. This chapter will 
show that the evolution of land use control and sanitation rules did not develop 
independently from the outside world. The importation of the public health 
movement from England helped shape development control in Hong Kong.   
 
Chapter 4 discusses the impact of the racial factor on urban regularisation and related 
laws. By reviewing urban regularisation operating in Taiwan and Hong Kong during 
colonial periods, one can see that concerns about public health made a major 
contribution to the implementation of development control, even though public 
                                                          
21 M. W. Swanson, ‘The Sanitation Syndrome: Bubonic Plague and Urban Native Policy in the Cape 
Colony 1900-1909’ (1977) 18(3) Journal of African History 387-410 
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health concerns only focused on colonists. Those concerns and the implementation of 
regularisation reflected colonists’ views on the colonised: the laws and regulations 
stipulated to guide and control urban development represented the colonists’ 
perceptions of local people whose physical appearances were different. The 
assumption that locals’ ways of living had a bad influence on public health were 
shaped by racial categorisation, necessitating some spatial design measures in order 
to deal with the racial factor. The racial factor was used by the colonists like spatial 
apartheid. For example, in Hong Kong, Chinese people’s crowded habitation and 
unhygienic living condition were distorted as “Chinese customs” and were selectively 
adopted to justify some implementations of development control that were only 
applied to Western settlements but not to Chinese quarters. Racial segregation in 
planning started as early as 1841, with similar stories can be seen in Taiwan as well. 
Chinese customs, such as collective punishment, were selectively adopted by the 
Japanese regime and integrated into the Japanese legal system for the convenience 
of governing the colony, whilst some western principles of law already adopted by the 
Japanese system were simply ignored. Building regulations were only applied to 
Japanese residential areas and used as a form of prohibition to prevent Taiwanese 
land owners from undertaking transactions and developments. Clusters of Japanese 
style houses could be seen in the city centres of newly regulated towns. However, the 
colonists were not the only ones who adopted the racial factor. In Hong Kong, 
“Chinese customs” were also used by local Chinese notables to plead against 
development control and the implementation of public health regulations, though the 
real reason behind the protest against the public campaign was economic. While 
Chinese customs were mentioned by both the Westerners and the Chinese in Hong 
Kong, the customs they described were neither traditional Chinese nor genuine 
Chinese. While the Chinese racial factor was mentioned in Taiwan, it was interpreted 
to justify the hierarchy of the racial system with Chinese people at the bottom, 
Japanese people at the top and Taiwanese habitants in the middle, leading to the 
modern urban regularisation brought by the Japanese being legitimised.  
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Chapter 5 reviews the legal framework of modern urban planning in Taiwan that was 
implemented by the Japanese before the Second World War. The Chinese Nationalist 
Party (Guomintang; K.M.T.) brought in the entire governing system, including state 
apparatus and legal instruments, from Mainland China to Taiwan in 1945. Hence, the 
Taiwan’s contemporary legal system is based on the Chinese Nationalist legal system, 
which gave legitimacy to Chinese Nationalist rule and current Taiwanese government. 
It is necessary to trace back urban planning related legislation to the pre-Communist 
period in China to fully understand Taiwan’s contemporary urban planning system. 
Zoning control in Taiwan will also be introduced and reviewed. Accompanied by 
revisions and the enactment of planning related laws, the zoning system in Taiwan 
evolved under detailed regulations and became the major land use control instrument. 
A comprehensive planning system was born and dominated the practice of urban 
planning, with zoning being the most powerful coercive legal instrument. However, 
the system, although looking mature on paper, has, in reality, always proven 
insufficient. Later in this chapter the system and its implementation under both the 
Japanese and Chinese regimes will be analysed and the reasons for failure highlighted. 
The urban plans of Wuchi, first introduced by the Japanese regime and then 
continually developed by the Chinese nationalist regime, will also be introduced in the 
chapter to support my argument. 
 
Chapter 6 introduces land reforms in Taiwan to reveal how political struggle decisively 
affected the outcomes of land policy, with the character of the state apparatus 
analysed alongside. The first case of Taiwanese land reform can actually be viewed as 
an extension of the Chinese civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and 
Communists, which more precisely was a struggle between Chinese landlords and 
peasants. The second case in this chapter that will be introduced is the failure of urban 
land reform between 1954 and 1977 in Taiwan, which was also an outcome of political 
struggle. Though this was seen by some of the Taiwanese press as a struggle between 
Chinese Mainlanders and local provincials, in actuality, the “Chinese” factor was 
merely a smoke screen masking a political conflict between power blocs within the 
 16 
government that represented, respectively, the interests of land speculators and 
bureaucrats. 
 
Chapter 7 introduces the evolution of comprehensive urban planning in Hong Kong 
and discusses the role of the Hong Kong government as developer of its land use. This 
thesis argues that the establishment of systematic development control in Hong Kong 
was precisely an implementation of McAuslan’s second ideology, the ideology of 
public interest. Developers’ common law rights could be diminished or indeed taken 
away by administrative decisions. The trend calling for state intervention against 
laissez-faire economics continued after the Second World War. With the publication 
of the Abercrombie Plan in 1948, open space, green belt and reasonable density 
concepts were imported to Hong Kong to emphasise the importance of development 
control. Later, statutory and zoning plans were applied to Hong Kong generally as a 
set of universal development control legal measures. The application of zoning was 
not a paradigm shift in terms of planning ideology but it did improve the efficiency of 
administrative power. The main task of planning in the 1960s in Hong Kong was to 
meet the needs of large scale immigration and economic expansion that came with 
population expansion. Land demand pressure made the city state play the role of 
efficient developer. A long-term land use plan was crucial at this stage. The 1970s in 
Hong Kong was an era that saw the upgrading of public housing, development of new 
towns and the urbanisation of the New Territories. The Hong Kong government was 
meant to be both a welfare state and developmentalist state at the same time;22 
                                                          
22 Regarding the characteristics of developmentalist state, I borrow the arguments from Castells and 
Bagchi. As Castells defines developmentalist state, 
 “a state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy, its ability to promote and 
sustain development, understanding by development the combination of steady high rates of economic 
growth and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in its relationship to the 
international economy.”  
While Castells emphasises the role of development ideology in mobilising the various forces in society 
for development and argues that it is a basis for state legitimacy, Bagchi stresses how the 
developmentalist state works. He points out that the developmentalist state  
“puts economic development as the top priority and is able to design effective instruments to promote 
such a goal. The instruments would include the forging of new formal institutions, the weaving of formal 
and informal networks of collaboration among citizens and officials, and utilising new opportunities for 
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nevertheless, this chapter argues Hong Kong has been developed primarily by the 
government for the benefits of property development or fiscal objectives rather than 
for social welfare. The role of developer continued after the handover of sovereignty 
to China. While the socialist state of China has maintained capitalism in Hong Kong, 
the British colonial style of elite governance, and undemocratically elected 
representatives consisting of bureaucrats, developers and businessmen, still 
dominates urban planning decision making in Hong Kong. 
 
Chapter 8 studies development control violations by focusing on illegal buildings that 
have arisen under the urbanisation of Hong Kong and Taiwan. The author points out 
that though this may look like a rebellion against the law, it actually eases the 
administrative state’s crisis of legitimacy, eases the financial burden of city 
administrations and, most importantly, supports the growth and development of 
cities. While illegal buildings challenge planning authorities’ development control, 
they are essential to urban development. They are not side effects of urbanisation, 
nor are city margins. This chapter also points out that in response to the challenge, 
laws and regulations can be arbitrary and fluid in practice. The definition of legality is 
not always straightforward. Building violations, for example, can be tolerated when 
the government does not have enforcement capabilities. Government also avoids the 
removal of large scale illegal constructions when the removal could result in social 
unrest that endangers the political legitimacy of the government. Though the selective 
implementation of building regulations exposes the failure of the government’s 
development control, a building violation cannot be seen as the failure of public 
                                                          
trade and profitable production, Whether the state governs the market or exploits new opportunities 
thrown up by the market depends on particular historical conjunctures.”  
Nevertheless, the role of a developmentalist state in development, like development itself, needs to be 
situated in the context of class, power and struggle. See: Manuel Castells, ‘Four Asian Tigers with a 
Dragon Head: A Comparative Analysis of the State, Economy, and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim’ in 
Richard P. Appelbaum and J. W. Henderson (eds), States and Development in the Asian Pacific Rim 
(Sage Publications 1992) 33-70; Amiya Kumar Bagchi, ‘The Developmental State Under Imperialism’ in 
ed. K. S. Jomo (ed), Globalization Under Hegemony: The Changing World Economy (Oxford University 
Press 2006) 227-277; Abdul Rahman Haji Embong, ‘Developmentalist State in Malaysia: Its Origins, 
Nature, and Contemporary Transformation’ in Joan M. Nelson, Jacob Meerman and Abdul Rahman Haji 
Embong (eds.), Globalization and National Autonomy: The Experience of Malaysia (Institute of 
Southeast Asian Studies 2008) 27-58. 
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interest ideologies. Government compromises on the legality of building violations are 
the results of the state’s policies being incapable of meeting the realities and the 
state’s incompetence to exercise its policies. The hegemony of public interest remains 
unchallenged.  
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Chapter 1: Setting the scene – The Outline and Failure of Urban Planning in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong in the 19th and 20th Centuries 
 
This chapter introduces the relations between modern planning and industrialisation, 
followed by a brief introduction to the relationship between the importation of urban 
plans into colonies and colonisation, which was the historical background of the 
earliest establishment of urban plans in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The historic 
development of Taiwanese urban planning, Hong Kong urban planning and their 
respective legal authorities will be reviewed here. The chapter points out that in the 
cases of both Taiwan and Hong Kong, urban planning failed to deliver what it had 
planned to achieve. Taiwan and Hong Kong authorities did foresee the urban problems 
that industrialisation would bring, but the solutions provided by urban planning have 
not solved the problems arising since.  
 
The chapter then moves on to present the three ideologies of planning law concept 
proposed by Patrick McAuslan, the author of Ideologies of Planning Law. McAuslan 
outlines three dominant planning ideologies: 1. the ideology of private property which 
exists for the maintenance and buttressing of private rights; 2. the ideology of public 
interest which tends to confer administrative powers and 3. the ideology of public 
participation, which demands direct public involvement.23 Since law itself is a major 
contributing factor to the disarray in urban planning, the argument outlined above is 
one of the approaches this thesis will apply in order to examine planning laws in 
action.24 According to McAuslan, planning law, far from being objective and neutral, 
is dominated by three distinct and competing philosophies which conflict with each 
other at various points of the planning system.25 
 
                                                          
23 Patrick McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press 1980). 
24 Ibid. p2. 
25 Ibid. 
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However, McAuslan’s study of planning ideologies was based on English planning 
system, and while he emphasized the importance of discussing the roles of lawyers 
and planning officials, his own study of those agents could not be fully applied to the 
legal and planning authorities of Taiwan and Hong Kong, since the emergence of the 
planning establishment had a completely different background to that of England. 
Indeed, as this thesis will point out in Chapter 2 and 3, the planning establishment 
serves for the interests of colonists and not of the local people. Given the difference 
of the respective relationships of Hong Kong, Taiwan and England to colonialism, in 
order to examine the planning authorities and specific agents’, including local people 
and colonists, involvement with the development of planning systems and to 
understand their intervention in the law and in planning, other theoretical concepts 
will also be introduced for this historical review of planning in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
For example, the concept of sanitation syndrome will be discussed in relation to the 
initiation of urban regularisation. Colonial urbanisation will be explored in order to 
understand how the colonial periphery was incorporated into the metropolitan core 
and helped build colonial cities where the colonists controlled the extraction of 
resources and surplus. While characteristics of the developmentalist states of Taiwan 
and Hong Kong are examined with a view to revealing the roles of planning authorities 
in central and local level, the power blocs, consisting of states and the socio-political 
forces which drive spatial development can be reviewed alongside.  
 
This thesis will discuss racial factors and urban informal sectors as well. With the 
discussion of race, this thesis argues that building regulations and planning 
implementation in both cases of Hong Kong and Taiwan were introduced according to 
the standards deemed appropriate for the segregated population, since with spatial 
segregation a social order could be created without disturbing the overall power 
structure of colonisation. In the discussion of urban informal sectors this thesis argues 
that informal sectors, for example illegal buildings and illegal settlement, actually 
constitute a collective reaction to the real estate market as part of which land capital 
deprives people of housing. In short, while this thesis adopts McAuslan’s three 
ideologies as general theoretical guideline, the thesis is also aware of the need for 
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taking on other theoretical concepts and arguments to provide further observations 
and analysis on the development of urban planning laws in both Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. 
 
 
1.1 The relationship between urban planning and industrialisation 
 
This section discusses what urban planning is and the purpose of its implementation. 
The section emphasises the relevance of the relationship of urban planning and 
industrialisation by pointing out that the origins of modern planning resulted from the 
need to solve problems concerning the living conditions of newly emergent urban 
working class in the nineteenth century. 
 
What is urban planning and what is the purpose of implementing urban plans? The 
Taiwanese Urban Planning Act, originally stipulated in 1939 and the latest amendment 
passed in 2015, clearly defines the meaning of urban planning and sets up its aims. As 
Article 3 of the Urban Planning Act reads,  
“An urban plan as referred to herein shall refer to a planned development for 
significant facilities concerning urban living such as economic activities, 
communications, sanitation, public security, national defence, culture, 
education, recreation and so on within a definite area and to a rational 
planning for land use therein.” 26 
Meanwhile Article 1 of the Urban Planning Act stipulates that “This Act is enacted for 
the purpose of improving the living environment of residents, and promoting a planned 
and balancing development in city, town and urban rural settlement.”27 The purpose 
of improving living environment and rationally planning land use of Taiwanese urban 
                                                          
26
 Article 3, Urban Planning Act, 2015 Taiwan. 
27
 Article 1, Urban Planning Act, 2015 Taiwan. 
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planning law is very similar to what Town Planning Ordinance of Hong Kong from 1991 
emphasizes in its endeavour,  
“[T]o promote the health, convenience and general welfare of the community 
by making provision for the systematic preparation and approval of plans for 
the lay-out of areas of Hong Kong as well as for the types of building suitable 
for erection therein and for the preparation and approval of plans for areas 
within which permission is required for development.”28 
Both Taiwanese Urban Planning Act and Hong Kong Town Planning Ordinance 
proclaim publicly that there are definitely things to be done for the betterment of 
people’s living condition and that there are ways of doing this. Both laws coincide with 
scholars’ opinions. According to Peter Hall and John Forester, urban planning is the 
guidance of future action29 and it is considered a rational process that is “an orderly 
sequence of action that will lead to achievement of a stated goal or goals.”30 The goal 
or goals are set in order to resolve urban practical problems and meet land users’ 
requirements. As Greed suggests:  
“planning is for people… It is important to acknowledge the importance of the 
needs and wants of the population in generating demand for development in 
the first place, and to seek to meet the requirements of ‘users of land’ rather 
than focusing on the ‘land uses’ in isolation.”31  
 
At an operational level, Keeble recognises urban planning as “the art and the science 
of ordering the land-uses and siting the buildings and communication routes so as to 
secure the maximum level of economy, convenience and beauty.” 32  Therefore 
                                                          
28
 Town Planning Ordinance, amended in 1991, Hong Kong. 
29
 John Forester, Planning in the Face of Power (University of California Press 1989) 3. 
30
 Peter Hall, Urban and Regional Planning (Routledge London 1975). 
31
 Clara Greed, Introducing Planning (Longman 2000) 4. 
32
 Lewis Keeble, Principles and Practice of Town and Country Planning (Estates Gazette 1969) 1. 
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planning is not merely the production of blueprints for the future desired state of an 
area but “a continuous series of controls over the development of the area.”33  
 
As Sutcliffe points out “the novelty of the town planning lay in its relevance to 
industrial urbanisation.”34 The historical origins of modern planning resulted from the 
need to solve problems concerning the horrendous living conditions of the new urban 
working class during the nineteenth century.35 Since the mass shift in the balance 
between the rural and urban populations was unprecedented, it was not only a 
question of the overall size and rate of growth, but also of the adaptation of towns to 
a rapidly changing technology and social patterns and meet the new demands of 
industries.36  Using technical means to meet the needs of land users and solving urban 
problems and planning land uses, the task of modern urban planning is somehow 
different from the long historical tradition of town planning before the Industrial 
Revolution: nineteenth-century town planning was more concerned with public 
health, sanitation and “meeting the functional requirement of industry”,37 instead of 
providing a classical style of architecture and urban designs serving the upper class. 
The surge of industrialisation in both Europe and the United States, accompanied by 
failures in the management of the unwanted physical consequences of development, 
brought with it the birth of modern urban plans and related laws. For example, in 
England, as McAuslan details, post Industrial Revolution legislation on this subject 
started in the 1840s.38 The earliest legislation included the Removal of Nuisances Act 
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 Peter Hall, Urban and Regional Planning (Routledge London 1975) 7. 
34
 Anthony Sutcliffe, Towards the Planned City: Germany, Britain, the United States and France 1780-
1914 (St. Martin’s Press 1981). 
35
William Ashworth, The Genesis of Modern British Town Planning (Routledge 1954); Patrick McAuslan, 
Land, Law and Planning (Weidenfield and Nicolson 1975); Anthony Sutcliffe, Towards the Planned City: 
Germany, Britain, the United States and France 1780-1914 (St. Martin’s Press 1981).  
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 Anthony Sutcliffe, Towards the Planned City: Germany, Britain, the United States and France 1780-
1914 (St. Martin’s Press 1981) 
37
 Clara Greed, Introducing Planning (Longman 2000) 68. 
38
 Patrick McAuslan, Land, Law and Planning (Weidenfield and Nicolson 1975) 37. 
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1846 and the Public Health Act of 1848.39 Certain types of power concerning public 
hygiene, land-use control and development control were introduced because of the 
defects of urban growth and the appearance of major urban centres that were not 
well regulated by pre-Industrial Revolution criminal legislation but required a more 
comprehensive approach with a wider range of administrative powers. 40 Before the 
turn of century, the expansion of public powers had grown steadily from an initial 
concern with nuisance in an individual house to embrace all aspects of development 
within a region.41 
 
The inseparable relationship of modern urban planning to industrialisation can also be 
seen in the cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong, both former colonies of imperial powers 
that later industrialised and imported urban planning. Nevertheless, the relationship 
between industrialisation and urban planning in colonies had unique complexities 
different from those seen in western countries. Colonialism took the form of a 
conquest by the establishment, exploitation, and acquisition of land and this was 
enforced by political power, military force and capital exportation. Industrialisation 
brought with it the means to set up colonies and urban plans had played a crucial role 
in this process.42  
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 Patrick McAuslan, Land, Law and Planning (Weidenfield and Nicolson 1975) 37. 
40
  The Removal of Nuisances Act was concerned with nuisances in individual houses and empowered 
public officials to remove them. The Public Health Act extended the range of powers available to 
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1975) 38. 
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Five Percent Philanthropy. An Account of Housing in Urban Areas Between 1840 and 1914 (Cambridge 
University Press 1973)  
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 Chang Jing-sen, Taiwanese Urban Planning: 1895-1988. (Institute for National Policy Research, Chang 
Yung-fa Foundation 1993) 9; Diane Kirkby and Catherine Coleborne, ‘Introduction’ in Diane Kirkby and 
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2001) 3. 
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To sum up this section, there are inseparable relations between colonisation, 
industrialisation and urban planning. Colonialism brought industrialisation to the 
colonies, with industrialisation necessitating urban planning. The following chapters 
of this thesis will discuss the relations between colonisation, industrialisation and 
urban planning by reviewing the British importation of urban planning to Hong Kong 
and the Japanese importation of urban planning to Taiwan, as well as their 
development in relation to. The discussion starts in the brief introduction in the next 
section with a focus on the importation of urban planning to Taiwan. 
 
 
1.2 A brief introduction to Taiwanese urban planning and its legal authorities 
 
This section provides a brief review of the current urban planning system and planning 
related laws in Taiwan to concisely introduce the hierarchy of Taiwanese urban 
planning and its legal sources. 
 
Modern urban planning was introduced in Taiwan during the early years of Japanese 
colonisation, which started in 1895.43 While city plans and building controls were first 
set up in Taipei City (the name literally means north of Taiwan) and Taichung City 
(middle of Taiwan), Tokyo was the only city on the Japanese Mainland where a city 
plan had been implemented. In the 1930’s, regional plans were established and 
implemented in three metropolitan areas (Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung in southern 
Taiwan), with city plans also applied to the construction of eight middle size cities and 
towns with designated populations ranging from 50,000 to 300,000. By the time 
Japanese colonists withdrew from Taiwan in 1945, 72 city plans had been published 
and implemented.44 After the Second World War, the concept of English New Town 
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 Chang Jing-sen, Taiwanese Urban Planning: 1895-1988. (Institute for National Policy Research, Chang 
Yung-fa Foundation 1993) 5; Huang Wu-dar, Studies on Taiwan Urban Planning under Japanese Rule 
1895-1945 Volume 3 (SMC Publishing Inc 2003) 3. 
44
 Chang Jing-sen, Taiwanese Urban Planning: 1895-1988. (Institute for National Policy Research, Chang 
Yung-fa Foundation 1993) 6. 
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was introduced, with the Chinese Nationalist Government initiating plans for two such 
towns.45 The 1960s and 1970s saw more urban plans announced and applied to most 
cities and towns, while regional plans were promulgated and an integrated planning 
system, supported by the revised Urban Planning Act and Regional Planning Act, was 
accomplished.46 
 
 
The Current Taiwanese planning system consists of four levels of planning, as shown 
in Figure 1.1. At the top of the system is the Comprehensive Development Plan of the 
                                                          
45 The first wave of English New Towns was planned under the power of the New Town Act of 1946 and 
influenced by Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City movement that proposed self-contained communities 
surrounded by greenbelts, containing proportionate areas of residences, industry, and agriculture. The 
Chinese Nationalist Government published similar plans in 1955 and 1956 for Yunghe in northern 
Taiwan and Chung Hsin New Village in central Taiwan. Yunghe was designed with proportioned green 
fields that would occupy one ninth of the city area and have a planned population was 30,000.  
However, Yunghe eventually grew rapidly and became Taipei’s dormitory town with a population of 
225,000 and green fields occupying only one percent of the city area. Regarding Chung Hsin New 
Village, it became the seat of the Taiwan Province Government with a population of approximately 
25,500 as of 2016. All the buildings in the village are owned by the government, with development 
strictly controlled and carefully planned. See: Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of To-morrow (Swan 
Sonenschein & Co., Ltd.  1902); Robert Fishman, Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer 
Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier (MIT Press 1982); Liao Ying-chi, Yesterday’s Garden City 
of Tomorrow:  A Planning History of the Yunghe City (Master’s Degree Thesis, Graduate Institute of 
Building and Planning, National Taiwan University 1999).  
46
 Chang Jing-sen, Taiwanese Urban Planning: 1895-1988. (Institute for National Policy Research, Chang 
Yung-fa Foundation 1993). 
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Taiwan Area, which concerns all of the Taiwan Area of The Republic of China.47 The 
Comprehensive Development Plan was a national strategic plan that set out the 
spatial structure of Taiwan in accordance with the needs of Taiwan's long term socio-
economic development plans. The latest version of the Plan was published in 1996 
and targeted the year 2000. According to the Plan, western Taiwan would be 
developed into three megalopolitan regions - northern, central and southern 
megalopolises - along with the principal government initiative at that time: the Asia-
Pacific Regional Operations Centre Plan. According to this plan, the cross-strait 
opening dialogue and economic exchange between Taiwan and Mainland China, 
would provide historical opportunities for the economic revitalisation of Taiwan.48 
The Comprehensive Development Plan delineated the spatial development guidelines 
for the Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre Plan. The Comprehensive 
Development Plan also bore the crucial task of tackling the problem of the 
deterioration of the environment and creating a better living environment. 
 
At the second level of the Taiwanese planning system are the Regional Plans. A 
Regional Plan usually concerns more than a county or municipal city. Unlike the 
Comprehensive Development Plan, Regional Plans are statutory plans made under the 
authority of the Regional Plan Act. According to this, a Regional Plan can include the 
development and conservation of natural resources, land use plans and zoning 
controls, regional transportation plans, regional industrial development plans, public 
facility plans, tourism plans, environmental conservation plans and implementation 
plans. However, the main purpose of a Regional Plan is to stipulate the conditions of 
land use in non-urban areas. Since development plans in a Regional Plan are mostly 
laid out as aims or goals without proper legal measures to ensure their 
implementation in a given area, the legal enforcement of land use plans and zoning 
                                                          
47
 Taiwan Area legally refers to the effective governing area of the government of The Republic of China 
including two off-shore islands, Kinmen (Quemoy) and Matsu, and the nearby islets of the Pescadores 
chain, which excludes the Mainland Area governed by the People's Republic of China. 
48
 Council for Economic Planning and Development, Executive Yuan, ‘The Plan for Developing Taiwan 
into an Asia-Pacific Regional Operations Centre’ (Council for Economic Planning and Development, 24th 
July 1997). 
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has become the main content of Regional Plans and stipulates the basic spatial 
structure of a region.  
 
On the third level of the Taiwanese planning system are County/City Comprehensive 
Plans, which concern local comprehensive planning conducted by county and city 
governments. The plans are actually consultation plans that act as strategic guidance 
for local government planning operations and have no legal authority. A County/City 
Comprehensive Development is an integrated development plan that covers various 
sectors including industry, transportation, infrastructure, tourism, education, public 
health, finance and local administration. 
 
At the bottom of the Taiwanese planning system are urban plans, including City/Town 
Plans, Countryside Street Plans and Special Area Plans. An urban plan is a statutory 
plan made under the authority of the Urban Planning Act, with zoning being the main 
content of an urban plan that stipulates the measures of land use planning. Therefore, 
an urban plan is the both the most impelling and confining regulation governing 
development control regarding urban areas, which gives a clear picture of the future 
appearance of a specific area and the layout of public facilities.   
 
To sum up this section, there are four levels in the hierarchy of Taiwanese urban 
planning system, with Comprehensive Development Plan of Taiwan Area at the top 
being the national strategic plan and County/City Comprehensive Plans at the third 
level being the guide lines of County/City development. Both national and county/city 
comprehensive plans are non-statutory plans. At the second level and at the bottom 
of the hierarchy are statutory plans: Regional Plans and urban plans, with urban plans 
being the most restraining regulation governing zoning and development control. 
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1.3 The failure of urban planning in Taiwan 
 
This section the introduces some examples of the unsatisfactory results of urban 
planning practices in Taiwan to demonstrate its failure to realise its stated aims. 
 
In terms of urban planning and the theories involved in planning, Taiwan did not fall 
far behind modern trends. As mentioned earlier, 72 city plans had been implemented 
in Taiwan by the end of the Second World War and new towns were initiated right 
after the war. However, the implementation of urban planning failed to provide 
sufficient affordable housing and public transportation, effective development 
controls and building controls. For example: in terms of development control, while 
most inhabitants in English towns have their own gardens, Taiwanese town dwellers 
mostly live in an apartment or a house without a front or back yard and without 
convenient access to green fields or open spaces. 49  According to Taipei City 
Government statistics, 50  there are 784 parks in Taipei, with most being so called 
“neighbourhood parks” that are no bigger than a small children's playground in a park 
in London. If only green fields or parks no bigger than 100 square metres were taken 
into account, Taipei’s green areas would make for just 0.6 per cent of the city. Green 
fields in Taipei are severely rare compared to London’s 20.8 per cent and Warsaw’s 37 
per cent.51 Whilst, in 2005, Taipei had a ratio of 4.95 square metres of green space per 
each single person, Paris measured 12.2 square metres, Seoul 13.0 square metres and 
Vancouver 23.9 square metres per person. In the 1910s, when the Japanese first 
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 According to Housing Statistics 2008 published by Department for Communities and Local 
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flats or maisonettes. In Taiwan, 34.78 per cent of dwellings were flats of apartment buildings. See: 
Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan, ‘Population and Household 
Census 2005’ (2005). 
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51
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added city parks into the Taipei City Plan, their intention was 8 square metres per 
person.52  
 
Other examples also show the unsatisfactory results of urban planning practices in 
Taiwan. The lack of public transportation (especially rail transport) has contributed to 
too much increase in the number of motorbikes. Taiwan has very high rates of 
motorcycle ownership: 388.3 motorbikes per 1000 people in Taipei, 720 per 1000 in 
Kaohsiung and 576.4 per 1000 in the rest of Taiwan.53 In comparison, grid-locked 
Japan has only 105 bikes per 1000 people, while in Europe, Great Britain has the 
lowest rate of ownership with about 20 bikes per 1000 people and Italy has the highest 
with about 159.54 Slow progress in building infrastructure also resulted in the biggest 
crisis in the history of Taiwanese urban planning: the crisis of land reservation for 
public facilities. As the Urban Planning Act of 1964 states, the reservation of land for 
public facilities in a City Plan becomes void 15 years after a City Plan is published, if 
the land acquisition has not been completed. By the end of 1987, most City Plans were 
approaching the 15-year deadline since they had been published in or before 1973. 
There was a large amount of land reservation for public use that would expire on 5th 
September 1988.55 If this had happened, more than half of the infrastructure in urban 
areas would not have been implemented. “It would [have been] the total collapse of 
the urban planning system, the biggest disaster since post-WWII”, according to Chang 
Jing-sen.56 
 
                                                          
52 Ibid. 
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Nor did Urban planning meet the needs of the working class in Taiwan. Summer in 
1989 saw the “Shell-less Snails campaign”, with the name of the campaign symbolising 
people lacking proper housing being like snails and lacking a shell to accommodate 
their bodies. More than 100,000 people joined the sleep-in campaign demanding 
affordable housing. People lay down in the streets of east Taipei, the busiest 
commercial section of the city, at a time when land prices in Taiwan were historically 
the most expensive. Activists argued that no housing policy to accommodate people 
had ever existed, but rather property policies were made to favour the interests of 
landlords and developers.57  In 1990, various international surveys on living conditions 
and life quality in Asian cities concluded that Taipei was one of the most uninhabitable 
cities: it was deemed polluted, over-crowded, seriously congested and ugly.58 The 
following year, even the Premier Hau Pei-tsun of Taiwanese government criticised 
Taipei for being the ugliest city in the world when he looked down from a helicopter, 
emphasising the illegal rooftop annexes/hubs everywhere in the modern city.59 
 
To conclude this section, although in terms of urban planning, Taiwan did not fall 
behind modern trends, the implementation of Taiwanese urban planning did not 
achieve the goal stipulated in Urban Planning Act: a planning and balancing 
development in city, town and rural settlements. The unsatisfactory examples include 
housing, transportation, development control, and building control, etc. To list the 
unsatisfied results is to lay down the background for this thesis’s further discussion: 
why urban planning does not achieve what it is supposed to achieve. 
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1.4 A brief introduction to urban planning law in Hong Kong 
 
This section makes a brief review of the current system of Hong Kong planning and its 
legal authorities by way of introduction to the hierarchy of Hong Kong urban planning 
and its implementation. 
 
In Hong Kong, the Western trend of urban planning was imported directly from the 
West by the British.60 The embryonic form of urban planning first arrived in the 1850s 
and matured during the second half of that century. Although Bristow argues that “the 
earliest development was piecemeal and without a plan”,61 the location arrangements 
and surveys of roads and building sites in the 1850s showed co-ordination with the 
requirements of commercial growth. The influx of Chinese people into Hong Kong in 
the 1850’s reflected the character of the colony: immigration to the frontier provided 
cheap labour. Demands for accommodation were acute and land auctions were held 
by the Land Committee to initiate development. Building controls were introduced 
and sustained by two interrelated mechanisms: Crown Leases of land auctions for 
development that established requirements asking lease holders to meet “the 
satisfaction of the Surveyor of Her said Majesty”; 62  administrative orders were 
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and planning issues of colonial Hong Kong. Also see Patrick Abercrombie, ‘Hong Kong Preliminary 
Planning Report’ (Hong Kong Government Printer 1948); Michael Havinden and David Meredith, 
Colonialism and Development: Britain and Its Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960 (Routledge 1995) 206. 
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announced in the form of Buildings Ordinances, with penalties for contravention of 
the regulations. 
 
Although it was not an industrialised city at the time, rapid urbanisation in the early 
development of Hong Kong was a product of industrialisation in the West.63 Capitalism 
was imported to Hong Kong, and the little fishing village was transformed into a world 
trade hub. Hong Kong was on the periphery of global industrialisation and urban 
planning was needed so that the city could meet the requirements of rapid 
industrialisation. 64  
 
History shows that modern urban planning in Hong Kong started in the early years of 
the 20th century: its first systematic and comprehensive urban plan was announced in 
1922.65 The main purposes of this plan included laying out land reservation for public 
facilities, regulating private buildings and proposing large reclamations on the sea 
front. 66  ‘New Towns’ were mentioned in 1947 in the Abercrombie Report. 67  The 
report was intended to cover long term policies and to plan a city with a population 
as large as two million.68  Concepts similar to New Towns were actually proposed 
before Abercrombie. New settlements in New Territories were discussed in the Report 
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of Housing Commission 1935 submitted by Secretary of Housing Commission, W. H. 
Owen. Owen also showed his commitment to public housing.69 Before Owen, in 1922, 
a garden city scheme for development in Kowloon Tong contemplated a small 
community living in detached or semi-detached houses with small gardens, mirroring 
those of an English residential community.70  
 
The western trends of planning on the island has resulted in the current Hong Kong 
planning system. In Hong Kong, the key legal elements regarding development control 
include Town Planning Ordinance, Building Ordinance and lease conditions. Town 
Planning Ordinance is the legal source of the statutory Outline Zoning Plan and the 
Development Permission Area Plan that impose restrictions on plot ratio, site 
coverage and building heights. Building Ordinance gives legal authority to Building 
(Planning) Regulations, controlling plot ratio, site coverage, gross floor area, open 
space and bonus plot ratio for planning gain. The Regulations also control building 
standards, including natural lighting and ventilation, lane/street width and prescribed 
window provision. 
 
Lease conditions are the foundation of Hong Kong's contractual planning. The Hong 
Kong government owns all the land in Hong Kong and releases land by way of long 
leases, known as Government Leases. The contract between the lessee and the 
Government is known as the Conditions of Sale. According to these conditions, lessees 
are required to comply with the Master Layout Plan, restrictions, maximum/minimum 
gross floor area, development period, design disposition, height restrictions and all 
other ordinances. Only when all the positive obligations of the Conditions are 
complied with will a Certificate of Compliance be issued to the lessee. 
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With regards to the hierarchy of current urban planning in Hong Kong, at the territorial 
level, there are the Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines and Territorial 
Development Strategy, both of which are non-statutory plans. On the sub-regional, 
below the territorial, level, is the Structure Plan, which is also non-statutory. Statutory 
plans exist at the district level and include: the Outline Zoning Plan and Development 
Permission Area Plan. Regulations of Use Classes are stipulated along with the 
statutory Outline Zoning Plans. Town Planning Ordinance makes a provision for a 
Schedule of Notes to be attached to each statutory plan. The main mechanism of 
development control in Hong Kong is zoning, introduced under Town Planning 
Ordinance, with Use Classes working alongside planning permission.  
  
Similar to Outline Zoning Plans, Development Permission Area Plans are enacted for 
developing areas in New Territories. Development Permission Area Plans also 
introduced zoning control and planning permission to areas not covered by an Outline 
Zoning Plan. At the lowest level of the planning system are the Outline Development 
Plan and Layout Plan, both of which are non-statutory plans. The function of an 
Outline Development Plan is to supplement a statutory Outline Zoning Plan and to 
show its land-use in greater detail. Being a departmental plan, an Outline 
Development Plan is prepared as a guide for land sales and for the reservation and 
allocation of land for public facilities. As with these plans, Layout Plans are 
departmental plans. They indicate detailed land use and the development proposal 
for an area covered by an Outline Zoning Plan and/or an Outline Development Plan. 
However, for particular reasons, separate plans need to be independently prepared. 
The particular reasons usually relate to the significance of localities, such as areas 
concerning urban regeneration and newly formed land. 71 
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 Chan Lik-tin and Lo Wai-ming, An Introduction on Hong Kong City Planning (Joint Publishing 1998) 
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By way of concluding this section, the table below shows the hierarchy of urban 
planning system in Hong Kong, as well as explaining the legal status of various plans 
and their relations. 
 
 
 
 
1.5 The failure of urban planning in Hong Kong 
 
This section introduces some examples of urban planning’s failure in Hong Kong. 
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As in Taiwan, modern urban planning started early in Hong Kong, falling not far short 
of modern Western practices. This said, whilst to some extent regulations concerning 
development control have been practically workable and legally effective, they have 
not been able to prevent over-urbanisation. De-centralisation of urban development 
can be noted in the 1922 Town Planning Scheme, even though the concept was never 
implemented successfully, and Hong Kong has become one of the highest density 
cities in the world. Most Hong Kong habitants live in the more than 7,500 high-rise 
buildings in Hong Kong. According to the Fact Sheet published by the Hong Kong S.A.R. 
Government in 2003, no city has more buildings over 150 metres high than Hong Kong 
(201 buildings over 150 metres).72 Though statistics show that the overall population 
density of Hong Kong is about 6,300 persons per square kilometre—73 which is not 
much higher than London’s 5,100— on Hong Kong Island the figure is more than 
40,000. Its densest district, Kwun Tong, has 55,000 per square kilometre, more than 
Kensington and Chelsea, London’s densest borough, which has almost three times 
fewer, at 15,177. New Towns (Sha Tin and Tseung Kwan O) in New Territories have a 
population density of around 35,000. Figures concerning land use analyses show that 
only about 21 per cent of land in Hong Kong has been developed. Among the rest, 
excluding uninhabitable areas or ecological reservations, more than 30 per cent of the 
land in Hong Kong is undeveloped land.74 
 
Hong Kong is a typical case of over-urbanisation, with a large percentage of the 
population living in over-crowded conditions. The over-urbanisation is certainly far 
away from the idea of garden cities in the early twentieth century. In this case, out-
of-control urbanisation is not due to a lack of land, it is a symptom of the failure of 
urban planning. 
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The existence of “Cage People” is another such symptom. Government statistics from 
2006 show that some 150,000 Hong Kong people lived in “inadequate housing”, 
including caged bedsits, cubicles, rooftop huts and hallways, despite the fact that 
Hong Kong has one of the largest public housing programmes in the capitalist world.75 
Charity organisation investigations say that there are approximately 4,000 “Cage 
People” who sleep in cages measuring 1.8 metres by 0.9 metres, usually stacked three 
high.76 According to a Hong Kong government spokesperson, despite of their financial 
difficulties, one of the reasons people choose to live in bed-space apartments and 
cubicles is because they are mostly conveniently located, in urban areas.77 A local 
press reported of a “21st century tragedy to real estate and progress in which 
thousands of elderly citizens with incomes are forced to live in “cage” or “cubicle” 
homes.”78 “Cage People” represent another failure of Hong Kong housing. 
 
To conclude this section, being a major global trade hub and financial centre, Hong 
Kong is home to some of the most densely-populated urban districts. This feature is 
also results from the long history of Western colonial planning: over-urbanisation, 
failure of development control and the existence of “Cage People” point us toward 
some of this system’s failures. 
 
 
1.6 The main conceptual approach: McAuslan’s ideologies of planning law 
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In the introduction to this chapter, some theoretical concepts are introduced to 
explain how this thesis will review the development of planning and planning laws in 
Taiwan. We discuss “sanitation syndrome” in relation to the initiation of urban 
regularisation; colonial urbanisation will be explored to expose the way the colonial 
periphery was incorporated into the metropolitan core and helped build colonial cities 
that controlled surplus extraction. While characteristics of developmentalist states of 
Taiwan and Hong Kong are examined to reveal the roles of planning authorities at 
central and local levels, power blocs consisting of states and the socio-political forces 
which drive spatial development will also be reviewed. This thesis will discuss racial 
factors and urban informal sectors as well. With the discussion of racial factors, this 
thesis argues that in the cases of both Hong Kong and Taiwan, building regulations and 
planning implementation were adjusted according to the standards deemed 
appropriate to the segregated population. Spatial segregation ensured that social 
order be created without disturbing the overall power structure of colonisation. This 
thesis also discusses urban informal sectors and argues that informal sectors are 
actually a collective reaction to the real estate market in which the ownership of land 
deprives people of housing. While the concepts detailed above are discussed in 
various chapters of this thesis, this section introduces McAuslan’s three ideologies 
planning law which will continue to be relevant as the main conceptual approach of 
this thesis. 
 
In the case of both Taiwan and Hong Kong, urban planning has failed to deliver its 
promises. In both cases the urban problems that industrialisation would bring were 
already evident when city plans were first drafted, but the solutions these plans 
proposed have not solved the problems arising since then. In reviewing the histories 
of urban planning in Taiwan and Hong Kong, this thesis aims to study the roles and 
characters of the two states and their respective apparatuses, as they functioned as 
decision making bodies in both areas, with particular attention to planning laws and 
city plans. As a set of institutions through which state power is exercised, state 
apparatuses are important because they offer the potential for strategic intervention 
by various economic interests, both domestic and international. By examining state 
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reactions to social changes and economic forces, this thesis investigates how states 
make decisions on planning matters (planning laws and city plans) and what factors 
have shaped the urban planning we see today. Reviewing laws on urban planning 
matters is a central part of understanding a state’s intentions and operations. Of 
course, laws are not merely the legislative outcome of government intentions but also 
the compromised results of many differing interests and inclinations; conflict between 
these different interests do not cease when legislation is passed. Regarding planning 
laws, key actors - including government level, private sector interests and foreign 
political and economic forces - shape the form of planning legislation and also 
influence planning practices. By examining the socio-political context of planning law 
legislation in Taiwan and Hong Kong, we will be able to understand why a particular 
society embraces a specific system or ideology. Serious consideration of urban 
planning law in action and close observation of the process of implementation of 
urban plans will reveal how social groups react or resist state plans. 
 
Law itself is also a major contributing factor to the disarray in planning. McAuslan 
outlines this in his three major planning ideologies, where he traces the emergence of 
planning law out of nuisance law. His analysis shows that the first prevailing ideology 
(against nuisances) of the maintenance and buttressing of private property has been 
the major supporting column in the superstructure of planning law.79  McAuslan’s 
second powerful ideology is that of public interest, an idea which emerged as part of 
the institutionalisation of public planning and tends to confer powers on 
administrators who are judged to be capable of determining the public interest.  The 
third ideology is that of public participation which, despite having long-standing 
philosophical roots, is a relative newcomer to planning ideologies. It denies that the 
public servant has full knowledge, demanding direct public involvement and openness 
to social change.80  McAuslan understood planning law to be: 
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“…far from being the golden metalwork of planning with all other aspects in a 
state of disarray… The law lacks objectivity and neutrality because it is based 
upon and is available to implement three distinct and competing philosophies 
or ideologies which dominate or conflict at different points of the system.... 
Firstly, that the law exists and should be used to protect private property and 
its constitution; this may be called the traditional common law approach to the 
role of law. Secondly, the law exists and should be used to advance the public 
interest, if necessary against the interests of private property; this may be called 
the orthodox public administration and planning approach to the role of law. 
Thirdly, the law exists to and should be used to advance the cause of public 
participation against both the orthodox public administration approach to the 
public interest and the common law approach to the overriding importance of 
private property; this maybe called the radical or populist approach to the role 
of law.”81 
McAuslan warned that British planning laws, for example, were not a set of statutes 
and judgments with technical modifications that could be transferred for use in other 
countries with common laws. Arguing that the law is a partisan in the struggle for 
power and control over resources, and not a neutral referee policing the struggle, 
McAuslan took on the entire planning law establishment.82 The three ideologies of 
planning law he identified concern the conflicts that historically arose during the 
process of modern urban planning and its implementation. They are also relevant to 
urban planning’s interaction with different socio-economic interests and influences. 
These three ideologies are often in conflict, which has formed the basis of dissonances 
within the planning system and public disenchantment with it. In the context of the 
United Kingdom, the ideologies do not exist independently of each other, but rather 
they: “do not always come through so clearly nor must it be assumed that the courts 
always expose the ideology of private property or the planners and administrators the 
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ideology of public interest.”83 He regarded private property as providing the outer 
limits of any public involvement, ensuring that that co-existence between public 
interest and private property will always on private property’s terms. 84   While 
discussing the conflicts involving the third ideology, McAuslan believed that the 
difference between private property and public interest ideologies is likely to be more 
apparent than it is real, particularly when either is faced with public participation, a 
threat to them both.85 McAuslan argued that usually public participation ideology that 
has the losing hand, while the other two vie for first place.86  He concludes that 
planning law has often been used to de-radicalise and ensure that its implementation 
occupies the same middle ground as the rest of the law and practice, in land use 
planning.87 Nevertheless, as his third ideology indicates, planning law can also be a 
platform for the advancement of public participation in the land use planning process, 
not by virtue of the ownership of property but thanks to the “more abstract principles 
of democracy and justice”88. From McAuslan’s review on the ideologies of planning 
law, one can see that at any given point in time laws are being shaped and reshaped 
by the needs of society. Planning law is the product of social processes which develop 
within the context of overall societal development. Planning law is shaped by dynamic 
                                                          
83
 Patrick McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press 1980) 6; K. Wekwete, Planning 
Laws for Urban and Regional Planning in Zimbabwe- A Review (University of Zimbabwe 1989) 1. 
84
 McAuslan did not spare judicial pronouncements from his poignant criticism. He argued that that 
the courts have a clear and usually consistent bias: if confronted with a conflict between the ideology 
of private property and that of the public interest, they usually support the property owner. However, 
if confronted with a non-landowning citizen, they will usually support the authorities in the name of 
the public interest. Among McAuslan’s many examples are judicial decisions involving the successful 
challenges of public health regulations by private property owners, as contrasted with the largely 
unsuccessful demands to enforce such regulations by community or tenant groups. See: Patrick 
McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press 1980) 145; Karla Sperling, ‘Going Down the 
Takings Path: Private Property Rights and Public Interest in Land Use Decision Making’ (1997) 14 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 429. 
85
 Karla Sperling, ‘Going Down the Takings Path: Private Property Rights and Public Interest in Land Use 
Decision Making’ (1997) 14 Environmental and Planning Law Journal 429. 
86
 Patrick McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press 1980); Rachelle Alterman, ‘British 
Planning: A Troubled Look in the Mirror’ (1982) 48 (2) Journal of American Planning Association 501. 
87
 Rachelle Alterman, ‘British Planning: A Troubled Look in the Mirror’ (1982) 48 (2) Journal of American 
Planning Association 501. 
88
 R. Alastair, ‘Legal Foundations for Public Participation in Environmental Decision Making’ (1976) 73 
Natural Resources Journal; Patrick McAuslan, The Ideologies of Planning Law (Pergamon Press 1980) 9. 
 43 
phenomena such as political conflict and class struggle. Planning law, (the same in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong) being a platform of political and social advancement, acts as 
a legal and political mechanism that carries or mediates the conflicts between social 
groups. 
 
Even in a non-common law country like Taiwan, the competing ideologies can be seen 
in the law; in planning law but also in other fields concerning land policy and 
development. The Constitutional Law states that “the right of property shall be 
guaranteed to the people” (Article 15), while freedom of contract is the core concept 
of Taiwanese Civil Code, guaranteeing that people have the right to dispose of 
property as they wish. On the other hand, the Constitution limits rights and freedom 
with a view to “attain[ing] a well-balanced sufficiency in national wealth and people's 
livelihood” (Article, 142). Article 142 of the Constitutional Law declares, “The national 
economy shall be based on the principle of people's livelihood and shall seek to effect 
equalisation of land ownership.” Article 143 also mentions the issue of the limits of 
ownership, stating that, 
“Mineral deposits which are embedded in the land, and natural power which 
may, for economic purposes, be utilised for public benefit shall belong to the 
State, regardless of the fact that private individuals may have acquired 
ownership over such land.”  
The Constitution’s intention to restrain private property ownership is therefore 
obvious. 
 
The Constitution’s intention to put restrictions on land ownership does not stop there. 
Article 143 of the Constitution states,  
“All land within the territory of the Republic of China shall belong to the whole 
body of citizens. Private ownership of land, acquired by the people in 
accordance with law, shall be protected and restricted by law. Privately-owned 
land shall be liable to taxation according to its value, and the Government may 
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buy such land according to its value. […] If the value of a piece of land has 
increased, not through the exertion of labour or the employment of capital, the 
State shall levy thereon an increment tax, the proceeds of which shall be 
enjoyed by the people in common. […] In the distribution and readjustment of 
land, the State shall in principle assist self-farming land-owners and persons 
who make use of the land by themselves, and shall also regulate their 
appropriate areas of operation.” 
Article 143 of Taiwanese Constitutional Law, then, looks like the land policy of a 
socialist state, contradicting the fact that the state of the Republic of China has been 
a capitalist state most of the time since its birth, whether as Mainland China before 
1949 or as Taiwan in the present day. Were we to think in terms of the competing 
ideologies of planning law in Taiwan, we would see that public interest is supported 
by administrators and planners but also by the Constitution.89 
 
In Hong Kong conflicts of McAuslan's three ideologies have a different outlook. The 
leasehold system in Hong Kong as a means of planning by contract is an instrument of 
the governmental allocation of private rights. Where such allocation is by means of 
auction, tender or negotiation, the means of allocation is contractual.90 Contractual 
planning is based in private property rights: the government acts as land owner and 
leaser, allocating land as a private commodity through the market mechanism. 
Contracts of Crown lease are civil contracts which have never been subject to judicial 
review, since such a review would be impossible due to the private nature of such 
leases.91  
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McAuslan's ideology of private property is reflected in this leasehold system of land 
auction, as is his second ideology, that of public interest. As Lawrence Lai argues, 
“Crown leases are bona fide, de facto and de jure town plans drafted by the 
government which control land use and built form in a town.”92 The leasehold system 
authorises the government executive powers to restrict land use to enhance the 
general welfare, as well as granting economic interests to the property developers. 
Hong Kong’s period of statutory planning (since the first statutory town development 
plan came to existence very late in 1955) is relatively brief, compared with its one and 
a half century long modern urban history. This longer history of contractual planning 
has been played a crucial role in the development control of Hong Kong. 93  In 
government leases, the conditions attached are both enabling and restrictive, and 
public interest is considered to have written the lease.94  The government, being 
simultaneously the leaser and the regulator of urban development, acts as both civil 
body and as public apparatus. These are definitely conflicting roles. While land 
auctions have been a stable financial source of governmental income, the 
consideration of maximising profit often overrides the possibility of attaching a 
condition of low density development to the contract. 95  Prices of auction are 
sustained by the expectation that the land can be developed to its fullest potential 
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given the state of the market.96 Meanwhile the lack of public participation meant that 
grass-roots organising against the auction and development is easily ignored.97 The 
conflicts of McAuslan's ideologies in the leasehold system, and the complexities 
resulting from government being a developer and regulator can be seen here. 
 
By reviewing McAuslan’s argument of the ideologies and their conflicts in planning 
and planning law this thesis wishes to understand how planning law and plans were 
made, shaped and written, as well as their implementation in the respective societies 
of Taiwan and Hong Kong. This study assumes then, that plans and planning laws are 
products of social dynamics. Different agents intervene in the law and plans in their 
own way in accordance with their own interests. This dynamic process will be revealed 
and analysed in this thesis, by the examination of the specific agents and forces 
involved. Therefore, there are some key questions that this thesis will engage with 
while reviewing legislation of planning laws and the practice of urban planning:  
● While the ideology of public interest is raised high to compete against the private 
property interest, who are the public and who represents the public?  
● While there are conflicts between the ideologies, who are the referees mediating 
the conflicts and making critical decisions?  
 
To conclude this section, planning law, acting as the vehicle of social conflict and 
resolution in the planning process, represents the state’s and social agents’ 
expectations and interpretations of socio-spatial development. By critically reviewing 
the legislation and practice of planning laws and by examining the conflicts of planning 
ideologies underpinning the relevant legislation and policies, this thesis will assess the 
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role of state apparatuses in planning and the socio-economic forces that exercise 
influence on states, with particular regard to Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
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Chapter 2: The Importation of Urban Regularisation in Taiwan  
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the earliest stage of town planning in Taiwan. The urban 
regularisation of Taiwan, the embryo of modern planning, was imported by colonial 
Japan. Therefore the importance of building and development control in colonial cities 
and its relations with the emergence of imperial powers will be discussed in the 
chapter. Borrowing Swanson’s concept of “sanitation syndrome”, I argue that building 
and planning regulations were established to supply infrastructure in order to attract 
colonial settlers rather than for the welfare of locals.98 City walls and houses in town 
centres were demolished to give way to the development of new Japanese districts 
and separate the Japanese settlers from Taiwanese. Urban regularisation resulted in 
the replacement of Chinese old towns by new city landscapes, accompanied by a 
centralised system of development control in the name of public interest, which met 
very little local resistance. During the process of implementation of urban 
regularisation, the public interest ideology overpowered the private property interest; 
however, urban regulations were stipulated on the needs of the colonists and 
therefore the definition of “public” included the Japanese, to the exclusion of 
Taiwanese locals. In the conclusion of this chapter, I would like to point out that the 
colonists used law to establish a racial hierarchy in the administrative system, presided 
over by the Japanese at the top and as part of which the Taiwanese were deprived of 
their legal rights. Urban regulations associated with racial bias were set up to 
eliminate the obstruction and resistance to urban regularisation. With the application 
of urban regularisation, colonial urbanisation took shape as did a spatial structure of 
racism. Law legitimated colonial governance and urban regularisation helped create 
the colonial urban system as the foundation for colonisation. In terms of ideologies of 
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planning law, the public interest ideology, paradoxically, was adopted to protect the 
private interest of colonists. 
 
 
2.1 Colonialism and urban regularisation in Taiwan 
 
This section reviews how the Japanese colonists exercised their power in the early 
stages of colonialism. Colonial law was established by the regime and was 
instrumental in legalising the occupation and in denying local Taiwanese from 
participating in rule-making. A racialised hierarchy was established within the Imperial 
legal system for the purposes of defining a distinct population so that the colonists 
could maintain authoritative. Along with the introduction of colonial law, town 
planning was also imported to Taiwan to regulate the environment. Urban 
regularisation was born and implemented through law which brought the Colonist’s 
order to the unruly land. 
 
Initially, it was opium traders who proposed the acquisition of Hong Kong.99 Hong 
Kong Island was first occupied by the British during the First Opium War in 1841 and 
then formally ceded by the Chinese Ching Dynasty in 1842 under the Treaty of Nanking. 
Regarding Taiwan, it was the Japanese Navy that lobbied for the occupation of 
Taiwan.100 Following defeat in the Sino-Japanese Jia Wu war, in 1895 (the year of Jia 
Wu) by signing the Treaty of Shimonoseki (Ma Guan), Ching China ceded Taiwan and 
the Pescadores to Japan in perpetuity. The colonisation of Hong Kong and Taiwan was 
a typical product of imperial powers competing in the Chinese arena. By conquering 
China, world trade incorporated certain ports and areas as elements of a division of 
labour in a world-wide economy. Colonial cities were the major links between core 
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and peripheral economies. They were sites for encounters between the 
representatives of capitalists and pre-modern social formations. Colonialism exercised 
its authority through the execution of the law; the rule of law was at the heart of 
colonial power. Law was instrumental in defining races and in deciding who would be 
the qualified subjects of the colonial empire.101 Locals in the colony, seen as savages, 
were denied a participative legal personality. Only the colonist was to provide civil and 
civilized order.102 ”There were no rights for the savages in this scheme, apart from 
‘rights’ to have things done to them so as to bring them within the ambit of 
civilisation.”103 Since a racialised hierarchy was established, it was assumed that the 
colonists could know and speak for the natives better than they could themselves and 
thence decided to act with an appropriate force. This racism was reflected in the socio-
political accommodation which colonist governments imposed upon the original 
inhabitants and became part of the nature of governance in colonies.104 In Taiwan, the 
aboriginals were categorised as either wild savages, cooked savages: wild and cooked 
savages were “people outside the civilisation, animals wandering on the territory”, 
according to Yasui Katsuji, then a Japanese judge. 105 Obviously most aboriginal people 
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did not even qualify as subjects of Empire. Nevertheless, according to the Japanese 
Imperial Parliament's interpretation of the Imperial Constitution, other natives in 
Taiwan, mostly Chinese Han people (the largest ethnic group), were merely objects of 
the Imperial rule and not citizens of Japanese Empire with political rights.106 The law 
created distinctive populations in colonies so that the colonist, inevitably 
outnumbered, could maintain authority and induce acute fear. 107 In that setting, law 
was integral to the colonial regime's mission of hegemony. The law sought to affect a 
direct and primary relation between the government and the individual native by 
dominating intermediate factors. Take native custom and traditional rules as 
examples: they were recognised solely in subordination to the law of the colonist. The 
pervasion of colonist rule accords with the prime place set for law in the imperial 
project. Given the separation and containment of the natives and the denial of their 
participating in rule making, the colonist imported law from the outside which he 
claimed was a civilised law of universal value. 108 Imperial law was an instrument of 
creating civilisation by the colonist's standard and since the violence of imperialism 
was legitimated in its being exercised through law, law brought the colonist's “order” 
to the native's “chaos”. Law was brought in to legalise the occupation and to develop 
the unruly land into a tamed built environment where the colonists could settle down 
and industrialisation, acquisition and exploitation could be enforced by the colonists 
and their law. 109 
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The concept behind the possession of Taiwan was different from that of the 
possession of Hong Kong. The occupation of Hong Kong Island was of great value to 
Britain for securing and expanding valuable Chinese trade, which was also an integral 
part of Indian trade.110 While the colonial focus in Hong Kong was commercial, the 
focus in Taiwan was rural. Initially, the main function of occupying Taiwan was the 
production of agricultural and mineral products and raw materials.111 Despite the 
differences between their colonial functions, the manifestations of colonialism were 
equally urban. As King’s studies on European imperial powers indicate, the political, 
administrative and economic role of its cities and towns shaped colonial urbanisation. 
Colonial cities controlled surplus extraction and subsequently their increasingly 
significant roles as markets, centres for consumption and “theatres of accumulation”. 
112 Colonial urbanisation became the instrument by which the colonial periphery was 
incorporated into the metropolitan core. For each of the main colonial powers, a 
colonial urban system was established, from the metropolitan capital and port cities, 
through to a network of colonial port cities, colonial capitals, regional and district 
centres, and down to the outlying stations of the colonial bureaucracy and system of 
military control. All were linked by transport, communications, and subsequently, 
electronic and other media. 113  The colonial urban system was the operations-
headquarters that dominated the politics and economies of the colonies. It located 
state organisations, police and military, bank, commerce, trade brokers and 
transportation etc. It was the vein through which the imperial powers flowed out to 
control to every corner. The colonial urban system represented the colonial power; 
and colonial cities and their institutions were emphatically instruments of colonisation. 
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The importation, legislation and implementation of urban planning law and urban 
plans in colonies shaped the colonial urban system and inscribed the disparities 
between colonists and colonised in the form of the built environment.114 
 
Goto Shinpei, Chief Officer of Civil Affairs of Taiwan during the early years of Japanese 
colonisation (1898-1906), understood the importance of colonial cities. In that era, his 
department was in charge of all interior affairs related to the colony, including military 
actions. As Chief Officer, Goto acted as the chief executive officer of government who 
possessed legislative, executive and judiciary powers. In fact, since the Governor, 
General Kodama, who also retained ministry positions in the Japanese cabinet, had 
been absent from his Taiwanese administration most of his tenure, Goto was the 
person who actually ruled Taiwan.115 Goto emphasised the importance of building 
“Taiwan as a place suitable for the Japanese to have the intention to stay forever”.116 
In order to do so, it was essential for the colonial government to police the native 
people and environmental conditions. He relieved the military police from their social 
security duty but gave the police more administrative powers for the reason that 
police were more capable of penetrating local society. In five years, 32,000 people 
were executed by the police under Bandits Criminal Ordinance. That was more than 1 
per cent of the then whole Taiwanese population.117 The police state was introduced, 
as was the policy of “policing the environment”.118  
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Under Goto’s governance, modern town planning was introduced to Taiwan. Japanese 
engineers and their western experts’ previous involvements in the transformation of 
ancient Edo into the most modern city of Tokyo were selectively adopted as a 
reference to their emergence as a colonial power. One of the first things Goto Shinpei 
did was to make plans to raze the Taipei city wall as the initial step in the 
modernisation of “Taihoku” (i.e. a modern Japanese Taipei).119 Taipei was expected to 
be the blueprint for the wide ranging economic and social transformation plans for 
Taiwan Island. Emphasis on the importance of urban infrastructure and regulating 
environmental surroundings were repeated in his policy statements and personal 
letters.120 Even in the latter years of life, Goto still often mentioned his ideas about 
colonialism, “The priority (in the colonies) is to set up schools, then build (Japanese 
Shinto) temples, then facilitate hospitals. That would attract immigration and make 
(Japanese) people have the intention to stay forever.”121 Goto’s priority was obvious: 
a regulated environment was needed for the colonists to settle down permanently. 
Goto’s modernisation of Taiwan was a profitable investment. Author and editor of his 
biography, and also his son-in-law, Tsurumi calculated the cost/profit ratio of the 
colonisation of Taiwan: in the first seven years of the occupation, the (Japanese) 
central government subsidised Taiwan with ¥27.3 million and the total volume of 
trade of the Taiwanese contribution to the Japanese economy was ¥15.2 million, 
making the cost/profit ratio 55 per cent. “Assuming it is an investment to a commercial 
company, 55 per cent of net profit in seven years was quite an achievement”, Tsurumi 
said.122 According to Hsu Chieh-lin, since Tsurumi’s calculation did not include the 
profit of about ¥3 million a year created by the Japanese monopoly on the opium trade, 
the actual ratio which would have been more than 100 per cent. 123 Hsu’s version is 
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consistent with the fact that since 1905 Taiwan had been financially independent on 
Japanese subsidies.124 
 
To sum up this section, colonial urbanisation was implemented in Taiwan by the 
Japanese in order to amass agricultural and mineral products and raw materials, 
therefore a colonial economic system was able to be set up for the expansion of the 
Empire’s accumulation of capital. The Japanese-imported modern town planning 
emphasised the importance of regulating environmental surroundings. Urban 
regularisation was adopted with a view to policing the environmental conditions, the 
police state was also introduced to control the native people, the purpose of both 
these measures being to make Taiwan a place suitable for the Japanese. During this 
process of policing Taiwan, law served to bring the colonist’s “order” to the native 
“chaos” and the violence of occupation was legitimated. Urban regularisation, 
enforced by the colonists and their law, developed the unruly land into a tamed 
environment. 
 
 
2.2 The sanitation syndrome and urban regularisation 
 
After reviewing the relation between colonisation and urban regularisation in Taiwan, 
this section reviews the implementation of urban regularisation and its correlation 
with public health concerns in detail.  The Japanese government made sanitation a 
priority, and urban regularisation started with improvements to the sewerage system. 
Before City Plans were introduced in the 1930s, building codes and other legal 
enactment of urban regularisation were all sanitation related. Nevertheless, 
accompanying this campaign of urban regularisation, an island wide construction 
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scheme was implemented to demolish Chinese style old houses, religious and 
community centres in town centres and city walls, and cities were expanded to 
allocate Japanese residential and organisational buildings. To accommodate the 
colonist’s needs, urbanisation was in progress on a nationwide scale. 
 
In the initial stages of urban planning history in Hong Kong and Taiwan, public health 
related urban regulations were the foremost task of the British and Japanese colonist 
states. Fears of endemic diseases forced the colonists to regulate surrounding 
conditions. The promulgation of sanitary regulations ensured that modern 
administrative centres, military quarters and commercial and residential areas for 
colonists were well established to accommodate the functions of the military and 
bureaucratic apparatus. As Goto’s “intention to stay forever” suggests, the 
establishment of towns and regulations for the surrounding conditions were to supply 
the infrastructure to attract colonial settlers and not for the welfare of locals. As 
Swanson pointed out in his study on colonial Africa, sanitation syndrome was 
considered of first importance for the health of colonists themselves. Japanese 
sanitation syndrome was initially required because of the huge number of Japanese 
soldiers who died of malaria.125 Epidemics happened whenever the Japanese troops 
invaded Taiwan. During the Botan Tribe Incident of 1874, the Japanese military doctor, 
Ochiai Taizo’s record showed that whereas only eight Japanese soldiers (of a total of 
3,600) died in the battle, 547 died of diseases. 126  General Saigo Tsugumichi and his 
troops had to retreat back to Japan. It was the first Japanese military invasion of a 
foreign country since the Meiji Restoration; the administration was shocked by the 
fact that modernised troops were defeated not by local tribes, but an endemic 
disease. 127  After the Sino-Japanese Jia Wu War, during the Japanese invasion of 
Taiwan in 1895, only 146 Japanese soldiers died in the battles whilst 4,642 died of 
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malaria the same year. 26,094 soldiers were infected, with 21,748 of them needing to 
be sent back to Japan for treatment.128 These historical events were considered by 
some Taiwanese scholars with expertise in Taiwanese history as proof that the 
Taiwanese were naturally unhygienic when compared to the modernised Japanese 
troops and colonists. Taiwanese people’s Chinese cultural inheritance was blamed for 
the insanitary living conditions and for exporting the diseases.129 On the contrary, 
plagues also actually occurred in Japan at that time, such as cholera outbreaks lasting 
more than twenty years. Learning from the struggle of the Japanese 1877-1895 
Cholera outbreaks, in 1896 the Japanese Prime Minister, the Secretary of State of 
Navy and the Taiwanese Governor arrived in Taiwan to investigate sanitary 
conditions.130 Instead of sending religious missionaries like western countries, the 
Japanese government made sanitation its priority. This was called the “taking care of 
sanitation first”.131 Horiuchi, had served as a military doctor when the 1895 invasion 
occurred and then later took the position of Chancellor of Taipei Medical School, 
witnessed that “no doubt the authorities’ priority on governance is sanitary.  Without 
improving [this], the government cannot proceed the governance.”132 Writing in his 
memoirs, of his arrival in Taipei in 1895, he stated that: 
“heat disease, cholera and beriberi could be seen everywhere but we did not 
know how to start the investigation. What was heat disease? No one 
understood it. How many kinds of epidemic diseases were there in Taiwan? 
There was no such survey. There were no western modern hospitals and 
schools. We felt like just entering into darkness.”133  
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“Heat disease” was later identified as Malaria. 134  However, the panic over this 
mysterious “heat disease” reflected colonists’ anxiety about facing an unknown world. 
If the colonists wished to stay, native people and the environmental surrounding 
needed to be regularised. City regularisation was introduced, which later formed the 
template for Taiwanese urban planning. 
 
Urban regularisation started with improvements to the sewerage system in cities. In 
1896, the administration initiated plans to build new sewer systems in Taipei and 
Taichung. A Scottish engineer, William Kinninmond Burton, was invited in 1877 by the 
Meiji Government of Japan to become the first Professor of Sanitary Engineering and 
lecturer in Rivers, Docks and Harbours at the Imperial University of Tokyo and working 
in the Japanese Home Office (Department of Civil Affairs). He arrived in Taiwan in 1896 
to start his survey and was appointed Sanitary Consultant to the Governor in 1897. 
Burton was expected to act like Sir Joseph Bazalgette, the Chief Engineer of the 
Metropolitan Board of Works and workaholic builder of 83 miles of interceptor sewers, 
had in London. Burton worked in Taiwan for only 3 years before dying, in 1899 aged 
43, of constant overwork and liver infection.135 With his students, such as Hamano 
Yoshiro, who was then an Engineer in the Taiwanese Civil Affair Department, he set 
up a foundation for modern sanitary engineering and city planning. Burton is 
remembered as “the father of Taiwanese tap water.” In 1897, Burton and Hamano 
submitted the ‘Proposal of Sanitary Engineering Designs in Taipei and Other Areas’. 
From this proposal, and with the approval of the Governor, water supply engineering 
in northern Taiwan was implemented. According to Burton and Hamano’s suggestion, 
construction was carried out along with road engineering, such as work broadening 
streets and building new roads. In 1898, the Taiwan Central Sanitation Committee was 
set up, with Hamano appointed as a member. 1899, Taiwan Sewage Regulations were 
recommended by the committee and approved by the Governor. According to the 
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Regulations, sewage systems were categorised as both private and public systems. 
The central and local health/sanitation authorities would be in charge of building and 
maintaining public systems and establishing the standards for all systems. Any 
development or improving of private sewers would need the local authority approval. 
This was the earliest building permission order applied to all inhabitants of Taiwan. 
 
In the same year, a building control regulation applied to town dwellers was 
introduced. The Governor’s Order Number 30, Notice on Building and Land in the 
Planned Areas of Public Facilities announced that “for the purpose of (constructing) 
parks, roads and sewage systems and the planned public facilities and official buildings, 
any activities of building and improving dwellings must seek the local authorities’ 
approval and permission.” This was actually an order of a building ban implemented 
in advance of the enforcement of an urban plan, imposed 2 months before the 
publication of the first Taiwanese urban plan in history, the Taichung Inner City 
Regulation Plan.136 The original legislation of the building ban on land reserved for 
public infrastructure became the legal foundation for eliminating the obstructions 
associated with compulsory acquisitions.137  
 
However, Order Number 30 did not cover building codes. In 1900, the Governor’s 
Office passed the Taiwan Dwelling Building Regulations and its sub-regulations. A 
more comprehensive system of building control was enacted to regulate all buildings, 
including new constructions and existing houses, to ensure safety (fireproof and 
structure) and sanitation (ventilation, lighting and hygiene). The regulations gave local 
officials extra powers to demolish dangerous buildings and evict occupiers. For 
example, when a plague attacked Taipei in 1907, and 963 cases of infection were 
recorded, 125 houses were categorised as unhygienic buildings and demolished 
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according to the legislation.138  The regulations also standardised arcaded “Qilou” 
(pedestrian side roads) and made them a legal requirement.139 Qilou was a traditional 
element of Chinese architecture and a popular building form in tropical and 
semitropical Chinese towns. The Japanese were therefore not experts of Qilou since 
there was no need to have sidewalks such as this in Japan, but the northern colonists 
in semitropical Taiwan did have need of them for walking and shopping in the shade. 
The shaded corridors kept pedestrians from the sun and rain. Qilou had to be made a 
standard element of urban regularisation so that the semitropical climate could be 
conquered.  
 
Taichung Inner City Regulation Plan was the first integrated urban regulation plan to 
target a specific area.  This began with the Governor Office’s plan to build a new 
sewerage system, with Burton and Hamano the men in charge of the design. In April 
1899, the Report of Taichung City Street Area Design was submitted and the following 
year, the Taichung Inner City Regulation Plan became very first Taiwanese 
development control plan. In the plan, street blocks were laid out to straighten the 
irregular lanes and aisles. Roads were widened. Winding water streams in the inner 
city area would be straightened as well. Later in the same year, the Taipei Inner City 
Regulation Plan was announced. The main content of these plans included plans for 
infrastructure, such as roads, water supply, bridges, railroads, parks, markets, 
slaughter houses, crematoriums and cemeteries. Sanitation syndrome dominated the 
city regularisation plans. As part of Burton’s design for Taichung, sewage ditches were 
laid on both sides of the street, and these effluents flowed by force of gravity to 
underground pipes. So as to use sunlight to kill bacteria, streets did not run in east-
west/north-south directions but were diverged fifty five degrees off the meridian. 
However, the design exposed residents and pedestrians to direct sunlight and heat 
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stroke.140 Both the Taichung and Taipei Plans were an emergency measure in reaction 
to colonists’ fear of endemics. The intramural plans only covered inner city areas.  
 
Urban regularisation schemes and urban regularisation in general are not legislations 
stipulated and announced by the colonial authority; they are terms that describe the 
implementation of building controls from the earliest years of the Japanese 
colonisation until City Plans were introduced, and Inner City Plans and Urban District 
Plans were replaced (in the 1930s). Urban regularisation started with the planning and 
building of sewerage systems, with the policing old towns to give way to the 
development of new Japanese districts as its main motive. Old houses in town centres 
and city walls were demolished; temples, religious and community centres of natives 
were demolished, or moved and rebuilt. City centres were expanded. Re-generated 
zones were preserved to accommodate government organisations and the Japanese 
and separate them from the Taiwanese.  
 
In the case of Taipei, as mentioned previously in this chapter, the Taipei town of 
Chinese characteristics was converted the Japanese Taihoku. The initial step in the 
modernisation of Taihoku was to make plans to raze the Taipei city wall, which 
reflected earlier patterns of modernisation in Tokyo.141 In traditional Chinese urban 
design the city wall functioned as a practical and symbolic measure of imperial power. 
The wall provided the military protection of administration; it delineated the city 
centre, with multiple walls marking the concentration of power in that centre; and it 
formalised the relationship between the urban commercial/administrative activity 
and the rural agricultural support. 142 By razing walls, expanding the city centre and 
creating roadways and boulevards that encircle and pass through the city, Japanese 
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urban regularisation made Taipei into a blueprint for the wide ranging transformations 
within Japanese colonised Taiwan.143 Filling in intramural space was also part of the 
Japanese urban regularisation. In terms of residential housing, Japanese-style new 
houses were built throughout the city area, but particularly in the area east and 
northeast of the old walls. The entire area was transformed, over time, into a Japanese 
style neighbourhood, which stood in contrast to the older suburban areas of Mengjia 
and Dadaocheng, with their southern Chinese style architecture and (in Dadaocheng) 
European commercial buildings dating from further back. 144  During the urban 
regularisation of Changhua, in central Taiwan, in order to accommodate the Japanese 
and their organisations, 11 out of the 36 temples registered with “Temple Accounts” 
in 1905, were completely demolished and gone , and 12 were partially demolished. In 
total 23 temples were damaged by the regularisation.145 As in Taipei, the Chinese 
town’s spatial texture was transformed. 
 
A series of instances of implementation of urban regularisations are included in the 
table below. (The list is in order from North to South.) 
 
Keelung: In Keelung, Urban District Plan was announced in 1907. 
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Taipei: In Taipei, sewerage engineering started in 1896. 
In 1899, Taipei Inner City Regulation Plan was published.  
In 1911, a typhoon damaged and destroyed thousands of dwellings 
in Taipei, with the colonial authority taking the opportunity to build 
new three-storey commercial buildings on some business streets in 
urban areas.  
In 1912, the construction of the Governor’s Office started. The site 
was located close to the original Taipei administrative hall of the 
Ching Dynasty secretariat. Aspects of Japanese colonial architecture 
was the main character, including a façade facing east and a creative 
blend of European elements (Renaissance, Baroque and neo-
Classical features). Between 1912 and 1915, four streets nearby 
were widened. Buildings were partly demolished and their facades 
reconstructed. Baroque or Renaissance styles replaced the original 
Min style fronts. 
In 1920, following the expansion of the Inner City Regulation Plan, 
urban regularisation was expanded to nearby areas. 
Shinchu: The Urban District Plan was published in 1905, followed by the 
implementation of urban regularisation. 
Taichung: In Taichung, the Inner City Regulation Plan was published in 1900.  
In 1911, the Plan was extended to a larger scale; straight streets 
were laid out and the newly rising city was expected to be 
transformed into the largest city in central Taiwan. Commercial 
buildings in a Japanese colonial style were built in newly developed 
urban areas. 
Changhua: In Changhua, the Urban District Plan was published in 1906 and large 
scale urban regularisation started in 1933. 
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Chiayi: Regularisation started in 1902, with demolition of the original 
Chinese style city walls to give way to the expansion of the city. In 
1906, a powerful earthquake destroyed houses and killed more than 
1,000 people. The Urban District Plan was published after this 
earthquake. The city was to be transformed to a city full of Japanese-
style architecture.  
Tainan: In Tainan, the largest city in southern Taiwan before Kaohsiung took 
that position saw the construction of sewerage and other 
infrastructure start in 1902. The Urban District Plan was published 
in 1911. 
Kaohsiung: In Kaohsiung, the first Urban District Plan was published in 1908. In 
1911, the colonial authority decided to develop Kaohsiung Port and 
a modified Plan was drafted. 
Pintung In Pintung, construction of the sewerage system started in 1907, 
with a Street Plan proposed in the same year. The Urban District Plan 
was published later in 1913. 
 
Besides the listed plans and actions, eight smaller towns began to implement urban 
regularisation during the 1910s, although most only started this after the 1935 
earthquake hit central Taiwan. 146  The campaign of urban regularisation was 
accompanied by an island-wide construction scheme. Sea ports were built in 
northern Taiwan, in Keelung, and in southern Taiwan, in Kaohsiung, for the purpose 
of agricultural transportation to Yokohama, in Japan, and to Japanese occupied 
Southern Manchuria.147 The western line railway stretching from north to south was 
completed in 1908 to connect the two ports and most of the urban regularisation 
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areas.148 It was the biggest engineering project in Taiwan’s history, and was met 
with the criticism that it revealed the collusion between the colonial government 
and conglomerates in Japan. The systematic engineering of this infrastructure 
provided the foundation for colonial accumulation, exploitation and governance. 149 
According to Huang Lan-Shiang, early urban regularisation was mostly applied only 
to city centres where the Japanese would reside or already resided. The 
construction of sewerage systems was not extended to non-Japanese districts. 
Taiwanese dwellings gained very little from regularisation. Regularisation and 
demolition were met with some resistance but most petitions were ignored. 
Regularisation was carried out by an army of engineers and police. Under the rule 
of the colonial military regime, Taiwanese cities were intrusively policed and re-
structured.150 
 
Accompanied by the campaign of urban regularisation, a centralised planning system 
was established to make sure that the central government would be in charge of 
leading plans, of monitoring works and of the engineering of local urban regularisation. 
In May 1897, the Taipei Urban Planning Committee was set up by the governor’s office 
in order to “perfect the design of sanitation facilities”.151 In accordance with the Rules 
of Taipei Urban Planning Committee, Goto, the Chief Officer of Civil Affairs, was 
appointed chairman. Of the 15 official members appointed, 13 were central 
government officials, including 9 from the Civil Affairs Department and 4 from Military 
Affairs. Only 2 members were Taipei County officials.152 Later that year, in August, the 
Tainan Urban Planning Committee was set up to make and review urban plans for 
southern Taiwan. It also belonged to the Governor’s Office with the same composition 
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as the Taipei committee.153 In November of the same year, the Governor’s Order 
Number 31 proclaimed that “all urban plans [must] be submitted for the governor’s 
approval to become effective”. 154 In 1902, the Tainan Committee was dissolved and 
handed over its duties and work to the then expanded Taipei Committee, which was 
reorganised in 1910 and renamed the Taiwan Governor’s Office Urban Planning 
Committee. The Governor’s Order 56 of 1904 and Order 65 of 1905 clearly represent 
the principal of centralising planning power. They stipulated that before local 
authorities approved any civil engineering, including roads, rivers, ditches, irrigation 
and improvements to existing unplanned roads and sewage, the plan, budget, 
maintenance plan and start/finish date needed to be submitted for the governor’s 
approval so that urban planning matters could be integrated and coordinated.155 A 
similar order was given to county mayors in 1911, stating that: 
“general affairs on urban regularisation and changes and alterations of routes 
and sewage in the following areas: 1. towns/cities where the county hall sits; 
2. towns/cities with a population of 1000 households or more; 3.new towns, 
the local authority shall prepare the detailed plan with reasons and submit it 
to the governor’s office”.156 
The order stretched out central government power to all towns, including those 
situated in non-urban planning areas. It also emphasised the principle of centralisation 
and forced local authorities to pay extra attention to planning matters. 
 
The centralisation of urban planning declared it to be a national concern of 
colonisation. Instead of being understood as directions and measures facilitating local 
government autonomy, urban planning matters were all taken over by the Governor’s 
Office. In 1936, the publishing of the Order of Urban Planning emphasised once more 
the authority of the central government in urban planning. Article two of the Order 
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stipulated that “areas of urban planning and urban plans will be decided by the 
Governor of Taiwan based on the opinions of the Taiwan Urban Planning 
Committee”. 157  The principle was opposite to practices in western countries and 
resulted from the Japanese Central-government-lead colonisation because the 
Governor’s Office dominated almost all matters of infrastructure and state-owned 
companies, including road, sewage, water supply, electricity and telephone services. 
Few were delegated to the local governments.158  Another reason for centralising 
urban planning was the necessity for authoritarianism in policing development and 
building. Nation-wide comprehensive, spatial developments were needed to serve 
colonial purposes: with Taiwan being the Japanese advance guard for the expansion 
of its Empire towards southern Asia, building and planning were focused on serving 
this single objective. The needs of local inhabitants were not the priority. Nevertheless, 
local governments at that time were not autonomous bodies so it would not have 
made much difference even if planning power had been given to them. 
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Map 2-1: Cities of urban regularisation and the western railway 
 
Urban regularisation was a Japanese import. It started in 1888 with the 
announcement of the Tokyo Urban District Regularisation Ordinance, the Ordinance 
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of Dwelling Building and the Tokyo Urban District Regularisation Ordinance‘s by-law, 
Regulations of Land and Building Control in Tokyo Urban District. It was the very first 
development control and urban plan in the history of Japan, and it was met with 
serious opposition. The Japanese Senate vetoed the proposed Tokyo Urban District 
Regularisation Ordinance and its by-law for the reason that it was a luxurious 
expenditure that would lead to financial difficulty. People of Tokyo voiced their 
opinions against the Ordinance with the reason that the proposal would affect their 
livelihood and ownership. Nevertheless, the central government insisted on the 
passage and implementation of the law. Eventually a compromise was reached: Tokyo 
Urban District Regularisation Ordinance and its Regulations would be enacted; the 
central government and Tokyo City authorities could go ahead with the scheme but it 
would only be applied to the Tokyo area. Meanwhile the legislation of Ordinance of 
Dwelling Building was abandoned.159 Therefore, for the next thirty years, while Taiwan 
was having more than sixteen urban district plans of various scales implemented, 
Tokyo was the only area with an urban plan in Imperial Inland Japan. Not until after 
the Great War did rapid urbanisation lead to the necessity of reconsidering the 
luxurious investment. In 1918, the government announced that the rules and 
regulations of the Tokyo Urban District Regularisation Ordinance would be applied to 
Kyoto, Osaka, Nagoya, Kobe and Yokohama. Kyoto was the oldest capital still surviving 
in Japan, with the other four cities being international ports with a rapidly growing 
population. Thirty years had passed since the original Ordinance was introduced.160 
 
The Tokyo Urban District Regularisation Ordinance was controversial and met with 
opposition whereas the Taiwanese version of urban regularisation, met little 
resistance, the reason being that it was a colony: Order Number 63 of 1896 authorised 
the Japanese Governor absolute power to govern Taiwan, including enacting laws 
without having to obtain approval from the imperial Japanese state. Order Number 
63, often called the “Six Three Law”, was legislation pushed by the military authorities 
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in Tokyo. There were 6 articles in the law which stipulated that the Taiwanese 
Governor-General’s Office had the power to enact executive ordinances applied to his 
governing area. The ordinances would have the same legal efficacy as laws. 
Additionally, while ordinances would be stipulated and decided by the Commission of 
Taiwanese Governor’s Office and submitted to the Governor-General’s for their 
approval, in the case of emergency, the Governor-General would be able to announce 
ordinances directly, without the Commission’s decision. The Six Three law, in a 
practical sense had placed the Taiwanese outside of the protection of Japanese 
constitution and deprived them of their rights of citizenship. 161  Although 
constitutionally Taiwan was a legal territory of Japan, the Japanese imperial 
government’s attitude made it clear that the issue of how law should be applied to 
Taiwan was a matter of governance rather than of interpretation of the 
Constitution.162 While the Governor-General received broad law-making powers to 
issue executive orders, the colony constituted a legally separate territory that the 
colonial government ruled with little interference from the cabinet or legislature in 
Japan. Since Order Number 63 was an intrusion on Parliament’s legislative powers, a 
three-year limit was set for it. This was prolonged twice until the replacement of the 
law was announced in 1907. However, the principle of the Governor having absolute 
legislative power over Taiwan stood firm in the re-enactment and the re-enactment’s 
substitute until the Japanese colonial regime surrendered Taiwan to the Allies in 
1945.163 When the Six Three Law was announced, the Governor of Taiwan was Count 
Kabayama Sukenori, who had been a field commander (Fleet Admiral) during the First 
Sino-Japanese War and the commander (Major General) of the Japanese invasion 
force of Taiwan. He had total control over military, executive and legislative powers. 
A military general acting as Governor was the typical political arrangement between 
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1895 and 1919 and from 1937 to 1945.164 The head of the state apparatus having 
authoritarian control over military, executive and legislative powers reflects the fact 
that the colonial regime did not need to consult native habitants or meet the approval 
of their representatives to implement urban and building regulations. 
 
In conclusion it was sanitation syndrome that initiated Japanese urban regularisation 
in Taiwan. Learning from the experience of Japanese Cholera outbreaks between 
1877-1895, as well as the defeat of Japanese troops by endemic disease in Taiwan, 
doctoring of sanitation first was imported to regulate environmental surrounding. 
However the campaign of public health related urban regularisation was organised to 
supply the infrastructure for the benefits of colonial settlers and not for the welfare 
of Taiwanese locals. Accompanied by a centralised system, early urban regularisation 
was mostly applied to city centres where the Japanese resided and construction of 
infrastructure was hardly extended to non-Japanese districts. The implementation of 
regularisation was supported by legal enactments, for example building permission of 
private sewers and building ban was introduced and legal foundation was set up to 
eliminate the obstruction associated with compulsory acquisitions. Nevertheless local 
officials were legally empowered to demolish buildings and evict occupiers. While old 
houses in town centres and city walls were demolished in the name of sanitation, city 
centres were expanded with newly developed infrastructure to exclusively 
accommodate colonial government organisations and the colonists. The racial 
separation which was resulted from urban regularisation was carried out by a mixed 
army of engineers and police therefore Taiwanese cities were being intrusively policed 
and re-structured. Compared to the campaign of urban regularisation in Tokyo which 
met severe resistance, the Taiwanese version went smoothly because of the Japanese 
Governor having absolute control over military, executive and legislative powers over 
Taiwan. 
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2.3 Conclusion 
 
Unlike urban regularisation in Tokyo, which met with serious opposition, in Taiwan it 
was implemented in all major cities. During the process, in terms of McAuslan's 
ideologies, public interest ideology seemed to overpower private property interests. 
Despite this dominance, decisions of urban regularisation and building controls were 
taken by engineers in the colonial government based entirely on the needs of the 
colonists, whilst colonised natives were not considered as part of “the public”. Law 
established a racial hierarchy system with the Japanese settlers at the top, “wild 
savages” at the bottom and Chinese Han people in the middle. Native Taiwanese were 
deprived of constitutional rights. Accompanied by the racial system, Order Number 63 
and the urban planning-related law in Taiwan were set up to eliminate the obstruction 
associated with urban regularisation. Providing, as it did, infrastructure in city centres 
for the colonial settlers, urban regularisation generated a spatial structure of racism. 
The colonists' fears of endemic disease exercised a powerful influence on their 
regulating surrounding conditions and created the spatial apartheid. Sanitation 
syndrome was considered of greatest importance for the colonists themselves rather 
than for the welfare of locals, which was reflected in the ordinances of urban 
regularisation. With the application of urban regularisation, colonial urbanisation was 
shaped and the occupied cities were transformed. The colonial urban system became 
a major instrument of colonisation. Being a state created and sustained by military 
force, the colonial state exercised its authority through the law and administrated 
accumulation, exploitation and acquisition through its spatial plan. Law legitimated 
colonial governance and urban regularisation provided the foundation for 
colonisation. Regarding the competing ideologies of planning law, though on 
appearance the public interest ideology had the winning hand actually it was adopted 
to support and protect the private interest of colonists, who represented a part, and 
not the whole, of the public. 
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Chapter 3: The Emergence of Urban Regularisation in Hong Kong 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter focuses on the rise of colonial urbanisation in Hong Kong. As in the case 
of Taiwan, discussed in the previous chapter, sanitation syndrome will be highlighted 
as the primary reason initiating the early phase of land-use control. Sanitation rules 
were the principle motivation for interventions concerning private property rights, 
with contractual planning at that time being the crucial mechanism regularising land 
use. Since all Hong Kong land belonged to the British crown, the leasehold system as 
a land management measure attained development control via land sales and 
contracts. Besides contractual planning, British administrative machinery was also 
introduced to deal with land-use and establish sanitary rules. Sanitation concerns ran 
throughout the whole of the nineteenth century in Hong Kong, and this chapter will 
argue that the early history of town planning in Hong Kong is rather more a history of 
public health. This chapter will also show that the evolution of land use control and 
sanitation rules did not develop independently from the outside world. The 
importation of the public health movement from England helped shape development 
control in Hong Kong.   
 
 
3.1 The rise of colonial urbanisation in Hong Kong 
 
This section reviews the earliest stage of colonial urbanisation in Hong Kong. On the 
surface it would seem that military power initiated the British occupation of Hong 
Kong, but really colonisation was driven by mercantile interests: British batteries were 
mobilised to protect British merchants’ trading rights with China and Hong Kong was 
gradually developed as a new establishment of mercantilism. 
 74 
 
The Japanese Economist and Chancellor of Tokyo University (1951-1957) Yanaihara 
Tadao compared Japanese colonialism to its German and British counterparts, arguing 
that while Japanese occupations were led directly by the Japanese imperial 
government, “western colonists’ occupations resulted from activities of monopoly 
capital. Chartered trade companies led and pushed the states to initiate the 
acquisitions”.165 The opium trade, which predated the decision by the Japanese navy 
to occupy Taiwan by 54 years, was the real motivating factor. Opium had been a 
crucially important part of Britain-India-China trade triangle which financed the British 
importation of tea and provided a large proportion of the revenues for both the Indian 
and British governments.166 Britain seized Hong Kong after the opium trade wars. 
Initially, British colonialism in Hong Kong during the earliest stage of the occupation 
was different from Goto’s modernisation policy in Taiwan. The small island was only 
seen as a temporary lodging port for the shipping business during the earliest years of 
colonisation. The colonial government had no intention of investing in or of 
developing the infrastructure for locals. For Europeans, it long remained an 
insalubrious station in which people who had made enough money were only too glad 
to quit. The imperialist’s intention was aimed at inland cities and ports like Shanghai 
and Canton. When the first Administrator of Hong Kong, Charles Elliot, seized Hong 
Kong island in 1841 by signing the Convention of Chuenpee, the conditions of the 
agreement were unacceptable to the British government because Hong Kong was 
deemed a small, desolate and bleak island that was rocky, wind-swept, mountainous 
and with a population of merely 4000 (or less), of which some 2000 were boat 
dwellers. Hong Kong was too far away from the Yangtse River estuary, which was likely 
to become the most important trading area in China. Even after the armed forces and 
British traders treated the island and harbour as an undisputed British possession 
(ratified by the Nanking Treaty), Foreign Secretary of State Henry John Temple, 
Viscount Palmerston, still did not favour the acquisition of Hong Kong. He and his 
merchant advisors’ preference was for the island of Chusan, a prosperous and well-
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cultivated island with a population of one million. 167  After being censured for 
inadequately representing British mercantile interests, Elliot was relieved of his duties 
and reassigned to Texas in 1842. This was a demotion.  
 
In 1843, under the Treaty of Nanjing 1842, Hong Kong Island was publicly proclaimed 
a British Colony. The Charter of 5th April 1843 erected Hong Kong and its dependencies 
into a colony and established therein a law-making body: the Governor, acting by and 
with the advice of the Legislative Council. Sir Henry Pottinger, the Plenipotentiary and 
Superintendent of Trade, who used to be in the service of the East India Company, 
was the first governor of Hong Kong. According to a letter written by Lord Stanley, the 
Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Sir Henry Pottinger was told that he had 
three functions: to negotiate with the Chinese Emperor, to superintend the trade of 
British subjects in China and to regulate the internal economy of the settlement.168 
These statements and Sir Henry Pottinger’s appointment as the governor made the 
role of Hong Kong clear. It should not exist only as war booty but also as a site of 
mercantilism. Once the new colony was recognised by the treaty, the need for a 
proper administration was immediately apparent. In response to recommendations 
forwarded from Hong Kong in July 1843, the Secretary of State for the Colonies set out 
a schedule in September 1843 for the new establishment, including a Surveyor-
General who was to be in charge of public works and land rent, and the Public Works 
Department that was to oversee the administration of land, roads and other public 
works. Thus, by 1843, not only had there already been an attempt to plan the further 
development of urban areas but a basic administrative mechanism had also been 
established.169 
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Transhipment brought urbanisation to the coastal areas of Hong Kong Island and 
Kowloon. Besides commercial activities, military factors were also an element 
contributing to the development of built-up areas. Since the occupation took place in 
war-time conditions, and under the noses of the Chinese military who had two forts 
near the tip of Kowloon Peninsula, British batteries quickly set up camp at strategic 
locations in the settlement. Forts were set up to accommodate and hospitalise troops, 
and to provide close protection of British interests.  A Victorian town, named Victoria, 
was set up jointly by merchants and administrators. The core of urbanisation was on 
the north-facing base of Victoria Peak, which started primarily because of the location 
of the major administrative buildings, including the court-house, the gaol, the post 
office, the hospital, churches, government offices and officials’ residences. The 
commercial-administrative characters of the central business district were developed 
and a market established. A shanty village, consisting of a higgledy-piggledy 
assemblage of bamboo huts and mat sheds in the harbour area was replaced by docks 
and warehouses. The emergence of Victorian neoclassical buildings suggested the 
atmosphere of the Anglo-Indian model.170  Flagstaff House, an impressive colonial 
style house constructed in the 1840s, embodied the merchants’ and the government’s 
joint participation in the urbanisation process: situated in the centre of the northern 
coast, it had originally been the headquarters of Jardine, Matheson and Company, 
before being the headquarters for the British Military, and was later converted into a 
residence for the commander of the British forces.171 Very near the Flagstaff House 
site, Matheson erected his mat shed “godown” (warehouse) only a month after the 
Union Flag had been hoisted, and the warehouse was soon rebuilt in stone, the first 
solid building on the island. The lots at the centre of the northern coast were 
surrounded by the military, with the Government later deciding to requisition them in 
1843. Jardine, Matheson and Company left the Centre and purchased further plots 
from the government’s land sale to develop East Point, having decided to make it its 
headquarters instead of Macao or Canton. The merchant firms that, like Jardine, 
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Matheson and Company, operated from Macao and Canton, played a major part in 
the development of Hong Kong which led to the acquisition. In continuation of 
Palmerston’s hesitancy, in 1841, his successor, Earl Aberdeen, ordered all building 
operations to be stopped because he considered that the occupation would cause a 
“certain expense, the nature of our relations with that strange empire, and the 
probable embarrassment it would create with other Powers.” 172  Stanley, at the 
Colonial Office, was equally reluctant. However, Stanley feared that the government 
might have to give away over Hong Kong: “all classes, Military, Civil and Mercantile, 
are conspiring to force us into its adoption”.173  His description stated precisely that 
mercantile interests were the real driving force of Hong Kong’s development.  
 
According to Blake, Major-General Lord Saltoun in 1842 wrote a vivid account of early 
British life on the island. He had been told that there were only four houses in 
September the previous year, and “now they have a street nearly a mile and a half 
long, most of the houses finished and inhabited, good shops of every kind, a bazaar 
and a covered market place”. 174  In 1844, Jardine, Matheson and Company’s 
headquarters were moved to East Point from Macao. The firm’s principal office was 
to remain in Hong Kong from that day to the present. A Victorian settlement arose. In 
1851, the administration made the first modest attempt at co-ordinated reclamation 
of the water front. The new settlement there, of quay facilities for handling growing 
commerce, was proposed for economic reasons. Expansion from the original central 
area between Ice House Street and Western Market was rapid. By 1851, Boham Road 
and Caine Road were being developed. Almost at the same time, the settlement 
spread both west and east; westwards to Sai Ying Pun and eastwards to Bowrington 
(Causeway Bay), which was the new reclamation completed in 1858. By 1860, the 
expansion of the settlement reached Robinson Road and up the hill slopes of the Peak. 
In the east, by the end of the nineteenth century, the settlement was expanded to 
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Kenny Road, Bowen Road and Macdonnell Road. In the west, Kennedy was laid out in 
the 1880s. Hong Kong was developed as a British town on Chinese soil and became an 
entrepôt for European merchants’ trading with China, in which opium was for many 
years by far the most important item. Governor Bowring, who submitted the Blue 
Book for 1858, proudly emphasised that Hong Kong was a magnificent harbour 
“inviting flags of all nations which there is nothing in its legislation to repel,” as well as 
the colonists bringing free trade and justice that “produce a most salutary effect on 
the minds of the Chinese people”.175 It had become a free port and commerce was the 
reason for its existence. 
 
To conclude this section, mercantilism was the driving force behind the establishment 
of Hong Kong. Once publicly proclaimed a British colony, the machinery was set up to 
oversee the administration of land and implement public works. The colonial 
government’s participation in the urbanisation was helped by merchants. The 
expansion of Hong Kong continued specifically so that the city could be maintained as 
an entrepôt, one interlocking part of the international trade-triangle of China, India 
and Europe. 
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Map 3.1 The early British settlement in Hong Kong 
 
 
 
3.2 Contractual planning 
 
This section introduces the origins of contractual planning which is one of the 
mechanisms that conducts Hong Kong’s land-use, a system based on a leasehold-land 
system introduced by the colonial administration. That system was a government 
means of allocating private rights by contract. By selling long leases on a contractual 
basis, the Hong Kong colonial administration had an incentive to provide contractual 
terms, obligations and rights to the leaseholders that would maximise the value of 
land. By introducing contractual planning, the colonial authorities also specified and 
enforced the administration’s land-use planning consideration and influenced the 
urbanisation of Hong Kong. 
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In the time before a comprehensive planning system was introduced, plans allocating 
buildings and land use were mostly piecemeal, meeting the immediate needs of trade 
expansion and the influx of Chinese workers, but lacked an overall long term vision. 
Contractual planning, at that time, was the crucial mechanism which allowed colonist 
government to be the land owner as well as to setting land-use development, and 
controlling individual site planning cases. Land auctions guaranteed property rights 
and development with conditions that specified limitations on development and use, 
and developers’ obligations towards public interest issues. Contractual planning in 
Hong Kong has been an arena where McAuslan’s first and second competing 
ideologies, the traditional common law approach and the orthodox public 
administration approach, contested against each other. The legal source of 
contractual planning is common law. The legislation in the Charter of 5th April 1843 
initially provided for the wholesale reception of English law,176 with English law thus 
becoming the main legal source in Hong Kong. Common law concepts, including the 
precedent doctrine, judicial review, respecting individual property rights and the 
principle that law emerges from judicial decisions rather than from the legislature, 
were all imported in this period. The legal machinery enforced the rule of law, 
regulating the relationship between the administrative body and the inhabitants. It 
also provided the fundamental rules for economic development. The importation of 
the British administration and English legal system profoundly influenced Hong Kong’s 
economic activities and also formed an essential part of urban planning in Hong Kong 
for almost 140 years. One of the most important elements introduced by Britain was 
Crown Leases, which was set up as the means of development control over urban 
planning. 
 
Since the ratification of the Nanjing Treaty, the Hong Kong Government has been the 
landlord of virtually all land, with all land held on leases granted by the Crown. The 
role of the Hong Kong Government has been comparable to that of the aristocratic 
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landlords of eighteenth century London. 177  Under the leasehold system, the 
government allocated land parcels to individuals by auction or private treaty grant. 
According to Bristow, although the formal position of Hong Kong as a permanent 
British settlement had to await the Treaty of Nanjing in 1843, the former form of 
modern town planning in Hong Kong concerning the control of land use was founded 
in the form of contractual planning in 1841.178 The first issue undertaken by the Hong 
Kong Government Gazette was a preliminary notice regarding land sales. The rapid 
development of Hong Kong was noted, and the arrangement of land that could be 
developed properly for suitable purposes was discussed, in this article. The authority 
(Superintendent of Trade and his advisers) went to work, carefully devising a system 
to encourage and control building.179 The provision of land for housing, offices and 
business premises had become an important issue. “Many merchants saw that if Hong 
Kong became a British colony, land would become valuable, and there was competition 
to get good sites partly as a speculation”.180 In the Gazette, the ‘Public Notice and 
Declaration of 1st May 1841’ detailed the “principles and conditions upon which 
allotments of land will be made, pending Her Majesty’s further pleasure.” 181  The 
notice went on to set up the principles of tenure, rent and building development for 
proposed allotments. Prospective land owners were permitted to choose their own 
sites with government approval. 
 
The leasehold system as a land management measure attained development control 
via contracts, with the government’s land-use control playing a crucial part in fitting 
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dwellings by enforcing leasing conditions, planning and implementing new 
developments. Lease conditions also provided the government with an opportunity to 
intervene in property rights. Crown land auction leases for building development 
normally required that the leaseholder,  
“shall well and sufficiently repair, maintain, pave, purge, scour, cleanse, 
empty, amend and keep the messuage or tenement… and all walls, rails, lights, 
pavements, privies, sinks, drains and whatsoever, the whole to be done to the 
satisfaction of the Surveyor of Her said Majesty.”182 
The Crown, as universal head lesser, also gained one significant advantage from the 
system: closer contact with and control over the land by means of the lease and its 
content. Above all, the Crown was put in the same position as a private property 
owner who sought to develop it by leasing it on short leases to others who undertook 
its development as a speculative activity, which would, it was hoped, prove profitable 
to them. The Crown could and did specify what general conditions should be complied 
with in relation to the development of land under the condition of land sales at public 
auction. This was as important in the case of the urban development of formerly non-
urban land (also as it was in the case of later urban renewal). Since the Crown 
controlled development in this way, the terms and conditions on which a lease was 
granted, including withholding execution of the lease until the conditions of sale had 
been complied with, it was within its power to specify and enforce planning 
considerations that it felt were desirable in a particular area. As Evans presents, it 
played a more direct role than could, say, the government in the United Kingdom or 
any other Western European country. 183  
 
Therefore, the property and development rights of the landowner (the lessee) were 
defined explicitly by the “conditions of sale” and then by the subsequent conditions 
contained in the contract between the government and the purchaser, called the 
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“lease document”. These conditions were interpreted as part of common law. The 
rights of the lessee included the exclusive right to use land for specific purposes (as 
defined by the “user clause”), the exclusive right to transfer the whole part of the use 
or income rights to another individual (such as assignment or re-assignment) and the 
exclusive right to derive income from land use (such as rent). The exclusivity of the 
three types meant, under the doctrine of the privity of contract, that a third party had 
no rights to interfere with such enjoyment of rights. The land contract was a civil 
contract that allowed for maximum development. When land for private development 
was allocated by the government through competitive public auction or tender, the 
consideration paid by the successful bidder was at market price. The price represents 
the full potential of a development.184 The terms of the leasehold contract could be 
modified on mutual agreement of the lessee and the government. The lessee was 
required to pay the government a premium if the value after the modification was 
greater than it had been before. Meanwhile, the conditions of sale specified that the 
obligations of the lessee must be fulfilled before legal title would be formally 
transferred from the government. An example of these obligations was that the lessee 
must carry out development on a specific use within a given period of time. A 
complete waste of land would prompt re-entry by the government.185  
 
In short, the leasehold land-use system was a contractual planning system. The 
contractual nature of land development was a characteristic, and not a mere “by-
product of the leasehold system.”186 Development rights were in effect already vested 
in the Crown in Hong Kong and needed no legislative action of the kind that led to 
their nationalisation.187 Same was McAuslan’s first ideology, the ideology of private 
right, vested in the common law practiced in the British colonial Hong Kong. In theory, 
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this combination of ground landlord and government authority should have given the 
Hong Kong government unparalleled power over the form of development and the 
effective means of ensuring compliance with long-term planning policy. However, it 
was not an equivalent to modern understanding about the planning process.188 Later 
problems arose because locating development and land auction plans were largely 
drawn up to meet immediate requirements. Where the land form permitted, the 
leasehold system produced the familiar rectangular gridiron street pattern. It was 
determined by the minimum street layout regulations and the building requirements 
of the Chinese tenement houses. The high value of land in the town soon led to the 
maximum use of available land for building and the minimum for public space. 
Nevertheless, contractual planning could not retroactively adjust the leases of 
developed/developing projects after land auctions to deal with the plagues or cholera 
outbreak that happened later. Facing British sanitation syndrome, administrative 
regulations and intervention was a necessity in planning matters. Administrative 
enactments on building and land-use control, including public infrastructure work and 
legislation which attempted to monitor development had to be introduced.  
 
 
3.3 The fear of endemics and the public administration approach towards sanitary 
rules and land-use control 
 
This section reviews the origin of administration approach land-use control and its 
relations with sanitary rules. It points out that sanitation syndrome was the motivating 
factor in the land-use control in the history of Hong Kong. Since disease related issues 
were the first priority of British colonists, earliest British rules then were mainly 
concerned with public health and improving living conditions. McAuslan’s second 
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ideology, the ideology of public interest, can be seen in the rise of land-use control in 
Hong Kong. 
 
As we have previously explored, Swanson’s study of colonialism highlights that 
sanitation syndrome was considered of utmost importance for the colonists’ health, a 
concern that reportedly arose in most colonies in Africa and Asia. 189 In Hong Kong, 
sanitary control was also the first stage in the early phases of land-use control, since 
climate, health, disease and death were the colonists’ main concerns during the early 
stage of colonialism. Sanitation rules were the principle motivation for various 
interventions concerning private property rights throughout the nineteenth century 
in Hong Kong. 
 
After the British military landed in Hong Kong in January 1841, malaria haunted the 
base at Sai Ying Pun (West Camp). One quarter of soldiers from the cannon troops 
died from the disease; many of the bodies were buried at the cemetery at Wong Nai 
Chung, later renamed by the British as “Happy Valley”, rather in contrast to the reality 
of their previously harsh living environment. Civilians suffered too. There was a high 
mortality rate among missionaries and their wives. Smallpox, cholera and tuberculosis 
had their day in the convents. Letters sent to friends and relatives often described the 
illness as “Hong Kong fever”.190 According to Colonial Treasurer Robert M Martin’s 
witness statement in 1844 in a letter to the Colonial Office in London: 
“.... on an average, every man went through the hospital more than five times 
in the year! (. . .) The destruction of life since our occupation of Hong Kong has 
been enormous. Last year the deaths among the troops in the island amounted 
to 1 in 3 1/2; at Chusan, to 1 in 29 1/2; and at Koolungsoo, to 1 in 12 1/2. (. . .) 
But in this and other regiments, it is not merely the deaths which indicate 
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disease and a pernicious climate, it is the number of men invalided, and 
constantly unfit for duty. One-half the men of a company are frequently unable 
to attend the parade; out of 100 men, there are sometimes not more than five 
or six men fit for duty. (. . .) I cannot name a single colony that was originally 
unhealthy, and that subsequently became salubrious. Soldiers, sailors, and 
civilians, Europeans and natives, women as well as men, residing in every part 
of Hong Kong, have fallen victims to the climate, and at all seasons of the year. 
(. . .) An extensive study of the subject, and no inconsiderable experience in 
different climates, induces me to concur in the opinion of Dr. Thompson, the 
respected head of the medical department of Hong Kong, that the island never 
will be healthy. (. . .) No drainage can obviate this destructive miasma; 
independent of new roads or buildings, the rain will every year uncover large 
portions of the hills, washing the putrefying substance down the deep ravines 
towards the sea, thus generating a fruitful crop of disease.”191 
Despite criticising Martin’s complaint as oversensitive to the unfamiliar environment, 
Colonial Governor J. F. Davis’ report to the Colonial Office admitted that the soldiers 
catching disease was a difficult problem to solve.192 Correspondences to the British 
government from the earliest colonists described Hong Kong and its environs as a 
frightening place. Lord Palmerston had disparagingly called Hong Kong a barren island. 
While calling Hong Kong an unhealthy and scandalous remote island, British colonists 
also described the situation as exciting, a place for adventures, rascals, the strong and 
brave.193 If Hong Kong was to be conquered, issues related to diseases were the first 
priority. 
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Studies on early colonialism in Hong Kong authored by Wu Yiching and Ip Iam Chong 
confirm that British rulers then were mainly worried with health and sanitation. From 
Davis and Martin’s correspondences, one can learn how significantly that health 
related issues and climate were their main concerns. Anything threatening soldiers’ 
health threatened the ruling of the colony because their bodies were the material 
pillars of the colonial government. 194  According to Wu’s study on early colonial 
culture, themes of death and disease were the negative side of the image associated 
with the freedom of Hong Kong. It was the cause that drove colonial rulers to enforce 
regulations, followed by harsh punishment.195 Every year, Davis submitted his Blue 
Book (the annual report) to the Colonial Office, and climate and sanitation were 
always a core issue. Improvements in living conditions, as well as soldiers and 
colonists’ health were discussed. According to Davis’ 1846 Report, 
“…about the time I quitted England, and led many persons to imagine that a 
residence in the place was a desperate undertaking. The best answer to the 
whole is the remarkable immunity from disease which followed immediately 
upon the completion of fitting dwellings, efficient drainage, and other 
improvements.”196 
From looking at colonist perspectives on sanitary matters we can see clearly that 
issues associated with buildings and nuisances were related. Fitting dwellings and 
efficient drainage were the main and crucial projects of colonialism. In other words, 
sanitary rules and related administrative regulations were meant to serve the ruling 
colonists. They provided the foundation for steadily population growth, tax revenue 
increases and the security of military forces. Therefore, ruling power was stabilised. 
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 Sanitary concerns were emphasised due to rapid population growth in urban areas. 
These initial sanitary concerns inspired the land-use control in city planning. To deal 
with land-use, British administrative machinery was introduced. The Lands Office and 
Department of Public Works were set up right after the first land sale that took place 
in June 1841. An island-wide scale land allocation scheme was set up later by A.R. 
Johnson, the deputy of the Chief Superintendent of Trade, which divided Hong Kong 
Island into marine lots, town lots, Wong Nei Chong (Happy Valley), Chek Chu (Stanley), 
Chek Pai Wan (Aberdeen) and suburban lots. In addition, some areas were marked out 
as bazaars serving the Chinese population.197 The Land Committee, the machinery 
responsible for contractual planning, also had administrative powers governing land-
use matters. The first committee was announced in March 1842, with wider powers 
being attached beyond just selling land. Those powers were actually town planning 
powers that included paying compensation to native Chinese dwellers on account of 
the British occupation of land: 
“selecting sites for public landing places, defining limits of Cantonments, fixing 
the extent of ground to be reserved for a naval depot and a dockyard and 
selecting a watering place for shipping.”198  
However, having seen military, naval and civil buildings spring up and the rapid 
erection of houses in Chinese areas, more careful plans were needed; hence, the 
Committee soon found itself prohibiting all further land sales out of necessity.199 
 
The second Land Committee was set up in 1844. One of its tasks concerned planning 
the layout of expanding towns, in response to clear instructions from London to 
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examine which land should be reserved for public sites, towns and villages, and to 
decide on their expansion, communications and recreation. According to the 
instruction, these reservations needed to be set out on public charts or as plans. The 
executive of the committee, Surveyor-General Gordon, recommended proposals 
setting out areas for housing, administration and commerce. He also proposed certain 
construction work, including: 1. moving the centre of new town to Happy Valley, 2. 
the construction of three quays connected to the sea by canal, 3. the extension of 
Queen’s Road (the main road on Hong Kong Island) round the island and 4. the 
construction of a waterfront road along the sea frontage. This project never took 
place, the Government having no intention of embarking on public investment on this 
scale. Also, no merchant was interested in this long-term investment.200  In 1849, 
another Land Committee was established. The extension of leases from 75 years to 99 
years was allowed. The Government (under the leadership of Governor Bonham) also 
brought in a change to sale conditions so that the auction was no longer for annual 
rent but for the payment of a single premium to secure a lot at a fixed rent. This 
change was a great leap forward in the commercialisation of land. 
 
Land Committees were aided by other administrative bodies to govern land-use and 
building control issues. Fear of epidemics had been the main motivation for building 
up administrative apparatuses. In August during the first year of British official 
colonialism (1844), the Committee of Public Health and Cleanliness was set up by 
Governor Pottinger. According to Bristow, the aim was to enforce sanitary rules 
amongst “all classes of community”.201 The Committee’s deliberation led to the 
enactment of No. 5 Ordinance of 1844, Good Order and Cleanliness Ordinance, and 
No. 14 of 1845, amendment of the Ordinance, for the preservation of good order 
and cleanliness within the Colony of Hong Kong. In total, 22 ordinances were put in 
place during the first year of British colonialism in Hong Kong. Yiu argues that the 
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ordinances governing land and building matters (No. 3 and No. 5) were created even 
earlier than that to establish a police force (No. 12).202 The importance of regulating 
land and building matters can be inferred from their priorities. In 1845, the 
Summary of Offences Ordinance was also established, making it an offence for the 
owner or occupier of any house or building to neglect its repair or permit it to remain 
in a ruinous or dangerous state.203 Other matters relating to building and planning 
were enforced through the Market Ordinance of 1846 and 1847 respectively. These 
included specific requirements regarding encroachments on crown land, and unsafe 
and inflammable buildings.204 
 
Sir John Bowring arrived in Hong Kong in 1854 as the new Superintendent and 
Governor, showing immediate concern about sanitation. He appointed a new Colonial 
Surgeon, Dr. J. Caroll Dempster, who had been an army doctor and turned out to be 
an outspoken critic of the existing sanitary system. In Dempster’s 1854 report, he 
wrote, “…so much filth…cowsheds, pigsties, stagnant pools” in Tai Ping Shan (Peace 
Mountain). He asked for drainage, sewerage, the laying of pavements and efficient 
scavenging. Crowded and miserable housing conditions were also noted. In 1855 and 
the following year, he complained insistently that nothing had been improved except 
for the construction of a few dustbins that were being used by Chinese people as 
latrines. Clearly, Dempster felt the government’s response was unsatisfactory. The 
statement addressed that things were “under consideration”, with Dempster 
underlining the phrase. 205  Responding to the growing sanitary hazard menace, 
Bowring responded with the Buildings and Nuisances Ordinance of 1856. It was the 
first sanitation related legislation to include “Buildings” in the title. By putting 
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“Buildings” together with “Nuisances”, the colonists emphasised the significance of 
building controls and sanitary concerns.206  
 
It was the first Hong Kong buildings ordinance and was assented by governor Sir John 
Bowring on 16th April 1856. It had 20 sections that established a minimum standard 
for the construction of houses, and required that dwellings should be provided with 
an adequate and safe place for the lighting of fires and the cooking of food. Kitchen 
and water-closet provisions in new buildings were regulated in paragraphs VIII and XIII 
of the ordinance, which also disallowed inflammable construction materials. The 
provision of a privy and sufficient ashpit furnished with proper coverings were 
required. 207  Paragraph III showed that the requirement for the approved 
commencement of work and the responsibility of building control was already vested 
in surveyors.208 However, the ordinance made no provision for the reservation of rear 
yards, the width of streets, the height of buildings or adequate means of ventilation 
and lighting. The requirements were clearly for European houses only, since 
Paragraph II of the Ordinance stipulated that: 
“The Walls of all Houses shall be solidly built of Bricks or Stones throughout, 
and shall be of the thickness of not less than nine inches at the upper Story, 
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thirteen and a half inches at the Story immediately below the upper Story, and 
eighteen inches at the Story (if any) at immediately below the said two 
Stories.”209 
As most Chinese tenements at that time were built in timber with neither kitchen nor 
water closet, the Ordinance was not applicable to overseeing the construction of 
Chinese tenements. 
 
Rapid population growth during Bowring’s years had been the main factor responsible 
for sanitary risks. Due to the rise of the Tai Ping Tian Guo rebellion and increasing trade 
contributing to steady economic growth in Hong Kong, the population increased from 
29,507 in 1849 to over 39,000 in 1853. In 1859, the population totalled 86,941. 
Between 1853 and 1859, the population more than doubled.210  In 1857, a global 
cholera pandemic occurred in Hong Kong. Multiple sporadic eruptions of the disease 
killed more than four thousand in the next five years. This event highlighted the 
sanitation crisis and justified Dempster’s criticism. However, the 1856 Ordinance and 
its later amendment in 1858, because it consisted of Bowring’s response to hygiene 
risks, was hard for Magistrates and Justice to interpret; often they handed down 
decisions which were contrary to the spirit of the ordinances. The matter was referred 
to the Colonial Office, where Bowring’s approach was rejected. Though the legislation 
was retained, its enforcement was difficult.211  In 1858, Dr. John Ivor Murray was 
appointed the Colonial Surgeon, a position he served until 1872.212 He repeatedly 
drew attention to the exceedingly unhealthy state of Hong Kong and spoke out against 
Bowring during his tenure. According to Dr Murray’s 1860 Annual Report, Bowering 
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was responsible for horrific and deteriorating environmental conditions.213 In 1859, 
Bowring boldly created a post for Inspector of Nuisances, the beginning of the 
following Sanitation Department. 
 
Bowring has been described by contemporary historians as a humane liberal 
reformist, “kind to Chinese people but tough to Chinese government”.214  Bowring 
learnt to speak the local language (Cantonese) to get close to locals. According to 
Frank Welsh, he was the most remarkable man ever to be Governor of the colony, a 
radical member of parliament and the closest friend of Jeremy Bentham. 215 
Considering himself the promoter and enforcer of equal justice for both races, 
Bowring allowed the Chinese in Hong Kong access to the legal profession and initiated 
a recruitment and training scheme for the Chinese to fill official posts. Commenting 
on a suspected miscarriage of justice in 1856, Bowring said that “every man’s life and 
liberty on British soil is intended to be most reverently protected by every security 
against wrong which legislation can provide.”216  In 1858, he advertised the equal 
justice of the authority of British law by publicly announcing the execution of two 
Europeans convicted of murdering a Chinese resident. Bowring attempted to suspend 
public flogging and introduce an element of properly representative Legislative 
Council that would include the Chinese population.217 
 
In February 1858, Bowring wrote in his correspondence to London that “the comfort 
is that in no part of China is there so much justice so little venality as here and we do 
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far better than would be expected with the instruments at our Command.” 218 
However, the assumptions that Bowring so frequently made about the impartiality of 
English law and the survival of justice in the colony during the trying years of his 
governorship are not borne out by investigations. No governor made greater use of 
deportation and rendition than the “liberal” Bowring. He ordered the deportation, of 
46 Chinese people seized on the streets, to Hainan because they could not give 
satisfactory accounts of their identities. More deportations were ordered to get rid of 
petty thieves. While Bowring proposed reforming the Legislative Council and 
empowering Chinese representatives, he publicly voiced his hatred toward the 
accused suspect of a baker poisoning case, declaring that he should be hanged without 
trial. The suspect was later released due to a lack of substantial evidence, but 
deported. Bowring decided to bypass the Supreme Court entirely by handing 73 men 
captured by the Royal Navy to the Chinese authorities for the reason that the 
administration of justice dealing with piracy was defective. Bowring was condemned 
as not being a Friend of China but “the greatest monster on the face of the earth.”219 
Bowring was a controversial figure. While questioning Bowring’s personal integrity in 
matters of conscience, instead of suggesting Bowring’s controversies and 
contradictions between his policies and actions were the result of his character 
defects, Munn argues that, given the weak instruments at their command and the 
troubled state of the region at that time, it is hardly surprising that officials failed to 
create a model of good governance and equal justice that many had envisaged for the 
colony. The imperative of protecting European lives and property distorted the 
colony's criminal justice system into one that gave little consideration to the liberties 
of the ordinary Chinese people who came before the courts.220 
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Bowring, being a politician was the last of the political appointees, with succeeding 
governors normally being colonial officials, with the last governor holding the 
combined offices of Governor and Superintendent of Trade. 221  Being a practical 
administrator, Bowring made the priorities of the colonial government clear: the 
administrative state served the interests of European colonial expansion. The rise of 
Hong Kong as a trading centre was seen as having a close relationship to the 
incorporation of the East Asian region into the world market. Bowring proudly stated 
in 1858 in one of his dispatches to the Colonial Office that “Hong Kong presents 
another example of elasticity and potency of unrestricted commerce.”222 Bowring’s 
expectation and plan for Hong Kong was consistent with his free trade ideology. In his 
reports on Commercial Relations between France and Britain, Bowring spoke for the 
manufacturers seeking to expand markets. The idea of freedom for industries to buy 
in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market was voiced.223 Despite being a famous 
pacifist (former President of the Peace Society in London), Bowring precipitated the 
Second Opium War by ordering the bombardment of Guangzhou in a dispute over the 
rights of the Chinese military to remove a Chinese pirate from a Chinese ship. The ship, 
The Arrow, was flying the British flag without authorisation. This minor incident was 
used as an excuse for hostilities by Bowring.224 His overreaction was one example of 
his deliberate aggressive acts towards China. As he insisted in his letter to the Colonial 
Office, “the appropriate way to deal with China is more warships and cannons”.225 He 
shared the view of Western merchants in China that the Chinese Empire was a 
worthless and degenerate tyranny and that trade would not flourish while the 
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Emperor and his mandarins in Peking refused to receive envoys. Bowring advocated 
that warships and cannons were the means to treaty ports, colonial settlements and 
free trade. In 1855, he wrote to the King of Siam: “I have a large fleet at my disposal 
but I would rather visit you as a friend than as bearer of a menacing message.”226 
Therefore, the treaty he imposed opened up the country to outside free trade. His 
military diplomacy was backed by merchants in China, who were an important 
influence on the political world in London. His warships and cannons were later 
adopted by other European countries in the East.  
 
Governor Bowring aggressively asserted British interests and trampled on Asian 
sensibilities: he not only demanded reparations for the “Arrow incident” but the 
reopening of the whole question of the Treaty of Nanking. Supplementary agreements 
were worked out. For Hong Kong, the most significant change was the legalisation of 
the opium trade. The hopes of decades of Western merchants at last became a reality. 
Bowring created an opium monopoly that gave the rights to prepare opium in the 
colony, which supplied no less than 29% of the colony’s annual income in 1858.227 
Bowring also left his characteristic marks on issues related to town planning. He had 
been an enthusiastic developer. In 1855, a scheme attempting the coordinated 
reclamation on the waterfront of the Victoria City settlement was proposed for 
economic reasons, with proper quay facilities for growing commerce in need of being 
built. By means of draining the swampy ground and filling it in with soil and rubble, in 
1858, the completion of the reclamation between Happy Valley and the sea was 
achieved, as was the government expanding the scope of the colonists’ urban 
settlement. The settlement spread both west and east, rationalising the contour of 
the shore: westward to Sai Yin Pun and eastward to Causeway Bay. The new 
reclamations on the waterfront had potential commercial value in the provision of 
new land for development and it would allow public access to the harbour at various 
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points. The eastward reclamation (Causeway Bay) was later named after Bowring as 
Bowrington.228 Development-wise, it was his main contribution to Hong Kong. 
 
In conclusion, with the support of British military diplomacy, Hong Kong had arisen a 
trading centre. Urbanisation in Hong Kong was in progress to accommodate the 
interests of European expansion, alongside its developing into a vital port to the 
incorporation of China into the world market. With the rapid urban growth came the 
increasing sanitary risks, therefore land-use administrative apparatuses were 
established to conquer colonists’ fear of epidemics. Sanitary rules were stipulated to 
regulate building and control development. Though on surface the aim of sanitary 
rules and building control was to protect all classes of community as the authority 
publicly claimed, in reality the priority of guarding European lives and property gave 
little consideration to the rights of ordinary Chinese people. In terms of land-use 
control, the emergence of sanitary rules and sanitary related building codes 
represented the necessity of public administration approach which was McAuslan’s 
second ideology, ideology of public interest, in action. 
 
 
3.4 Chadwick’s Report: the importation of a public health movement 
 
This section continues reviewing the evolution of land-use control in Hong Kong and 
its relation with sanitation syndrome.  
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The sanitary state of Hong Kong never stopped being a question of great interest to 
the colonists in the second half of nineteenth century, despite the fact that controlling 
land-use and sanitation related ordinances had been implemented in the forms of 
contractual planning and public administration in the early 1840s. The continuing 
growth of population and general neglect over the enforcement of health regulations 
had made colonists still live in the shadow of fearing endemic disease. Later the life 
threatening condition was worsened by cholera pandemic, therefore more detailed 
sanitary rules and sanitation related building control measured were stipulated 
accompanied by establishment of administrative machineries to deal with the 
situation. Although compared to earlier regulations the later stipulations did not 
present many new concepts, a more comprehensive system of land-use control 
notwithstanding emerged and the ideology of public interest continued to dominate 
the works of development control. 
 
After a series of military confrontations in the 1840s, Hong Kong established itself as 
a permanent trading station under British control that British merchants needed to 
escape the control of the Chinese rulers. Trade increased the population, which rose 
tenfold in fifteen years. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, an Inspector of Nuisances 
was appointed in 1859. It was the beginning of the later Sanitation Department. The 
new authorities announced Building and Nuisances Ordinance 1856 and Nuisances 
Ordinance 1858. The former was the first to include “Buildings” in its title.229 In 1860, 
under Article 6 of the Convention of Peking between China and the United Kingdom, 
part of Kowloon Peninsula (up to present day Boundary Street) was ceded in 
perpetuity to the UK. More Chinese came from the mainland seeking employment in 
Hong Kong. Despite the continual outflow of people, newcomers arrived in such 
numbers that by 1865 the population had increased to some 125,500 persons, of 
whom 63% were adult males. This reflected the frontier character of Hong Kong.230 
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Accompanied by the overcrowding situation and shortage of accommodation, houses 
were commonly occupied by three to eight families per room, which were in a filthy 
state and constructed without any regard to basic sanitary requirements. Such 
properties were owned both by Europeans and wealthy Chinese who exacted high 
rents. Due to the accommodation shortage, the tenants were in no position to seek 
more equitable terms or improvements.231 
 
A cholera incident led to the appointment of a Sanitary Committee in December 1862. 
The Committee recommended a complete reorganisation of the sanitary system and 
proper enforcement of the 1856 and 1858 Ordinances. To deal with the continually 
worsening situation, the Order and Cleanliness Ordinance of 1866 was promulgated. 
Having learned from the cholera pandemic that devastated Europe between 1829 and 
1851, generic concepts on adequate drainage, sewage and water, present in the Public 
Health Act of 1848 in England, were introduced. By that time, Dr. John Snow had 
proved his theory that cholera was linked to a contaminated water supply by studying 
his case of a single water pump in Soho in 1854. The “germ theory of disease” had 
been proven, even though it was controversial at that time. The Hong Kong ordinances 
then, like their parent legislation, the British Public Health Act, were products of the 
influence of the miasma theory of disease that maintained that diseases were caused 
by “bad air” or poisonous vapour. The miasma theory made sense to the English 
sanitary reformers of the mid-nineteenth century because it was obvious that cholera 
was concentrated in the poorest districts where sanitation was most neglected and 
the slum housing most befouled by excremental filth. The concerns about the miasma 
(bad air) caused public health reforms and encouraged urban cleanliness. 232  The 
assumed ideology of the Act was that the reformers believed that diseases could be 
fought by the use of mixed population management actions: population growth 
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control, locations of cemeteries and air circulation, etc. The miasma theory has been 
proven wrong since because it did not explain the mechanism of diseases. However, 
the correlation between poor urban conditions and diseases did exist as the theory 
suggested. The concerns about miasma led to the bringing in of urban sanitary 
management as a social practice or as social medicine233 that had been developing in 
capitalist societies in the middle of the nineteenth century.  
 
However, in Hong Kong, the enforcement of those ordinances and the new sanitary 
rules were unsuccessful, 234  since the sanitation infrastructure had not been 
sufficiently invested in. Steady population growth had worsened the situation and also 
led to increasing resistance in the enforcement of regulating sanitation and buildings. 
By 1876, Hong Kong’s population had increased to 139,000, of whom 93.5% were 
Chinese. This growth continued and by 1881, 160,400 persons were resident in Hong 
Kong, an increase of 15.3%. The development was heavily concentrated along the 
western part of the northern coast of Hong Kong Island. The expense and difficulty 
associated with creating building sites consequently placed a high premium on land. 
This provided developers with a good reason to justify the fullest exploitation of their 
properties.235 According to an Annual Report by the Colonial Surgeon in 1874, houses 
were occupied by five to ten families and were constructed against every sanitary rule, 
lacking a yard and ventilation. In addition, pigs were often kept in houses, which made 
the living conditions even worse.236 
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The 1874 Report recommended some means of improvement, as did the Surveyor-
General in 1878. The Colonial Surgeon and the Surveyor-General made 
recommendations for open spaces and better ventilation by widening the alley at the 
rear of premises. These actions met with protests. The Governor was favourably 
inclined to the petitions. He took the view that traditional Chinese methods of 
sanitation and the overcrowded conditions in the city were adequate. They were 
considered habits deeply rooted as social customs. Another opinion was noted in the 
Hong Kong Government Gazette on 27th July 1878: 
“Chinese tenants are, as a rule…unable to pay high rents…and it is only by so 
dividing the houses that many families can reside in each division that Chinese 
property is made profitable and at the same time the necessary lowness of 
rent is attained.”237 
The economic reason was noted as an obstacle to the enforcement of building 
regulations.  
 
After forty years of growth and general neglect over both the enforcement of building 
and health regulations, and the provision of sanitary services, the condition of the city 
was extremely unhealthy. Sanitation issues continued to plague the colonisers. It was 
the issue of British soldiers and colonists’ health that continued to plague the 
governments of Hong Kong and London. In 1881, the Colonial Office conducted an 
investigation into Hong Kong's sanitary problem because a military official’s complaint 
raised concern that Hong Kong's sanitary state was threatening his soldiers' health. 
The Colonial Office sought the services of a sanitary engineer, Osbert Chadwick, who 
was put in charge of the investigation. Though Governor Sir J. Pope Hennessy claimed 
in his letter to the Colonial Office that, “The sanitary state of this colony is always a 
question of great interest to us” and frankly stated that the health and death rate of 
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soldiers were indicators of local sanitary conditions, the Governor had a different idea 
about sanitation from that conceived by the Colonial Office. He stated: 
“I think that the town of Victoria might be made a model of sanitation, with 
its position on the slope of a hill, the possibility of obtaining an almost 
unlimited supply of water for drinking and washing purposes, and above all, 
having here a native population who will readily carry out the Chinese custom 
by which the sewage and refuse is carried out of the town, and used for 
agricultural purposes. (. . .) Eminent sanitary authorities seem now to be in 
favour of what is called the Chinese process.”238 
Instead of investing in proper drainage systems, Hennessy preferred the Chinese 
model of house buckets, for the reason of not imposing a European custom on native 
people. In his Blue Book submitted to the Colonial Office, he quoted Dr Dudgeon, a 
European medical doctor, to support the Chinese house-bucket system ahead of the 
underground drainage system connected with water closets or house privies. 
Hennessy adopted Dr Dudgeon’s opinion, arguing that the association between "bad 
smells" and disease was not applicable to the Chinese because “[g]ases (. . .) are not 
so injurious to health when given off in the open air, as when escaping from sewers”. 
He concluded that “China is par excellence, the country of bad smells, and yet, as we 
have seen, the people do not seem to suffer from them.”239 Hennessy twisted the 
concept of the germ theory of disease to make excuses for the lack of infrastructure 
investment for Chinese communities. While followers of the theory like Dudgeon 
stated that “bad air” was not the cause of an epidemic, they did not mention that 
hygienic practices were important.  
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Chadwick, like his father Edwin Chadwick who was the author of the English 
Chadwick’s Sanitary Report in 1842, was also convinced that the health of the 
labouring population was largely determined by the state of the physical environment. 
He campaigned for sanitary measures because they were needed on both economic 
and humanitarian grounds. Chadwick’s belief and the view of the Colonial Office and 
its perception of Hong Kong's sanitation at that time were coherent. He defended 
official sanitary ideas, arguing that crowded environments required special measures 
to deal with health problems. Chadwick’s investigation contradicted the Governor’s 
description of the Chinese population: the death rate then was incredibly high, 
therefore “energetic remedial measures” were urgently needed and he expected that 
even when assuming the absence of epidemic diseases that there “there is no ground 
for the assertion that the violation of the laws of health is not punished”.240 Chadwick 
presented his own report in 1882. His main concerns were building and drainage. His 
research was mostly conducted in the Taiping Shan area, a Chinese community.241 
 
According to Chadwick’s observation: 
(1) Houses were commonly built back-to-back without backyards, no lane or space 
being left between them. 
(2) Most buildings had very narrow frontage. By comparison, the depth of 
buildings was considerable, ranging from 30 to 60 feet. In terraced houses, only 
the front rooms had windows so the inner compartments were dark and 
airless. 
(3) At the rear of each floor was a cookhouse, normally about 7 feet deep, which 
also frequently served as a latrine, storage room and even sleeping quarters. 
Chimneys were the exception, with the consequence being that fumes 
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permeated the living space. 
(4) Each floor was usually leased to a separate tenant and then sublet to other 
families. Severe overcrowding became a way of life. 
(5) Whilst the regulations required the provision of latrines, they were rarely 
found. 
(6) The drain system condition was very poor. Drains overflowed and saturated the 
walls and floors with filthy effluent. None of the public drains had vents so 
uprising sewer gas had no means of escape. 
(7) The storm-water drain system was chaotic. Drains were also inappropriately 
used as sewers that emptied directly into the sea. There was an offensive smell 
at low tide along the waterfront. 
(8) Little thought was given to ensuring the reservation of adequate street widths. 
The public right-of-way was so narrow that the bamboo poles used to hang out 
washing reached from side to side. 
(9) The water supply was barely sufficient for cooking and drinking. Families in 
houses with no water supply had to hire a water carrier to obtain their day’s 
supply from public standpipes that were turned on between 2am and 5am. 
Those who were left out had to obtain water from wells, distant water-holes 
and streams on hillsides. 
(10) The life expectancy of Hong Kong’s Chinese citizens was relatively short. 
Statistics showed that the mean age of adults at death was 43 years in Hong 
Kong in 1881, compared to 55 years for the whole of England in 1840.242 
Overall, Chadwick’s report presented the lay-out of Chinese accommodation 
tenements using illustrations. It was the first detailed examination of Chinese housing 
in Hong Kong. 243 
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According to the Report, Chadwick made a considerable number of bold 
recommendations.244 He pointed out necessary improvements to the water supply, 
drainage, scavenging night-soil collection and public latrines, as well as suggesting the 
provision of additional facilities such as public bath houses, laundries and new 
markets. Regarding housing, he commented that both the design and construction of 
existing dwellings was defective. He urged that Building Ordinance required a 
complete revision and that the amended law must be “enforced with more vigour and 
intelligence than the present, particular as to alleys, lanes and open spaces”.245 He 
further recommended the prohibition of cocklofts and earthen floors, the provision of 
open spaces at the rear of buildings, the provision of a window in every habitable 
room and all buildings being required to install a ventilation system because, 
according to Chadwick's theory, crowded and enclosed spaces were the hotbed of 
disease. He planned the provision of surfaced roads with drains before building lots 
were offered for sale and put limits on overcrowding. Other notable 
recommendations were that the government should carry out improvements to 
existing properties financed by an improvement fund set up by contributions from 
licence fees placed on gambling houses. He also recommended that buildings 
incapable of improvement should be acquired by the government, demolished, rebuilt 
and sold.246 
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The Chadwick report resulted in an almost 46% plummet in land prices by the end 
of 1882. Chadwick proposed the establishment of the Sanitary Board to improve 
Hong Kong's sanitary conditions. After being pressurised by the Colonial Office, the 
board was set up by the then Governor Bowan in 1883, with the government putting 
forward the Order and Cleanliness Amendment Ordinance 1883 by incorporating 
the Chadwick Report’s recommendations regulating the sanitary conditions in 
streets and apartments. It was an amendment to the existing public health related 
ordinances, such as the Nuisances Ordinance. The Order and Cleanliness Ordinance 
empowered the Sanitary Board to deal with overcrowded, dangerous and unhealthy 
buildings. It stipulated that overcrowded, filthy houses would be seen as dangerous 
or injurious to the public health and that the Magistrate should issue a summons 
against the householder.247 Efforts to regulate excrementitious disposal also could be  
seen in the Ordinance. For many dwellings in Hong Kong at that time that did not have 
a drainage system, the collection of soil at night by cleaners was common practice.  By 
nationalising the property rights of night-soil and urine, and outsourcing the collection 
to designated contractors, the government intended to control sanitary practices. For 
a few houses with toilet facilities and new developments, the Ordinance regulated 
connecting drains to water-closets.248 The Ordinance also licensed domestic animals. 
Households raising pigs were required to attain a licence.249 It also became the first 
building control legislation regulating the density and ventilation of buildings in 
Hong Kong. For example, sub-section 3(a) of the Ordinance stipulated the minimum 
space (50 square feet) and volume of air (550 cubic feet) per occupant, sub-section 
4(c) set up regulations for windows (the minimum room space that required a 
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window) and section 12 also required routine maintenance via painting and 
repairs.250 
 
Chadwick’s report was a landmark in the history of development control. Although 
compared to previous regulations Chadwick did not present many new concepts, the 
Report clearly proved that urban regulation work in the previous forty years had 
failed. The Sanitary Board consisted of the Surveyor-General, the Registrar-General 
and the Colonial-Surgeon, based on the English municipal model of the time. The 
Ordinance gave the Board wide powers to deal with insanitary houses, the inspection 
of premises and compulsory disinfection. However, these policies displeased some 
Chinese residents.251 Strong opposition from property owners and landlords caused 
these provisions to be withdrawn because the Ordinance forced them to reduce their 
rental area and disturbed their everyday life. The draft bill did not even obtain a first 
reading in the Legislative Council. In order to comfort the Chinese privileged class, the 
government revised the Ordinance and recruited two elected members (only 
taxpayers and residents documented on the juries list were qualified as voters 
because they could read English) onto the Sanitary Board. In 1886, an amended Public 
Health Bill was drawn up by the new Sanitary Board and passed in 1887 by an official 
majority over the unanimous opposition of the unofficial members.252 The unofficial 
Chinese members led the opposition on the ground based on insufficient consultation, 
of attempting to apply western standards to Chinese people and for removing 
valuable space from needy Chinese tenants. They claimed that what was perhaps 
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necessary legislation in England was not required in Hong Kong. Principally, they 
demanded compensation for the property owners affected by the bill.253 
 
As Yiu highlights, Public Health Ordinance 1887 was a much more detailed law 
governing buildings than previous regulations. 254 Part III of the Ordinance established 
drainage system requirements that made a drainage system compulsory for new 
buildings.255 Section 66 of the Ordinance was also the first time in the history of Hong 
Kong’s building control stipulating that back yards with a certain space were a 
necessity for new buildings.256 Chadwick’s principles on density were adopted in law, 
as well as establishing the legal definition of overcrowding as being a building in excess 
of the minimum standard of 300 cubic feet per person being deemed a Nuisance.257 
An occupation permit system was introduced by the Ordinance for the first time.258 
The Sanitary Board at that time was officially fully in charge of building control. 
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However, implementation was not successfully carried out until the early years of the 
twentieth century, after the bubonic plague shocked Hong Kong in 1894.259 
 
In 1889, the Government attempted to introduce new provisions in the form of a 
Building Ordinance. The matter of rear yards was included in the Bill but was once 
more forced out by the unofficial members on the Legislative Council and had to be 
included in the Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance of the same year. A clause was 
proposed whereby mezzanine floors could only be constructed if provisions were 
made for a vertical clearance of 2.7 metres above and below. This was modified at the 
insistence of the unofficial members again so that it would only apply in cases where 
the mezzanine extended over more than two-thirds of a room, otherwise a clearance 
of 1.8 metres was permitted. Another clause relating to the provision of sufficient 
windows was eliminated, whilst the installation of privies was made optional.260 Stiff 
resistance continued from property owners against further proposals.261 The building 
control work drafted in the reformed legislations since Chadwick did not achieve their 
aims. As Colonial Surgeon Dr. Ayres stated in his Annual report in 1891, “the Building 
Ordinance refers only to new buildings, and existing buildings previous to the 
Ordinance remain the same.” Despite the Sanitary Board inquiring into the issue of 
overcrowding in 1890 and later intending to introduce a series of amended ordinances 
to enforce the overcrowding clauses, little effectively happened. Nuisance Notices 
served by the Sanitary Board were commonly unenforced.262 
 
An outbreak of the great bubonic plague hit Hong Kong in 1894, even though French 
researcher Paul-Louis Simond in the 1890s postulated a connection between human 
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and rodent plague, identifying the flea as a possible vector. Also, in 1894 in Hong 
Kong, bacteriologist Alexandre Yersin isolated the responsible bacterium  and 
determined the common mode of transmission, even though most scientists still 
believed that unhygienic living conditions was the cause of the plague.263 In Hong 
Kong, the leadership in the government were still followers of miasma theory. The 
mainstream opinion was that by omitting the implementation of the 
recommendations in the Chadwick Report, the government had paved the way for 
the coming plague.264 However, it is fair to say that the bubonic plague of 1894 
exposed the failure of building controls. In five months, over 2,500 people died and 
80,000 left Hong Kong. Between 1894 and 1923, more than 20,000 people were 
killed by the disease. Of the 2,679 persons treated in government hospitals, 2,485 
died. The exact number of victims was far beyond the recorded statistics. Of the 
victims, the vast majority were Chinese.265 With the outbreak of the plague, strict 
emergency measures were adopted. Empowered by the Closed Houses and 
Insanitary Dwellings Ordinance 1894, the government had absolute power to enter 
private premises to search, clean, disinfect and quarantine people. Chinese 
communities were considered the hot bed of disease by miasma theory followers, 
so strict measures were only applied in Chinese areas.266 
 
Tai Ping Shan District was the most infected area. On 27th August 1894, the 
Government submitted the bill of Land Resumption for the Tai Ping Shan District to 
the legislative council in order to stop the spread of the plague. In 1895, the Tai 
Ping Shan Resumption Ordinance was set up to improve the epidemic area. 
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HK$944,000 was spent under the Ordinance by 1899. Access to Tai Pin Shan was 
blocked and the whole area secluded. An army of three hundred British and Indian 
hygienists, policemen and soldiers were sent in to comb the whole area, with houses 
searched one by one. The resumption involved 384 buildings in the district, including 
76 houses that had reported more than 3 cases of Bubonic Plague and 146 houses that 
had reported one or two cases. More than 7,000 people were affected, with hospitals 
nearby used to accommodate the homeless. The government decided to burn the 
whole district into ashes so as to eradicate the then unknown cause of the epidemic. 
The Notice was issued and habitants were asked to leave in seven days or be punished 
by public whipping.267 
 
Regulations with rigid measures were introduced almost immediately to combat the 
plague. Ventilation was the main concern of the Closed Houses and Insanitary 
Dwellings Ordinance 1894. It was the first time a ratio of window-to-room area was 
designated.268 The Ordinance also set up limitations on the height of buildings and the 
standards for overcrowding. A more rigid standard than the Public Health Ordinance 
1887 was stipulated.269 The modern concept of building bulk control/floor space ratio 
was introduced, so building height was limited in accordance to the street width. The 
Sanitary Board was authorised to control building height. Buildings taller than 76 feet 
would need the Board’s permission to be erected.270 At this stage, legislation and 
                                                          
267
 Philippa Levine, ‘Modernity, Medicine, and Colonialism: The Contagious Diseases Ordinances in 
Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements’ (1998) 6(3) Positions 675, 705; Yiu Chung Yim, The Plague and 
Building Control in Hong Kong (Hong Kong Museum of History 2007). 
268
 Section 8 of Closed Houses and Insanitary Dwelling Ordinance 1894 stipulated that “Every person 
erecting a new building shall provide every habitable room therein with one window, at least, opening 
directly into the external air, and he shall cause the total area of such window or windows, clear of the 
window frame, to be at least one-tenth of the floor area of every such room.” 
269
 Section 9 of Closed Houses and Insanitary Dwelling Ordinance 1894 redefined overcrowding density 
as “Every domestic building and any part thereof found to be inhabited in excess of a proportion of one 
adult for every 30 square feet of habitable floor space or superficial area and 400 cubic feet of clear and 
unobstructed internal air space shall be deemed to be in an overcrowded condition.” 
270
 Section 12 of Closed Houses and Insanitary Dwelling Ordinance 1894 stipulated that 
“In the case of any existing street where the length of such street does not exceed 420 feet ...the height 
of any building hereafter erected shall not exceed 35 feet where the width of such street on which the 
 112 
implementation of building controls were continually driven by the public health 
concerns. Inhabitants in Hong Kong and their living environment were expected to be 
disciplined as the amended ordinances stipulated.  
 
Public Health and Buildings Ordinance 1903 was the first comprehensive and 
integrated version of building regulations. It combined the Public Health Ordinance 
1901 and the Buildings Ordinance 1889 as the drastic action to fight the plague. Similar 
to one of its predecessor, the Ordinance for Buildings and Nuisances 1856, which was 
basically an imported copy of the sanitary and building laws of England at that time. 
Building control and public health were integrated into a legal format that symbolised 
their inseparable relationship. Besides ventilation, density control, floor space ratio, 
drainage and water closet, building materials were also regulated to prevent mice 
hiding on ceilings or inside hollow walls. It was the response to the great plague.271 
The short life and frequent enactment and amendments to the Public Health 
Ordinances at the turn of century reflected the serious sanitary problems encountered 
in Hong Kong. The legislation of the Ordinances, its predecessors and related 
legislation clearly represented the government’s intentions, with Chadwick’s 
prescriptions to treat the issues. Public health authorities dominated the drafting of 
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building control legislation and its implementation. Though building height, back yard 
regulations, floor space ratio, height of mezzanine floors and occupation permit were 
shown on paper, the achievements were unsatisfactory, with Dr. Ayres again 
criticising the Sanitary Board in 1895, during the outbreak of the plague, for its “long, 
wordy, windy, desultory rambling discussions, ending in nothing being done”. 272 
Nevertheless, the administration did achieve a number of major improvements 
recommended by Chadwick. Between 1883 and 1890, with over HK$2 million spent 
on improvements to water supplies and over HK$1 million on the sewerage system 
and drains. Furthermore, HK$660,000 was used for the construction of new markets, 
animal depots, slaughter houses, latrines, laundries and other infrastructure works.273 
At that time, the annual government expenditure was about HK$2 million (HK$2.3 
million in 1894) therefore the government spending on sanitation related public works 
accounted for about a quarter of annual expenditure every year in average. Although 
resistance was met, such as two petitions developed by the Hong Kong Chamber of 
Commerce at the end of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth 
century, urban regulation work continued.274  
 
To conclude this section, the close relations between public health and development 
control reflect that sanitary concerns were the driving force behind regulating the 
living environment for 60 some years. Building control and sanitary improvement 
provisions had been the main theme of development control in Hong Kong in the 
nineteenth century, which represented the government’s concerns over colonists’ 
interest. While the campaign of public health was advocated to protect Europeans the 
living condition of Chinese communities was blamed as the cause of disease. British 
concepts and legal enactments of building control were imported as measurements 
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to regulate the living condition. Though the effort had not prevented the outbreak of 
bubonic plague, more rigid building codes were stipulated to combat the plague. The 
frequent enactments of sanitation related ordinances in the second half of nineteenth 
century, and at the turn of the century as well, reflected the inseparable relationship 
between building control and public health. In terms of planning ideology, the 
evolution of the ordinances also reflected the domination of public interest ideology. 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
In order to present a clear view of the urbanisation and evolution of related laws 
during the earliest years of British colonialism in Hong Kong, the table below 
summarises the most important events related to land use and development control. 
 
Table 3.1: Significant events related to land use and development control in Hong 
Kong (1840s-1900s) 
Years Events 
1841 
Controlling land use started in the form of contractual planning. The 
first land auction initiated the leasehold system as a land 
management measure with development control attached.  
1842 The first Land Committee meeting held.  
1843 
Surveyor-General, Public Works Department and Land Office 
established. 
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1844 
The layout of expanding towns was planned. The Committee of 
Public Health and Cleanliness established. 
The Good Order and Cleanliness Ordinance enacted. 
1845 Summary of Offences Ordinance enacted. 
1846 Market Ordinance enacted. 
1856 
Buildings and Nuisances Ordinance enacted as the first sanitation 
related law to include buildings in the title. 
1857 
The global cholera pandemic attacked Hong Kong, with more than 
4,000 deaths in the following five years.  
1858 Nuisances Ordinance enacted. 
1859 
Inspector of Nuisances established (later became the Sanitation 
Department). 
1862 Appointment of the Sanitary Committee. 
1866 
Good Order and Cleanliness Ordinance promulgated. 
1881 
Colonial Office conducted an investigation into sanitary problems. 
1882 Chadwick’s Report published. 
1883 
Establishment of Sanitary Board. The Order and Cleanliness 
Amendment Ordinance 1883 published. 
1887 Public Health Ordinance passed. 
1888 Veranda Ordinance passed. 
1889 
Crown Lands Resumption Ordinance passed; Building Ordinance 
passed. 
1890 
Amendment of Public Health Ordinance (No. 4 of 1890) and 
Amendment of Public Health Ordinance (No. 26 of 1890) passed. 
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1891 
The Latrine Ordinance passed; Amendment of Public Health 
Ordinance passed. 
1894 
Great bubonic plague hit Hong Kong. Closed Houses and Insanitary 
Dwellings Ordinance passed. 
1895 
Amendment of Public Health Ordinance and Tai Ping Shan 
Resumption Ordinance passed. Medical Officer of Health Ordinance 
passed. The Sanitary Committees Ordinance passed. 
1897 The Government Latrine Ordinance passed. 
1898 Buildings Amendment Ordinance passed. 
1899 Insanitary Properties Ordinance passed. 
1901 Public Health Amendment Ordinance passed. 
1903 Public Health and Building Ordinance passed. 
 
While Hong Kong grew into a trading centre, urbanisation appeared in the coastal 
areas and land auctions initiated land use management and development control. 
Though town expansion layouts were being prepared, development at this stage was 
piecemeal and without a systematic plan. Concerns about public health had brought 
up the construction of basic infrastructure and sanitation rules, with the significance 
of building control on sanitation concerns also reflected in the enactment of 
ordinances. An administrative state set up the land use and development control 
machinery to advance the public interest. The table of various development control 
related regulations represents the rise of a sanitary city in Hong Kong. The close link 
between building control and sanitation syndrome can be seen by reviewing the 
administration busily catching up with the need to improve sanitation. To conclude, 
sanitation syndrome gave birth to Hong Kong’s urban planning regulations.  
 
The emergence of urban regularisation in Hong Kong shows that, in terms of 
McAuslan’s ideologies, public interest ideology overpowered private interests. 
Though resistance was met, private property rights were restrained by public health 
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legislation. The public health and development control legislation had made it clear 
that the property rights of private owners were not absolute natural rights that could 
not be intervened by the State or shared with the public. The nationalisation of private 
night soil was a case that specially symbolised the triumph of the public interest 
ideology: almost everything can be nationalised via legislation, even human faeces. 
Nevertheless the legislation and implementation of urban regularisation and building 
control were advanced based on the needs of the colonists, which was very similar to 
the situation in Taiwan as introduced in the previous chapter. Some laws were 
deemed to be applied only to areas with western inhabitants, with race used as an 
excuse to stop improvements to Chinese settlements. Unhygienic living conditions 
were labelled a Chinese custom, therefore in the name of respecting local custom it 
has become the reason for not implementing building controls. Chinese communities’ 
resistance was overruled or adopted accordingly as well.  
 
In his book, McAuslan’s observation on British judicial judgements notes that there 
was a consistent bias: if confronted with a conflict between the ideology of property 
rights and that of the public interest, public interest quite often would lose. Public 
interest would get support only when the opponent against the planning authorities 
was a non-landowning citizen. 275  In Hong Kong, the administrative authorities’ 
discretion showed similarity. Though the parties involved with administrative 
decisions were different from those involved with British judicial pronouncements, 
the selective adoption of public interest was the same. In the case of Hong Kong, race 
was indeed a factor. The racially hierarchical system created a spatial apartheid that 
supported the colonists’ need to conquer sanitation syndrome. In next Chapter this 
thesis would focus on exploring the racial factor to have better understanding of the 
relations between development control, public interest ideology and race. 
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Chapter 4: The Racial Factor in Development Control: A Comparison of Taiwan and 
Hong Kong 
 
Introduction 
 
By reviewing urban regularisation operating in Taiwan and Hong Kong during colonial 
periods, one can see that concerns about public health made a major contribution to 
the implementation of development control. However, the public health concerns did 
not consider the whole population and instead focused on the colonists. These 
concerns and the implementation of regularisation reflected colonists’ views of the 
colonised; the laws and regulations stipulated to guide and control urban 
development represented the colonists’ way of seeing those local people, whose 
bodies and physical appearance were different to their own. The colonists assumed 
that locals’ ways of living had a bad influence on public health, a view influenced by 
modes of racial categorization which were used as an excuse for spatial apartheid.  In 
Hong Kong, “Chinese customs” were selectively adopted as the reason to justify 
applying some development controls to Western settlements but not Chinese 
quarters. Racial segregation in planning started as early as 1841. It was the colonial 
authorities’ intention to keep Chinese and European towns apart.  
 
Similar stories can be seen in Taiwan. “Chinese customs” were selectively adopted by 
the Japanese regime and integrated into the Japanese legal system for the 
convenience of governing, with some western principles of law already adopted by 
the Japanese system being simply ignored. For example, Chinese style collective 
punishment that targeted a suspected perpetrator’s neighbours and relatives was 
kept in the colonial legal system, with the western concept of judicial independence 
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never genuinely exercised in Japanese controlled colonial Taiwan. 276  Building 
regulations were also used to apply only to Japanese residential areas and used as a 
form of prohibition to prevent Taiwanese land owners from transactions and 
development. The consequence of the application of building regulations was that the 
city centres of newly regulated towns were reserved for the Japanese only, with old 
Chinese style houses replaced by clusters of Japanese style houses. However, the 
colonists were not the only ones adopting racial factors. In Hong Kong, “Chinese 
custom” was also used by Chinese local notables to plead against development control 
and the implementation of public health regulations, though the real reason behind 
the protest against the health campaign was economic. While Chinese customs were 
mentioned by both the Westerners and the Chinese in Hong Kong, the customs they 
described were neither traditional Chinese nor genuine Chinese. In Taiwan, when the 
Chinese factor was mentioned by mainstream scholars, it was interpreted to justify 
the hierarchy of the racial system, with mainland Chinese at the bottom, Japanese 
people at the top and Taiwanese habitants in the middle, therefore legitimising the 
modern urban regularisation brought by the Japanese. This chapter reveals the impact 
of the racial factor on urban regularisation and related laws. It also reviews how the 
factor interacted with administration’s selective adoption of public interest ideology 
when implementing development control. When the ideology of private interest, in 
relation to property rights, was upheld against the ideology of public interest, in 
relation to health, the racial factor was also proclaimed to obstruct development 
control. 
 
 
4.1 Race and building regulations: the case of Hong Kong 
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This section reviews the evolution of building control and public health ordinances 
in Hong Kong. In both instances, a pattern was repeated in which criticism was 
followed by new legislation, which was followed by more criticism of the same 
nature, which would then lead to further legislation or amendment. During this 
process, racial categories were repeatedly used to argue both for and against the 
implementation of building and development control. While this section also 
reviews the relations between racial factors and McAuslan’s first and second 
ideologies, it argues that the real cause behind the racial factor was economic. 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter of this thesis, the bubonic plague showed the 
failure of building controls in nineteenth century colonial Hong Kong, with 
Chadwick’s report clearly proving that urban regulation works were 
unsatisfactory.277 Nevertheless, the causes of the outbreak were more complicated 
than simply “insanitary living conditions”. Climate, transportation, population 
density and military action have been statistically proven to be related to the spread 
of the disease.278 While strict building control measures were enforced in Hong 
Kong by the city state, in Canton, Chinese officials remained largely uninvolved in 
plague relief efforts; the disease disappeared almost at the same time in both 
areas.279 However, the plague did expose the sanitary issue and shift the colonists’ 
attention, previously focused solely on British troops and merchants, to all of Hong 
Kong’s inhabitants. Consequently, building control measures were developed to 
cover the whole of Hong Kong. 
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As previously mentioned, Colonial Surgeon Dr. J. Caroll Dempster’s criticism of the 
sanitary system in 1854 led to the new 1856 and 1858 ordinances. In 1858, Dr. John 
Ivor Murray took over as Colonial Surgeon and repeatedly drew attention to the 
exceedingly unhealthy state of Hong Kong. In 1860, Dr. Murray’s damning Annual 
Report again raised the same issue, resulting in the setting up of the Sanitary 
Committee. However, little was done. In 1870, the colonial surgeon noted, “It is not 
creditable to this colony that after their unhealthy condition has been pointed out; they 
[the drains] should remain as they are, a source of disease and death.”280 Dr. Philip 
Ayres, who had succeeded Dr. Murray as Hong Kong’s Colonial Surgeon, reported on 
15th April 1874, that the living conditions of the Chinese were very poor, “such as bad 
drainage, deficient ventilation, foul privies, filthy condition of houses.” 281 
Nevertheless, in response to criticism of the health of British troops in 1880, 
Chadwick’s Report was published and gave birth to amended laws. Yet Chadwick’s 
bold recommendations were not fully implemented. Dr. Ayres, who held the post of 
Colonial Surgeon for twenty four years, stated in his 1891 annual report that “the 
Building Ordinance refers only to new buildings, and existing buildings previous to the 
Ordinance remain the same.”282 Even after the appearance of the plague and the 
introduction of new ordinances, including The Sanitary Committees Ordinance of 
1895 and Amendment of Public Health Ordinance of 1895, similar criticism was 
recurred in the then Colonial Surgeon Ayres’s Annual Report. 
 
Resistance from property owners and Chinese people was blamed by the colonial 
authorities for the failure of implementing building controls. The intervention of 
building control met with the combined opposition of the Chinese, who asked for no 
more than to be left alone, and of property owners who resented interference with 
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property rights. 283  Enforcement was difficult when the legal concept of private 
property rights was upheld against building controls. According to Bristow and 
Endacott, the Public Health Ordinance forced landlords to reduce their rental 
areas.284 Local Chinese notables led the petition against the proposal and pleaded 
that the implementation of the new regulation would inevitably intrude into 
people’s everyday life. Segregation was also an excuse for asking the authorities to 
leave Chinese people “free to live or die, avoid, catch and spread disease as it 
pleases them.” 285  To placate the resistance, two Chinese representatives were 
recruited to the Sanitary Board. They led the opposition against the attempt to 
apply the standards of the new British Public Health legislation to Hong Kong and 
demanded compensation for the property affected by the bill.286 
 
Sir Kai Ho Kai, at that time serving on the Legislative Council, was one of the first 
Chinese physicians to be medically trained in Britain, collecting some 47,000 
signatures protesting against the Public Health Ordinance.287  As a result of this 
petition, the colonial authority revised the original bill. All sections concerning 
windows, privies and backyards were deleted, with only certain public health 
standards for new buildings remaining in the Ordinance.288 Nevertheless, the new 
policies were seen as a violation of the promise made in 1841 by Charles Elliot, 
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Superintendent of Trade in China, that the Chinese would be guaranteed against 
future British interference and allowed to follow their own customs. According to 
Ip, the establishment of the Sanitary Board was viewed as a sort of official 
intervention into Chinese life.289 
 
This was not the first time that the “Chinese customs” plea was used to justify 
opposition to health regulations. The colonists took it as a reasonable excuse as 
well. As mentioned earlier, Hennessy stated that “the system of water-closets and 
house privies is a system quite out of place in a tropical colony, and not in 
accordance with the custom of the Chinese people.”290 He also argued that “some 
of the provisions (of the Ordinance for Building and Nuisances, 1856) are entirely 
unsuited to this Colony and would do more harm than good if enforced.” 291 
Hennessy’s objection was the main reason why the Ordinance for Building and 
Nuisances of 1856 was not implemented in Chinese quarters.292 
 
Accounts of health reforms in Hong Kong have argued that members of the Chinese 
elites like Dr. Ho Kai, who were beholden to special economic interests, were the 
main obstacle to Western modernisation, and that Dr Kai’s petition against public 
health regulations was a consequence of lingering xenophobia and cultural 
conservatism. Yet was this really the case? Loss of rent was indeed a great concern 
for landlords. In his 1874 report, Colonial Surgeon Dr. Ayres described the living 
conditions found in Chinese tenements: 
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“the average size of the main rooms is 26 feet by 14 feet by 10 feet high, 
containing eight partitions, averaging 7 feet by 6 feet by 7 feet high, over 
which a sort of loft is often built to increase the accommodation, and in a 
room of this description, from 16 to 25 people live.”293 
Accordingly, the average living space for a person was about 180 cubic feet, far 
below the requirement of three hundred cubic feet per person stipulated by the 
1887 Ordinance. The enforcement of the proposed Ordinance would either push up 
rent or cause a huge loss for landlords, or both. 
 
The draft Bill also included provisions that required alterations to existing buildings to 
be carried out at the owner’s expense. The main concern of all economic interests 
affected was the requirement of a backyard (10 feet wide for one-storey structures 
and 15 feet wide for two), which would be equal to half the size of a main room. The 
removal of valuable space from landlords and tenants was the reason why land prices 
went down sharply after Chadwick published his Report. There were European and 
British landlords who suffered the same loss, but it was unofficial Chinese members 
of the Legislative Council who led the opposition. 
 
Race played a significant role in the campaign. Dr. Ho Kai spoke to the Sanitary Board, 
criticising the regulation of Chinese buildings as unreasonable. He correctly pointed 
out that all these regulations originated from the context of British cities. Indeed, 
Chadwick, in his report, did quote The Metropolitan Buildings Act issued by the Local 
Government Board in Britain to argue that Hong Kong's houses were below standard. 
The opposition claimed that these regulations violated the colonial policy that 
maintained the colonial divide between the British and the Chinese.294 More racial 
tension between the colonists and natives resulted from the outbreak of the plague. 
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In the name of public health, the authorities intervened in Chinese communities. The 
deployment of soldiers for house-by-house searches, the implementation of 
quarantine and the sealing off of a Chinese community were viewed, not only as a 
violation of freedom, but also as an intrusion into Chinese tradition, since Chinese 
people took care of patients at home rather than submitting them to a hospital or 
isolated cells, where they would be forcibly subjected to Western medicine. Disputes 
about Chinese and Western medicine increased during the plague. While Chinese 
patients refused to be admitted to the quarantine ship (Hygeia) and chose Tung Wah 
Chinese hospital, where all patients were treated using Chinese herbal medicine, the 
Sanitary Board opposed this. When statistics showed that treatments in Western 
hospitals had not achieved a lower fatality rate than at Tung Wah, the authority had 
to compromise. As Carol Benedict notes, “the resistance to quarantine was a 
reasonable response to an alien and intrusive medical system that had not 
satisfactorily demonstrated its therapeutic superiority to the indigenous one.” 295 
Benedict proposes an explanation to Dr. Ho Kai’s opposition to the passage of the 
1887 Public Health Ordinance:  
“He was a Chinese nationalist who selectively assimilated those aspects of 
Western learning that he believed would strengthen China, but rejected the 
notion that all western knowledge and institutions were intrinsically 
superior.”296 
Thus, while he opposed colonial health measures, Dr. Ho Kai identified himself with 
colonial views about crime and punishment, recommending English justice as a model 
for reform in China.297 Later in 1894, an empty glass factory was converted into a 
branch of Tung Wah to quarantine patients and Western medicine was introduced to 
Tung Wah in 1896 through the recommendation of the colonial authority as a 
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compromise, rather than to dissolve the Chinese hospital.298 The Chinese tradition 
was broken at Tung Wah and a Western trained medical doctor was appointed 
Superintendent. In 1896, the population in Hong Kong was 240,000, with 220,000 
Chinese. Tung Wah’s clinics received 110,000 patients that year. The figures showed 
that the hospital being a charity organisation did indeed play a vital role in Hong Kong’s 
public health system, even though Tung Wah had been independent from the colonial 
government’s administration until the first Superintendent was appointed. However, 
the hospital still did not get any subsides from the government until 1973, even after 
it was integrated into the official public health system.299 
 
The encounter and conflict between Western and Chinese doctrines on public 
health and medicine serves as a significant example of the Chinese appropriation of 
Western modernisation, including the public health movement and development 
control. Instead of assuming the superiority of Western practices and the 
backwardness of Chinese customs, Benedict criticises “the triumphalist narrative 
that characterised earlier interpretations [which] had seen the Chinese resistance 
as cultural conservatism.”300 Benedict suggests that the resistance and adoption of 
Western knowledge and discipline was a complex and ever-shifting process of 
negotiation and selective assimilation, undertaken by multiple actors for diverse 
purposes.  
 
Furthermore, while “the Chinese” were viewed by the colonial authorities and 
subsequent scholars as the principal factor obstructing the implementation of the 
building control and the public health campaign, the real cause was economic 
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interests. The British building regulation standard was not completely opposed, but 
selectively absorbed. The opposition, led by Dr. Ho Kai, condemned the lack of 
consultation, even though he did not reject the detailed construction regulations 
for new buildings when he served as a Chinese Representative. The petition mainly 
pleaded for affordable accommodation. This was an era before the concept of the 
welfare state and the solution that Chinese dwellers could opt for was to sacrifice 
comfort in exchange for low cost. Similar motivations led to earlier oppositions to 
building controls. When population growth led to overcrowding, it saw renewed 
opposition to the enforcement of the 1856 Building and Nuisances Ordinance.301 
 
Low cost accommodation was a reasonable request and in accordance with the 
interests of privileged Chinese elites. Class was a factor here. Race and traditional 
customs were conveniently used by members of these elites to mobilise Chinese 
people to challenge Western regulations and also to cover up potential class conflict 
between Chinese landlords and their tenants. Race and customs were also 
conveniently borrowed by the colonial authorities as an excuse when the 
government was reluctant to invest in infrastructure. The difficulties of 
implementing building controls were exacerbated by Hong Kong Governor John Pope 
Hennessy’s non-intervention approach. 302  In 1878, Hennessy took the view that 
traditional Chinese methods of sanitation and overcrowded conditions in the city were 
adequate. They were considered habits deeply rooted as social customs.303 Likewise, 
in a letter of 1881, Hennessy mentioned “a native population who will readily carry 
out the Chinese custom by which the sewage and refuse is carried out of the town, 
and used for agricultural purposes.” 304  Instead of investing in proper drainage 
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systems, Hennessy preferred the Chinese house buckets model so as not to impose 
a European custom on the native people. In order to support his opinion of “leaving 
the Chinese custom alone”, he did not even consider the living conditions in Chinese 
tenement buildings as being overcrowded, stating: 
“These houses can hardly be called overcrowded. In no case is there less 
than 250 cubic feet for every individual inhabitant, men, women and 
children included; and never reckoning the space in verandas and kitchens, 
the average space would be about 400 cubic feet for each individual.”305 
These figures were very different from Dr Ayres's estimate of on average of 
approximately 180 cubic feet per person.  
 
Nevertheless, even campaigners for public health like Dr Ayres had seen the Chinese 
resistance as cultural prejudice. In 1898, in the Report of the Commission to Inquire 
into the Existence of Insanitary Properties in the Colony, Dr. Ayres commented: 
“Many laws have been made in the twenty years previous to 1894 to remedy 
the insanitary state of the Colony, but most have remained dead letters owing 
to the difficulties of enforcing them and the prejudices of the Chinese…”306 
The topic of racial and cultural difference was treated at some length, with both sides 
(the Chinese and colonists) happy with the excuse for their reluctance or 
disagreement with the building control reforms. For the campaigners and reformers, 
the Chinese were the main obstacle to sanitary regulation and building controls. They 
genuinely assumed that the issue was mostly racial and cultural. 307  While most 
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criticism focused on the Chinese residents, the State’s responsibilities were also 
mentioned. However, though the reformers condemned the colonial government for 
its failure to enforce the regulations, this criticism assumed that a more powerful 
administrative apparatus was needed to deal with the Chinese factor.308 So, the root 
of the issue was held to be the Chinese. There was a hidden discourse behind this kind 
of criticism, which held that the correct approach to the reforms was to support the 
entire Ordinance, the amendments, and the regulatory measures introduced by the 
sanitary authorities. Regulating Chinese habitation was the cure to poor sanitary 
conditions. 
 
Sanitation campaigners, like Ayres, emphasised that regulating Chinese habitation 
could have helped solve the sanitary syndrome if the regulatory rules relating to 
both Chinese and non-Chinese habitations had been implemented alongside 
proactive investment in infrastructure. 309  Yet such investment was frequently 
lacking. The Sanitary Board of Hong Kong, in charge of public health, was actually 
an importation of the British General Board of Health. During the birth of the public 
health movement, the State was expected to play a crucial role in the campaign and 
asked to invest in public health. The British Public Health Act of 1848, which was the 
outcome of Edwin Chadwick’s Sanitary Report and the Health of Towns Association’s 
campaign, was one of the first to challenge the notion of laissez-faire. It stipulated 
government investment in infrastructure and set up the authorities to take charge of 
public health, with the following presenting some features of the act: 
(1) The establishment of a General Board of Health. 310 
(2) Responsibility for water supplies and drainage, amongst other things, was 
given to corporations. 311 
(3) Permission was granted to towns that did not have corporation status to 
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have a Local Board of Health.312 
(4) Taxes and fees would be levied locally to pay for improvements.313 
(5) Where the death rate exceeded 23 in every 1,000, a Local Board of Health 
could be imposed by the General Board of Health.314 
  
Responsibilities similar to these stipulations on public investment, including water 
supply, drainage and street cleaning, were also incorporated on the regulations of 
the Hong Kong Sanitary Board in 1883.315 However, little was done in terms of public 
investment in Hong Kong, until Chadwick filed his report. As Bristow states on the 
subject of the failures of the Sanitary Committee, “despite recommendation that a 
complete reorganisation of the drainage system and proper enforcement of existing 
ordinances were required, little was done, mainly on the grounds of cost. ”316 During 
the three decades, investment in infrastructure had consistently proved insufficient 
in Hong Kong. It was unsurprising that Dr. Ayres repeatedly criticised the Sanitary 
Committee and Sanitary Board for nothing ever being done or achieved.  
 
This thesis argues that the causes for failing to implement building control were 
economic. The lack of government investment in infrastructure meant that the 
implementation of building controls was destined to meet public resistance. The 
frequently amended ordinances repeatedly requiring people to be “disciplined” 
merely shifted the burden from the government to the people. Over-emphasising 
the “Chinese factor” as the excuse, both when the State was reluctant to enforce 
regulations, and when State enforcement met resistance, the authorities regarded 
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repeated legislation, rather than a greater focus on economic infrastructure, as the 
most appropriate approach for public health and a better living environment. 
Blaming the people was not an action intended to deceive, since the colonial 
authority genuinely believed the Chinese people to be responsible. Yet this 
mistaken view meant that the government evaded sufficiently investing in the 
infrastructure. 
 
The frequently-invoked notion of “Chinese customs” was a speculative inference 
and vague concept whose true contents had not been debated between the 
colonists, Chinese elites and reformers. They mostly referred to crowded living 
conditions. By illustrating the floor plans and interior of houses in his Report, 
Chadwick’s sketch showed a three dimensional image of the spatial tradition of 
“Chinese customs”: the ground floor was used as a shop, the upper floor was the 
living space and there was narrow front with a long depth so there were few 
windows and many partitions lacking natural light and ventilation. This was, in fact, 
a drawing of a typical commercial house in many urban areas in China or Chinese 
settlements, including Canton, Taiwan, Singapore and Shanghai. It is called a 
“shophouse” or “street house” in Chinese because it commonly appeared on busy 
commercial streets.317 However, the common pattern of a shophouse is actually an 
exception in Chinese dwellings.318 Narrow and long shophouses existed in the busy 
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commercial centres of towns. Many studies on traditional Chinese/Taiwanese 
architecture point out that the unique “pattern language” 319  of architecture 
enabled the busiest street to accommodate the maximum numbers of shops 
because the closer to the town centre is, the more expensive rent is.320 Chadwick’s 
illustration of the traditional narrow front houses in Hong Kong, on the contrary, 
did not represent the traditional way of living. The reason for the building style he 
had sketched, with its crowded conditions, was a consequence of commercial 
activities and urbanisation.321 Hence, the “Chinese customs” quoted by the Chinese 
and Europeans in the public health debate in Hong Kong was a myth. Similar to Hong 
Kong, the implementation of regulating narrow-front commercial buildings was 
carried out in Japanese colonial Taiwan as well. The Taiwan Dwelling Building 
Regulations of 1900 and its sub-regulations were set up to improve the ventilation, 
lighting and sanitary conditions of urban dwellings. Building permission was stipulated 
in the regulations because the hot-bed of diseases needed to be conquered. 
 
Ip Iam Chong’s observation on the British public health movement of the nineteenth 
century further supports the above point that the causes for failing to implement 
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building control were not racial but economic. Ip argues that sanitary syndrome was 
not necessarily a colonial product.322 As mentioned above, the original sanitary 
ordinance of 1856 was imported from the British public health movement, as 
mentioned earlier in this section. Campaigners like Edwin Chadwick, under the 
influence of miasma theory that maintained that diseases were caused by “bad air” or 
poisonous vapour, believed that the solution to public health was mainly through a 
focus on civil engineering, rather than through medical science. 323  Ip borrows 
Foucault’s argument that modern (Western) medical science not only envisions a 
space of configuration for disease, but also marks out the space for the localisation 
of disease. 324  He observes that the ideology of the public health movement in 
Britain and Hong Kong presumed that diseases each had particular domains of 
genesis, occurrence, development and treatment: the public health movement in 
Britain located diseases in crowded working class dwellings, while the movement in 
Hong Kong located disease in Chinese inhabitation.325 In both cases, disease was 
not viewed as an independent entity but associated with perceptions based on 
racial and class categories. Such perceptions on the part of State authorities were 
frequently not borne out in reality. For example, at the turn of the century, the plague 
disappeared in Canton and Hong Kong at almost at the same: this was a mystery to 
the public health campaigners who believed that improving hygiene helped extinguish 
the disease. While conditions in hygiene seemed to have improved far less in Canton 
than they had in Hong Kong, the same result had been achieved. However, the 
communities and dwellings of the Chinese in Hong Kong and the working class in 
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British cities were viewed as the hot bed of plagues, which needed to be conquered 
by civil engineering. Ip’s analysis of the public health movement in Hong Kong 
concludes that a disease cannot be separated from the social perception of different 
peoples and groups. The Chinese in Hong Kong and the poor people in Britain’s cities 
were deemed inferior and were the targets of frequently aggressive campaigns. 326 
Viewed as being responsible for the causes of disease, they were regulated and asked 
to be self-disciplined. Such legislation placed the emphasis on individual conduct, 
rather than focusing on State-supported infrastructure. Thus, in Hong Kong, when 
tenants were asked not to squeeze into a crowded room, neither subsidies nor 
alternative housing were provided. The main theme of the legislation promoting 
building control and public health burdened individuals with heavy and often 
unrealistic responsibilities. 
 
To conclude this section, by reviewing the history of building control and public health 
ordinances in Hong Kong, the interaction of racial discourse with the administration’s 
selective adoption of public interest and private property interest can be made clear. 
While the British colonial regime brought the concept of public health movement to 
implementation, the ideas of the movement adapted themselves to the needs of 
colonists. The well-being and health of Europeans were the priorities. Building 
controls were introduced in the name of public interest, but this notion of the public 
did not include the Chinese. When the ideology of private property was upheld against 
public interest ideology, the notion of “Chinese customs” was again used to resist 
building control. Viewed as inferior to the colonists and responsible for the causes of 
diseases, local Chinese were targets for regulation, and were required to be self-
disciplined. Instead of investing in infrastructure, as stipulated in the establishment of 
Sanitary Board, the colonial authorities implemented legislation which placed the 
responsibility on Chinese individuals. As the repeated legislation on regulating building 
and development and the repeated failure of its implementation suggests, the 
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amended ordinances which repeatedly required people to be “disciplined” merely 
shifted the burden from the government to the people, and the “Chinese factor” was 
over-emphasised as an excuse when the enforcement met resistance. The real cause 
of the failure of building control was economic, a result of the colonial government’s 
evasion of investment in infrastructure. 
 
 
4.2 The Chinese factor and legal segregation: the case of Taiwan and Comparison 
with Hong Kong 
 
Following the preceding analysis of race and building regulations in Hong Kong, this 
section shifts its focus to town planning and development control in Taiwan. There 
are many similarities between the two cases. In Hong Kong, the earliest building 
regulations were not applied to Chinese settlements, with Governor Hennessy 
urging that the Chinese were better left alone. In Taiwan, early urban regularisation 
was applied to city centres where only the Japanese lived, as was the construction 
of sewerage systems; “insanitary” Taiwanese dwellings were mostly excluded from 
such measures, and so derived no benefit from the infrastructure and 
regularisation.327 Even now, contemporary scholars and politicians in Taiwan claim 
that crowded and unhygienic conditions are the default way of Chinese living. Race, 
or “the naturally unhygienic character of the Chinese”, has been conveniently used to 
describe the under-developed state of Taiwan and the cultural conservatism of the 
Chinese people of Taiwan. 328  This section would like to challenge the above 
stereotype. 
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Reviewing the history of the public health movement in Japanese colonial Taiwan, 
Taiwanese scholar Li Siao-fong reinforces this stereotype, arguing that, in terms of 
sanitary conditions, the Taiwanese are indeed Chinese (the nature of Chinese being 
unhygienic), since it was epidemics that almost defeated the Japanese invasion.329 As 
mentioned in the second chapter of this thesis, the Japanese administration was 
shocked that a modern army could be defeated by an endemic disease and not by 
local tribes. However, Li Siao-fong’s conclusion that some races are superiorly more 
hygienic than other races by nature is highly dubious. In the second half of the 
nineteenth century, there were four outbreaks of cholera in Japan, with 
approximately 50,000 people dying between 1877 and 1882. 330 While Japanese 
soldiers died of cholera in Taiwan, the disease spread in sea ports like Nagasaki. The 
poor and working class in the dock areas suffered most. While the Japanese of that 
time are viewed as a more “advanced” people by some Taiwanese scholars, public 
urination was a common practice throughout the country. 331 In 1872, legislation 
was presented making it illegal to appear nude in public and banning public 
urination. 332 The more “modernised” Japanese people were not necessarily more 
hygienic than Taiwanese people, though it is a fact that the public health movement 
started earlier in Japan than Taiwan. Facing the fear of epidemics, the Japanese 
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started to implement town plans in Taiwan, but did not apply them in plague 
infected cities like Nagasaki.333 Writing in 1905, Louis Seaman argued:  
“Japan is the first country in the world to recognize that the greatest enemy 
in war is not the opposing army, but a more treacherous and dangerous – 
preventable diseases, as found lurking in every camp – whose fatalities in 
every great war of history have numbered from four to twenty times as 
many victims as those of mine, bullets and shells.”334  
The reason and motivation for Taiwan being a priority for implementing urban 
regulation was military based. This was the same in Hong Kong. Chadwick’s 
investigation into sanitation were prompted by the threat to the health of British 
soldiers. Governor Davis frankly said that the health and death rate of soldiers were 
indicators of local sanitary conditions. When Governor Davis proclaimed in 1844. “I 
will pledge myself for the improvement of the general health”, he was only referring 
to the British people.335 Sanitary syndrome began from soldiers’ bodies rather than 
native people, as parallel studies on colonialism and public health in India 
confirm.336 The cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong are not exceptional in this regard. 
 
In a Ph.D. thesis on British imperial medicine in China, Li Shang-jen adopts the figure 
of the “alien” from the American film of the same name as a metaphor to explain 
the colonists’ fear of disease in colonies. Li argues that folk diseases and epidemics 
in colonies were “aliens” to the colonists/explorers because they were fatally 
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threatened by and unfamiliar to the outsiders.337 Since fear and understanding of 
disease cannot be separated from the colonists’ perceptions and fear of local 
natives, the Chinese in both Hong Kong and Taiwan were identified as the carrier of 
“aliens”; or even more directly, they were aliens. Their habitation and bodies 
needed to be regulated, conquered or separated. Usually, segregation was the 
prepositional measure when colonising local habitation and habitants; it was also the 
most economical approach. Segregation was a common practice during the earliest 
stage of colonisation. It was a state of social exclusion performed spatially. Laws and 
city plans were enacted accordingly to segregation. As Anthony King notes, the central 
social fact of colonial planning was segregation on racial lines. The native population 
were kept out of core urban districts and confined to “native locations”.338 
 
In Taiwan, before building permission was introduced to the whole county in 1900 
through the Taiwan Dwelling Building Regulations, it was only applied to Japanese 
residential areas. The Mayor of Taipei County in 1896 published the No. Thirty Three 
Order, Dwelling Building Regulations. It was the very first appearance of building 
permission in Taiwanese history. However, the Regulations only applied to Japanese 
residences in five towns in northern Taiwan. Most residents were colonial officials, 
with their dependants and residences located close to town centres with easy access 
to State buildings and police stations. The Regulations were actually a prohibition 
order preventing Taiwanese land owners from transactions and development. 
Protected zones were reserved solely for colonists.  
 
Newly built houses in Japanese zones differed from traditional Chinese and Taiwanese 
dwellings; influenced by traditional Chinese architecture, they consisted essentially of 
post-and-beam structures that did not greatly diverge from their Japanese rural 
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precursors. Houses had a grid of wooden or bamboo supports that supported wall 
positions. Walls were not structural but movable partitions defining space or rooms 
with “tatamis” (straw mats) or wooden floors. Clusters of Japanese style dwellings 
could still be seen after the colonial years until these areas were regenerated during 
the 1980s by the Ministry of Defence and some departments or State companies of 
the central/provincial government in the Chinese nationalist government (such as the 
Bank of Taiwan, the Taiwan Water Company and Cooperation Bank).  
 
After the Second World War, the Chinese government took over the Japanese 
properties and they became high-level officials’ residences. For example, Japanese 
one-storey houses in Jin Hua Street, located in inner city Taipei, are still well-
preserved, some of them being high level public servants’ or ministers’ official 
residences. Jin Hua is now a quiet and low density residential precinct in a busy city 
centre. However, most of the Japanese dwellings here were previously used by 
Chinese soldiers and their families from the Mainland as dormitories.339 Usually, a 
house was divided into several units and shared by different households. Annexes 
were added and living quarters extended to the garden or street. Such a unique urban 
landscape was informally named Military Dependant Quarters and positioned in the 
original Japanese zones where the finer locations of the city were located.340  For 
example, close to the Ministry of National Defence, Tao Yuan Street was a typical 
urban ghetto accommodating veterans and famous for its Northern Chinese beef 
noodle stalls before being demolished.341 It was deliberate segregation stipulated by 
urban regulations and plans during the Japanese occupation to protect the minority 
ruling class. After the Chinese takeover, it was segregated as well but for a different 
reason: such areas became un-regulated and un-planned slums accommodating lower 
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class soldiers and dependants. Residents of these urban villages were alienated from 
local Taiwanese people, whatever ethnicity they were. 
 
Taiwanese scholars who preach Taiwanese nationalism still adopt Goto’s view on 
modernisation, which emphasises the importance of infrastructure and suggests that 
colonies can be brought to development in the same manner western countries had been, 
without examining the racial and spatial differential factors of uneven 
development. 342  For example, while some Taiwanese nationalist politicians and 
scholars praise the modernisation of Japanese colonisation by mentioning that the tap 
water supply at that time covered 60% of Taiwanese households343, the actual figure 
for the whole of Taiwan was 20% in 1942.344 Most of the running water supply was 
concentrated in urban areas.345 The 60% figure actually only referred to Taipei’s urban 
area. While the racial aspect was ignored, it is easy to draw the picture of “the civilised 
Japanese versus the backward Chinese.” Yet, if the progress of industrialisation is to 
be used as criteria measuring civilisation, some figures actually suggest the opposite. 
The Chinese Ching Dynasty started building water pipes in Canton in 1905, and within 
3 years, 89km had been completed. The Japanese started water supply engineering in 
Taiwan in 1907, with 169km of pipes constructed in twenty five years. 
“Modernisation” was in progress in China as well with no less efficiency.346 
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In Hong Kong, racial segregation in planning started as early as 1841. Segregation was 
the colonial authority’s original intention and had been decided on to keep Chinese 
and European towns apart. In 1841, when Deputy of Chief Superintendent of Trade A. 
R. Johnson set up a comprehensive land location scheme, some areas were marked 
out as bazaars serving the Chinese population.347 Victoria Town (Central District) was 
planned as an area for British settlement and commercial activities. Chinese people 
were secluded in Tai Pin Shan. In a letter to London of July 1844, Governor Davis 
expressed his concern about mixed habitation, arguing that it was a potential 
problem that needed to be prevented in the future.348 By the 1870s, there had been 
a significant increase in the Chinese population. Chinese businesses were increasing 
and prospering, while businesses in the European sector were decreasing. Having 
learnt trade knowledge and built their commercial networks by having served their 
Western bosses, many Chinese compradors started their own business. With their 
businesses expanding, Chinese entrepreneurs were accepted by the Hong Kong 
General Chamber of Commerce as members, with their stores and offices gradually 
encroaching on the British settlement. Responding to this change, Davis’ successor, 
Governor Hennessy reported in 1878 that “One sees warehouses that a few years 
ago were in the midst of a European district… now in occupation of the Chinese.”349 
Though segregation was breaking down a little, most Chinese people resided in the 
east and to the west of Victoria Town. A Clause in the leases of European Settlement 
properties restricted construction to Western-style buildings.350 Yu Sheng Wu and 
Liu Cun Kuan describe the changing pattern, highlighting that in the 1860s, 
European residences, their businesses and banks had clustered mostly in 
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Wellington Street, Ice House Street and Wyndham Street.351 In the 1870s, property 
transactions between Chinese and Europeans increased, with Chinese shops 
appearing on Wellington Street and Wyndham Street. In the 1880s, Wellington 
Street had become a mixed-race business street. 352  According to Evans, many 
Europeans could not afford the high prices asked for property in the European town 
so moved or settled in nearby hillside areas, living with the Chinese.353 Because of 
this, segregation ultimately failed.  
 
In terms of transfer of property from Europeans to Chinese, between January 1880 
and May 1881 the property transactions amounted to a shocking $1.71 million, with 
Chinese purchases accounting for 88% of the transactions.354 Governor Hennessy 
elaborated the growth of Chinese merchants and professionals in Hong Kong in the 
past decades, and he concluded that “it was a just and natural process, and that 
this transfer of property from Europeans to Chinese was not of a merely speculative 
kind.” 355Hennessy had been a supporter and promoter of commerce, proclaiming 
in 1881 that,  
“There being no legal impediment in the way, and it being a principal 
importance that no obstruction should be put in the way of the natural 
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course of trade… permits be freely granted for native structures along any 
part of the Queen’s Road, and business streets immediately adjoined.”356  
The expansion of the central commercial district collided with the westward spread 
of the Chinese quarter, with the east-side European/Chinese boundary gradually 
disappearing. Nevertheless, there was still a line drawn along Upper Wyndham 
Street, Hollywood Road and Aberdeen Street setting the boundary at the south of 
the European Central District. The Chinese were allowed to infiltrate few certain 
areas. The authorities could not seclude expansion from their former quarters, so 
they had to seclude themselves. The Peak area was made into a European enclave 
by introducing a clause that land could only be transferred to non-Chinese.357 The 
colonisers of Hong Kong were by no means immune from disease and death, and 
believed that their health was at stake when contact with the Chinese increased. 
Their fear and anxiety about disease, death and losing their military power and 
ruling authority soared. The expansion of colonial power into the Chinese 
community was also paralleled by this heightening fear and anxiety. 
 
Nevertheless, the policy to “spatially and legally open up to the Chinese” met 
resistance. The Registrar-General, C. C. Smith, and the Commander-in Chief, 
Lieutenant General E. W. Donovan, opposed it on the ground that the insanitary 
condition of most Chinese housing might introduce a health hazard.358 Driven by 
economic interests, Governor Hennessy was more adventurous. Reliance on land 
related items (including stamp duties, rates and land sale premiums) for 
government revenues was explicitly spelt out in his report of 1881: 
“Hong Kong is a free port; we have no income tax; we have no public debt, 
and we have a moderate surplus." "The house taxes, which were at the 
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same rate (12 per cent) in 1876 and in 1880, produced in these years 
respectively, 38,439 pounds and 48,032 pounds...The other chief items of 
our revenue are stamps, ... .”359 
Hence, no obstacle should be put in the way of development and land transactions 
between the Chinese and the Europeans. 
 
On the surface, the attitude of Hennessy’s predecessor, Governor Bowring toward 
Chinese people was similar to that of Hennessy, adventurous and broad minded. In 
his Blue Book of 1858, Bowing proudly emphasised that Hong Kong was a magnificent 
harbour, “inviting flags of all nations which there is nothing in its legislation to 
repel”,360 and that the colonists had brought free trade and justice which “produce a 
most salutary effect on the minds of the Chinese people.”361 However, as Christopher 
Munn has argued, Bowring’s assumptions about the impartiality of English law and 
the success of justice in Hong Kong during the 1850s are not borne out by the actual 
practice of criminal law during this period. ”362 The imperative of protecting European 
lives and property distorted the colony’s criminal justice system into one that gave 
little consideration to the liberties of ordinary Chinese people. As Munn notes,  
“The belief that Chinese people had been brutalized by their own society gave 
rise to dual standards of sensibility that demanded heavy punishment and 
intrusive control for the Chinese but urged consideration and leniency toward 
Europeans.”363 
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The legal system was heavily prejudiced against Chinese people: it abounded with 
bribery, intimidation of witnesses, inadequate provisions of defence counsels and 
interpreters, racially exclusive and prejudicial juries. In addition, there was the 
problem of wide-spread police corruption, the frequent use of emergency powers, 
curfews, deportation, and the running of protection rackets.364 Contrary to Governors 
Hennessy and Bowring’s words, grossly anti-Chinese legislative measures, racial 
division rather than equality, repression not liberation, were the norm during the 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth. 
 
In Taiwan, local people faced a similar situation in terms of their legal status. As 
Fitzpatrick argues, colonialism was legitimated by being exercised through law.365 
The military regime of Japanese empire imported modern Japanese criminal law, 
based on western law, to Taiwan in 1896. According to Wang Tay-sheng, the reason 
was not, as many have argued, because it was a modern Western system, but because 
it was the Japanese colonists’ law.366 Nonetheless, Governor Goto emphasised the 
necessity of understanding local Chinese people’s customs and respecting Chinese 
traditions, in a similar manner to Hennessy and Bowring’s governance of Hong Kong. 
Goto proposed a comprehensive and detailed survey of Chinese customs in Taiwan. 
For instance, Koo Hsien-jung, a Taiwanese bourgeois originally from Lukang Town, was 
rewarded with industrial and commercial privileges by the Japanese for his 
cooperation with the colonial government, with Goto inviting Koo to the Secretary’s 
Residence every Saturday and Sunday to consult Koo about Chinese traditional 
customs.367 Goto also created and headed the Provisional Council for the Investigation 
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of Old Habits in Taiwan.368 He wanted to adopt those that would smooth Taiwanese 
resistance and favour the colonial regime. Goto argued that those traditional Chinese 
customs should be integrated into the Japanese legal system and would be crucial to 
his efforts of making Taiwan a modernised state. At the same time, some Western 
principles of criminal law, though already adopted by the Japanese system and 
introduced by the Japanese, were simply ignored for the convenience of the colonial 
government. Various special Ordinances were promulgated to override legitimate 
criminal procedure and penalties.369 Savage punishments, malicious accusations and 
prosecutions were only applied to Taiwanese people. The legal system was 
institutionally discriminative on the grounds of race. The selective adoption approach 
represented the ideology of Goto on colonialism and race. Goto, who is still praised 
by some Taiwanese historians as “father of Taiwanese modernisation”, held that, from 
a biological perspective, the natives could not be completely assimilated.370 Thus, 
Taiwan would never be governed in exactly the same way as the Home Islands of the 
Japanese Empire, but under a whole new set of laws. 
 
To conclude this section, in both Taiwan and Hong Kong, because of the fear of alien 
bodies and unfamiliar territories, the colonial authorities put natives under their 
gaze; both people and habitation needed to be regulated and policed. Intrusive 
policing, racial and class discrimination, and a periodic campaign of repression 
existed in various areas of the law in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. Urban and 
building regulation was a typical example. As King points out, physical-planning 
notions and legislation were introduced as part of the overall expression of colonial 
power.371 
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4.3 Conclusion 
 
In the cases of both Taiwan and Hong Kong, while the colonial powers brought the 
concept of modernisation and public health to the colonised, such campaigns 
adapted themselves to the needs of colonists. In both cases, the colonial authorities 
segregated and put native urban areas under their control and had the habitation 
regulated, so that the fear of alien bodies and disease-ridden environments could 
be conquered to meet the priorities of the colonists. Hierarchical systems were built 
according to racial categorisation, and these racial systems were legitimated by 
legislation. Law in the colonies had responsively extended towards unfamiliar 
territories and by doing so sought the subjugation of the alien race and habitation 
in a determined order. Colonial power and imperial violence was regulated through 
law, which played the leading part in the creation of westernized civilisation. By 
promulgating laws related to development control, the colonial states projected a 
particular gaze towards both space and race that had the consequence of delineating 
certain spaces and the native inhabitants. In the spatial control process, racism 
appeared as a product of diverse political actions driven by economic forces. As 
Swanson highlights, “problems of public health and sanitation, over-crowding, slums, 
public order and security [were] perceived in terms of racial differences.”372   The 
culture and class-specific perception of health hazards, more than actual health 
hazards themselves, were instrumental in determining many colonial urban planning 
policies. Racism had become the nature of colonial planning law. The law was used as 
an instrument to reinforce the perception of the colonial force over native people 
and their plan to form new social constructions. 
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As a result, building regulations were introduced according to the standards 
deemed appropriate to the segregated population. Segregation and planning 
arranged a certain population at a certain location, so that an order could be 
created without disturbing the overall power structure. This arrangement was an 
integral part of the “modernisation” progress. While Goto, Hennessy and Bowering 
were praised as either “the Father of Taiwanese Modernisation”, “liberal” or 
“progressive”, an image of conservatism and retrogression was labelled on the 
Chinese to serve as contrast and justification for such measures. A hierarchy of 
racism was created in which ethnic groups were regarded as more “civilized” the 
less “Chinese” they appeared. People in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore are still 
competing for the status of being “less Chinese” to this day. To the Taiwanese, the 
only way to win the competition is to identify themselves as non-Chinese and 
discriminate against the Chinese; otherwise there is no way to challenge the 
superiority of British subjects (of Hong Kong or Singapore). The Chinese myth still 
dominates the discourse analysing Japanese colonisation and the ruling state. While 
such essentialist racial discourses are problematic in and of themselves, the 
comparison of the Chinese and Japanese, and the statement of the Japanese being 
superior also ignores the fact, mentioned earlier in this chapter, that the Chinese 
Ching Dynasty started modernisation in the Western style in some coastal cities 
earlier than the Japanese colonial authority, and with more efficiency in some 
areas. More importantly, the notion of modernisation implies a process of social 
adoption throughout a universal society, leading to racial segregation and spatial 
uneven-development being ignored.  
 
Regarding the competition between McAuslan’s ideologies of public interest and 
private property rights, it can be seen the campaigns of public health and urban 
regulation selectively adopted the ideologies of public interest and private property 
rights in order to suit the well-being of the colonists. Urban regulation was introduced 
in the name of public interest to suppress property rights - yet while the private 
property in question mostly belonged to the local Chinese, the “public” did not include 
them. Likewise, when the ideology of private property rights was upheld against public 
 149 
interest ideology, because the State lacked the resources to implement infrastructure, 
racial was used to as an excuse to resist urban regulation. As mentioned in the first 
section of this chapter, local natives were legally categorised as inferior to the 
colonists and viewed as responsible for disease and epidemic, and were consequently 
targeted to be regulated and ordered to be disciplined. Instead of the colonial 
authorities’ investing in infrastructure, the requirement of urban regulation burdened 
native individuals with responsibilities. This finding accords with McAuslan’s 
observation of British planning law in practice.  He argues that British courts had a 
clear and consistent bias: if confronted with a conflict between private property 
ideology and that of public interest, the property owner would usually win. If 
confronted with a non-landowning citizen, the courts usually supported the 
authorities in the name of public interest.373 In the cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
colonists were entitled to better protection than the rest of the public, with this 
privilege coming at the cost of other people. The colonial administration’s inclination 
toward planning ideologies was arbitrary and fluid. As I have argued in this chapter, 
the public is not comprised of equal individuals with no differences: the public 
hierarchies in Taiwan and Hong Kong appeared in the format of racial apartheid. The 
racial factor was conveniently used by the administration to protect the colonists and 
serve the interest of colonial regime. Yet the real force behind such discourse, and 
that which drove urban regulation was economic: the empirical power. 
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Chapter 5: The Modern Planning of the Developmentalist State in Taiwan 
 
In previous chapters, this thesis introduced the earliest stages of town planning in 
Taiwan and Hong Kong during the nineteenth century. In Taiwan, urban regularisation, 
the embryo of modern planning, was imported by colonial Japan to serve the interest 
of the colonists. Similarly, in Hong Kong, the contractual planning of the British 
leasehold system was the crucial mechanism regularising land use. In both cases, 
sanitation syndrome was the primary reason initiating the earliest phase of land-use 
control and urban regularisation. Concerns about colonists’ public health had 
necessitated the construction of basic infrastructure and sanitation rules. The 
emergence of urban regularisation in both Taiwan and Hong Kong shows that, in terms 
of McAuslan’s ideologies, public interest ideology overpowered that of private 
interests. Nevertheless while the campaigns of public health and urban regularisation 
adopted themselves to the needs of colonists, colonial powers selectively adopted 
public interest ideology and private property ideology. Decisions regarding urban 
regularisation and building controls were taken by colonial regimes based entirely on 
the needs of the colonists, and the colonised natives were not considered as “the 
public”. This thesis further points out that the “public” is not comprised of equal 
individuals with no differences, and that public hierarchies in Taiwan and Hong Kong 
manifested in the form of racial apartheid. Race was conveniently used by the colonial 
administration to protect the colonists and urban regularisations were introduced 
according to the standards deemed appropriate to the segregated population. 
Moreover, laws were stipulated to legitimate the spatial segregation and hierarchical 
system of racism. In the following chapters, this thesis will continue to introduce the 
development of planning laws in both Taiwan and Hong Kong: later stages of town 
planning in both cases will be reviewed to find out how the competing ideologies of 
private and public interest shape modern urban planning in Taiwan and Hong Kong, 
and the role of both states in the evolution of planning laws will be discussed. 
 
Introduction 
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After Japan handed over Taiwan to China at the conclusion of the Second World War, 
the Chinese Nationalist Party (Guomintang; K. M. T.) ruled Taiwan for fifty-three years, 
until losing the 2000 presidential election. Guomintang brought in the entire 
governing system, including state apparatus and legal instruments, from Mainland 
China. Hence, the Taiwanese contemporary legal system is based on the Nationalist 
Chinese legal system, which gave legitimacy to the Nationalist Chinese rule and 
current Taiwanese government. To fully understand the contemporary Taiwanese 
urban planning system, it is necessary to trace the history of urban planning-related 
legislation back to the pre-Communist period in China. This is the first task of the 
present chapter and is presented in section 1. Zoning control, the primary instrument 
of land use control, will be introduced and reviewed in section 2. Zoning was 
introduced to the Chinese planning system earlier than was urban planning legislation. 
The earliest zoning regulations were attached to city plans introduced by Western 
colonists and implemented in colonial cities on the Chinese east coast to preserve the 
character of non-Chinese communities. In Taiwan, accompanied by the revisions and 
enactment of planning related laws, the zoning system evolved with more detailed 
regulations. A comprehensive planning system was born and dominated the practice 
of urban planning, with zoning being the most powerful coercive legal instrument.  
However, zoning has consistently failed to match the expectations behind its 
implementation. In section 3 of this chapter, I will analyse the system and its 
implementation during both Japanese and Chinese regimes, as well as highlighting the 
reasons for its failure. To support the argument of this thesis, two cases of study are 
introduced in section 4 and 5. First, the urban planning of Wuchi, initially introduced 
by the Japanese regime and then continually developed by the Chinese nationalist 
regime. The second is the experiment of planning permission in Taipei which 
represents the challenges faced when planning permission is introduced into a zoning 
system. 
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5.1 The origin of Taiwanese planning laws: Chinese planning laws 
 
This section introduces the framework of Taiwanese planning laws. Though an 
element of the Taiwanese legal system, these laws were in fact derived from those of 
the Republic of China (R.O.C). Following the handover of Taiwan from the Japanese 
colonial government to the Guomintang regime of the ROC in 1945, the ROC legal 
system took effect, with most  Japanese laws repealed the following year.374 The 
following section therefore traces the root of current Taiwanese planning laws to their 
origin in the planning laws stipulated in Mainland China during the 1930s. 
 
In 1928, with the help of the Chinese Communist Party, Guomintang's Northern 
Expeditionary Army, mainly under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership, unified the whole of 
China. In April of the same year, the Nationalist Government was established in 
Nanjing and the Interior Ministry and its departments officially launched. One of these 
was the Department of Land, the first land administration authority in China after the 
Republican Revolution. In June 1930, the first land administrative law, the Land Act, 
was announced. In Section 3 of the Land Act, the State was given powers to classify 
land and establish land-use regulations: “Urban land is classified into two categories, 
free-use area and limited-use area.”375 The Act stipulated that Urban Design Plans 
should include the following provisions: 
(1) Limitation of land-use. 
(2) Limitation of building-use. 
(3) Building site boundary lines. 
(4) Building height, numbers of storey and shape. 
(5) Building density. 
                                                          
374  Wang Tay-Sheng, Jurisprudential Reception: Taiwan Experience and its Inspiration (Taiwan 
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375 Article 148, Land Act 1930. 
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(6) Building coverage ratio and floor space ratio.376  
Other land-use administration measures were introduced as the Act stated that: 
(1) “The government is authorised to restrain the use of fragmentary land.”377 
(2)  “The government is authorised to re-plot land.”378 
(3)  “The government is authorised to restrict building and construction.”379  
The government was given powers by the Act to regulate development. 
 
In 1939, during the early years of the Sino-Japanese War, the Urban Planning Act was 
stipulated as the very first urban planning legislation in China. The 1939 Act can be 
seen as an extension of Section 3 of the 1930 Land Act, which was later removed from 
the legislation of the 1946 Land Act.380 After Guomintang’s withdrawal from Mainland 
China, the Urban Planning Act was amended six times: in 1964, 1973, 1988, 2000, May 
2002 and December 2002. Generally, the alterations did not result in any radical 
change to the urban planning system. The Chinese 1939 legislation thus gave rise to 
the contemporary urban planning system in Taiwan. 
 
Three elements constituted the structure of the Chinese/Taiwanese urban planning 
system. 
 
1. The separation of urban planning areas and non-urban planning areas. 
 
Firstly, it set up urban planning areas. All land was classified into two main categories: 
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urban planning and non-urban planning areas. According to the Urban Planning Acts 
of 1939 and 1964, places with a dense population or of political or commercial 
importance should be assigned as urban planning areas, with urban plans drawn up 
as soon as possible. 381 They included: 
(1) Cities. 
(2) Developed commercial ports. 
(3) Provincial capitals. 
(4) Areas where population is greater than one hundred thousand people. 
(5) Areas specially assigned by the Government.382 
The 1964 law stipulated four kinds of urban plans: 
(1) City/ Town Plans. 
(2) Countryside Street Plans. 
(3) Special Area Plans. 
(4) Regional Plans.383 
According to the Act, City/Town Plans should be drawn up and implemented in the 
following cities and towns: 
“national capitals and municipal cities, provincial capitals and provincial 
municipal cities, towns where County Halls are located and other places 
assigned by the Ministry of Interior or Provincial Governments.”384 
The Countryside Street Plan is a less complicated version of the City Plan on a smaller 
scale. According to the stipulation, Country Street Plans should be drawn up and 
applied to the following places: 
“Places where town halls (Town/Village Public Offices, Public Offices of 
County Administrated Cities) are located. Places where the population has 
                                                          
381 After its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party, Guomintang withdrew from Mainland China to 
Taiwan in 1949. The origin Chinese legal system ceased to exist in Mainland China but was still effective 
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382 Article 3, Urban Planning Act 1939 and 1964. 
383 Article 6, Urban Planning Act 1964. 
384 Article 7, Urban Planning Act 1964. 
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been more than three thousand for five years, and has increased no less than 
one-third in the last five years. Places where the population are more than 
three thousand people and more than 50 per cent of the inhabitants are in 
commercial/industrial employment. Other places assigned by Provincial 
Governments or County Governments.” 385 
The boundaries of urban planning areas did not have to be consistent with local 
administrative territories. Urban Planning Act was only applied in urban planning 
areas. 
 
2. Zoning as the main measure of development control in Taiwan. 
 
Article 10 of the 1939 Urban Planning Act stated that an urban plan shall contain: 
(1) A contemporary demography of the city. 
(2) The plan area. 
(3) Zoning control. 
(4) Land use for public facilities. 
(5) Road system and drainage system.386 
This was the very first time that zoning control was introduced nationally. As the above 
article shows, zoning would be the main system of land-use regulation and the main 
content of an urban plan. The Chinese system is a use-based measure regulating the 
uses to which land may be put and combining regulations concerning building height, 
lot coverage and similar building control characteristics. In this system, the use-based 
measure and administrative regulations regarding development controls were the 
main content of urban plans. To specify the activities and character of each zone, the 
Act divided each urban area into four kinds of zone: Residential, Commercial, 
Industrial and Special-Use Areas. The purpose was to segregate uses that were 
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thought to be incompatible. In Article 13 - 18 of the Act, principles were set up to 
maintain the standards for living conditions and the commercial/industrial activities 
for each area. In Article 12, it was decided that green belts in urban areas should be 
kept to the city’s edges, and designated for agricultural purposes only. Articles 
governing zoning were kept in the later Amendments of 1964, 1973, 1988, 2000 and 
2002, and constitute Section 3, the Zoning Section, of the current Urban Planning Act. 
Mapped zones were represented by different colours drawn in the urban plans and 
have become development control guidelines. 
 
3. The hierarchy of reviewing urban plans 
 
According to the Urban Planning Act, “an urban plan shall be prepared by the 
City/Town Office or the County/City Government, and approved by the Provincial 
Government and the Ministry of Interior”.387  Town Offices were appointed as the 
planning authorities at the lowest level. In order to study planning affairs, and prepare, 
implement and review urban plans, all local and central governments were requested 
to set up an Urban Planning Committee (Article 74 of the 1964 and 1988 Law). As 
Figure 1 in Chapter 1 shows, a Plan prepared by a Town Office needed to be approved 
by at least three superior authorities.388 In 1973, the Ministry of Interior promulgated 
the Regulations on Urban Plan General Reviews. Article 2 of the Regulations stipulated 
that the review of an urban plan should be conducted at least once every five years. 
A general review was the only opportunity to modify zoning, such as a residential zone 
being changed to a commercial zone. At local government level, members of urban 
planning committees were appointed by Mayors who were usually also the chairs of 
committees. Mayors can hold great power over re-mapping zones. 
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To conclude this section, as I have shown above, Taiwanese urban planning laws 
originated from the R.O.C. Land Act of 1930, which was followed by the Urban 
Planning Act of 1939. Both laws were stipulated in Mainland China and set up the 
framework of the modern Taiwanese urban planning system. The Chinese Land Act 
and Urban Planning Act constituted of three core elements: separation of urban 
planning areas and non-urban planning areas; zoning; and the hierarchy of reviewing 
urban plans. Of the three elements, zoning was the key mechanism that control urban 
growth and development, by permitting and prohibiting land uses. In the next section, 
I will introduce the practice of zoning in the Chinese planning system. 
 
 
5.2 The practice of zoning in the Chinese planning system 
 
Being a mechanism that controls land uses, zoning was introduced to China before the 
1939 Urban Planning Act legislation. In 1900, German colonists announced the first 
comprehensive urban plan of Qingdao City. In order to protect “the right of 
comfortable living hood of Europeans”, the practice of zoning was designated to 
“permit” Chinese people’s uses of land in a Non-European zone. 389  Two sets of 
regulations on building height, building design, parks, road systems and sanitary issues 
were laid down to be applied separately in both the European Zone and the Chinese 
Zone. Chinese style buildings were not allowed in the European Zone; the height limit 
was set at 18 metres or three storeys and the maximum building coverage ratio was 
60%. In the Chinese zone, the building coverage ratio was set at 75% and rooms in 
living quarters in buildings were required to be at least 2.7 metres in height and 5 
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square metres in size.390 Chinese habitants originally residing inside the European 
Zone were moved to the Chinese Zone. 
  
Strict regulations were implemented to confine the Chinese evictees to certain areas, 
leading to new buildings being crowded along narrow streets in the city centre of the 
Zone. New building forms arose in a mixed architectural style called shophouse to 
maintain the traditional life style of “Siheyuan” (courtyard houses) and meet the 
necessities of urban commercial activities. 391   Similar stories occurred in colonial 
Shanghai, Dalian and Changchun. Zoning control was introduced to international 
settlements in Shanghai without a comprehensive master plan. Urban planning in 
Dalian and Changchun was closer to Qingdao. City plans were prepared by the 
Russians (Dalian) and Japanese (Dalian and Changchun), with the zoning and building 
control regulations used as a permit system.392 The purpose of zoning in these colonial 
cities was to create new settlements for the colonialists, to prevent new 
developments by Chinese people from “harming” the European or Japanese residents 
and businesses in the protected zone, and to preserve the character of non-Chinese 
communities. 
 
In the 1920s, before the Urban Planning Act legislation, the Chinese Nationalist 
Government published city plans for Shanghai and Nanking that were accompanied 
by zoning regulations. In 1929, the Shanghai New City Area Plan was announced, and 
                                                          
390
 Cao Sheng, ‘The Inspiration of Qingdao Urban Construction during German Occupation’ (2004) 1 
Journal of Qingdao University of Science and Technology. 
391
Shophouse and Siheyuan are vernacular architectural building types commonly seen in China. 
Shophouses are mostly two or three stories high, with a shop on the ground floor for mercantile activity 
and a residence above the shop. This mixed-use building form characterises the historical centres of 
towns and cities in the Southeast China. Siheyuan (courtyard houses) is also known 
as Chinese quadrangle in English. The name literally means a courtyard surrounded by houses on all 
four sides. A spacious Siheyuan would be occupied by a single large and extended family, signifying 
wealth and prosperity. Li Aihua, ‘The Architecture Culture and Preservation of Qingdao City’ (2000) 1 
City Planning Review. 
392
 Dong Wei, ‘A Study of Urban Plan History of Dalian’ (Dalian University of Technology 2001); Liou 
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commercial zones, special zones for import/export trade, inner city areas and 
residential zones were set up. Residential Zones were sub-categorised according to 
the wealth of residents: the upper class, the poor and the rest in the middle. In the 
same year, the Capital Plan was prepared for Nanking. The city was divided into a 
Central Administration Area, a City Administration Area, Commercial Zones, Culture 
and Education Areas and Residential Zones. An annex to the plan, the Zoning 
Regulations Bill stipulated the details, including the building controls. Through these 
measures, land uses were regulated and the activities of residents from different 
ethnic groups segregated. 
 
In theory, zoning was controlled by local municipal governments, but it was the central 
Nationalist Government that initiated the Plans. The person in charge of the Capital 
Construction Committee was the Minister of Finance in the central government, Sun 
Ke, the son of Sun Yat-sen. Chiang Kai-Shek, the Chinese Nationalist Party Chairman, 
endorsed the Plan by inscribing his name on the cover of the Capital Plan. By grasping 
the power to plan the two most important central-east coastal cities’ futures and 
policing development and industrial/commercial activities, political factions in the 
Chinese Nationalist Government were competing to control the resources of these 
cities. By implementing the Plans, the Nationalist Government strengthened its rule 
over coastal areas and consolidated its legitimacy, using planning and zoning as a 
means of social control.393   
 
The Nationalist regime started preparing the Capital Plan in January 1928, eight 
months after Guomingtang’s Northern Expeditionary Army unified the whole of 
Mainland China and appointed Nanking as China’s capital. The Director of National 
Capital Design, Lin Yi-ming, emphasised the importance of the Plan by pointing out 
that it would be the ideal model that other cities in China should follow.394 The Plan 
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was expected to be a pilot scheme, crucial for the Nationalist regime’s plans of 
building a modern China. As part of these plans, the Chiang Kai-shek leadership, 
representing the interests of industries and commerce in coastal cities, initiated 
violent oppression of workers’ movements once Guomingtang took over Shanghai. 
Unionists were asked to surrender their weaponry and students and activities were 
arrested or executed. Left wing revolutionaries were forced to go underground. 
Besides the potential social upheaval, the Chiang Kai-shek leadership was also facing 
political challenges from other Guomingtang factions. Modern plans for building 
China’s new future were urgently needed to appeal to the people to support Chiang 
Kai-shek’s leadership. The implementation of the Capital Plan was seen as the 
initiation of modern social engineering in China, with the selective assimilation of 
Western technology and the preservation of Chinese cultural characteristics. The Plan 
bore the mixed ideology of Chinese nationalism and Western modernity, which had 
been the ideological pillars of the Nationalist regime’s legitimacy. 
 
The Shanghai New City Area Plan of 1929 was promulgated in the same political 
context. By classifying residential areas in accordance to inhabitants’ wealth, zoning 
was used as a means of social control. Western-style urban plans were imported to 
coastal cities and modified to meet the regime’s political needs. Urban planning was 
integrated as part of the rulers’ authoritarian apparatus. The Nationalist government 
first experimented with the Nanking and Shanghai Plans, including the attached 
zoning regulations, in coastal areas, before introducing the concepts of modern urban 
planning to the rest of China and passing Urban Planning Act legislation. The practice 
of starting pilot projects in premier cities was echoed the actions of the Japanese 
government in Tokyo in 1888 before national urban planning legislation was 
introduced. 
 
The 1939 Urban Planning Act was kept in its original form while the Nationalist 
Government effectively ruled China. Not until 1964, fifteen years after Guomintang 
was defeated and withdrew to Taiwan, was the Act amended. Zoning regulations were 
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for the first time expanded and enriched in 1976, three years after the second 
amendment to the legislation, to deal with the increasingly complicated situation of 
urbanisation that resulted from the rapid growth of the Taiwanese economy in the 
1960s and 1970s. In 1976, Taipei City Government promulgated Taipei City’s 
Enforcement Rules of the Urban Planning Act. The Rules set up nine main zoning 
categories: 
(1) Residential zone. 
(2) Commercial Zone. 
(3) Industrial Zone. 
(4) Administrative Zone. 
(5) Educational and cultural Zone. 
(6) Storage Zone. 
(7) Scenic Zone. 
(8) Reservation Zone. 
(9) Agricultural Zone.395 
The Taiwan Province’s Enforcement Rules of the Urban Planning Act were also 
introduced in the same year with very similar zoning regulations. Section 3 of the Rules 
consisted of 22 Articles (from Article 14 to Article 35) and named Zoning Control. This 
Section regulated land use, use classes, plot ratio and gross floor space, etc. According 
to Article 14 of the Enforcement rules, 10 zones were set up: 
(1) Residential Zone. 
(2) Commercial Zone. 
(3) Industrial Zone, including Special Industrial Zone, Industrial Zones (Type A), 
Industrial Zones (Type B) and Fragmental Industrial Zone. 
(4) Administrative Zone. 
(5) Educational and Cultural Zone. 
(6) Scenic Zone. 
(7) Conservations areas. 
(8) Preservation Zone. 
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(9) Agricultural Zone. 
(10) Zone of Other Uses.396 
Under both Rules in Taipei City and Taiwan Province, use classes were regulated and 
a segregation system set up to prevent mixing different kinds of economic activities. 
The Enforcement Rules of Urban Planning Act of Taipei City and Taiwan Province 
provided a new channel for amendments of use classes. Before the advent of the two 
Enforcement Rules, use classes were rigidly attached to an urban plan and technically 
seen as part of an urban plan. Without reviewing the urban plan, zoning use classes 
could not be modified. According to Urban Planning Act, though an urban plan would 
need to be reviewed at least every five years, some plans had been left unreviewed 
for ten years or more. After the promulgation of the Rules, use classes could be more 
flexibly adjusted by only amending the Enforcement Rules of Urban Planning Act. 
Regulations governing zoning use classes comprised Section 3 of the Enforcement 
Rules, in both Taipei City and Taiwan Province. In 1984, the regulations in Taipei City 
were significantly expanded again and the whole of Section 3 became the Taipei City 
Land Use and Zoning Control Regulations, an independent statutory instrument from 
the Enforcement Rules of Taipei. The complexity of the zoning system in Taipei was 
enriched by the delegated legislation. The Taipei City Land Use and Zoning Control 
Regulations was the most complicated zoning code in Taiwan, containing stipulations 
for 56 categories of use classes and twenty-two zones. 
 
There are some similarities in non-urban planning areas, but the regulations came 
later. In 1974, Regional Planning Act was passed by Legislative Yuan to replace Article 
19 (provisions for Regional Plans) of Urban Planning Act, as the new legal authority for 
Regional Plans. Compared to City Plans, Regional Plans were supposed to be more 
development oriented. They were expected to encourage the utilisation of land and 
natural resources and advance economic development, as stipulated in ‘Section 1: 
General’. According to the Act, the government is obliged to draft and prepare four 
Regional Plans: the Northern Regional Plan, the Southern Regional Plan, the Central 
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Regional Plan and the Eastern Regional Plan. However, there was neither a 
commercial/industrial/tourism development plan nor a financial plan provided for 
“advancing economic development.” Without the supplement for the means of 
development, the Regional Plans were only development control stipulations. The 
zoning regulations in the Regional Planning Act controlled all development activities 
in non-urban areas, similar to their counterparts in Urban Planning Act. In 1978, the 
Enforcement Rules of Regional Planning Act was disseminated by the Ministry of 
Interior and later amended in 1988 and 1997, providing more details about zoning 
regulations on non-urban land. Of Taiwan’s total area of 13,814 square miles, more 
than 70% were regarded as Non-Urban Planning areas; therefore, the zoning 
regulations in the Regional Planning Act were applied to most areas of Taiwan. The 
course of development in the enactment of zoning rules exhibits the trend towards 
increasing complicated statutory instruments. The delegated legislation permits 
municipal level government to pass and adjust the regulations without central 
government approval. Meanwhile, the content of the zoning codes was significantly 
expanded. 
 
To conclude this section, I present the chronological table below, which illustrates the 
evolution of the zoning from Chinese urban planning law evolved. 
Table 5-1: Evolution of zoning in Chinese planning  
Year City Zoning Measurement 
1900 Qingdao German colonists set up European and Chinese Zone. 
1910s Shanghai Zoning was introduced to international settlements. 
Dalian Japanese and Russians prepared city plans and introduced 
zoning and building regulations as a permit system. 
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Changchun Japanese prepared city planning and introduced zoning and 
building regulations as a permit system. 
1929 Shanghai Shanghai New City Area Plan was announced. Set up 
commercial zones, special zones (trade zones), inner city 
areas, upper class residential zones, middle class residential 
zones and lower class residential zones. 
Nanking Capital Plan was announced. 
Central Administration Area, City Administration Area, 
Commercial Zone, Culture and Education Areas and 
Residential Zones were set up. 
1939 Nationwide 
(Mainland 
China) 
Urban Planning Act stated that an urban plan shall contain 
zoning control. 
1976 Nationwide 
(Taiwan) 
Zoning of Urban Planning Act was first time amended and 
expanded. 
Taiwan 
Province 
Enforcement Rules of the Urban Planning Act (Taiwan 
Province) was promulgated. Section 3 of the Rules, named 
Zoning Control, was stipulated. 
Taipei City Enforcement Rules of the Urban Planning Act (Taipei City) 
was promulgated. The Rules set up nine main zoning 
categories. 
1978 Nationwide 
(Taiwan) 
Enforcement Rules of Regional Planning Act was 
promulgated, providing details regarding zoning on non-
urban land. 
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In theory, zoning is supposed to accord with a comprehensive plan, a City Town Plan 
or a Street Plan, designated to meet the characteristics of each individual planned 
area. Nevertheless, the zoning section in the Enforcement Rules of Urban Planning Act 
(Taiwan Province) 1976 provided universal directives covering all urban plans in 
Taiwan island, except for Taipei City and Kaohsiung City. As we have seen, during the 
1920s and 1930s, urban planning directives were used as a means of social control, 
directed towards the interests of industrial and commercial concerns, and to cement 
the power of the Central Government of the R.O.C. Likewise, Taiwanese governmental 
plans have reduced the authority of local governments over spatial development and 
development control. More than three hundred urban plans followed the 
commandments originally stipulated by the Taiwan Provincial Government, leaving 
sparse room for local autonomy.397 
 
 
5.3 The evolution of Taiwanese systematic planning 
 
Though the legal source of Taiwanese urban planning is, as we have seen, urban 
planning laws stipulated in Mainland China during the 1930s, the earliest urban 
planning implemented in Taiwan was imported by the Japanese. The following section 
argues that current urban planning practice in Taiwan is based on the combination of 
two foundations: Japanese urban plans and Chinese planning laws. However, both 
Japanese urban planning and Chinese planning related laws were deeply influenced 
by Western planning trends, and therefore they share similar roots. 
 
5.3.1 The developmentalist approach of systematic planning 
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In the 1930s, under the growing tensions of war, Taiwan was becoming geopolitically 
more important to Japan. Due to the increasing importance of ports and industrial 
cities, simple urban regulation was insufficient. The legal system for modern Japanese 
urban planning was introduced to Taiwan to rectify land use, development benefits 
and land re-plotting. In 1933, Japanese civil engineers on urban committees were 
employed by the Taiwan Governor’s Office. In 1934, the Preparation of Implementing 
Urban Planning Act Committee was established in the Governor’s Office. The aim was 
to set up an integrated urban planning legal system. Under leadership by Japanese 
planners, the Taipei Expansion Plan and Hualian Expansion Plan were prepared, 
incorporating the latest Japanese planning concepts. In 1936, seventeen years after 
the Japanese Urban Planning Act was enacted in Tokyo, the Order of Taiwan Urban 
Planning was officially passed into legislation, as was the Performance Rules of Taiwan 
Urban Planning.398 According to the Order, the purpose of urban planning was to 
“regulate city areas and plan transportation, sanitary and social security facilities and 
economic development as well”. The Order of Taiwan Urban Planning continued to 
have legal effects long after the Japanese regime withdrew from Taiwan; it was not 
until 1964, that the Chinese Urban Planning Act was amended and officially operated 
in Taiwan. The Japanese Performance Rules lasted until 1972. According to Shia Chu-
joe, seventy two towns and cities were planned during the Japanese colonial period 
in accordance with the Order. The Japanese urban planning system thus 
overwhelmingly shaped Taiwanese spatial development.399 
 
The development control of Japanese urban planning was quite similar to that of 
China. Under the provisions of the Order of Taiwan Urban Planning, Taiwan’s 
Governor was responsible for setting up zoning in urban planning areas. The zone 
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categories included Residential Districts, Commercial and Industrial Districts, Scenery 
Areas, Artistic Areas, Crime Security and Fire-Proof Areas. The Order enumerated 
restricted development activities for districts; it also set up areas for special uses. 
Accompanying those restrictions, use classes, building height and building plot-ratio 
were also announced. The Japanese zoning system was in fact, a land use control plan, 
because it was concerned with setting up areas/districts for some basic urban 
functions to control land use. It was more a control plan than a development plan. The 
later Chinese zoning system in Taiwan had the same effects. The similarities between 
the Japanese and Chinese systems were one of the reasons that the two systems 
articulated almost seamlessly in Taiwan. 400 
 
In 1940, under the influence of the National Development Plan Bureau of the German 
Nazi Party, the Japanese Outline of the National Development Plan was published by 
the Cabinet.401 It was the concretisation of Japan’s “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere”, a doctrine promulgated during the Shōwa era by the government and the 
military of the Empire of Japan which argued for a self-sufficient bloc of Asian nations 
led by the Japanese and free of Western powers. Economic reasons played a large role 
in Japan's announcement of the Co-Prosperity Sphere in 1940. Japan required East 
Asian raw materials, such as oil from the Dutch East Indies and rubber from Indochina, 
in order to keep its manufacturing industry and military in China supplied. The U.S. 
embargo on oil and steel shipments to Japan and other restrictions on raw materials 
shipments by Western nations pushed the Japanese leaders to seek resources in Asian 
countries to ensure Japanese self-sufficiency. The other Asian countries in the Co-
Prosperity Sphere would also provide Japan with export markets for its manufactured 
goods and with land for its surplus population. Under the guidance of the Outline, the 
Task of Regional Planning in War Time was proposed in 1944, and the Proposal of 
National Development Plan in War Time announced later the next year. The national 
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plan included Manchu, Korea, Taiwan and Southeast China.402 In 1942, the National 
Development Plan Bureau was set up by the Taiwan Governor’s Office and Shingao 
Port commenced construction in Wuchi Town in central Taiwan.403 
 
Situated in the centre of the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, Taiwan was 
regarded by the Japanese Government as an important military base and gangway to 
the South Pacific region. Taiwan’s Governor’s Office was asked to enhance the 
construction of ports and traffic systems. According to the National Development Plan 
Bureau’s programme, the task of Taiwan’s development was to advance 
industrialisation and establish Taiwan as an industrial production base to exploit the 
rich natural resources in South Asia. 404  Regional and urban plans followed the 
development principles. In order to properly lay out the distribution of population and 
industry, three regional plans were drafted for northern, central and southern Taiwan. 
These were the Taipei, Taichung and Kaohsiung Regional Plans, as laid out in Table 5.2 
below. 
Table 5-2: Regional plans of Japanese colonial Taiwan 
Plan Area/ Cities Total Area  
(km²) 
Population in 
1939 
Population 
expected in 
1985 
Density 
(person/ km²) 
Taipei Region 823.8 664,510 1,200,000 1,460 
Taipei City   600,000  
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Industry Cities   150,000  
Satellite Towns   250,000  
Villages   200,000  
Taichung Region 687.4 357,082 1,000,000 1,450 
Taichung City   250,000  
Shingao New City   300,000  
Fong-iuan   50,000  
Satellite Towns   200,000  
Villages   200,000  
Kaohsiung Region 295.4 216.842 800,000 2.710 
Kaohsiung City   400,000  
Tzuoying   100,000  
Shiaugang Industrial 
City 
  100,000  
Fongshan   100,000  
Nantz   50,000  
Villages   50,000  
Total 1,806.6 1,238,434 3,000,000 1,600 
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Source: Hayakawa, 1941; Chang Jing-sen, 1993.405 
 
Taichung, which literally means “centre of Taiwan”, has been the biggest city in central 
Taiwan since the early twentieth century. The cities in central Taiwan were covered 
by the Taichung Region Plan. Taipei, which literally means “Taiwan North”, is the 
biggest city in Northern Taiwan and the capital of Taiwan. The Taipei Region Plan 
covered most cities in Northern Taiwan. Kaohsiung City is the biggest city in Southern 
Taiwan and the biggest port. The Kaohsiung Region Plan covered cities in the South. 
In the Taipei Regional Plan, new industrial cities were expected to be built along the 
Danshui River. According to the Taichung Plan, the construction plan for the 
commercial port Shingao was expected to start in 1939 and was expected to expand 
into an industrial port with a population of 300,000. Such a port would be even greater 
than Taichung City, despite the fact that Shingao (Wuchi) was a small fishing and 
shipping village with population of less than 20,000 at that time.406 In the Kaohsiung 
Region Plan, a metropolitan area in Southern Taiwan was drawn up. Descriptions of 
the Plans exhibited an ideal picture of spatial development in Taiwan: reasonable 
urbanisation, new industrial cities growing along regional commercial centres and the 
zoning system in urban areas were the means of development control that would 
prevent over-urbanisation and overcrowding. The planners assumed that rationalised 
development could be achieved through comprehensive plans. Due to their military 
defeat, the Japanese Government did not see the results of their plans, but the urban 
planning blueprints did not leave with them. After the Second World War, the 
Guomintang government followed up these plans and continued most of the Japanese 
ideas. For example, the development of Shingao Port (which was then renamed 
Taichung Port) in the 1970s and the construction of number 7, 14 and 15 parks in the 
1990s in Taipei City actually followed the Japanese footsteps on urban planning. 
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After the Taiwan Province Administrative Government Office of Nationalist Chinese 
took over the Taiwan Governor’s Office of Japan in 1945, there was a period of 
recession on urban planning until 1958.407 The most important land policy in the 1950s 
shaping the Taiwanese socio-spatial structure was Land Reform. It undertook land 
tenure improvement, land acquisition and distribution. Agrarian justice was expected 
to be delivered by the Reform, under the guidance of Vice-President General Chen 
Cheng. Agrarian reforms were appreciated by tenant peasants but opposed by 
landlords: the landlord class saw such reforms as military oppression over the local 
provincials of Taiwan, a view shared by contemporary mainstream scholars and 
politicians.408 However, my current research argues that agrarian reform was actually 
an extension of the civil war between Guomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, 
whose Red Army was mostly assembled of peasants. 
 
The preliminary cause of agrarian reform in Taiwan was the Nationalist’s defeat in 
China. In 1948, Guomintang was defeated in northern and north-eastern China. 
Despite the Nationalist Army being equipped with modern weapons, the Guomintang 
government was on the brink of losing the war. In January 1948, in order to acquire 
aid from the United States, Executive Yuan expressed the determination of the 
Guomintang government to advocate land reform. Agricultural Revival Associations 
were established in central and southern China. In 1949, land reform was 
implemented in Taiwan, Fukien, Szechwan, Canton, Kwangsi and Kweichow 
provinces. 409  Chen Cheng was then the Governor of the Taiwan Provincial 
Government and Chiang Ching-Kuo (son of Chiang Kai-shek) the Chief of the 
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Guomintang Party in Taiwan. Both aggressively carried on land reform, mainly based 
on the Three Seven Five Arable Rent Reduction Act of 1951, which stipulated a rent 
ceiling set at 37.5% of a tenant’s harvest.410 According to Cheng Chen,  
“…the general situation on the Mainland was deteriorating fast......and at the 
juncture it looked as though anything might happen. To safeguard the island 
(Taiwan) as a base of operations for national recovery, we require social 
stability……Farmers constitute more than three-fifths of the population and 
the number of peasant tenants constitutes more than two-thirds of all 
farming households. Social stability, improved people’s livelihood and 
economic development could take place only through land reform.”411 
 
After the implementation of the Three Seven Five Act in 1951 and The Land to the Tiller 
Act in 1952, it was claimed that “land reform achievements on Taiwan have attracted 
world-wide attention.”412  Actually, agrarian reform in Taiwan was a compromised 
agreement between local landlords and the Chinese Nationalist Government. 
Taiwanese landlords could only choose between supporting the Nationalist 
Government or facing the foreseeable Communist Party take-over. The Guomintang 
party was bidding to win over the political support of Taiwanese peasants and directly 
control the production surplus in the countryside.413 In order to implement the idea 
of agrarianism, Taiwanese landlords were persuaded to release their land to tenants, 
but promised compensation by the Nationalist Government. Since post-war economic 
difficulty could not provide enough sufficient financial compensation, Guomintang 
privatised major State-owned companies, which were originally taken over from the 
Japanese, releasing shareholdings to landlords in exchange for land.414 According to 
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the arrangement of the “converting landholdings into industrial holdings” policy, 
major land owners had become entrepreneurs and industrialists, with their industries 
supplying Taiwanese people’s livelihoods. The privatised companies were Taiwan 
Cement Corporation, Taiwan Paper Corporation, Taiwan Tea, Pineapples, Aqua 
Products and Livestock Corporation, and Taiwan Industrial Development 
Corporation.415 
 
Privatisation was part of the conditions demanded by the US government for 
American Aid. It led the Taiwanese economy to a new development of inputting new 
management and private capital into the bureaucracy of state companies and down-
scaling the monopoly of state capital.416 The legislation of the Issuance of Land Bonds 
in Kind Regulations, Taiwan Province (1952) and the Transfer of Government 
Enterprises to Private Ownership Regulations (1953) were passed to implement the 
privatisation and agrarian reform policies. According to the Regulations, 
compensation to landlords should be paid with 70% of land bonds in kind and 30% of 
state enterprise stock shares.417 However, the lack of investment opportunities in 
rural areas of recessionary Taiwan meant that most land capital did not find a way out, 
leading to urban land speculation. Land speculation triggered incredible price 
increases. The average price of land in cities shot up 14.9 times. In Taipei, the 1959 
price was 28 times that of 1954.418 Agrarianism in the 50s resulted in an increase of 
productivity in farming, contributing to the industrialisation of the 60s. Nevertheless, 
the recessionary 50s was a period of decline in town planning. Urban regulation and 
development control work were more emphasised than developing comprehensive 
urban development plans, as the discussion below will explain. 
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Two major issues changed urban planning during this period. The first was refugees. 
An estimated 1,500,000 soldiers and Mainlanders withdrew along with Guomintang 
after the civil war defeat. Being homeless and lacking social connections in Taiwan, 
most Mainlanders (Foreign Provincials) flocked into cities. In 1955, 66.8% of Mainland 
Chinese in Taiwan lived in metropolitan and industrial areas, while the figure for the 
islanders (Local Provincials) was 23.3%.419 Before the Taiwanese economy recovered 
and returned to pre-war production levels, the poor and overloaded economy fell 
short of providing sufficient employment. Islanders’ immigration from rural to urban 
areas contributed to severe overcrowding in cities. With both Mainlanders and 
migrant islanders moving into the same areas, there were severe housing shortage 
problems in urban Taiwan. Self-help informal housing was the foremost form of 
housing supply because of the huge influx of political/economic migrants from the 
Mainland and the countryside. Numerous squatter settlements were established in 
large cities. In 1958, 44% of Taiwan’s 106,259 informal housing units were in Taipei 
City, with 35% in five other major cities. Squatter settlements accounted for nearly 
one-third of all dwelling units in Taipei City.420 This overnight urbanisation resulted in 
slum problems, illegal buildings and the increasing price of urban land. 
 
The second issue affecting urban planning was the problem of scarce housing, one 
which compelled the government to enforce its policy of equalising land rights in 
urban areas, an ideological principle preaching the principle of “land capital gains 
belong to the public”, one of the most important revolutionary programmes 
advocated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. Disorderly urbanisation also forced the Nationalist 
Chinese leadership to implement urban planning. In order to accomplish both tasks, 
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the Taiwan Province Urban Affairs and Construction Inspection Group was organised 
in 1953. Group members included eight representatives from central government 
departments and the Taiwan Provincial Government and seven social welfare, land 
administration, sanitation and finance experts. The Group published their suggestions 
in 1954 as guidelines for the preparation of urban planning in Taiwan. 
 
In the same year, the Equalisation of Urban Land Rights Act was enacted. The Act 
stipulated four main sections in accordance with Sun Yat-sen’s four equalising land 
rights steps: assessing land value, levying land tax according to valuation, purchasing 
land at the declared value and land value increment going to the public. In Sun’s 1912 
speeches, he described the land problem in terms of the future “spectre” of monopoly 
and speculation. Sun advocated equalising land rights by implementing the following 
steps: 
(1) Self-assessment of all land values exclusive of improvements.  
(2) A standard tax rate of about 1% on the assessed value. 
(3) Governmental appropriation of all future increases in value. 
(4) The government have the right to purchase any piece of land at any time 
according to its original value. 421 
Sun proposed a unique method of self-assessment in place of the government 
valuation systems prevalent in the West. In Sun’s proposal, each land owner would 
submit his own valuation, with the State always reserving the right to purchase the 
land at the original self-assessed value, therefore deferring an owner from under-
assessing his property. Also, the annual land tax would discourage a land owner from 
over-valuation.422 The 1954 Act was a compromised version of Sun Yat-sen’s land 
policy doctrine. According to Sun, the equalisation of land rights meant governmental 
appropriation of all future land value increases. The Act imposed a Land Value 
Incremental Tax (capital gains tax) on land transactions. Although the tax rate was set 
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at between 40% to 60%, the tax was not levied on actual land transaction prices, but 
on an “Official Announcement Price” which was far lower than market prices. The Act 
was merely an urban taxation device because the government would not levy all the 
land value increments. 
 
Another significant difference concerned the way land value was assessed. According 
to Section 1, Article 15 of the Act, the responsibility of assessment fell upon the State: 
“The procedure for the assessment or reassessment of land value by the 
competent authorities of municipality or county (city) shall be as follows: 
(1) Investigate the transaction prices and income values of lands occurring in 
the last 12 months by sections. 
(2) Demarcate land value sections and evaluate section values according 
 to the investigation, then transmit the result to the Land Value 
Evaluation Committee for finalization. 
(3) Calculate the land value of each plot. 
(4) Publicly announce the land values for 30 days for the landowners to 
 declare the values of their lands. 
(5) Compile land value rolls and general registers of landowners in  
 accordance with the declared land values. ”423 
The above stipulations make it clear that the responsibility did not fall upon individual 
owners. The following article stipulated how the land value should be assessed on 
various occasions: 
 “In case the landowner fails, during the period of assessment or 
reassessment of land value, to declare the value of his land within the time 
limit, then 80 per cent of the announced land values shall be deemed as his 
declared land value. In case the landowner declares land value during the 
announcement period, and the land value declared is higher than 120 per 
                                                          
423
 Article 15. 
 177 
cent of the announced land value, the 120 per cent of the announced land 
value shall be deemed as his declared land value. If the land value declared 
by the owner is lower than 80 per cent of the announced land values, the 
government reserves the right to purchase his land at the announced land 
value, or the 80 per cent of the announced land value shall be deemed as his 
declared land value.”424 
As the above regulation shows, limitation was set when the land owner declared land 
value too low or too high. 
 
Since the Equalisation of Urban Land Rights Act stipulated that the Act would only be 
applied to areas covered by urban plans, all levels of government were urged to 
prepare urban plans as soon as possible. In November 1954, the Ministry of the 
Interior established the Urban Plan Reviews Group, with members representing other 
government bodies and two being urban planning experts. Of all the plans which were 
reviewed, fifty-three plans were approved and thirty-four required modification. Most 
of the eight-seven plans took effect in 1954 and 1955.425 In 1954, a proposal to prepare 
development plans for Northern and Southern Taiwan was announced. The Taipei 
Regional Plan and Kaohsiung Regional Plan would cover more than half of Taiwan. 
However, the approval of the Plans was not a priority and the planning authorities 
eventually gave up.426 Accompanied by the intention to continue with urban plans, 
sets of urban land reform provisions were announced to improve the deteriorating 
situation in crowded cities and restrain land speculation, including the Taiwan 
Province Urban Land Reform Procedure (1951), the Urban Planning Implementation 
Notes (1956) and the Regulations of Illegal Buildings (1956). For urban landlords, as 
their land was covered by urban plans, the urban planning and land reform legislations 
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meant: 1. building control, less plot ratio and less floor space and; 2. more taxes on 
land transactions. For people living in illegal buildings in cities, urban planning was 
nothing more than an eviction device. 427  Development control during that era 
appeared not as a guideline for development but merely a force of urban policing. 
 
There was nonetheless a chance, at least according to Western experts’ expectations, 
that urban planning in Taiwan would not only be a means of urban policing, but 
provide reasonable urbanisation that was achievable through comprehensive urban 
plans. In the late 1950s, foreign capital was introduced to Taiwan to take advantage 
of the low cost of Taiwanese labour. 428  The low grain price also contributed to 
maintaining the cheap cost of labour and pushed the new generation of peasants from 
the countryside into industrialising cities. In 1964, Taiwan’s industrial sectors were 
starting continuous double-digit growth. Taiwan entered the High-Speed 
Development of the export-orientated period, which was described by economists as 
the Taiwanese economic miracle. 429  During the period between 1964 and 1973, 
economic growth of 12% or more was attained annually. In 1966, the export and 
import of goods accounted for over 50% of Gross National Product for the first time.430 
Under the export-orientated industrial policy, Taiwan’s urban planning was supposed 
to engage in the development process. In 1961, the Ministry of the Interior, the 
Taiwan Provincial Government and the Industrial Investment Research Unit of 
American Aid Association jointly established the Taiwan Urban Planning Survey Group. 
After a six month investigation and review of plan designated urban areas, the group 
reached the following inclusions: 
(1) Industrial Zones were not properly planned and located. The infrastructure in 
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industrial zones was inadequate. 
(2) The price of industrial land was unreasonable for industrialists. 
(3) Accompanying the modification of industrial zoning plans, plans for the traffic 
system, sanitation system, schools and residential areas should be reviewed 
and amended. 
(4) In order to start the review of industrial area plans and urban plans, Urban 
Planning Act should be amended first.431 
 
In 1962, the Workshop of Amending Urban Planning Act was set up, organised by the 
Ministry of Interior and Committee of American Aid. The workshop introduced the 
translation of British, American, French, Japanese, West German, Dutch, Swiss and 
Belgian urban planning systems and laws as references. In addition, local government 
opinions were consulted. In 1964, the new Urban Planning Act was passed by 
Legislative Yuan.432 The new Act, which embraced Western trends and was made for 
the interests of foreign industrial capital, bore the following characteristics: 
(1) An urban plan would consist of a Main Plan and Detail Plan. 
(2) The concept of regional plan was introduced. The Section on reginal plans was 
enacted within the Act. Later, the Section was separated from the Act and 
became the Regional Planning Act, an independent entity, in 1973. 
(3) Encouraging private investment in infrastructure. Article 27 states: “if 
necessary, county (city) governments or town (village) offices may encourage 
private persons or companies to invest in parks, play grounds, markets and 
public services in urban planning areas”. The State expected private investment 
to partly relieve financial burdens on the government. The concept of the 
minimal state was introduced. 
(4) Public exhibition. For the first time in Taiwan’s urban planning history, public 
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participation was considered part of the planning process. Under the 
provisions of Article 15, after an urban plan was approved, the county (city) 
government shall publicly put it on display for 30 days. During the public 
exhibition, any citizen or private organisation may submit opinions as 
references for review by the superior planning authorities. However, local 
government preparations of urban plans were still to be treated as a 
government secret. 
(5) Introducing the American urban regeneration approach. Articles 54 and 55, for 
the implementation of urban renewal, suggest that:  
“a local authority may be authorised to compulsorily acquire land or buildings 
by enforcing land acquisition or the above-quota acquisition. After purchase, 
the local authority shall demolish obstructions or buildings, carry out land 
preparation, construct infrastructure and re-construct buildings, or sell the site 
to a developer in the private sector […] The earnings shall contribute to further 
betterment or compensation for land acquisition.” 
(6)  The law made it clear that the government was obliged to suppress objections 
when an urban renewal project was being carried out. 
 
In 1964, the same year of the enactment of the new Urban Planning Act, the United 
Nations sent Donald Monson, an urban planning expert, to help with regional plans in 
Taiwan. After reviewing the Taipei-Keelung Metropolitan Plan, Monson suggested 
that the Taiwanese government should ask for help from the United Nation’s Special 
Fund for Assistance in Metropolitan and Urban Planning. Monson warned Taiwan that 
by the end of the twentieth century, the population in cities would increase two or 
three-fold; without proper development guidelines and urban planning, the expansion 
of urbanisation would lead to money being wasted on the reconstruction of 
infrastructure and housing investment, which could damage economic development. 
According to Monson, metropolises, such as New York, Detroit, Tokyo and Buenos 
Aires, were ugly, inefficient and unhealthy. In order to support industrial 
development, an integrated and efficient urban infrastructure system should be 
established. Monson proposed that planning should be undertaken to arrange the 
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population distribution before the migrating population came into urban areas.433 For 
the purpose of a reasonable spatial plan, Monson argued that, firstly, a national policy 
for population distribution was needed, and that the policy would need to be urgently 
put into practice. In metropolitan areas, control plans for crowded populations were 
immediately required. Secondly, the State should help with the establishment of 
industrial areas and public housing, followed by the construction of urban planning 
areas.434 In Monson’s proposal, the first step was a national development plan. He 
suggested locating Industrial Zones in medium-sized cities to avoid over-centralisation 
of industrial sectors. He expected industrialisation to bring reasonable development 
to the cities. After population growth in medium sized cities, the second step was to 
set up and implement metropolitan plans in northern, central and southern Taiwan. 
According to Monson’s proposal, the relationship between core cities and surrounding 
towns must be properly regulated, setting up the standards for Taipei, Taichung and 
Kaohsiung’s densities and development limitations, then leading the population 
overflows to satellite towns, building new towns, and finally setting up agricultural 
areas to restrain the urban spread. The third step was scheduling implementation 
plans by arranging construction work in the planned areas.435  
 
Monson emphasised that his urban/regional planning idea was different from those 
of socialist states, although it could restrict development opportunities for private 
investment. Addressing the common view of socialist states as dictatorships, he 
explained that administrative powers over development control were not an invasion 
on individual and local liberty. He argued that Taiwan had no choice but to obey the 
rules of order because it was a necessity to establish an industrial urban society. 
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According to Monson, by encouraging private investment and paying proper 
compensation to land owners, his plan would not over-restrain commercial activities 
by private enterprises.436 
 
In 1966, with Monson’s help, the Taiwanese Government’s application was approved 
by the United Nations, receiving funding through the United Nations Development 
Project. Funds and experts were sent to Taiwan. An Urban and Housing Development 
Commission was set up under the Economic Cooperation Committee, Executive Yuan. 
In the next three years, working with experts from the United Nations, the Committee 
finished two-hundred-and-forty-eight reports on housing, urban and regional 
planning. The UN’s consultants also proposed four-hundred-and-fifty-nine suggestion 
notes. Those reports and suggestion notes have shaped the prototype for Taiwanese 
urban/regional planning since the 1970s. Even after Taiwan’s United Nations 
membership was handed over to China, concepts of urban planning similar to 
Monson’s remained the main trend in the country for quite some time, under the 
influence of Western trained Taiwanese experts and overseas scholars. Monson and 
his followers’ plans were built on the systematic programming approach that intended 
to develop an integrated comprehensive plan. The difficulty with their systematic 
theory was that close-end planning does not really exist. Therefore, an urban plan has 
to be expanded to the regional level and become a regional plan, then a national plan 
later. Every time the planners have to start all over on the national level to complete 
a systematic planning system. Under the influence of this concept, the National 
Comprehensive Development Plan was published and implemented in 1971. In the 
next 10 years, the priority of urban planning was to build and implement the 
integrated planning system, including the National Comprehensive Development Plan, 
regional plans, County/City Comprehensive Development Plans and urban plans.437 
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Monson and his colleagues worked like missionaries delivering the modern gospel on 
town planning. The gospel was welcomed and accepted but hardly put into practice. 
Monson and United Nations’ suggestions can be summarised in three points: 
reasonable development control; development of medium size cities and new towns; 
and more infrastructure construction. None of the above was the then Government’s 
priority. The Guomintang government did not start its first great national 
infrastructure plan until 1974. It was named “Ten Great Constructions” and included 
commercial/industrial ports, the first national super highway, Electrification of the 
Western Line railway, improvements to electricity and water supplies, nuclear power 
stations and the expansions of the Chinese Steel Corporation, the Chinese Petroleum 
Corporation and the Chinese Ship Building Company. These were national 
infrastructure projects to upgrade both industries and State investment in certain 
industrial sectors. At that time, Taiwan was experiencing significant economic effects 
from the 1973 oil crisis, with the Government expecting the “Ten Great Constructions” 
to increase employment and encourage industrialisation by significantly investing in 
massive building projects. However, the six transportation-building infrastructure 
projects did not result in reasonable development between large and medium-sized 
cities as Monson had expected. Over-urbanisation in Taipei and its satellite cities was 
never stopped. 
 
Contrary to planner suggestions on developing industrial zones to attract industry, in 
the 1980s, small sized factories were encouraged by the government under the slogan 
“living rooms being factories”. In both towns and countryside, farmers set up 
machines in their living rooms, with pollution and non-licensed factories being 
tolerated by people and the government. In cities, illegal extensions were built on 
rooftops, with fire lanes or arcaded passages seen as the solution to over-crowded 
living conditions and expensive housing. Some of the New Towns and satellite cites 
suggested by Monson and his colleagues had become crowded dormitory cities with 
higher densities than Taipei. For example, Yong-he city in Taipei metropolitan area 
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now has an approximate population of 250,000, but was designed as a garden city 
with a planned population of 50,000.  Yong-he’s density is twice that of Hong Kong 
Island. 
 
Urban plans based on the modern systematic model fell behind the reality of 
economic development, and were never prepared one step ahead of urbanisation as 
the planners had expected. When the United Nations’ team prepared hundreds of 
notes on Taiwanese town planning, they believed that the package of detailed plans 
and modern planning techniques was eminently achievable, but these ideal concepts 
were proven impractical. The Taiwanese modern planning system had been 
established to be a perfect blueprint, but failed to catch up with the reality of 
development. Urban planning had only been “planning”. Nonetheless, the whole 
system based on the United Nations’ suggestions still forms the basis of the 
contemporary planning system currently used in Taiwan. 
 
The following table summarises the history of Taiwanese urban planning laid out 
above. 
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Table 5-3: A brief introduction to the legal evolution of Taiwanese urban planning. 
The Mainland China Period 
 
Land Act, 1930 
Legal/Political background: 
Autonomy of some local costal governments started in China. 
1. It gave birth to the Taiwanese land use control system in its current form. 
2. It was also the first legislation on land use control in China. 
 
 
Urban Planning Act, 1939 
Legal/Political background: 
It was based on the Land Act and deeply influenced by Western systems. 
1. The modern Taiwanese planning system can be traced back to this first urban 
planning law in China. 
2. There was only one urban plan level, not like the later legislations. There was no 
distinction between the master plan and detailed plan. 
3. Urban Planning Committees were set up to produce urban plans. 
4. Zoning control system was introduced.  
 
 
Buildings Regulations for Towns in Recovered Territory, 1943 
Legal/Political background: 
Instated by the Minister of Interior with respect to the Urban Planning Act, 1939. 
It created an integrated development control system. The superior level was the 
Provincial Building Plan. There was a Regional Building Plan in the middle. The lowest 
was the Town Plan. 
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The Japanese Colonial Period 
 
1897 
Legal/Political background: 
The third year of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan. 
The Taipei City Area Planning Committee was established to produce the Taipei Inner 
City Regulation Plan. It was one of the first urban plans in Taiwan. 
 
 
1900 
Legal/Political background: 
The imported urban planning model was generalised to some other cities. 
In Taichung, the Inner City Regulation Plan was published. 
 
 
Taiwan Urban Planning Order, 1936  
Procedure Rule of Taiwan Urban Planning, 1936 
Legal/Political background: 
The Urban Planning Department was established under the Civil Engineering Class, 
Bureau of Interior Affairs in the Governor’s Office. The Taiwan Urban Planning 
Committee was established in the Governor’s Office, to review the urban plans. It was 
the first urban planning committee in central government in Taiwan. 
1. These were enacted as the legal sources for urban planning in Taiwan.  
2. Building control and zoning control were introduced. 
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The Guomintang Period 
 
1964 Urban Planning Act 
Legal/Political background: 
1. Taiwan started high speed economic growth. 
2. To resolve the few technical conflicts between the Japanese and Chinese 
systems. 
3. To improve the infrastructure for economic development. 
1. There were four kinds of urban plans: City/Town Plan, Countryside Street Plan, 
Special Area Plan and Regional Plan. 
2. Urban Planning Committees were in charge of the reviewing of urban plans at 
every level. 
3. Planning authorities were required to exhibit urban plans to the public. 
 
 
1973 Urban Planning Act 
Legal/Political background: 
1. Taiwan went into the second imported substitute period. 
2. The law sought to resolve the “Reservation Land for Public Facilities” issue. 
1. It simplified the Urban Planning review procedure. 
2. It improved the procedure for draft exhibition of urban plans. 
3. The provisions of the Regional Plan were deleted in this Law. 
 
 
1974 Regional Planning Act; 1977 Regional Planning Procedure 
Legal/Political background: 
To move toward a less uneven development in Taiwan. 
To avoid undesirable externalities resulting from land use competition. 
1. Regional Plan set as the superior plan to an urban plan. 
2. It was supposed to be a development plan and not only a control plan. 
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1976 Regulations of Land Use Control in Non-urban Areas 
Legal/Political background: 
As a supplementation of the Regional Plan. 
Zoning control in no-urban areas. 
 
 
1984 Regulations of Zoning Control in Taipei 
Legal/Political background: 
To avoid overcrowding and over-urbanisation in Taipei. The complexity of the zoning 
system in Taipei was enriched by the delegated legislation. Taipei City Land Use and 
Zoning Control Regulations are the most complicated zoning codes in Taiwan, 
containing stipulations of fifty six categories of usage classes and twenty two zones. 
1. Original regulations governing zoning usage classes composed Section Three of the 
Enforcement Rules of Urban Planning Act. In 1984, the regulations governing Taipei 
City were significantly expanded again, with the whole of Section Three becoming 
the Taipei City Land Use and Zoning Control Regulations, an independent statutory 
instrument from the Enforcement Rules of Taipei. 
2. Building control regulation was separated from zoning control.  
 
To conclude this section, as we have seen, current urban planning practice in Taiwan 
is based on the combination of two foundations: Japanese city plans and Chinese 
planning law. It is a mixed blood with two nationalities. The concept of modern urban 
planning was imported to Taiwan by the Japanese who set up the earliest city plans of 
Taiwan, and the legal source of urban planning implementation has been Chinese 
since the end of the Second World War. However, both Japanese and urban planning 
were significantly influenced by Western planning trends, and thus share similar 
influences. Given this, the Western gospel of systematic planning spread throughout 
Taiwan during the last century. 
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5.3.2 The failure of systematic planning in Taiwan 
 
Urban planning is supposed to project the future and translate future needs into land 
use requirements. Urban plans are supposed to control development and achieve 
reasonable urbanisation. By contrast, this section argues that in the case of Taiwan, 
urban planning has consistently been chasing over-urbanisation, with problems 
seldom acknowledged or tackled until they are out of control, and reactive crisis 
management becoming the norm. Often, planning is merely the after-fact reparation 
of an out-of-control situation. 
 
Several reasons have caused the failure of modern planning practice in Taiwan, as 
discussed below. 
 
1. Planning without financial plans 
 
During discussions of the Urban Planning Act in 1964, an important amendment was 
proposed, involving the setting up of a centralised authority with a special budget. 
However, the idea was not adopted by Executive Yuan and Legislative Yuan. 
 
Before the Nationalist Government took power, the Japanese Urban Planning Order 
had been established to stabilise urban planning financial resources, although 
economic difficulties sometimes led to the concept being abandoned. The financial 
resources were to come from: 
(1) Planning gains: whoever benefitted from urban planning was required to take 
full responsibility for urban planning expenses. 
(2) An urban planning tax set up as the most reliable source for urban planning. 
(3) Fixed and regular subsidies from central government, which would be the main 
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financial resource for local planning authorities. 438  
  
After the Chinese Nationalist Party’s take over, the Provisional Measures on Tax 
Collections during the Period of National Mobilisation in Suppression of Communist 
Rebellion was published in 1951 in order to simplify the complicated tax system, and 
the urban planning tax abolished. The lack of a regular financial source for urban 
planning meant that there was no proper budget for local planning authorities to 
prepare and implement urban plans. In 1964, the appeal for proper urban planning 
funding was submitted and presented in the Urban Planning Act draft by the Land 
Administrative Department, Executive Yuan. According to the draft of the Bill, an 
integrated planning authority independent from the Land Administrative Department 
should be established by central government. There was also a section stipulating 
proper urban planning funding. The provisions can be summarised below. 
(1) The Land Value Incremental Tax (capital gain tax) levied in urban planning areas 
should be used for urban planning first. 
(2) The financial benefits from the sales of public land/properties in urban planned 
areas should all be applied to urban planning expenses. 
(3) Local government should encourage private investment in parks, playgrounds, 
public service enterprises and markets. 
(4) For urban planning purposes, local governments should issue government 
bonds. 
(5) State owned financial organisations and banks should grant local governments 
loans to aid urban planning.439 
 
These ideas for special financial budgeting for town planning, proposed by planning 
staff, were not approved by politicians. Executive Yuan did not support the provisions 
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and the whole section did not pass in Legislative Yuan. The apparent reason for the 
failure of the legislation was the authoritarian central government’s disagreement on 
local governments possessing this degree of autonomy. More independent financial 
resources would have meant less centralised administrative power. Even if the draft 
had been passed, a steady supply of financial resources for local planning authorities 
would not be guaranteed. Since the Land Value Incremental Tax had been the main 
source of local government tax revenues and Town Office administrative expenses, 
and local infrastructure taking up most of the tax levied, the stipulation that the 
“capital gains tax should be used for urban planning first” would be just lip service 
without practical implementation. 
 
2. Urban planning without the means of development but with development control 
 
Besides stable financial resources, land readjustment has been an important means 
for urban planning in Taiwan. In the later period of the Japanese occupation, the 
German concept of compulsory re-plotting was introduced to Taiwan as an efficient 
urban expansion measure. The first compulsory re-plotting was introduced in 1938, 
the year following the Urban Planning Order’s enactment. Between 1938 and 1943, 
the Japanese government conducted re-plotting in twenty towns and cities, on a total 
amount of 4,387.7239 hectares (10969.309 acres). This was equal to the total amount 
of re-plotting implemented by the Guomintang government in the thirty-five years 
between 1949 and 1983.440 Due to the lack of re-plotting, urban planning became only 
control planning in the early era of the Chinese Nationalist regime. In 1977, the 
Equalisation of Urban Land Rights Act was amended and became the Equalisation of 
Land Rights Act, with re-plotting work intensifying. By 1986, planning authorities had 
finished re-plotting 137 areas on a total amount of 6,536 hectares (16,340 acres). 
4,458 hectares (11,145 acres) of land available for buildings and 2,004 hectares (5,010 
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acres) land for public facilities and infrastructure were acquired.441 
 
This uneven and fragmented history of urban planning and land readjustment activity 
had serious long-term consequences. 
(1)  The progress of infrastructure acquisition was too slow, resulting in the delay 
of infrastructure development and greater cost of compulsory purchases and 
compensation. 
(2)  Without land re-plotting, the implementation of zoning caused injustices. 
Some landlords gained sudden and large profits from the implementation of 
urban plans because their agrarian land was designated for commercial or 
residential use. Others, however, suffered significant losses and resisted 
infrastructure construction because their land was marked for public facilities. 
Without re-plotting, urban plans led to fragmented development. 
(3)  The delayed land re-plotting of urban planning and unstable financial 
resources resulted in an urban planning crisis. According to provisions of the 
1964 law, the authorities’ purchase of Reservation Land for Public Facilities in 
a planned area should have been completed within five years, once the urban 
plan was approved. If necessary, the purchase could be extended to ten years 
(Article 49). By 1973, most compulsory acquisition of reservation land in 
Taiwanese planned areas had not been completed due to budgetary 
deficiencies. The expiry dates were extended to ten or fifteen more years. In 
order to cut down compulsory purchase expenses, the 1975 Regulations of 
Urban Plans Reviews stipulated that local planning authorities should reduce 
the amount of reservation land. The new regulation proposed “multiple 
purpose use for reservation land” to encourage local governments to multiply 
the development of public facilities on an individual plot of land. This meant 
less open space and more floor space on reserved land. In 1984, only 16% 
(65,503.3 hectares) of land in urban planning areas was used for public 
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facilities, much less than the 40% in the original plans. Among the 16% of land 
for public facilities, 62.7% had not been purchased or developed.442 Until the 
end of 1987, 54.02% of reservation land had not been purchased.443  Over 
twenty years since the passing of the 1964 Act, urban planning had not been 
able to catch up with the reality. Urban planning in Taiwan suffered a serious 
collapse. 
(4)  Social injustice remained widespread. Firstly, according to the original concept 
of Taiwanese planning law, landlords and developers who gained profits from 
the implementation of urban plans should have taken responsibility for the 
financial resources associated with infrastructure. In practice, landlords and 
developers received the benefit of the land value increment and enjoyed the 
betterment of the infrastructure but their unearned increment was not subject 
to appropriate recapture by public bodies (community, society or government). 
Urban planning had become a process in which the public subsidised landlords. 
Secondly, the rigid zoning system controlled by local governments without 
public participation had become the most important land speculation 
mechanism. 
(5)  The collapse of urban planning also caused regional injustices. As mentioned 
above, when the modern planning system was introduced to Taiwan by 
Monson and other experts, it was supposed to build an efficient and healthy 
environment with an appropriate distribution of population to support 
industrial development. An integrated and efficient urban infrastructure 
system should have been established. Monson proposed using public sector 
investment in infrastructure to have industrial sectors allocated and distributed 
properly and reasonably. Nevertheless, with the staggering amount of 
infrastructure construction this plan required and, more importantly, without 
powerful and efficient means to allocate industries, over-urbanisation and 
regional uneven-development became increasingly worse. Between 1967 and 
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1981, 90% of public investment accumulated in metropolitan areas, with 60% 
of that being in Taipei.444 
 
To conclude this section, we can see a number of reasons for the consistent failure of 
planning practice in Taiwan. Firstly, urban planning with insufficient financial 
projections has resulted in lack of regular financial source for local planning authorities 
to prepare and implement urban plans. Secondly, urban planning without the means 
of development but with development control has caused the slow progress of 
infrastructure development and the lack of land re-plotting. Without proper land re-
plotting, the implementation of zoning frequently caused land injustices. Even worse, 
the combination of delayed land re-plotting of urban planning and unstable financial 
resources resulted in an urban planning crisis. Accompanied by the collapse of urban 
planning, over-urbanisation and regional injustices have increasingly deteriorated. 
Taiwan’s double digit economic growth has not been distributed reasonably 
throughout its regions, and Monson’s systematic programming consistently failed in 
practice. Urban planning was expected to be the social engineering mechanism that 
would lead to regional and social justice. However, in policy, legislation and 
implementation, many of the necessary elements were missing, distorted and 
abandoned. The imported Western model failed and finally became merely a Utopian 
theory.  
 
 
5.4 Case study: the development plan in Taiwan 
 
This section introduces a case study of the Taiwanese development plan to support 
the argument presented in section 5.3 that systematic planning failed in Taiwan due 
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to its lack of financial strategies and means of development. The case is the 
development of Wuchi, a town with a fisheries port in central Taiwan, which started 
during the Japanese occupation and continued after the Nationalist government took 
over Taiwan. It has been more than seventy years since Wuchi’s first urban plan was 
introduced, with Wuchi failing to reach the goal of being a port city with a 300,000 
population as its urban plan proposed.  
 
With a population of 55,000 people, Wuchi is situated in the centre of the western 
coast of Taiwan. It is 20 miles from Taichung, the largest city with a population of 
700,000 in central Taiwan. Taichung Port and a 700 hectare industrial park are located 
in the west of Wuchi. Though it is part of Wuchi, the port is more like a foreign 
settlement to the town. The Town Office has no authority over the land use and 
development of Taichung Port. By the end of the 1990s, 23.1% of employment in 
Wuchi was in the agricultural and fisheries sectors, 37.74% in the industrial sector and 
24.38% in the commercial sector.445 The total area of Wuchi Town (excluding the port 
area) is approximately 6500 acres, with 27% industrial areas, 20% categorised as 
commercial areas but mostly undeveloped, and most of the rest of the areas for 
agricultural use.446 Wuchi was a small agricultural village and fishing harbour before 
the development of Taichung Port. Like most ports in western Taiwan, trade between 
the Chinese Mainland and Taiwan during the Chin Dynasty initiated Wuchi port’s 
development. After the Japanese took over, cross-strait commercial trade declined 
and the Wuchi economy suffered a depression. In 1932, there were no more 
commercial shipments. Instead of shipping, railway transportation increased and 
Wuchi was overtaken by nearby towns where the Western Railway ran through. The 
golden age of Wuchi had gone, as it had for most ports on the west coast. 
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The earliest modern urban planning in Wuchi started in 1939. For the purpose of 
Japanese national defence, industrial decentralisation and deployment of warships, 
Wuchi port was chosen to be built as the commercial/industrial hub of central Taiwan 
and renamed Niitaka (or Shingao, as pronounced in Chinese Mandarin). According to 
the Taichung Regional Plan, Shingao was expected to have population of 300,000 in 
1985, about fifty years later, higher than the expected population of Taichung City. At 
that time, the population of Taichung was 200,000 and the Shingao Plan area, 
including the 25,000 from Wuchi and nearby villages, was 60,000. The Japanese 
government estimated that the cheap and sufficient electricity supply from other 
areas of central Taiwan would enable Shingao’s industrial and commercial 
development. Its development would bring out the economic potential of 
metropolitan Taichung. According to the plan, the Taichung area was possessed a mild 
climate, rich soil and good quality water, suitable for habitation. Twin cities (Shingao 
and Taichung) would be the cores of the region. The new city’s industrial sector would 
support Taichung City’s further development and help it remain the political, 
economic and cultural centre of central Taiwan. In 1944, the development and 
construction of Shingao was stopped in 1944 because of a shortage in financial and 
material resources during the war-time period.447 
 
After the War, there was a very short period in the revival of Wuchi’s economy when 
shipping and commercial trade between Taiwan’s western coast and Mainland China 
resumed. However, the Chinese Nationalist Government’s retreat to Taiwan had 
frozen the cross-strait relationship again. No more shipping and trade took place 
between the Mainland and Taiwan. After the Chinese Nationalists’ take-over, the 
Japanese plan was adopted by the Guomintang government. In 1969, with the help of 
Japanese consultants, a plan was established to develop Taichung Port. In 1973, the 
development started and the newly named Taichung Port in Wuchi was planned as 
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the international port of central Taiwan to support the high speed growth of 
international trade between Taiwan, Japan and America.448 Taichung Port was later 
listed as one of the “Ten Great Constructions”. In 1972, accompanied by the 
preparation for construction, the Taichung Port Special Area Plan was proposed by the 
Taiwan Provincial Government. The planned area included Wuchi and three other 
towns and villages nearby. The Special Area Plan aimed to construct a hinterland to 
provide residential, commercial and industrial areas for the development of Taichung 
Port. The population of this area was expected to reach 500,000 by 1991. A light and 
heavy industrial park were both planned. 
Table 5-4: Schedule for development of the Taichung Port Special Area Plan449 
Years Construction Schedule Development Population 
estimate 
1969~1973 Part of the port built  183,500 
1974~1981 Most parts of the port 
built. Shipment 
expected: 8,000 tons of 
goods a year. 
The development of 
industrial parks begins. 
271,000 
1982~1986 The construction of the 
port finished. 
The development of 
industrial parks finished. 
417,000 
1987~1991  A new harbour city 
established. 
500,000 
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In the 1978 Taiwan Area Comprehensive Development Plan, the Council of Economic 
Development, Executive Yuan proposed the setting up of a new metropolitan 
administrative authority, Taichung Port City, to replace Wuchi and three other nearby 
Town Offices. According to the proposal, Wuchi and other nearby towns should be 
merged and become a municipality directly under the administrative leadership of the 
provincial government. This would mean an elevation in administrative status for 
Wuchi.450 In 1981, there was a similar proposal in the Taiwan Provincial Government’s 
Central Taiwan Regional Plan. According to the Plan, the Special Area (Wuchi and 
nearby towns) would be developed as a new town in central Taiwan and the new 
centre of metropolitan Taichung. In 1989, the Comprehensive Development Plan for 
New Town in Taichung Port Area was proposed by the Taiwan Provincial Government. 
Under the Comprehensive Development Plan, the new municipality of Taichung Port 
City was mentioned again and a New Town Plan set up for the new city.451 The plan 
aimed to adopt the concept of British, Japanese and Singaporean new towns in Taiwan 
and set up a new town development authority directly under the provincial 
government. The Comprehensive Development Plan was expected by the planning 
authority not only to be a land use plan, but also to be a plan including substantial 
economic and social development plans. The Plan held back (and actually gave up on) 
the idea of a heavy industrial park, but specified that the development of a light 
industrial area should continue; this had been the main economic development plan 
for this area since 1969. Food processing, textile, electronic, furniture, drinks and 
tobacco industries were suggested. However, the Plan did not provide a powerful 
means to attract such industries and encourage investment. In 1996, with the help of 
the Urban Planning Department at Fong Jia University, the Taichung County 
Comprehensive Development Plan was prepared and published by Taichung County 
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Government. The development of Taichung Port Special Area was mentioned again 
and the main ideas are presented below. 
(1) Enhancing development and construction work in the port area, and building 
it up as the sub-centre of Taichung metropolitan. 
(2) Developing a high-tech industry, establishing a research and innovation centre 
and increasing the employment of high-tech personnel. 
(3) Developing the under-developed commercial zone of Wuchi. 
(4) Preparing to set up a shipment operation centre, a technology industrial park, 
a community college and an intelligent economic/industrial park. 452 
Despite the above plans, Wuchi was still a small town with a population of 
approximately 50,000. The only achievement was a light industry park and the 
construction of Taichung Port. 
 
In 1995, Executive Yuan published the Developing Taiwan as Pacific-Asian Operation 
Centre Plan, which the Premier declared as “the national development plan for the 
next millennium”.453 According to the Operation Centre Plan, Taichung Port was to 
form a shipping operations centre and would be the main port in western coastal 
waters. “Western coastal waters” was actually a metaphor hinting at future direct 
trade between Mainland China and Taiwan. The Operation Centre Plan was supposed 
to be a substantial development plan for cross-strait shipping. According to the plan, 
an offshore operations centre would be set up in Taichung Port because of its 
geographical convenience. Despite the political restriction, it would be a trial 
touchstone for direct shipment and cross-strait trade between Taiwan and Mainland 
China. The direct trade plan raised local inhabitants’ expectations one more time. 
Replacing the previous plans made for Taichung Port but never implemented, direct 
shipping was seen as the new and only hope for the flourishing of Taichung Port and 
Wuchi. 
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Following the Pacific Asian Operation Centre Plan, the 1996 Economic Development 
Council introduced German international corporation Bayer to invest NT$8.9 billion 
(£445,100 million sterling) in the Taichung Port area and found a 58 hectare site for a 
chemistry factory project. The case was proclaimed by the central government as the 
greatest foreign industry investment since 1990 and the key plan for the Pacific Asia 
Operation Centre. Although Bayer is famous for its pesticides and pharmaceutical 
products, and has a long history of commercial business in China and Taiwan, the 
investment project still met fierce opposition. The then-opposition party (Democratic 
Progressive Party) and environmentalists led a campaign against the project which 
was later joined by Wuchi town hall. According to Fu-sheng Shih’s case study, there 
were two reasons why Bayer sank into complicated political difficulties. 454 Firstly, the 
people of Wuchi had learnt from other third world countries’ experiences that the 
manufactories of multi-national corporations caused pollution and hazards in 
developing countries. They did not have any confidence in Bayer. Secondly, local 
notables considered that the Bayer project would benefit local development and 
themselves very little. Besides those reasons, the Wuchi people’s campaign was also 
encouraged by the rise in local autonomy and communalism, and the successful anti-
Du Pont campaign case in nearby Lukang town of 1985-1987. In November 1997 and 
January 1998, there were County Mayor and Town Mayor elections, with the Bayer 
issue in need of a referendum according to most candidates. Anti-Bayer was the main 
theme advocated by local activists in the Democratic Progressive Party. In March 
1998, Bayer announced that they were giving up the investment project. 
 
Wuchi is a typical example of Taiwanese urban planning. Modern planning concepts 
were introduced into Wuchi by the Japanese government, with Chinese Nationalists 
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inheriting the practices. As Table 5-5 below shows, many plans had been prepared 
since the 1930s. 
Table 5-5: A list of plans in Taichung Port Area455 
Plan Hierarchy  Plan Name  Year Content 
Regional Plan Taichung Regional Plan 1939 Develop a new city. 
Start to build up an industrial 
port. 
Urban Plan Taichung Port Special 
Area Plan 
1972 The special area planned as a 
hinterland of Taichung Port. 
Set up zoning control. 
National 
Comprehensive 
Development Plan 
Comprehensive 
Development Plan in 
Taiwan Area 
1978 The name Taichung Port City 
appeared for the first time. 
Set up a new town. 
Regional Plan Central Taiwan Regional 
Plan 
1981 Set up a Port Area as a sub-centre 
of Taichung metropolitan. 
Urban Plan Comprehensive 
Development Plan for 
New Town in Taichung 
Port Area 
1989 Plan substantial social and 
economic development. 
County 
Comprehensive 
Development Plan 
Taichung County 
Comprehensive 
Development Plan 
1996 Develop a commercial area in 
Wuchi. 
Prepare to set up a shipment 
operation centre, technology 
industrial park, community 
college, intelligent economy and 
trade park. 
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By comprehensively surveying these plans, one can find that many ideas have been 
introduced over a period of many years. Promises had been made to the people of 
Wuchi, but what really happened in Wuchi? 
(1) In the last 32 years between 1975 and 2007, the population of Wuchi had not 
changed much, remaining at approximately 50,000.456 
(2) The expansion and over-urbanisation of Taichung City continued. The 
expectation of reasonable growth and even the development of Taichung 
region was not achieved. By 1999, the population of 700,000 in Taichung City 
was much more than the Japanese plan’s 250,000. 
(3) According to the provisions in the Taichung Port Special Area Plan, a restriction 
order for building still exists in most of Wuchi’s designated commercial areas. 
The detailed plan was prepared and announced in 1996; however, land re-
plotting was not continued. The regulations for floor space and building height 
were not set for twenty-seven years. Habitants could not have their cottages 
rebuilt or renovated. On 27th May 2002, Councillor Bi-ling You questioned 
Taichung County Mayor on this issue. She complained that seven of the nine 
designated commercial blockers were still un-developed and countryside like. 
Before being elected as a Country Councillor, she was the Mayoress of Wuchi 
and during the eight years of her two terms, she was powerless to amend the 
situation. 
(4) Taichung Port City never materialised. According to the conclusion of the 
Reviews of Comprehensive Development Plans for New Town in Taichung Port 
Area, made by the Economic Development Council in 1989, the idea of 
Taichung Port City was not mentioned. 457  The central government seemed to 
have given up on Taichung Port City. 
(5) Construction of infrastructure has been seriously delayed. For example, 
without the regeneration of old villages, the integrated sewerage system was 
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never finished as planned. Under developed areas of old cottages have serious 
flooding problems. 
(6) There were no direct trade and shipments from the Chinese Mainland until 
2008.458 
 
It is particularly clear that the central state tried to develop a new town in Wuchi: an 
ideal, self-sufficient garden city with light industry, suburban style new houses and 
perfect urban functions. However, without efficient means of development and 
financial plan, the proposed plans were, in the words of the Chinese saying, “moon in 
the water: beautiful but cannot be touched”. Among those plans, only the Taichung 
Port Special Area Plan contained substantial content. The plan, based on the authority 
of Urban Planning Act, was actually a larger scale urban plan and specially prepared 
by the Taiwan Provincial Government, unlike common urban plans prepared by local 
governments. Like most urban plans, zoning control was its most powerful land use 
planning tool. Other plans, including the Central Taiwan Regional Plan, the Taichung 
County Comprehensive Development Plan and the Comprehensive Development Plan 
for New Town in Taichung Port Area, did not have any power governing land use 
control. The Taichung Port Special Area Plan was the plan at the lowest level and the 
only plan with real effects on urban planning in Wuchi. 
 
In the Wuchi case, planning did not challenge the centralised urbanisation of central 
Taiwan. According to the central government’s plans, Taichung Port City was supposed 
to be a new city administration, with the city providing industrial, commercial and 
financial services to Taichung Port. However, the idea did not succeed. Nearby 
Taichung City has been the capital of central Taiwan for more than one hundred years, 
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with 52% of people in employment in Taichung City working in the services industry.459 
It continues to attract business for commercial and industrial services. The ideal of the 
de-centralisation of urbanisation in metropolitan Taichung was not achieved. 
 
Likewise, planning could not challenge politics. It is clear that the development of 
Taichung Port area relied deeply on the development of Taichung Port. The 
government expected that the growth of the port would have a ripple effect spreading 
economic achievements over the port area and cities nearby, which would de-
centralise the urbanisation of Taichung City. A more even and reasonable development 
of central Taiwan could be achieved. Nevertheless, it did not happen. The expectation 
of a sudden increase in shipments had not materialised. The economic and planning 
authorities in the government struggled to challenge political reality. Most plans for 
the development of Wuchi were merely paperwork. 
 
The lack of public participation and public inquiries into the planning process are also 
a reason for the central government failing to implement its development schemes in 
Wuchi. According to the central government, the Bayer investment project would 
meet the Taiwanese public’s common interests. However, Wuchi residents and nearby 
towns were never consulted about their concerns around industrial safety and 
environmental pollution. Local residents felt ignored, and more importantly, sacrificed, 
for a cause in which the locals felt that there was hardly any positive impact on local 
development. The people of Wuchi felt offended by the central government’s 
insistence on forcing the Town Office and Council to accept the plan. As the Bayer case 
highlights, the central government played the role of a broker finding a plot of land for 
Bayer. The project was not designated in accordance with the interests of local people. 
Not only did the Bayer project lack public participation, but so did other Wuchi-related 
plans. As Shih Fu-sheng’s study on the Bayer case points out: “the planners in central 
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government never expected that they would meet local resistance. To them, Wuchi was 
‘a site under construction’ for the Bayer project, not a town where people lived and 
worked.”460 To local people, the Pacific Asian Operation Centre Plan became merely 
political spin, not a plan that local development could relate to. It was an alien plan 
that ignored existing conditions and sacrificed local interests. The same ideology can 
be found in other plans introduced by the central state. Planners expected Wuchi to 
be a plain site with little-to-no man-made disturbance. Tough measures were executed 
to restrict the growth of old villages, to meet the needs of top-down plans. 
 
To conclude this section, the proposals to de-centralised urbanisation in metropolitan 
Taichung and build a self-sufficient garden city in Wuchi were never implemented. 
Within all the plans prepared by the central government, the only tool governing 
development that had real effects on urban planning in Wuchi was zoning control. 
Without efficient means of development and supporting financial plans, all of the 
urban plans failed. Planning could not challenge the reality of urbanisation. The lack 
of public participation in the planning process was also a reason for the central 
government failing to implement its development scheme in Wuchi. While the 
ideology of public interest was held by the central government, the local public did 
not believe that they were included within the government’s conception of the 
“public”. The central government’s scheme was an alien plan that sacrificed local 
interest.  
 
Furthermore, the legitimacy of the central government’s development plan was 
challenged because public servants, elected politicians and permanent officers were 
accused of planning not in the public interest, but for certain special interests. Wuchi 
was not an isolated case. The first case of a central government development plan 
meeting local resistance, the anti-Du Pont campaign, started in 1985 and gave birth to 
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the first street demonstration against development in Taiwanese history. Since then, 
on average, there are more than one hundred rallies or street protests with a similar 
cause every year. 461  The authorities of the authoritarian government met 
unprecedented objections and eventually resulted in the change of regime in 2000.  
 
The calls for public participation were calls for democratic governance, as has 
McAuslan noted:  
“All who are likely to be affected by or who have, for whatever reason, an 
interest or concern in a proposed development of land or change in the 
environment should have the right of participation in the decision on the 
proposal just because they might be affected or are interested.”462  
McAuslan also argues that, “Public servants should act only after full public debate 
(and by public debate is meant a debate in which the general public can take a direct 
part) and subject always to continuous consultation with the public.”463 The public 
need to be empowered, because the state apparatus is not value neutral with regard 
to making reasonable and unbiased decisions. In fact, various special interests are 
affiliated with the decision-making process, and the state apparatus itself is a 
complexity of power blocs, with each having its own political agendas. It was those 
power blocs that decided on the use of land and the distribution of benefit and profits 
from land development. The planning laws were shaped accordingly.  
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5.5 Case study: the trial of planning permission in Taipei ─ Control Yuan v Chang 
Jing-sen 
 
This section introduces a second case study, considering the introduction of planning 
permission in Taipei. This process was begun in 1995 by the Taipei City government, 
which introduced flexibilities to the zoning system. The challenges faced by the 
introduction of such planning are clearly illustrated by the 1998 case, detailed below, 
of Control Yuan v Chang Jing-sen, which concerned the up-zoning of an abandoned 
manufactory site.  
 
The 1994 Taipei Mayoral election was the first democratic election for the position 
after Order of Martial Law was lifted in Taiwan. After Chen Shui-bian of the 
Democratic Progressive Party won the mayoral election in Taipei City, a genuine 
planning permission system was introduced to Taipei by Chen’s Director at the Urban 
Development Department, Chang Jing-sen. The idea was actually a recapture scheme 
imposed on developers while their land on an industrial zone was being up-zoned for 
commercial use. The idea matured after several cases of up-zoning in Taipei County 
brought the original land owners huge profits. By moving their factories to new 
locations in sub-urban areas, the land where the factories were originally located 
could be sold at a fairy good price if the zoning rules were reviewed and changed. 
Huge profits could be generated without any development of the land. Chang Jing-
sen’s practice was imposing conditions on up-zoning while zoning was being reviewed. 
Conditions could be negotiated between the land owner/developer and the local 
government. 
 
The Control Yuan is the official body of the ombudsman that conducts supervisory 
work of civil servants and carries out independent investigations into complaints 
against departmental bodies. It is hereditary and from the old Chinese feudal 
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tradition.464 The case of Control Yuan v Chang Jing-sen, the then Director of the Urban 
Development Department of Taipei City Government, was an impeachment case. It 
happened in November 1998 during the city’s mayoral election, in which Chen was 
campaigning for re-election. Chang Jing-sen was indicted on two accounts. One was 
bribery, with Chang accused of accepting an improper payment valued at NT$50,000 
(about £1000) by the developer, Nan-long Development Company. The other was the 
criminal offence of unjust enrichment. The verdict became a contentious issue and 
deeply influenced the Mayoral election. 
 
The case of up-zoning was named after the developer, the Nan-long consortium. Nan-
long bought a parcel of land, an abandoned factory site in the East End of Taipei, 
applying to the authority in an attempt to change the zoning of the land into a 
Commercial Zone. This was the second case to concern changing the zoning of 
industrial land to commercial land in Taipei City. After a zoning review, the Taipei City 
Plan was approved by the Urban Planning Committee of the Interior Affairs Ministry. 
According to the conclusion of the review, the developer was required to donate a 
certain portion of land as a recapture to the Taipei City Government. The developer 
wanted to do so, but the Taipei City Government asked for more than was required 
by the Plan. Trying to apply the concept of planning permission to the existing zoning 
control system, the City planning authority expanded its discretion on the case. The 
Urban Development Department used its Urban Design Committee as a stumbling 
stone to delay development and tried to negotiate with the developer. According to 
the Urban Design Committee’s conclusions, firstly, part of the land would be donated 
to the City for public facilities and the total amount of floor space reduced: i.e. the 
density of development was reduced. Secondly, the Committee asked the developer 
to buy back the reduced amount of floor space, meaning that the developer could get 
the same amount of gross floor space if the developer was willing to pay the 
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government. Finally, the developer and the authority reached an agreement in which 
the developer would spend approximately NT$1 billion (approximately £20 million) 
buying the gross floor space. During the review period, the developer also donated 
NT$20 million (£400,000) to Taipei City Government’s Cultural Development Fund, 
trying to develop a good relationship with Taipei City Government.  
 
The Control Yuan’s verdict declared that: 1. There is no law or regulation allowing 
administrative authority the power to make the developer buy back the donated gross 
floor space and; 2. NT$1 billion was not the right price and was much less than the 
market price. As such, it was concluded that there must be an unlawful profit 
exchange between Director Chang and the developer. Control Yuan impeached Chang 
for accepting a NT$100,000 bribe and making an unjust profit for the developer. This 
was happening at a critical time in Taiwanese urban planning history. The final verdict 
affected the future practice of the reformation of the planning system. The reform 
was chiefly concerned with socio-economic injustice that resulted from zoning, 
especially up-zoning. The demarcation of zoning could make a land owner a millionaire 
overnight because their land was drawn as a commercial zone, whilst their neighbours 
gained almost nothing because their land was set for infrastructure use with little 
compensation. Zoning meant land speculation opportunities. Local notables from 
political factions took advantage of opportunities for personal gain because they had 
control over local governments and councils, a common practice in local politics in 
Taiwan. Speculative facts have clearly revealed that the land-use problem is a land 
issue. It has been called the “land use” or “zoning problem” only to technically cover 
its political nature. The reforms proposed by economists and planners aimed, firstly, 
to add some flexibility to the rigid zoning control system and secondly, to socialise the 
profits from zoning. The two principles were in the guidelines of the new planning 
system, which is what the Taipei City Government was experimenting with. 
 
One year after the start of the prosecution, Chang was found not guilty by the Public 
Servants Discipline Committee. This acquittal had two major consequences. Firstly, 
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the new system would bring big changes to all the roles and functions of developers, 
citizens and planning authorities. A new flexible system would mean that the planning 
authorities would have more discretion when making a decision about particular 
projects and have the power to negotiate with developers. The officials would not just 
do what the urban plans said, as had happened in the past. On the other hand, 
developers would also meet new challenges, and would have to prepare for a longer 
negotiation period. At the same time, a public inquiry would become a crucial part of 
the new planning system. More room for public participation would allow community 
members to voice their opinions. It had been easy for local politicians to manipulate 
zoning reviews and profit from land speculation. While the introduction of planning 
permission brought discretion and negotiation power to planning authority 
professionals, it did reduce the involvement of traditional local political factions. One 
characteristic of the new system was a more transparent process. Under these 
circumstances, Control Yuan, the jurisdictional system and supervising departments 
had to recognise the new room for manoeuvre possessed by the administration when 
the merits of planning permission were being reviewed. 
 
Secondly, however, such room for discretion would not necessarily guarantee good 
urban planning. A legal administrative action does not guarantee a reasonable urban 
planning case. In Chang’s case, the buying back of gross floor space meant more 
financial gains for the government and more intense development for the project. It 
also meant larger financial gains for the developer. If the recapture by the government 
is not to be used in the infrastructure or construction of open space in a nearby area, 
if the limitation of density is not properly set, and if the authority does not ask the 
developer to off-set the density, the recapture would only be a larger burden on the 
environment. Reasonable urbanisation could never be achieved. Moreover, 
permission for development and up-zoning has always meant the granting of huge 
profits, and scandals like political donation for planning permission could therefore be 
expected in cases like Chang’s case. The NT$20 million donation was ultimately 
deemed legal, but the case did expose the fact that some special interests were 
certainly exchanged between Democratic Progressive Party politicians and 
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developers. Prevention would rely on a more transparent decision making process, 
including public participation in politics and public participation in urban planning. 
 
To conclude this section, the case of Control Yuan v Chang Jing-sen reflected the 
problem caused by zoning: the rigid zoning system controlled by local governments 
without public participation had become the main instrument for land speculation. 
Though, in the case of Nan-long up-zoning, a new and flexible mechanism was added 
to the zoning system, which succeeded in reducing the involvement of traditional local 
politicians and brought discretion and negotiation power to planning authority 
professionals. However, the key to its success was a more transparent public inquiry 
and public participation. 
 
 
5.6 Conclusion  
 
By reviewing the city plans of Japanese Colonial Taiwan and the legal evolution of 
Taiwanese urban planning, one can that see a comprehensive framework has been 
built up in Taiwan, with regulations governing land use and control administrated by 
the planning authorities. The earliest elements of Chinese Urban Planning Act, were 
initially supposed to be implemented throughout the whole of China, in order to guide 
and control development in a continent of 9.6 million km2. These elements are still 
being implemented in overcrowded Taiwan, an island with only 23,900 km2 of land 
available for development, although they have been adjusted to meet Taiwan’s 
situation. The use of zoning as the main instrument of development control in the 
current urban planning in Taiwan had its legal source in Chinese, but was imported by 
the Japanese before the Chinese urban planning legal framework was brought to 
Taiwan. It is a mixed product of Japanese and Chinese zoning, both of which were 
deeply influenced by modern Western planning trends. The ideology of systematic 
planning, which dominated Taiwanese urban planning and its implementation, was 
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expected to systematically conquer existing urban issues on every corner and lead to 
reasonable urbanisation. The fact that zoning has been the most powerful 
measurement of the Taiwanese planning system shows that the system lacks 
sufficient means of development. Instead of the original purpose of reasonable spatial 
development, development control had become the most important mechanism for 
land speculation. Urban plans did not bring an ideal environment but caused social 
and spatial injustices. The failure of modern systematic planning to catch up with the 
reality of development, the lack of financial plans, the rigidity of zoning and the lack 
of transparency and public participation in planning decision further contributed to 
this failure. Though they have consistently failed, the systematic planning and related 
laws have been a vehicle for McAuslan’s second competing ideology, the public 
interest ideology. Planning and laws have been seen as providing the backing and 
legitimacy for the implementation of urban plans to advance the public interest. The 
ideology is translated into laws and plans that confer wide power to administrators 
and planners to do as they see fit. Planners’ development visions were held up as all 
habitants’ collective common goals. Nevertheless, in the Wuchi case, local people’s 
public interest was clearly different from the public interest claimed by the central 
government. The public interest that was supposed be a legitimate concern for 
planning authorities was challenged by a different public group. The lack of public 
participation and public inquiries in the planning process was one reason for the 
failure to implement the government’s development scheme. McAuslan’s third 
ideology – that law is a carrier for the advancement of public participation – differs 
from public interest ideology by denying that the public interest can be identified and 
acted upon by neutral public servants on the basis of their own views and assumptions 
as to what is right and wrong.465 In the cases of Wuchi and Control Yuan v Chang Jing-
sen, the lack of public participation also meant the lack of a democratic and 
transparent decision making process. The legitimacy of the government’s 
development scheme was therefore questioned. In the case of Taiwan, an 
authoritarian state that possesses more independent, autonomous political power 
over the private sector can be seen in the evolution of the Taiwanese planning system 
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and related laws. The developmentalist state led planning with strong state 
intervention and extensive regulation, until it met challenges like the case of Wuchi. 
However, the state’s ambition did not guarantee satisfactory results. The next chapter 
examines the characteristics of the Taiwanese state and the power blocs within the 
state by reviewing the politico-economic elements affecting the evolution of urban 
planning in Taiwan. 
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Chapter 6: The Chinese Nationalist State and Land Reform in Taiwan 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, by reviewing planning cases such as Wuchi, I argued that the 
public need to be empowered because the state apparatus is not value neutral 
concerning making reasonable and unbiased decisions. In fact, various special 
interests are affiliated with the decision making process, and the state apparatus itself 
is a complexity of power blocs, with each having its own political agendas. This chapter 
introduces land reforms in Taiwan to reveal how political struggle decisively affected 
the outcome of land policy, as well as analysing he characteristics of the state 
apparatus and the power blocs within it. The chapter begins by introducing the 
historical context of the struggle between the Chinese right and left wings, to argue 
that the first case of Taiwanese land reform can actually be viewed as an extension of 
the Chinese civil war between the Chinese Nationalists and Communists, which more 
precisely was a struggle between Chinese landlords and peasants. Secondly, this 
chapter introduces the failure of urban land reform in Taiwan, which was also an 
outcome of political struggle. Though some Taiwanese scholars have seen this struggle 
as one waged between Chinese Mainlanders and local provincials, I argue that, in fact, 
the “Chinese” factor was merely a smoke screen, and that the real reason for the 
failure of the reform was the political conflict between power blocs within the 
government which represented the interests of land speculation and bureaucrats. 
Thirdly, by analysing the nature of Taiwanese state, I suggest some reasons as to why 
agrarian land reform could succeed in Taiwan but urban land reform failed. At the end 
of this chapter, I argue that, by reviewing the historical development of land reform 
in Taiwan, one can see that the development of land use and planning related laws 
were not constructed through the professionalism of planners, but was instead 
affected by political and economic forces beyond the planners’ control. Though the 
competition between McAuslan’s ideologies can be seen during the evolution of land 
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reform, the real agents who advocated the competition were power blocs that 
comprised the governing elite. 
 
 
6.1 The success of agrarian land reform and the failure of urban land reform in 
Taiwan 
 
This section introduces land reform in Taiwan, and discusses both the success of 
agrarian land reform and the failure of urban reform. I begin by challenging the 
identity politics of main-stream discourse in Taiwan, and arguing that the social 
conflicts between classes have to be looked back upon to review the success and 
failure of Taiwanese land reform. In 6.1.1, I introduce the historical context of the 
struggle between Chinese right wings and left wings to review the relations between 
the political struggle which mainly happened in Mainland China and the agrarian land 
reform implemented in Taiwan. In 6.1.2, I outline the initial stages of agrarian land 
reform in Taiwan, and continue by reviewing the relations between this reform and 
the political struggle in Mainland China. In 6.1.3, I review the implementation of land 
reform in Taiwanese urban areas. I argue that planning in Taiwanese urban areas had 
become a political arena, and discuss the reasons behind the failure of urban land 
reform. 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, Taiwanese urban planning was initially introduced 
by the Japanese colonial regime. After the Second World War, Guomintang took over 
Taiwan and inherited the Japanese planning system. The Japanese and Guomintang 
governments each ruled Taiwan for some fifty years, with the state apparatus 
dominating urban planning during those periods. There was very little public 
participation or involvement of civil society during the planning process. Mainstream 
scholars in Taiwan and Taiwanese Nationalism activists argue that these regimes, being 
foreign and alienated from local society, should be blamed. Being a foreign regime and 
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having little connection with local society when taking over Taiwan, the state 
apparatus was authoritarian. To develop their anti-Chinese argument, which blames 
Guomintang for being a foreign regime, libertarian economists argue that the 
Guomintang state was beyond class and had become a new class; economic 
development in Taiwan was state-capitalism. Therefore, urban planning in Taiwan was 
merely a process for the developing special interests and properties of the 
Guomintang’s party-state.466  
 
Based on such discourse, the Democratic Progressive Party in its 1996 presidential 
election manifesto argued that the foreign regime’s failure to identify itself with 
Taiwan had caused the twin catastrophes of the current Taiwanese environment and 
living conditions. Accompanying the rise of this democratic movement, Taiwanese 
nationalism was the main theme of identity politics in Taiwan, with “identity with 
Taiwan” being the most important criterion by which to judge politicians and their 
policies. The logic is simple: Guomintang was a foreign regime imported from China, 
and therefore never identified itself with Taiwan, despite being in Taiwan. The 
presumption behind the statement is that China has been a backward country and that 
the Chinese are the enemy of Taiwan. Since Guomintang is Chinese, it is the enemy to 
Taiwanese people. Taiwanese people were urged to unite behind a new regime and 
build a cooperative commonwealth that would overcome all the issues caused by 
Guomintang, including crowded living conditions and ugly city landscapes in Taiwan. 
However, it is my contention that, in such discourses, identity politics have been 
manipulated to cover up social conflict between classes. 
 
Comparing the Japanese government in Taiwan to Guomintang, as I argue in previous 
chapters that Japanese urban plans in Taiwan focused on the interests of the 
colonialists. Taiwanese urban planning was part of the “Great East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere” and resulted in dependent development in Taiwan. The Japanese government 
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was a colonial state. The case of Guomintang is somewhat different. Guomintang 
originally came from Mainland China but broke up with China in 1949. Since that year, 
they did not have any connection with the “mother country”. Taiwan had not been a 
colony of Guomintang or China, and the development of Taiwan bore no interest to 
China or the Communist regime of Mainland China. Consequently, the analysis of 
colonialism or alien regime cannot be applied to Taiwan.  
 
6.1.1 Historical context of the struggle of Chinese Right/Left wings 
 
Given this, we must now answer the following questions. What was the Guomintang 
government that dominated Taiwanese development for 53 years? Whose interests 
did their development plans represent? By reviewing Guomintang’s land policy, I will 
now analyse the elements that have shaped Taiwanese spatial development. 
Guomintang worships its founders, Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his Principle of People’s 
Livelihood, through which they can identify Guomintang’s tradition, history and 
legitimacy. At the end of the nineteenth century, Sun Yat-sen was exiled and fled 
abroad. Influenced by Henry George’s 1879 book of social theory, Progress and 
Poverty, he believed in the nationalisation of land. Based on his Western experience, 
Sun concluded that, in the West, the trend of change pointed towards governmental 
intervention, a form of socialism, to ensure a more equitable sharing of wealth. Sun 
Yat-sen argued that the land issue was the root of Chinese peasants’ poverty, as well 
as the key for China to prevent capitalistic corruption in the future. Nationalisation of 
land could take away the feudal class’ land ownership and initiate the development of 
capitalism. When Tung Meng Hui (an antecedent of Guomintang) was founded in 1905 
in Tokyo, the equalisation of land rights was one of the “Four Big Platforms”. Sun Yat-
sen explained the meaning of “the equalisation of land rights” as “the cultivation of 
culture shared by all citizens equally.”467 He explained how to put the idea in practice: 
when the social economy improves, the land value is estimated, with the original land 
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value belonging to land owners; after revolution, the increased land value is due to 
social progress, attributed to the state and shared by all people.468 From then on, the 
equalisation of land rights has been one of the most important pieces of political 
propaganda for Guomintang. For over one hundred years, Guomintang had put the 
equalisation of land rights in the Constitution and Land Act. This policy was 
consistently in Guomintang’s platform and was presented in Taiwanese students’ 
textbooks. However, in practice, Guomintang never really stuck to Sun’s principle, and 
the issue was hardly taken seriously. In 1912, the provisional government of the 
Republic of China was founded in Nanking. During his brief tenure as Provisional 
President, Sun Yat-sen advocated the equalisation of land rights and policies for the 
people’s livelihood for the purpose of solving agrarian problems, but these went 
unapproved by most of his comrades. In August 1912, the government was reshuffled 
and Tung Meng Hui’s platform in essence omitted The Principle of the People’s 
Livelihood. This was the first time that Guomintang gave up on its socialistic policy.  
 
At almost the same time, the inevitable struggle between landlords and peasants for 
the land was occurring in certain rural areas. The tillers refused to pay rent or taxes, 
burning landlords’ houses. In one speech, Sun assured his followers that the 
equalisation of land rights did not imply actual land division or nationalisation.469 In 
1927, under cooperation of the revolutionary force led by Guomintang and the 
workers’ and peasants’ movements of the Chinese Communist Party, most areas 
south of the Yangtze River were taken over by the Northern Expedition Army. 
Nevertheless, conflicts existed and grew between Guomintang and the Chinese 
Communist Party. Ever since the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921, the 
workers’ and peasants’ alliance has been its revolutionary base. In 1923, when the 
Party was ordered by Comintern to cooperate with Guomintang to build a united front 
under Guomintang’s leadership, some Party leadership officials aggressively 
organised peasant movements. Mao Tse-tung was a typical case of campaigning for 
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agrarian reform. During the Northward Expedition, the Chinese Communist Party set 
up provincial peasant associations consisting of more than nine million members that 
gave the Party’s revolutionary power reach to the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers areas.470 
The Party launched campaigns protesting against landlords and other issues, such as 
cutting rent, reducing deposits, forbidding usuries, opposing extortive levies and 
encouraging peasants to boycott rents, deposits and taxes.  
 
On the Nationalist side, by issuing state bonds and selling them to the plutocrats of 
middle coastal cities, Chiang Kai-shek made alliances with the bourgeoisie and became 
their political representative.471 Since the Guomintang leadership mostly consisted of 
landlords or provincial notables of a similar background, it finally counter-attacked the 
Chinese Communist Party, leading to Guomintang’s purging of the party of 
communists and the end of cooperation with the Chinese Communist Party. In 1927, 
Guomintang officially broke off with the Chinese Communist Party and started hunting 
left wing activists. The Party decided to arm workers and peasants and build up Soviet 
regimes by initiating an agrarian revolution. A ten-year-long revolutionary war 
commenced. Campaigns rallying around “down landlords and share lands” were 
spreading in mid-western provinces. The Chinese Communists led poor peasants in 
confiscating land and workers in organising strikes. Local armed forces (Red Army) 
were established to develop the revolutionary strategy of “rural villages surrounding 
urban areas.” A wide range of Soviet states were established during a short period of 
time (1928-34). The Chinese Communist Party promulgated the Land Act of the 
Chinese Soviet Republic and the Land Act of Jing Gang Mountain. The Party’s agrarian 
revolution continued until the anti-Japanese war. In order to carry on the policy of an 
Anti-Japanese National United Front, the Chinese Communist Party declared the 
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abolishment of the policy of confiscating landlords’ land, and replaced it with the 
“two-five reduction rent” movement as the land policy in rural villages.472 
 
Concerning Guomintang, after the party purge, there were debates within the party 
on the issue of organising peasant based associations, which it was considered would 
help consolidate the support of the lower classes. They acknowledged the importance 
of the implementation of the “two-five reduced rent” policy. The right wing of the 
party clearly opposed the rent reduction movement; Zhejiang province’s leadership 
appointed a landlord as the Minister of Agriculture who strongly opposed the its 
enforcement. Between 1927 and 1929, the struggle between the left and right wings 
spread. Young radical members of the left wing were accused of being “members of 
the Chinese Communist Party” and arrested for supporting agrarian reform.473 When 
the Nationalist government was established in Nanking, the platform for “the period 
of political tutelage” was declared in October 1928. The Guomintang party soon drew 
up nine principles as guidelines for Land Act legislation. Land Act was promulgated in 
1930, which stipulated the measures for the Guomintang government to implement 
the equalisation of land rights policy. Chapter Four of the Act, titled “Land Tax”, 
included detailed regulations on assessing land value, levying land tax and value-
increment tax (capital gains tax). The chapter also included the policy for reducing 
agrarian rent in order to support the peasant’s campaign; however, the Act had a 
different viewpoint to Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s notion of the government taking over the 
increment of land value. A right wing nationalist, Hu Han-min, who had been a 
prominent figure during the republican revolution, spoke out with his own 
interpretation of Sun’s concept, intervening in the legislation. Instead of the 
government taking over all the increment of land value, Hu argued that the increment 
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only partly belonged to the state. 474  Hu’s concept was popularly supported by 
warlords, landlords and politicians. Therefore, the value-increment tax was introduced 
into the legislation. The original drafter of the Land Act, Wu Shan-ying, explained that 
the introduction of the capital gains tax was a step towards Sun Yat-sen’s idea and a 
gradual reform.475 The Guomintang leadership was afraid of an attack by the right wing 
and pushed the policy.  
 
Nevertheless, the Guomintang government’s compromised policy still met strong 
resistance. The leadership of a Nationalist faction (Central Club faction, a clique 
founded in 1927, which was a close ally of Chiang Kai-Shek) commented on the failure 
of implementing Land Act because the regime was reluctant to carry on with Sun’s 
policies. The newly established government was too weak to fight on so many fronts 
and agrarian reform was not a priority.476  The case of urban planning in Nanking 
reveals one of the reasons why land reform was unsupported by party members. The 
compulsory acquisition of land for public facilities met opposition because high level 
officials had invested in real estate and purchased land. The situation everywhere else 
besides Nanking was more severe. At that time, most provinces were dominated by 
warlords, and warlords were landlords.  
 
In 1945, Japan was on the verge of losing the Second World War, so the Chinese 
Communist Party started preparing for civil war against the Nationalists. Mao Tse-tung 
advocated putting the “land to the tiller” policy in practice and liberating the peasants. 
Mao made it very clear in his political report to the seventh National Congress of the 
Chinese Communist Party in 1945, “On Coalition Government”, that the real reason 
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for the clash between the Communist and Nationalist Parties was the agrarian issue.477 
In August 1945, civil war between the Chinese Communist Party and Guomintang 
resumed again, but in the liberated area, with the Communists aggressively carrying 
on with agrarian reform. The movement in the end turned out to be the action of 
confiscating a landlord’s land. With tension between the Chinese Communist Party 
and Guomintang increasing, the Party’s leadership in 1946 instructed local party 
leaders to abandon the 1937 policy of stopping confiscating landlords’ land. The Party 
motivated peasants by letting them acquire land. The peasants were armed against 
Guomintang. Tensions developed, and in September 1947 the Chinese Communist 
Party held a national meeting on land issues and announced the “Guidelines of 
Chinese Land Act”, declaring the abolishment of the feudal land system, 
implementation of land to the tiller and the redistribution of land. No sooner had the 
Guidelines of Chinese Land Act been promulgated than a widespread land reform 
movement began in liberated areas. Around 100 million peasants in liberated areas 
acquired land. Since peasants had land, they were more aggressive in supporting and 
joining the liberation war. The Red Army of the Chinese Communist Party was 
strengthened. In the second half of 1948, the Chinese Communist Party carried both 
military and political advantages in the war. By 1953, the agrarian reform campaign 
had been carried out through most of Mainland China.478  
 
In 1945, the Central Club faction (also known as CC) of Guomintang, which gradually 
controlled the party machine, launched a political struggle inside Guomintang by 
insisting on progressive land reform guidelines. CC’s leaders including Chen Guo-fu 
and his younger brother Chen Li-fu, who were loyal to Chang Kai-shek and authorised 
to run the party administration. There was a famous saying describing the relationship 
between Chiang and the Chens: “Chiang Kai-shek’s Empire; the Chen family’s party.” 
The Chens were anti-Communist right wing Nationalists, but insisted on agrarian 
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reform. They emphasised the importance of having progressive land policies to 
enhance Guomintang’s propaganda. The Chens wanted to revive the Land Act that 
had been frozen by Guomintang. They accused the Minister of Finance of failing to 
carry out land reform, with the Minister of Finance forced to resign. In April 1946, the 
Guomintang government passed a Land Act amendment. It stipulated that rent could 
not be more than 8% of the land price, or more than 37.5% of the harvest. Land would 
belong to the farmers who tilled the land, while the transaction and transfer of 
ownership had to be approved or monitored by the government. A progressive land 
tax and capital gains tax were announced. Other articles included measures for re-
plotting land, encouraging development and setting up a housing fund. The 
Constitution of The Republic of China was promulgated on 1st January 1947. The 
Constitution Law adopted the Chens’ land issue concepts.479 
 
In April 1947, the CC faction’s Chinese Land Reform Association was founded. It made 
a rousing statement, aimed at the Chinese Communist Party’s land reform, stating 
that: “the current truth told us, the land problem in China is more serious than any time 
before. It has made us go to a crucial point of whether to progress or go backward, 
revive or decline. If we do not solve it, it is going to solve us!”480 In March 1948, the 
Chinese Land Reform Association proposed a more drastic Land Reform Act, focusing 
on how to solve land problems to meet the needs of tenant farmers in the fastest and 
simplest way. It suggested that the tenants could have the land immediately on the 
day the radical legislation passed and pay for the transaction later in instalments.481 
The political situation was so disadvantageous to Guomintang that landlords were told 
by some Guomintang members to either cooperate with the Nationalists or face the 
consequences of a Communist revolution. They were told that “all land reform acts 
have no reasons to protect landlords” and that “if landlords want to protect their own 
interests rather than going with the peaceful reform, someday it will be impossible to 
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protect their own lives. The rebellion led by the Chinese Communist Party right now is 
a fact in front of your eyes.”482 In May, Guomintang proposed the Agricultural Land 
Reform Act as a response to the proposed Land Reform Act and demanded that land 
reform must be completed within one year after promulgation of the act. The purpose 
of the act was to prevent the Chinese Communist Party’s expansion of power via its 
agrarian reform policies. 
 
6.1.2 Land reform in Taiwan 
 
Taiwan’s land reform can be seen as an extension of the civil war between 
Guomintang and the Chinese Communist Party. According to an undercover member 
of the Chinese Communist Party, the Party’s undercover Taiwanese activists had been 
campaigning for land reform in Taiwan in the 1940s.483 By late 1948, the Chinese 
Communists had captured some northern industrial cities. Guomintang’s position was 
bleak. Guomintang had the advantage of numbers and weapons, and benefited from 
considerable international support, but low morale hindered their ability to fight. 
Though they administered a larger and more populous territory, civilian support was 
eroded by corruption in the Nationalist administration. The capture of large 
Nationalist formations provided the Chinese Communist Party with the tanks, heavy 
artillery and other combined-arms assets needed to carry out offensive operations 
south of the Great Wall. Meanwhile, a hyperinflation crisis afflicted the Nationalist 
Government. In January 1948, in order to acquire aid from the United States, the 
Nationalist government was determined to carry on with its agrarian reform policy. 
Agricultural Revival Associations were established for the reform. In 1949, agrarian 
reform had been implemented in Taiwan, Fukien, Szechwan, Canton, Kwangsi and 
Kweichow provinces. Chen Cheng was the then Governor of the Taiwan Provincial 
Government and Chiang Jing-guo Chief of the Guomintang Party in Taiwan. Both of 
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them aggressively carried out the land reform mainly based on the 375 (37.5%) Rental 
Reduction Policy. 
 
In Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist government consolidated its political legitimacy by 
successfully carrying out land reform. As previously mentioned in this thesis, agrarian 
reform in Taiwan was actually a compromised agreement between local landlords and 
the Chinese Nationalist Government. Taiwanese landlords could only choose between 
supporting the Nationalist Government or facing the foreseeable Communist Party 
take-over. Taiwanese landlords were forced to release their land to tenants but were 
promised compensation by the Nationalist Government. According to the 
arrangement of the “converting landholdings into industrial holdings” policy, major 
land owners had become entrepreneurs and industrialists, owning industries 
supplying Taiwanese people’s livelihoods. Agrarianism in the 1950s resulted in an 
increase in productivity in farming, which contributed to the industrialisation of the 
1960s. With the Guomintang government’s defeat in the civil war, a flux of Chinese 
political migrants from the Mainland had been rushing into Taiwanese cities. The 
increasing population pushed up urban land prices. The implementation of agrarian 
reform also contributed to the increase in urban land prices. After the “land to the 
tiller” policy was carried out, of the compensation given to landlords, only 30% was 
transferred to the industrial sectors. The rest found its way to cities and speculating 
on urban land, leading to land speculators monopolising urban land ownership. 
Between 1949 and 1952, urban land prices had risen almost five times, with the rising 
prices not slowing down between 1954 and 1959.484 Land speculation resulted in 
expensive rents, inflation and a scarce housing problem. Entrepreneurs found it hard 
to find suitable and affordable sites for factories, damaging the government’s effort 
to attract foreign and overseas Chinese investment.  
 
In 1951, the Nationalist government decided to carry out land reform in urban areas. 
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Chiang Kai-shek announced his determination to enforce Sun Yat-sen’s principles, the 
equalisation of land rights, in cities. The “Regulations of Taiwan Province Urban Land 
Reform” bill was introduced by the Taiwan Provincial Government and later approved 
by Executive Yuan. Nevertheless, most measures introduced by the Regulations were 
not carried out. Sun Yat-sen’s equalising land rights were stipulated but rarely put into 
practice.485  In 1954, Executive Yuan again pushed forward the urban land reform 
policy. In the same year, the Equalisation of Urban Land Rights Act was enacted. The 
Act stipulated four main sections in accordance with Sun Yat-sen’s four steps of 
equalising land rights: assessing land value, levying land tax according to valuation, 
purchasing land at the declared value and land value increments going to the public. 
In September, Executive Yuan ordered Taiwan province to be the area in which the Act 
would be applied, but the order met strong resistance from the Provincial Assembly. 
The by-laws and implementation details had not been passed until 1956. 59 cities, 
villages and towns were appointed as the applied areas. The land value-increment tax 
was put into practice on 1st August 1956 and the land tax on 1st September. 
 
6.1.3 The failure of urban land reform in Taiwan 
 
The Taiwan Provincial Assembly was officially established in 1959. Though the 
leadership consisted of Taiwanese politicians with either strong connections to the 
Chinese Nationalist Party or with experience working in Mainland China, most 
members were native Taiwanese (local provincial people) who represented the 
interests of local landlords and notables. It was a democratic body and members were 
elected via popular elections, easily infiltrated by the special interests of local political 
factions in the Guomintang Party that were allowed by the central government to 
operate local monopoly businesses. The Assembly was the main obstacle to the 
government being able to carry out the equalising land rights policy. In the 1960s, 
there were approximately 400 cities and towns in Taiwan. Due to the Provincial 
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Assembly’s opposition to the implementation of the equalisation of land rights, urban 
cities, only 85 cities or towns had prepared urban plans. Of the 85 cities towns, only 
61 practically carried out the equalisation of land rights. The areas putting the 
equalisation of land rights into practice accounted for only 32% of the total area of the 
61 towns and cities.486 Fast growing areas with booming property markets were not 
included in the equalisation of land rights plan. The government dared to impose a 
high capital gains tax on the increment of land value in cities. There was no real 
intention to achieve Sun Yat-sen’s policies. The first property boom in Taiwan was 
after the war started in 1967. With the interest rate cut, savings poured into the 
property market. In 1967, annual house price growth was 25%. In 1968, growth 
increased, reaching 65% in Taipei.487  The boom also increased inflation, the most 
serious increase in 60 years. In 1968, several measures were introduced to slow down 
the boom in the cities, including restrictions on land ownership, tightening credits on 
loans and mortgages, and taxing vacant land. The market slowed down for 
approximately a year before growth continued. In 1971, the boom spread to suburban 
areas not covered by urban plans. In order to suppress speculation, Guomintang 
announced its determination to carry out the equalisation of land rights on non-urban 
land.488  
 
However, work assessing land prices (the first step in equalising land rights) was not 
completed until 1978. While there was a boom, the areas of fast growth were not 
covered by the practice of equalising land rights. When the government wanted the 
policy to be implemented, land consortiums had already acquired huge profits from 
speculation. The gains strengthened the war chests of local political factions, with 
their influence even infiltrating central government. After seven amendments, 
Guomintang’s version of the equalisation of land rights was eventually implemented 
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in Taiwan, but it was far different from Sun Yat-sen’s previous versions. The failure of 
the publicisation of value increment meant that land speculation became a very 
profitable business, a niche involving those local politicians who could manipulate 
urban planning. Suburban greenbelts could be up-zoned to gold-belts overnight. 
Accompanying the democratisation of Taiwanese politics, local political factions 
infiltrated the state apparatus. Leaders of regional conglomerates from Taipei Country 
(consisting of property developers, construction, credit societies, bus companies and 
the media industry) worked with Lee Teng-hui, the first local Taiwanese to become 
President, to replace Guomintang’s old Chinese Nationalist leadership.489 Together 
they dominated the plutocracy period in Taiwanese politics. Lee Kuan Yew (the life-
long leader of Singapore) provides an accurate description of this period:  
“…to be elected to Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan in the 1990s, some KMT 
candidates spent as much as US$10-20 million. Once elected, they had to 
recoup and prepare for the next round by using their influence with 
government ministers and officials to get contracts awarded or to convert 
land use from agricultural to industrial or urban development.”490  
As a political operator who has been involved in Taiwanese electoral campaigns at 
various levels, I concur with the figures Lee suggests.  
 
While urban planning had been an important political arena for the new democracy, 
home ownership concentrated rapidly. In 1989, there were more than 3,000 
individuals owning more than 10 houses in Taiwan.491 In Taipei, 3% of households 
owned 27% of the land. The property boom in the late 1980s resulted in un-affordable 
housing prices. The Department of Comptroller estimated that in Taipei City it would 
take 37.57 years of saving for a family to own a house, even if the family was thrifty 
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during their daily spending. In Kaohsiung, it would take 19.33 years, and in the rest of 
Taiwan, the average figure was 13.53 years. Meanwhile, the statistics indicate that 
there were more than 800,000 empty houses in Taiwan, with 16.65% in the housing 
market. In 1989, the property boom reached its peak. Demanding affordable housing, 
more than 100,000 people joined a lie-in protest on the busiest street in Taipei. The 
campaign was organised by left-wing scholars, under the leadership of Professor Shia 
Chu-joe, and postgraduate students from the Graduate Institute of Building and 
Planning, National Taiwan University. By initiating the movement, the advocates 
declared their disappointment with the urban planning practices in Taiwan, urging 
reform. The government’s legitimacy was challenged and they responded with the 
Second Land Reform policy. Nevertheless, the proposed amendment to capital gains 
tax was the only substantial content in the Reform. The localised Guomintang regime 
had no intention to carry out the Reform, not even the section on capital gains tax. 
Minister Wang Chien-shien from the Finance Ministry insisted on the proposed 
amendment and was later forced to quit. He was accused by the Guomintang 
leadership of “being a Mainlander who would like to take away local Taiwanese 
people’s land.” Whilst being interviewed by me in 1993, Wang clarified his position at 
the time. As a right-wing politician who believes in the free market, he did not agree 
with the idea of another land reform, and only wished for a more effective measure 
for levying capital gain tax. 492 The Second Land Reform, though it had not been a 
genuine one, was defeated by identity politics relating to stereotypical visions of 
“mainlanders” and never implemented. 
 
To conclude this section, I have argued that because identity politics in Taiwan have 
been manipulated to cover up social conflicts between classes, the key reason to the 
success of agrarian land reform has been simplified by main-stream discourse to 
suggest that Guomintang was an alien regime with little connections to Taiwanese 
people, which implemented land reform by coercion. As part of main-stream 
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discourse, theories of an alien regime are also being applied to explain the failure of 
urban planning and urban land reform: according to such discourse, being a foreign 
regime and being Chinese, Guomintang, has not identified with Taiwan, so it does not 
care about the living condition of Taiwanese people. Challenging the above discourse 
by reviewing the historical context of the struggle of Chinese right wings and left 
wings, this section points out that the agrarian land reform in Taiwan was actually an 
extension of the Civil War between the left and right in Mainland China. The Chinese 
Nationalist regime in Taiwan had to consolidate its political legitimacy by carrying out 
agrarian land reform. In order to prevent the power expansion of Chinese Communist 
Party to Taiwan, the landlord class was also willing to work with the Guomintang to 
implement the agrarian land reform. Regarding the failure of urban land reform, it was 
not the alien element of Guomintang that failed the reform; on the contrary, it was 
the local element of Guomintang that opposed its implementation, since it dared not 
challenge local Taiwanese special interests. 
 
 
6.2 The analysis of the nationalist state in Taiwan 
 
To further review why it was the local element of the Chinese Nationalist regime, 
rather than its foreign element, that opposed urban land reform, this section analyses 
the essence of the Guomintang regime and examines its composition. This section 
argues that it was Guomintang’s local political factions, which had control over local 
planning authorities, who opposed urban land reform. 
 
The fact that Guomintang was from the Chinese Mainland and had few ties to 
Taiwanese indigenous landowners had little to do with the success of agrarian reform 
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in the 1950s.493 The Reform did not result from Guomintang’s forceful suppression. 
The possibility of the Chinese Communist Party’s invasion of Taiwan left landlords with 
no choice but to support and cooperate with the Chinese Nationalists, though some 
landlords sought independence for Taiwan through the help of American and 
Japanese sympathisers. The fact that Guomintang was an outsider party did not mean 
that it could do whatever it wished; otherwise, Guomintang would have carried on 
urban land reform by force. Why was Guomintang so reluctant to implement land 
reform in urban areas? Guomintang was arguably little more than an assembly of 
warlords and party officials. In exchange for the support of local notables, Guomintang 
granted local political factions privileges for operating monopolistic industries in their 
constituencies. 494  The alliance made Chinese Guomintang localised and become 
Taiwanese. Meanwhile, state capitalism in Taiwan had been strongly established. High 
speed economic development had created a new class of Taiwanese capitalists, 
including those who used to be landlords. The government’s economic policies 
needed to meet the interests of the bourgeoisie who were usually important elements 
in local politics. During the period of Guomintang’s rule, local political factions had had 
control over local planning authorities and they opposed land reform.  
 
Local factions refer to a web of interpersonal networks that function in local political 
arenas. The activists in a faction are called pillars (vote captains), who organise and 
round up votes for candidates. Once they hold public office, politicians are expected 
to take care of their vote captains’ needs in exchange for the vote captains’ continuing 
support. The network is built on nepotism and cronyism. There used to be over one 
hundred local factions in Taiwan in the 1980s and 1990s, which were the most 
powerful force that decided election outcomes, usually with two or three factions in 
a county competing for public office.495  They are mainly built around geographic 
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connections, lineage, marriage and business cooperation. Politicians and activists seek 
collectively to pursue political and economic resources through elections, and once 
elected, to distribute the resources among the networks. Nearly all the local factions 
originated in 1951 when popular elections were instituted. 496  While Guomintang 
encouraged the existence of local factions, it also prevented their expansion by 
restricting them from moving beyond local borders to the national stage, until 
President Lee introduced them into the central party machine and replaced the old 
Chinese Nationalist cadres in the late 1980s. Due to the authoritarian government’s 
suppression of the opposition movement virtually guaranteeing Guomintang 
candidates’ success, leaders or factions were encouraged to join the party to help win 
elections and receive the spoils and patronage that accompanied political positions. 
However, local popular elections did not necessarily mean local autonomy, and the 
central government still had the final say on the distribution of most financial and 
economic resources. 
 
Nevertheless, as previously noted, local politicians’ personal gains were granted by 
allotting regional monopolies and special interests to local political factions, including:  
(1) Prerogatives of regional banks, credit societies and bus companies, etc. 
(2) Local politicians had the privilege of receiving large personal loans from 
provincial government banks. 
(3) Local factions dominating state purchases and construction work at the local 
level and making exorbitant profits from it. 
(4) Local factions running protection rackets. They were involved in illegal 
economic activities, such as pubs with escort services and casinos and saunas 
with prostitutes.  
(5) Urban planning was also a niche for local politicians to speculate on land 
transactions. Due to their control of urban planning committees, factions 
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manipulated zoning reviews. They bought cheap agricultural land and 
converted them to residential zones.497  
Land speculation and protection rackets have been the most important niches for local 
factions. They do not cause an obvious loss for local governments because they can 
generate huge profits. Through shrewd manipulation and by granting material 
incentives, including a local monopolistic business environment, Guomintang was able 
to turn most factions away from the call for political reform. While local factions were 
practicing the politics of cronyism and nepotism, the migrant party, Guomintang, 
established its legitimacy by integrating local elites into government. Local factions 
ruled local people for the migrant party and had become an important power bloc of 
the regime. 
 
Following Gramsci, Manuel Castells defines a power bloc as the aggregation of 
heterogeneous actors that together control the development of state institutions. In 
the same way as institutions are territorially differentiated, so are power blocs. The 
inclusion of power blocs can help achieve the balance of domination and legitimation 
on which the state is based. 498  Traditionally, in Taiwanese academic circles, 
“clientelism” has been used to describe the relationship between the Taiwanese 
central government and local political factions. The Chinese Nationalist Party’s rule in 
Taiwan has been defined as clientelist authoritarian. 499  The concept of clientelist 
authoritarianism aims to show how an outsider party from the Mainland can govern 
a country in which the majority of people are islanders. However, while clientelism 
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suggests that local political factions are fringes of the authoritarian party-state, local 
factions actually sustained the whole political machinery. Instead of clientelism, some 
studies describe local factions as informal political sectors, which worked like hinges 
between the Chinese Nationalist state and Taiwanese society. 500  
 
Therefore, in political terms, Taiwanese people have been mobilised and organised by 
local factions, not by trade unions. This helps explain how identity politics arose in 
Taiwan and why there has been little room for class politics. While local factions have 
been suggested as being on the margins of the Taiwanese political system, in reality 
the power bloc consisted of the biggest land owners in Taiwan. According to my 
previous field research, 18 factions in Taipei County owned at least 161 development 
companies.501 Between 1988 and 1994, 9 of the 18 factions had sold NTD$2.62 billion 
(£5.8 billion) worth of properties in the real estate market.502 95% of local councillors 
in Taipei County owned or were supported by development companies.503   
 
To conclude this section, it was the local (Taiwanese) element of the Chinese 
Nationalist regime that opposed urban land reform. This conclusion is quite contrary 
to the argument prevalent within Taiwanese main-stream discourse that it was 
Guomintang’s being Chinese which resulted in the failure of land reform. This thesis 
argues that Guomintang, in exchange for the support of local notables, dared not to 
challenge local political factions’ special interests, since local political factions mostly 
consisted of landlords, and land speculation has been the most important niche for 
local factions. This explains why Taiwanese urban land reform met severe resistance 
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from Taiwan Provincial Congress, because it represented the special interests of local 
factions. 
 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
 
By reviewing the historical development of land reform in Taiwan, one can see that 
the development of land use and related laws occurred as a result of political and 
economic forces beyond the planners’ control. The land reform carried out in the late 
1940s was driven by the fear of agrarian rebellion led by the Chinese Communist Party 
and to win support from the United States for the Nationalist government. By 
successfully implementing land reform, the government consolidated its political 
legitimacy. The urban land reform initiated in the late 1950s and continued through 
the second half of the century was another proof that the political complexity of 
power blocs dominated land policy and development decisions. Though the doctrine 
of equalising land rights proposed by Sun Yat-Sen in the name of public interest was 
written in Constitutional Law, the power blocs in central government and local politics 
who represented the interest of land owners and speculators won the battle against 
publicisation of land capital gain. The government’s policies operated in a society 
based on recognition of the institution of private property and a property market, with 
the conflicts between those policies occasionally stressing the public interest over 
private property.  
 
In this chapter, we can once again see how the competition between the ideologies 
of private property and public interest analysed by McAuslan, can be seen during the 
conflicts between various political economic forces. Though the ideologies differed, 
the parties advocate the ideologies all are members of power blocs that comprise the 
governing elite. Members of the power blocs are persons who have arrived at their 
political positions because they represent certain special interests, with their visions 
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on land policy and development reflecting the ideologies of the governing elite and 
serving their interests, rather than reflecting the aspirations and ideals that originated 
from the commitment to professionalism. Concerning Taiwan, this chapter has 
emphasised that local political factions are an important economic force that 
decisively affected the spatial landscape. McAuslan’s analysis of the conflict between 
persons and organisations accompanying planning ideology conflicts – which in the 
case of Britain are central government vs. local government, Conservative vs. Labour 
and judges vs. bureaucracy – does not provide the necessary insight into the 
development of the Taiwanese land-use system without focusing on the unique local 
political factions, the power bloc comprised of the biggest land owners in Taiwan. This 
was the reason why Taiwanese urban land reform met severe resistance. 
  
 237 
Chapter 7: Comprehensive Urban Planning and the Developmentalist State of Hong 
Kong 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter introduces the evolution of comprehensive urban planning in Hong Kong 
and discusses the role of the Hong Kong government as the developer of Hong Kong’s 
land use. The first modern town planning attempt in Hong Kong, the Town Planning 
Scheme of 1922, concerned laying out sites for new development in Kowloon to meet 
Hong Kong’s economic expansion. In this respect, it differed from its counterpart in 
England, Town Planning Act 1925, that was planned to solve existing urban issues. 
However, the successors to the 1922 scheme, introduced later in the 1930s, were 
similar to the British planning legislation of the same era, focusing on the issue of 
externalities. Accompanied by the setting up of permanent planning machinery in 
1939, Hong Kong’s Town Planning Ordinance legislation created an integrated 
authority that combined building control and sanitation control to carry out the 
concept of state intervention for public goods and external effects. The establishment 
of systematic development control was an exact implementation of McAuslan’s 
second ideology, the ideology of public interest. Developers could be deprived of their 
common law rights by administrative decisions.  
 
The trend calling for state intervention against laissez-faire continued after the Second 
World War. With the publication of the Abercrombie Plan in 1948, open space, green 
belts and reasonable density concepts were imported to Hong Kong to emphasise the 
important of development control. Later statutory and zoning plans were introduced 
to generally apply to Hong Kong as a set of universal development control legal 
measures. The application of zoning was not a paradigm shift in terms of planning 
ideology but it did enhance the efficiency of administrative power. During the 1960s, 
the main task of planning in Hong Kong was to meet the needs of large scale 
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immigration and economic expansion that came with population expansion. Land 
demand pressure made the city state play the role of efficient developer. A long-term 
land use plan was crucial at this stage. The 1970s in Hong Kong was an era that saw 
the upgrading of public housing, the development of new towns and the urbanisation 
of the New Territories. The Hong Kong government was meant to be both a welfare 
state and developmentalist state at the same time; nevertheless, this chapter argues 
that Hong Kong has primarily acted for the benefits of property development or fiscal 
objectives rather than social welfare. The role of developer continued after the 
handover of sovereignty to China. While the socialist state of China has allowed Hong 
Kong to retain its capitalist economic system, the British colonial style of elite 
governance, with undemocratically elected representatives consisting of bureaucrats, 
developers and businessmen, still dominates urban planning decision making in Hong 
Kong. 
 
 
7.1 The importation of modern comprehensive urban planning 
 
This section introduces the evolution of modern comprehensive urban planning in 
Hong Kong. It begins with the importation of modern comprehensive urban planning 
through the Town Planning Scheme of 1922. I will then introduce the establishment 
of planning ordinance and the setting up of permanent machinery to take charge of 
town planning, followed by a discussion of the 1947 Abercrombie Plan, a master plan 
that covered long term urban planning policies and development plans. 
 
According to the Town Planning Division, Lands Department of Hong Kong, the earliest 
history of institutionalised planning began with the enactment of the Town Planning 
 239 
Ordinance in 1939. 504  However, the first major attempt to apply modern town 
planning to Hong Kong was the Town Planning Scheme of 1922.505 The 1922 Scheme 
was introduced to counter the explosive growth of Kowloon. In the late 1880s and 
early 1890s, the corresponding concessions made by China to Russia, France and 
Germany created demand in Hong Kong to extend the northern boundary to defend 
against European competition. New Territories were leased to Britain in 1898. In the 
same year, Hong Kong entered the world financial market, using merchant finance to 
underwrite the cost of railway construction in southern China. Two major transport 
systems were built. The tram service was inaugurated in 1905 and the Canton-
Kowloon railway opened in 1905, with the transportation systems allowing the 
integration of Kowloon and Hong Kong Island. 506  From this period, Hong Kong 
experienced steady economic growth. Industry received its first major boost during 
the First World War when substitution was required for European products that were 
no longer available. As the annual Administrative Report of 1921 stated, great and 
rapid development had taken place on the Kowloon Peninsula. The 1922 Town 
Planning Scheme plan for Kowloon was essentially a scheme for laying out building 
lots for subsequent private development, including offensive trade areas, residential 
areas and markets. The government also took the opportunity to reserve sites for a 
wide variety of public facilities, including recreation grounds, sewage, transport 
networks such as planned railways and ferries, and reclamations and harbour work. 
Kowloon had been mapped out in detail for the future requirements of a very large 
population.507  
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By the 1920s, the New Territories on Kowloon Peninsula had become the known as 
the countryside of Hong Kong and the gateway to recreation. With steadily increasing 
numbers of people migrating to Kowloon, it was fast becoming a twin city to Victoria 
on Hong Kong Island.508 Concern about provisions for the reservation of playing fields 
for members of the Police Force and subordinate staff in the Town Planning Scheme 
reflected the fact that Kowloon was expected to be essentially a colonists’ “country 
house” in Hong Kong: a recreation quarter for Europeans.509 The Governor did indeed 
have a country house at Fanling in Kowloon, with many bachelors of British society 
settled in spacious colonial houses in the newly developing Territories. The Town 
Planning Scheme was both the result and cause of land and property speculation.510 
Although the government failed to set up a permanent authority to deal with property 
development pressure, it is apparent that most developments after the enactment of 
the 1922 Scheme were confirmed by the master plan. The scheme was suggested by 
Legislative Council members to be drawn up to provide the expansion of the Colony 
for the next fifty years.511 The scheme was largely related to the proposed reclamation 
of East Praya and North Point. The square pattern of building plots in contemporary 
Tsim Sha Sui and Mong Kok resulted from this scheme and shows the enduring 
influence of the 1922 Scheme on the layout of contemporary Hong Kong. 512  
 
7.1.1 The Establishment of Planning Ordinance and the Planning Board 
 
Another important town planning development before the Second World War was 
the setting up of permanent machinery to take charge of town planning. The 
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permanent organisation was expected to be armed with planning powers to deal with 
not only the development of private property but also slum clearance, housing and 
compensation for interference with private property rights. The Town Planning 
Ordinance bill was presented before the Legislative Council and passed in 1939, giving 
birth to the Town Planning Board. The Ordinance had 14 sections stipulating the 
following powers, among others: 
(1) Drafting the content of lay-out plans. 
(2) Exhibition of draft plans. 
(3) Objections to draft plans. 
(4) Approval of draft plans. 
(5) Governor-in-Council’s powers on making regulations. 
The Ordinance only applied to urban areas, similar to the legislation for the Housing 
and Town Planning Act 1909 and 1919, and the Town Planning Act 1925 in Britain, 
which were enacted before universal rural planning was introduced.513 
 
The making of the Ordinance was influenced by British planning., In his report to the 
Commission and the Executive Council, the Housing Commission Secretary, Mr W. H. 
Qwen, suggested details on how town planning procedures and functions might be 
introduced, with lengthy quotes from the British Town and Country Act 1932 being 
presented.514 It is clear that the Ordinance was a brief version of the British Town and 
Country Planning Act 1932. Nevertheless the difference from British planning was that 
development control in Hong Kong could be exercised by both contractual leases and 
planning laws. The Town Planning Ordinance of Hong Kong not only gave 
administrative bodies planning powers over development and building control, but 
the authority to make master plans. Though there were no statutory enforcement 
powers directly attached to the Ordinance, the Hong Kong government was 
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empowered to have a permanent board to set up plans. Town Planning Board 
members were appointed by the Governor, with members including non-officials who 
were not approved by any democratic procedure but did represent the public. The 
town plans implementation procedure was well established, with the Board 
submitting plans pursuant to the Ordinance for approval by the Governor. These 
approved plans, according to Section 13 of the Ordinance, “shall be used by all public 
officers and bodies as standards for guidance in the exercise of any powers vested in 
them.” The function, formality and responsibility of preparation for Town Planning 
Board plans still exist in its current amended form. 
 
The importation of modern urban planning came to Hong Kong approximately 100 
years after contractual planning. Since the 1922 Town Planning Scheme and earlier 
schemes were purely administrative, the 1939 legislation was emphasised as a 
milestone that upgraded development control to town planning, provided legal force, 
provided plans for infrastructure, and dealt with the issue of externalities.515 However, 
it would be unfair to say that development controls before 1939 did not have any 
effective function as urban plans. The main functions of modern urban planning are 
to regulate private property development and provide public amenities, in the vein of 
mainstream planning theories such as Pigouvian Market Failure and Keynes’ Welfare 
State model, which suggest state intervention for public goods and external effects. 
The contractual planning and early administrative regulations, such as Building 
Ordinance and Order and Health Amendment Ordinance, had already suggested the 
same approach to guarantee state interference in private development rights. At the 
urban planning conceptual level, it would be fair to say that the 1939 legislation was 
not a paradigm shift from the previous development controls, but an integration of 
planning authorities. It was an administrative integration provided by the law to 
organise development control powers with different departments and make the 
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master plans the legal obligation of planning authorities. Since the Legislative Council 
was not a democratic parliament with grass-roots support and was only a ruling 
organisation constituted by members imported from and introduced by British 
authorities in London, the shift in legal status for the planning regulations from the 
administrative body to the legislative body was merely a change of formality. Since 
development control could now be exercised by both contractual leases and planning 
laws, more power and discretion towards development control had been given to 
planning authorities. Development control measures made by the delegated 
legislations could over-ride development rights granted by a lease. It can be argued 
that developers’ common law rights had been deprived by administrative decisions, 
sometimes for vague public purposes. The conflict between entitlement of leases, 
master plans and property rights has been one of the most important issues 
associated with town planning laws and administrative laws in Hong Kong. The 1939 
Ordinance of Hong Kong carried some characteristics of the British 1932 and 1947 
Town and Country Planning Acts: prevention of urban sprawl, universal planning 
complying with a master plan, legalised town planning and nationalised development 
rights. The creation of the British Town and Country Planning Act 1932 and its 
predecessors, including the Housing and Town Planning Act 1909 and 1919 and Town 
Planning Act 1925, lay in concerns developed during the previous century in response 
to industrialisation and urbanisation. The laws were products of campaigns 
introduced by Patrick Abercrombie’s The Preservation of Rural England (1926), 
Ebenezer Howard’s Garden Cities Association and the philanthropic actions of 
industrialists, such as the Lever Brothers and the Cadbury family.516 A trend towards 
calling for state interventions on property development resulted in development 
control legislation, with the ideal of laissez-faire gradually going out of fashion. The 
Town Planning Ordinance of 1939 declared in its introduction its intention: 
“To promote the health, safety, convenience and general welfare of the 
community by making provision for the systematic preparation and approval 
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of plans for the future layout of existing and potential urban areas as well as 
for the types of buildings suited for erection therein.”  
The welfare state concept began to tentatively form in Hong Kong, accompanied by 
the importation of systematic urban planning.  
  
7.1.2 The 1947 Abercrombie Plan 
 
In 1947, the famous Irish architect and planner, Sir Patrick Abercrombie, project leader 
of the County of London Plan and Greater London Plan, was appointed to advise the 
Governor of Hong Kong on the long term general guidelines and principles of planning 
for a future Hong Kong. According to the Minutes of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, 
Abercrombie spent a month investigating Hong Kong. His work involved the planning 
of the port and urban areas, advising on what such plans would involve and what 
planning organisations would be needed.517 The Abercrombie Plan, published in 1948, 
suggested a bold system of legislation for land development and outlined various 
physical planning proposals, including the provision of a cross-harbour tunnel, 
reclamations, railway locations, the removal of military establishments, creation of 
industrial and residential zones, and the development of new towns in rural New 
Territories. Abercrombie set a maximum population of two million in the existing 
urban area.518 The Plan was intended to provide not only a master plan, but also 
guidelines for development plans to cover long term urban planning policies and allow 
for revisions from time to time in light of changing requirements and technical 
accomplishments.519 The Plan’s planned population of two million was one-third more 
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than the currently existing population. The Plan also suggested decentralisation of 
urban development. Although Abercrombie proposed the expansion of the urban area 
to the sea, new towns in New Territories were also suggested.520 The conception of 
decentralising urbanisation had been Abercrombie’s trade mark and he had left 
significant footprints in his City Development of Dublin, two London Plans and City and 
the County of Kingston-upon-Hull Plan. He advocated the necessity of a coordinated 
open space system, arguing that “adequate open space for both recreation and rest is 
a vital factor in maintaining and improving the health of people”.521 He also suggested 
figures for reasonable low density in urban areas. The plan prepared for Hong Kong 
was an accumulation of nearly fifty years of experience and knowledge in the planning 
field. 
 
In 1948, the Governor announced that Town Planning Office established within the 
Public Works Department. It would prepare the land-use plans and necessary surveys 
to facilitate Abercrombie’s work, and to draw up the future plans that would be 
needed as a result of Abercrombie’s investigations. However, in 1950, Abercrombie’s 
proposal was delayed and the town planning sub-department disbanded. It was not 
until 1953 that the Planning Branch was set up within the Crown Lands and Survey 
Office of the Public Works Department. Meanwhile, the Town Planning Board, under 
the 1939 Ordinance that had been reinstated in 1947, had not formally functioned 
until 1951 despite Abercrombie’s suggestion of setting up an advisory committee.522 
The reason that the Hong Kong government did not implement the Abercrombie Plan 
was that the long-term planning proposals had not been considered a priority. Given 
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the economic depression which Hong Kong suffered at the time, the plan was 
abandoned as too costly in terms of both finance and resources.523  
 
To conclude this section, it was the economic boom in the 1920s which initiated the 
earliest modern comprehensive planning in Hong Kong, Town Planning Scheme. Town 
planning was carried out for laying out building lots and public facilities, with the 
consideration of future requirements of a large population. Along with the 
implementation of comprehensive planning came the needs of setting up permanent 
machinery to take charge of town planning, which resulted in the establishment of 
Town Planning Board. To arm the Board to deal with development related matters, 
the Town Planning Ordinance was enacted to stipulate planning powers. The birth of 
the Town Planning Ordinance was the milestone that upgraded development control 
to town planning, and provided legal instruments and plans for infrastructure and 
further development. Comprehensive planning, administrative body and legal 
stipulation together constitute modern town planning and built the foundation for 
Hong Kong’s future planning. 
 
 
7.2 The introduction of statutory planning and zoning 
 
This section predominantly introduces a new era of urban planning in Hong Kong: the 
era of urban district plans. During this period, comprehensive long-term planning such 
as the Abercrombie Plan was not considered a priority. Instead of preparing a visionary 
development strategy, the planning machinery was under pressure to prepare the 
way for immediately realisable District Plans. With the appearance of District Plans, 
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statutory planning and zoning, which acted as the legal instruments to control 
development, were also introduced as the Plans’ main legal components. 
 
Abercrombie originally proposed a development plan similar to British urban plans 
that had been prepared in accordance with the planning system introduced in the 
1947 Town and Country Planning Act in Britain. However, the Hong Kong Government 
moved to emphasise the introduction of a set of universal measures on development 
control to be generally applied to Hong Kong. In 1950, the Town Planning Ordinance 
was revived and zoning introduced as the main legal instrument for policing urban 
growth.524 Although the Abercrombie Plan had not been accepted in the late 1940s, 
the setting up of the Town Planning Board and Planning Branch initiated an era of 
urban district plans. One of the main duties of the Planning Branch was the 
preparation of statutory plans under the auspices of the Town Planning Board and the 
production of detailed plans. The task included land-use plans, regulation of private 
property development, public housing development, public amenities and 
recreational facilities. District Plans had been started in over 70 per cent of urban 
districts in the 1950s. Kwun Tong (in Kowloon) was one of the districts in which a 
District Plan was successfully implemented.525 District Plans were the main practice of 
Hong Kong’s town planning in the 1950s and 60s. 
 
In the 1950s, the pressure put on the Town Planning Board principally focused on 
preparing the way for immediately realisable development, instead of a further 
development strategy. District Plans were the main task, instead of preparing a 
comprehensive plan for the development of the whole of Hong Kong.526 The detailed 
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plans of District plans, Outline Development Plans and Layout Plans were urgently 
needed to lay out every inch of planning maps for un-built areas. Actually, District 
Plans consist of statutory Outline Zoning Plans, Outline Development Plans and Layout 
Plans. statutory Outline Zoning Plans, as the name suggests, are statutory plans, 
which, being statutory instruments, must be approved by the Town Planning Board. 
Outline Development Plans and Layout Plans are non-statutory plans, prepared within 
the framework of statutory Outline Zoning Plans. The legal source of statutory plans 
is Building Ordinance. The 1935 Building Ordinance was amended and enacted in 
1956. The 1956 Ordinance has been considered a mature piece of planning 
legalisation.527 One of its legal significances was the introduction of statutory plans, 
which have become the legitimate blue prints for statutory Outline Zoning Plans for 
District Plans. Furthermore, the Ordinance granted mandatory power to the Building 
Authority for refusing a building plan if a proposed development did not conform to 
the statutory Outline Zoning Plans. The Ordinance stipulated: 
“The Building Authority may refuse to give his approval of any plans of 
building works where the carrying of the building works shown thereon would 
contravene the provisions of this ordinance or any other enactment, or would 
contravene any approved of draft plan prepared under the Town Planning 
Ordinance.”528  
This stipulation made statutory Outline Zoning Plans a powerful development control 
instrument. 
 
New administrative discretions were also given to the Building Authority. The 
Ordinance introduced the Occupation Permit and gave the Building Authority more 
grounds to refuse building plans. As the 1935 Building Ordinance stipulated, the 
increased principal grounds included:  
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“…the carrying out of […] building works […which] would result in a building 
differing in height, design, type or intended use from buildings in the 
immediate neighbourhood or previously existing on the same site; …the 
access or other opening of the building [which would] be dangerous or likely 
to be dangerous or prejudicial to the safety or convenience of traffic using the 
street”.  
Therefore, the public safety and public interest of a neighbourhood would be legal 
grounds for the government’s intervention in development. An appeals tribunal 
procedure was also set up to consider appeals against refused plans. 529  Plans 
produced were from the initial detailed zoning plans that specified use to be 
permitted and certain limited exceptions. Draft plans had to be made available to the 
public on demand. At the same time, the new arrangement for public access to plans 
was made under the 1956 Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance. The first two cases 
of public exhibition were put up in the same year for Yau Ma Tei (Kowloon) and North 
Point (Hong Kong Island). For the first time, draft and approved plans became not only 
the guidance standards for planning officers but also mandatory provisions. As Bristow 
points out, development control had finally come of age in Hong Kong.530 
 
The legal classification of statutory plans and non-statutory plans does not signify the 
hierarchy of plans.531 Following the era of immediate district plans of the 1950s and 
the first half of the 1960s came the age of comprehensive planning for the whole of 
Hong Kong. In 1965, the Colonial Secretariat called for the preparation of a 
comprehensive development plan for the whole of Hong Kong. The plan was finally 
agreed to by the Land Development Planning Committee in 1971 and noted by the 
Executive Council in 1972. In 1974, the Plan, known as the Outline Plan, was 
                                                          
529
 Section 11, Buildings Ordinance (1956). 
530
 Roger Bristow, Land-use Planning in Hong Kong: History, Politics and Procedures (Oxford University 
Press 1984) 84. 
531
 As Table 7-1 presents, at the top of the planning system at that time was Hong Kong Planning 
Standards and Guidelines, a non-statutory plan at the territorial level. 
 250 
substantially revised and took into account changes in socio-economic conditions and 
government priorities. It consisted of: Part One, Planning Standards, which was later 
renamed the Hong Kong Planning Standards and Guidelines, and formed a separate 
document of its own; and Part Two, Territorial Development Strategy. The Guidelines 
and its revised successors were by no means rigid. They were a government manual 
concerned with district and local criteria for site reservations, location factors and site 
requirements. The application of the Guidelines involved in the formulation of 
Territorial Development was an important source of reference for government land 
use planning policies in the preparation of statutory and department plans.532 
 
At the second highest level of the planning system in Hong Kong, Structure Plans (later 
renamed sub-regional Planning Statements in the 1990s) were sub-regional guidelines 
for development policies. Structure Plans were designed to meet the specific 
objectives of the development of individual sub-regional areas in accordance with 
regional characteristics. Structure Plans were prepared for the four sub-regions: the 
North-east New Territories, North-west New Territories, South-east New Territories 
and the Main Urban Areas. In the 1980s, most of the North-west New Territories were 
designated as Agricultural Priority and Livestock Upgrading Areas, with North-east 
New Territories being Recreation and Natural Reservation Areas. A Structure Plan is 
also a non-statutory plan. At the third level of the planning system are statutory 
Outline Zoning Plans that are applied to existing and potential urban areas. They were 
prepared under the provision of Town Planning Ordinance and approved by the 
Executive Council. Broad land use patterns for particular areas were proposed in the 
Plans. Areas were zoned for residential, commercial and industrial areas, and public 
facilities, open spaces and specified use areas. As statutory instruments, the Plans had 
legitimate power to regulate development. A Plan could affect a land owner’s 
development right by zoning the land for public purposes, restricting the land to a use 
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not permitted under the Lease and severely restricting use other than those permitted 
under the Lease.  
 
In order to specifically put land uses into various categories, regulations for use 
classes, which govern the indications of the types of use that may fall within each use 
class, were also stipulated along with statutory Outline Zoning Plans. The 1939 Town 
Planning Ordinance made a provision for a Schedule of Notes to be attached to each 
statutory plan. Zoning with use classes, working alongside planning permission, which 
was introduced under Sections 16 of the Town Planning Ordinance, has been the 
development control system in Hong Kong since the Ordinance was enacted. 
According to the Town Planning Division, the combination of zoning and planning 
permission allowed for greater flexibility in land use planning and better control of 
development to meet changing needs. 533 
 
Similar to Outline Zoning Plans, Development Permission Area Plans were enacted for 
developing areas in New Territories in 1991. Development Permission Area Plans 
introduced zoning control and planning permission to areas not covered by an Outline 
Zoning Plan. In most areas in New Territories, use class changes would be regulated 
by Development Permission Area Plans until an Outline Zoning Plan was drafted and 
replaced the existing Development Permission Area Plans for that area. At the lowest 
level of the planning system are the Outline Development Plan and Layout Plan, with 
both being non-statutory plans. The function of an Outline Development Plan is to 
supplement a statutory Outline Zoning Plan and to show the land-use plan in greater 
detail. Being a departmental plan, an Outline Development Plan is prepared as a guide 
for land sales, and for the reservation and allocation of land for public facilities. An 
Outline Development Plan indicates the specific use of land reserved for public use. 
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In a similar manner to Outline Development Plans, Layout Plans are departmental 
plans as well. These Plans indicate detailed land use and development proposals for 
an area covered by an Outline Zoning Plan or/and Outline Development Plan. 
However, for particular reasons, separate plans need to be prepared independently. 
The particular reasons are usually the significance of related localities, such as urban 
regeneration areas and newly formed land. In the following table, I outline the major 
features of the urban planning system in Hong King since the 1970s. 
 
Table 7-1: The urban planning system in Hong Kong since the 1970s. 
Hong Kong Planning Standards 
and Guidelines 
Territorial Development Strategy  
Territorial Level Non-statutory plan  
 
Non-statutory plan 
Structure Plan 
(Sub-regional Planning 
Statement) 
Sub-Regional Level Non-statutory plan 
Outline Zoning Plan 
Development Permission Area 
Plan 
District (Local) Level Statutory Plan 
Statutory plan 
Outline Development Plan 
Layout Plan 
District (Local) Level Non-statutory plan 
Non-statutory plan 
 
Apart from preparing plans, the Planning Branch also undertook comprehensive 
studies with other government departments. Though no district plan for rural areas 
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was prepared by the Branch, staff from the Branch contributed to the coordination of 
physical development in New Territories.534 
 
Legislative enactment on building control was also passed to help empower the 
discretion of planning officials when undertaking development. In 1953, a Building 
Regulation Committee was formed to review development and building control 
regulations. The draft Building (Planning) Regulations made reference to building and 
zoning laws in New York and Chicago. The legislation stipulated a set of orders 
concerning the process of issuing leases and minimising the adverse impact of 
development on neighbouring buildings.535 The Building (Planning) Regulations in the 
1956 legislation authorised government departments to exercise wider discretion on 
development control. The Regulations specified a wide range of reasons for refusing 
building plans and also made possible a much higher plot ratio, resulting in the high 
density that shapes the characteristics of present-day Hong Kong.536 
 
In 1974, the amendment legislation to the Town Planning Ordinance introduced a 
system of planning permissions for uses in Column 2, stipulating that uses that may 
be permitted with or without conditions would be subject to Town Planning Board 
approval. Therefore, a modern system of development control was complete, 
combining zoning control and planning permission for statutory plans and contractual 
planning by means of issuing leases in accordance with Building (Planning) 
Regulations.    
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To summarise this section, during the era of urban district plans, the Hong Kong 
Government moved to emphasise the introduction of a set of universal measures on 
development control to be generally applied to Hong Kong. Development control had 
come of age in Hong Kong in the second half of 1950s. With later, more gradual 
improvements, a modern system of development control was eventually complete in 
1974. Along with the evolution of development control in Hong Kong, the statutory 
Outline Zoning Plan was introduced as a powerful statutory instrument to guide and 
regulate development, and zoning introduced as the main legal measure for policing 
urban growth. Furthermore, mandatory power and new administrative were granted 
to the Building Authority for refusing building plans. Nevertheless, the Building 
Ordinance authorised the government’s intervention in development when the 
government had legal grounds concerning public safety and the public interest of a 
neighbourhood. To conclude, supported by statutory plans, zoning and ordinances 
stipulated for administrative discretion, this was an era of government intervention, 
with the ideology of public interest deployed to regulate private property and to build 
public housing, public amenities and infrastructure. 
 
 
7.3 The long-term planning of Hong Kong 
 
As noted in the previous section, the main task of planning in the 1950s was setting 
up District Plans, and long-term planning was not considered priority. However, 
following the gradual maturation and completion of the system of development 
control, which worked within the frameworks of District Plans, the priorities of 
urban planning gradually shifted back to visionary planning during the 1960s. This 
section illustrates how, compared to the 1950s, planning in the 1960s dealt broadly 
with the long-term development of the whole of Hong Kong. 
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7.3.1 The ignition of long-term planning in Hong Kong: planning in the 1960s 
 
Following the large scale post-war immigration wave in the 1950s, which brought 1 
million refugees into Hong Kong and saw the population reach 3 million, the 
continuation of in-migration in the first half of the 1960s brought another 600,000 
people into Hong Kong. In the ten years, the population had risen to almost double 
its initial size.537 Economic expansion had come with this population expansion. In 
1959, following the end of the Korean-War-embargo on strategic exports to China, 
domestic commodity exports took a dominant position in the trade structure and 
led to rapid economic growth. In the 60s, GDP grew at an average rate of 10 per 
cent a year. The process of export-led development started and was accompanied 
by the very first property boom.538  
 
Economic development and land demand pressure led to a preliminary 
investigation of five possible sites for new town development. The concept of 
building new towns in Hong Kong originally suggested by Sir Patrick Abercrombie 
was resurrected in 1959. The first two Outline Development Plans for new towns 
(Sha Tin and Tsuen Wan) were published in 1962 and 1964. The first new town, 
Tsuen Wan, was then a community with a population of 80,000. Most inhabitants 
were new immigrants from China, which comprised 20 per cent of Hong Kong’s 
labour force. The idea for the Tsuen Wan plan was to develop a new town of self-
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contained and balanced development.539 One of the functions of new towns was 
designed to encourage small size family style factories to move from slums to new 
sites. The flexibility of small-size factories, built on traditional Chinese immigrant 
social networks and cheap labour, had been one of the major factors contributing 
to the economic competitiveness of Hong Kong. Sites in new towns were designated 
for flatted factories and expected to bring their former neighbouring workers with 
them. Redevelopment of the worst slum areas commenced in 1965, focusing on 
Western District and Yaumatei, where intense use of commercial activities and 
crowded residences resulted in high rents and the pressure of rising wages. 
Displacing residents to public housing in new towns effectively and continually 
provided cheap labour to industry sectors.540 
 
Planning for the expansion of urban areas was also in progress. In 1960, a plan 
covering 1,350 acres in north-eastern Kowloon was prepared for a population of 
650,000. As the Town Planning Division pointed out, the plan was characterised by 
its emphasis on public housing development and sites of flatted factories.541  Re-
development plans for old urban districts that paved the way for the private sector 
were also progressing. In 1961, a comprehensive re-development plan for the 
Central District was published. In 1967, the study of a Pilot Scheme Area in Western 
District was authored by the Planning Branch. The layout plan was prepared and 
adopted in 1970.542 Some land policy modifications accompanied the planning to 
meet the development pressure demands in the property industry. Firstly, regular 
sales of twice-weekly lease auctions were introduced to Crown Lands, resulting in 
a six-fold increase in the number of leased sites. The availability of development 
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sites in the New Territories increased. Secondly, in October 1960, the existing 
lessees of seventy five-year non-renewable leases in Kowloon were granted an 
extension to their leasehold. Thirdly, some alterations were adopted concerning 
more conversions of agricultural land to building land, helping to increase land 
supply. The original procedure was only permitted in areas where lay out plans had 
been prepared. The new procedure would be broadly adopted in more rural areas 
in the New Territories, particularly on the sites of proposed new towns.543  
 
During this period, the density zoning policy emerged. Concepts of American style 
zoning were adopted. A set of regulations were stated in the Building (Planning) 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 1962. It set out the permitted maxima of plot 
ratios and the coverage of sites for three density zones: the greatest densities were 
allowed in principal built-up areas; an intermediate level was set up mainly for 
central Kowloon; the lowest level was for the rest of Hong Kong Island and the 
foothills in Kowloon. Later, in 1969, some alterations related to zoning control and 
planning procedures were made to the Regulations. The 1969 Regulations 
introduced the designation of zoning for undetermined use and revised the 
examination and exhibition procedures for draft plans. Administrative procedures 
between the Governor and the Town Planning Board were re-consolidated.544  
 
In accordance with economic development and modifications to planning control, 
the Colony Outline Plan (renamed the Hong Kong Outline Plan in 1974) was 
proposed by the government at the end of 1962 as the framework for the long term 
spatial development plan for the future Hong Kong. It was prepared not only to 
meet the rapid population increase but also to be a comprehensive plan that was 
assisted by several government committees and outside experts working on various 
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subjects, such as industry and infrastructure.545 The Outline was not completed 
until 1972, and was amended in 1974 and 1979. It comprised of two major parts: a 
long-term land-use plan and development strategy was included in the first part, 
and standards for the planning guidance included in the second part. The Outline 
was more like a proposal without statutory power, but available as a guide for 
detailed planning. With the introduction of the Hong Kong Outline Plan, the 
hierarchy of planning in Hong Kong had reached three levels: the Outline, the 
District Plans and Draft Plans prepared under planning ordinances. The last two 
plans had statutory power to control development.   
 
In short, the 1960s saw the ignition of Hong Kong’s long-term planning. While some 
realisable plans and urban expansion were prepared to meet the immediate needs 
of population growth and economy boom, visionary plans were planned and 
accompanied by some modification of planning hierarchy for future development. 
This progress continued in the 1970s and early 1980s. 
 
7.3.2 The 1970s and early 1980s 
 
The 1970s was an era that saw the upgrading of public housing, development of 
new towns and urbanisation of the New Territories. An estimated 40 per cent of 
the Hong Kong population (1,600,000 people) had been accommodated in public 
housing by 1972, with the number of squatters substantially decreased. However, 
the 1971 census showed that the housing crisis was far from solved. Nearly 50 per 
cent of residents still lived in living quarters that were not self-contained; 32 per 
cent of the population was in urgent need of housing. In the middle of the 60s, the 
number of squatters had increased to 550,000. The increase in rents in the private 
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sector forced workers to seek cheap accommodation in slums. A survey in 1968 
showed that half of the squatters interviewed were living in private tenements 
before becoming squatters. Housing policy since the 1950s controlled squatting, 
but the population increase was still threatening the delicate social equilibrium in 
Hong Kong.546   
 
The 1966 and 1967 riots (also known as the Anti-British Struggle by leftists) inspired 
by the Chinese Great Cultural Revolution, were seen at the time as social 
disturbances by social elites and the government.547 In fact, they had actually done 
nothing significantly damaging to the economy. Evidence showed that the riots 
were only large-scale demonstrations. However, they were triggered by the 
unjustifiable living conditions of common people, and had been the first challenge 
to the rule of the colonial government since the Second World War. Before the riots, 
the process of the administrative absorption of politics had co-opted the emerging 
socio-economic elites into politics through appointments on government councils 
and boards. During and after the riots, however, this process was facing challenges 
from the grass roots. While the majority of non-English speaking people criticised 
the alienation of their English-speaking Chinese fellows in government, the younger 
generation of Hong Kong habitants started seeking identification with China or 
Hong Kong, distinguishing themselves from the foreign regime. A manifesto of 
social justice and political reform was declared by campaigners and activists. The 
integration of the government that was built on the elite consensual society of Hong 
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Kong was facing a legitimate crisis.548 In response to this crisis, the government tried 
to ameliorate popular tension and get closer to the people: for instance, the City 
District Officer Scheme was introduced into urban areas to improve communication 
between the government and the people. This Scheme was also useful for the work 
of the Building Ordinances Office, and provided more material benefits and welfare 
to them in exchange for an implicit conferment of legitimacy.549 The riots resulted 
in the ten-year era of urban planning reconstruction, including upgrades to public 
housing, building new towns and urbanisation of the New Territories. 
 
Sir Murray MacLehose was appointed Governor-in-Council in 1971, with social 
reform a high priority of his policies. His housing policy aimed at providing adequate 
and affordable housing to the entire population. The following year, the new 
Governor approved the adoption of the Ten-Year Housing Target Programme. In 
April 1973, the Housing Board evaluated housing needs. According to an estimate, 
1,535,000 people would need to be re-accommodated to public housing. The 
Governor ordered all housing needs to be satisfied by the public housing 
programme within ten years.550 A significant part of the population – almost one-
third of the targeted residents – were resettlement estate occupants involved in 
redevelopment schemes driven by property development by the private sector in 
urban areas. The programme would build not only residences but multi-storey 
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factories, providing flatted industrial buildings to small factories for displaced 
businesses which were operating industrial undertakings in areas subjected to 
redevelopment.551  
 
In response to this ambitious task, all housing agencies were unified in a new single 
institute. The Housing Authority, headed by the Secretary of Housing, was set up to 
take charge of the study, and make and implement housing policy. The Housing 
Ordinance of 1973 was enacted. Under the pressure of implementing public housing 
policy, the government decided to accelerate the development of new towns and 
expand market towns in the New Territories.552 Some institutional changes had also 
been brought along with the housing programmes and the re-organisation of 
housing authorities. As the Town Planning Division of Land Department reported in 
1984: 
“the New Territories Development Department was formally set up in 1973 
within the Public Works Department to be responsible for planning, 
coordinating and implementing the development programme of new towns 
[…] concurrent with the establishment of the New Territories Development 
Department, the Planning Branch was upgraded to become a full-fledged 
Office with the Lands, Survey and Town Planning Department which operated 
under the umbrella of the Public Works Department. It was responsible for 
statutory planning matters in both the new towns and the urban areas, 
district planning matters in the rural New Territories and the urban areas as 
well as the revision of the Hong Kong Outline Plan.”553 
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In terms of the division of labour, the intention was clear: the implementation of 
the programme was split between the two main branches of the Public Works 
Department, so that the New Territories Development Department was in charge 
of the development of new towns, and the rest – mainly statutory planning, 
development control and some development programmes – was administrated by 
the Lands, Survey and Town Planning Department.  
 
Actually, the political context of the alterations to the planning machinery was more 
complicated than the report published by the Town Planning Division. Long existing 
political competition between the building divisions (led by the Director of Public 
Works) and sectoral divisions (led by the District Commissioner of New Territories) 
contributed to an escalation of planning authorities’ administrative levels. A new 
Secretary for the Environment was appointed in 1973, followed by an upgrade in 
the status of the Commissioner for the New Territories to Secretary level. The 
Secretary of Environment took over the chairmanship of the government’s land 
Development Planning Committee, which was reformed as the Land Development 
Policy Committee in 1975, while the New Territories Development Progress 
Committee was established in the same year. However, it was not administratively 
related to the Environment Secretary, but subordinately connected to him and his 
Committee in policy-making terms. The New Territories Development Progress 
Committee was designated to be responsible for the implementation of physical 
development policies in the New Territories and to approve detailed layouts. From 
1974 onwards, under the leadership of the New Territories Development Progress 
Committee, a Rural New Territories Works Progress Committee and similar 
Committees for each of the new towns were introduced. There had been a re-
organisation within the spatial and building departments as well. The Town 
Planning Office was upgraded to an independent branch in 1973, under the 
administrative leadership of the Director of Lands and Survey, and headed by a 
Principal Government Town Planner. The Town Planning Office was subdivided into 
two divisions. One was the District Planning Branch that was in charge of urban 
areas and the New Territories; the other was the Colony Planning Division, later 
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renamed the Hong Kong Outline Planning Division, which was responsible for the 
preparation and revision of the Hong Kong Outline Plan. The co-ordination between 
the authorities of New Territories and Public Works was also considered in the re-
organisation of spatial sectors. This was the reason why the new New Territories 
Development Department was formed within the Public Works Department in 
1973. It was established as a multi-disciplinary organisation resulting from the 
government’s objective to implement the public housing programme and 
associated development in the New Territories. The New Territories Development 
Department took responsibility for the planning and co-ordination of the 
development works of three new towns and other major areas in the New 
Territories, including all administrative, professional and financial functions. It 
prepared layouts, prepared and reviewed development programmes, and provided 
all kinds of infrastructure required by plans. Four Development Offices were set up 
for the new towns and major areas. By 1982, these Offices had expanded to six. 
Development Offices were designated to have an inter-disciplinary staff of 
professionals, including town planners approved by the Town Planning Office to 
develop and monitor the development programmes for public sector investment 
with broad departmental directives.554 
 
The setup of the New Territories Department can be seen as an extension of the 
administrative reform to local authorities that had begun in the late 1960s, and was 
mainly implemented in the first half of the 1970s. In 1966, the Governor responded 
to the issue of local governments by pointing out that: “An effective method of 
providing channels for the exercise of local initiative in the management of purely local 
affairs is valuable.”555 There was a consensus between government departments 
that the most efficient way to co-ordinate the local operations of specialised 
departments was to have territorial-based agencies that could help adjust policies 
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laid down by the central authority to fit the localities. It was also one of the political 
projects that won popular support from distinct remote areas. 556  The New 
Territories Development Department was not only a planning authority but a 
development- and construction-orientated organisation. It had more functions for 
development than just development control. As previously noted, the setup of the 
New Territories Development Department occurred as a result of competition 
between the spatial planning and district sectoral sections, but the establishment 
was actually an integration of administrative reform coordinated with the great 
spatial plan located in the New Territories. The diagram below represents the 
Government’s ambitious attempt to develop and re-construct Hong Kong’s remote 
areas. 
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The era was a golden age for town planning and planners. District planning was 
stretched out widely, covering both urban districts and some new towns. In 1973, 
twenty-two statutory plans were applied to twenty-one planning areas in urban 
areas and three new towns in the New Territories. By the end of 1983, there were 
a total of twenty-four statutory plans covering twenty-six planning areas in urban 
districts and seven draft Outline Zoning Plans covering most of the new towns. 
Meanwhile, in those urban areas where urban renewal was needed, plans for 
Diagram 7-1. The role of the New Territories Development Department and the 
administrative co-ordination between the spatial and sectoral departments in 
1973. 
 
Sources: Ambrose Y. C. King and Rance P. L. Lee, Social Life and Development in 
Hong Kong (The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong 1981) 172; Town Planning 
Division, Lands Department, ‘Town Planning in Hong Kong’ (Government Printer, 
Hong Kong 1984) 14. 
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Environmental Improvement Areas and Comprehensive Redevelopment Areas 
were prepared.557 More administrative alterations by the planning authorities were 
stepped up in the early 1980s. The most comprehensive re-organisation attempted 
so far shaped the current institutional form. The administrative changes included:  
(1) The establishment of the Urban Area Development Organisation (and 
Offices). Its Offices would be in charge of local detailed plan-making, for 
layout and departmental plans. 
(2) The establishment of the Strategic Planning Unit. 
(3) The abolition of the Secretariat of Environment, the appointment of a 
separate Secretary for Lands and Works, and the de-federalisation of the 
Public Works Department.558 
 
The Urban Area Development Organisation was established in 1980 as a parallel 
unit to the New Territories Development Department, on behalf of the Public Works 
Department, to take charge of the coordination and implementation of urban 
development in urban areas. Like the New Territories Development Department, 
several local Offices were set up under its leadership. While the Offices were 
formed at the bottom of the administrative structure, at the top level, the Strategic 
Planning Unit within the Secretariat for Lands and Works was formed in the same 
year to prepare the overall Territorial Development Strategy to guide public and 
private investment. The Strategy would be, as the Governor-in-Council pointed out, 
to accomplish “in the longer term the most careful strategic planning.”559 At the mid-
level of the planning machinery, a new Town Planning Division provided technical 
and planning support to the Secretariat and the Strategy Unit. With the de-
                                                          
557
 Town Planning Division, Lands Department, ‘Town Planning in Hong Kong’ (Government Printer, 
Hong Kong, 1984). 
558
 Source: Town Planning Division, Lands Department, ‘Town Planning in Hong Kong’ (Government 
Printer, Hong Kong, 1984). 
559
 Legislative Council, ‘The Legislative Council Debates Official Report: The Session of The Legislative 
Council of Hong Kong in the Thirtieth Year of the Reign of Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth the Second’ 
(Legislative Council Chamber, Hong Kong, 7th October 1981).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
 267 
federalisation of the Public Works Department in 1982, which had long existed for 
140 years, it was divided into five departments, including the planning related Land, 
Building and New Territories Departments. The old Town Planning Office was re-
organised to the Town Planning Division, under the Lands Department. It was 
designated as the core of the urban planning hierarchy. The overall functions of the 
Division are listed below: 
(1) To formulate planning policies, planning standards and guidelines. 
(2) To prepare structured plans and plan sectoral studies. 
(3) The responsibility to take charge of statutory planning matters, including 
drafting and publishing statutory plans. 
(4) To provide professional advice to the public and other government bodies on 
town planning matters. 
(5) To service the Town Planning Board in the preparation of statutory Outline 
Zoning plans and process planning applications under the provisions of the 
Town Planning ordinance. 
(6) To service the Land Development Policy Committee and the Special 
Committee on Land Supply, and their sub-Committees. 
(7) To update the Hong Kong Outline Plan or later Strategic Plans.560 
 
The head of the Town Planning Division was the Principal Government Town 
Planner and was also responsible for the professional quality of the work of town 
planners seconded to the New Territories Development Department, Urban Area 
Development Organisation and the Strategic Planning Unit within the Lands and 
Works branch of the Secretariat. The role of the Town Planning Division was similar 
to the New Territories Development Department in New Territories’ planning. 
However, via the administrative channel of the Sub-Regional Planning sector, which 
was set up under the Town Planning Division to co-ordinate the work of the New 
Territories Development Department, the Town Planning Division was able to 
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access planning in the New Territories.561 Consequentially, a modern hierarchy of 
Town Planning authorities eventually emerged. This firm administrative hierarchy 
formed the current structure of planning bodies in the Hong Kong Government. 
 
Diagram 7-2 below presents the administrative hierarchy of those planning 
authorities responsible for policy making, preparing plans and implementing them. 
The mechanism for the submission/approval of plans (including planning 
permissions and contractual development control) consisted of a tidier hierarchy, 
as illustrated in Diagram 7-3.  
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Governor in Council 
Secretary for Lands and Works 
(Strategic Planning Unit of Lands) 
Division) 
Land Development Policy Committee 
(Development Progress Committee) 
Land and Works Conference 
New Territories 
Development Department 
Lands Department 
Urban Area 
Development 
Organisation 
Town Planning Division 
Subregional 
(Structure) 
Planning Section 
Statutory 
Planning 
Section 
Planning 
Standard 
Section 
Diagram 7-2: The administrative structure of Town Planning in the 1980s. 
 
Source: Roger Bristow, Land-use Planning in Hong Kong: History, Politics and 
Procedures (Oxford University Press 1984); Town Planning Division, Lands 
Department, ‘Town Planning in Hong Kong’ (Government Printer, Hong Kong 
1984). 
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The introduction of this modern planning administrative structure was part of the 
Government’s administrative reform that occurred in the second half of the 1970s 
and the early 1980s. Continuous and steady economic growth forced the 
administrative bodies to self-re-regulate in order to cope with the rapid changes 
and requirements of Hong Kong’s economy and society. The request for 
administrative efficiency and effectiveness by the private sector in the planning 
The Governor-in-Council 
Approval of strategic plans ← 
→Approval of statutory plans and planning 
permission appeals 
Secretary for Lands and Works 
Submitting strategic plans 
Instruction to prepare statutory plans 
Town Planning Board 
Review and Consultation of 
Statutory Plans 
Granting planning 
permission 
Town Planning Division 
Prepare statutory plans 
Developers 
applying for planning permissions 
Land Division 
Land sale and lease 
Building 
Ordinance Office 
Diagram. 7-3: The processes for approval of plans and permissions. 
Source: Roger Bristow, Land-use Planning in Hong Kong: History, Politics and 
Procedures (Oxford University Press 1984) 
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system suggested, not only a speeding-up of the planning process, but most 
importantly, the speedy release of land. It included the sale of land from the 
Government and the permission to re-generate developed land. 562  The 
administrative reform of planning functioned as a political programme serving the 
interests of landowners and real estate developers, who pushed forward the 
property boom in the 1970s and ’80s. 
 
The planning works in this era had similar effects on social and economic situations. 
It is also worth mentioning that, like the Hong Kong Outline Plan prepared in the 
1970s, the Territorial Development Strategy had been the outline plan for Hong 
Kong in the 1980s. To help prepare this Strategy, a Structure Planning Section was 
created within the Town Planning Division. This Section undertook several sub-
regional structure plans and took charge of sub-regional studies for the Territorial 
Development Strategy. The Strategy consisted of five sub-regions: the North-east 
New Territories, North-west New Territories, South-east New Territories, South-
west New Territories and the main urban areas. Despite continuous work 
developing new towns, which had been mainly planned in the 1970s, the main task 
of planning in the 1980s, as the Territorial Development Strategy showed, was 
urban renewal in the main urban areas. The development of new towns and the re-
generation of urban areas resulted in an inner-migration wave in the 1970s and 
early 1980s. While growing international trade and the accompanying service 
sector gradually occupied urban areas and pushed employees in the industrial 
sector to move mainly to high rise buildings in the New Territories, the high price 
of accommodation in renewal areas also contributed to the migration. It is not 
unfair to say that, just as the planning administrative reform had functioned as a 
political programme to serve the interests of landowners and real estate 
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developers, the planning work that reflected economic requirements was also a 
contributing factor to the property boom.563 
 
In short, the 1970s Hong Kong was an ambitious era for town planning in Hong 
Kong. The riots of the late 1960s, triggered by unjustified living conditions, forced 
the government to face a grass-roots challenge. In order to save the authorities 
from a genuine crisis, strategies of upgrading public housing, developing new town 
and urbanising New Territory were being implemented. Though the housing crisis 
was far from solved, cheap accommodation provided by the private sector and non-
self-contained living units in slums also helped ease the issue. Property 
development by the private sector was also one major measure that the Hong Kong 
authorities introduced to conquer the housing problem: one-third of the Hong Kong 
residents who needed to be relocated were resettlement estate occupants involved 
in redevelopment schemes driven by the property development of the private 
sector. In terms of housing policy, the Hong Kong government intervened in the 
housing market by essentially appoint itself as the land lord, but also by paving the 
way for the private property market. Drastic intervention in both public housing 
and private housing in the 1970s provided Hong Kong’s labourers with cheap 
accommodation and also helped to maintain the cheap cost of labour. It sustained 
the continuous economic boom of the 1970s and early 1980s. In terms of urban 
planning, the 1970s was a golden age for planning and planners. Accompanied by 
new measurements in planning, with administrative reform and organisation re-
regulation, a mature, modern hierarchy of town planning authority emerged during 
the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. This hierarchy forms the basis for 
the present-day structure of planning bodies in the Hong Kong Government. 
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7.3.3 Practices in the 1980s, the 1990s, and beyond 
 
This section introduces the Chinese factor, the main force driving town planning in 
Hong Kong during the last two decades of the twentieth century. The imminent 
1997 re-unification with Mainland China resulted in adjustments to the formalities 
of Hong Kong politics. A series of de-colonisation processes, initiated by the 
colonists themselves, led to a political agenda that social movement activists had 
not expected. Prior to the political and administrative reforms of the 1980s, the 
question of democratisation was regarded by most activists as remote from the 
political reality.564 Firstly, political power was released to local authorities before 
alterations to the central administrative and legislative bodies. Eighteen district 
councils were set up, with two-thirds of council members elected. There were nine 
in urban areas and nine in the New Territories. The growing calls for participation 
in formal institutional politics from pressure groups, social movement organisations 
and grass-roots protesters were influencing the de-colonisation agenda. The 
Colonial Government had been pushed to make the political system more 
representative and accountable. A series of White Papers released by the 
government in the first five years of the 1980s pressed for an increase in direct 
representation through the electoral process.565  
 
After 142 years of colonial rule, the first elected representatives appeared on the 
Legislative Council in 1985. They represented functional constituencies 
(representing different social sectors such as workers, trade business and 
professionals). In 1995, all appointed legislative members were replaced by 
members elected from either functionally- or geographically-based constituencies. 
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Accompanying the political reforms, some changes were also made within planning 
authorities. The major changes included the re-organisation and re-naming of the 
Town Planning Division to the Town Planning Office under the new Buildings and 
Lands Department in 1986. In addition, the Planning Department was established 
in 1990, under the then Planning, Environment and Lands Branch of the Secretariat, 
amalgamating all the planning functions previously carried out by the Town 
Planning Office, the Strategic Planning Unit and various development offices of the 
New Territories Development Department.566 The 1990 establishment was actually 
an administrative upgrade to the old Planning Office. It was the very first time a 
planning authority was independently set up in the Departmental level from the 
Land or Public Works Department. The establishment reflected the Government’s 
acknowledgement of the unique importance of planning. 567  As the Planning 
Department was designated as a parallel unit to the Housing Department and the 
Land Department, planning was no longer treated as subordinate to housing and 
land policy. Although land policy and the contractual planning of land leases in Hong 
Kong had been one of the main mechanisms in development control and town 
planning, the setting up of the New Department was a significant sign that the 
Government took the economic changes in the 1980s seriously, and was prepared 
to use planning as a means of development to face these economic challenges.      
 
The reform of the administrative apparatus in the early 1980s was a reaction to the 
Chinese factor. However, the Chinese factor related to the planning authorities, 
with planning more an economic than a political issue. The “Open-Up” policy of the 
Chinese Government had been initiated under the right-wing leadership of Den Xio 
Ping in 1979, and resulted in the reconstruction of Hong Kong industries and the 
development of the Zhujiang Delta Region (Pearl River Delta Region). In 1980, the 
south part of the Delta was granted special economic jurisdiction. The 
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establishment of the Shenzhen Special Economic Zone in the south-east of the Delta 
and adjacent to Hong Kong, and the Zhuhai Special Economic Zone adjacent to 
Macao, promoted an increase in national investment in fixed assets in the area, and 
also granted greater local discretionary powers regarding foreign investment 
inflow, including tax breaks, de-regulation of currency control and land provision. 
In the first decade of the Open-Up policy, the Delta had developed a strong 
connection to Hong Kong. A belt of export-process towns had sprung up within a 
250km radius of Hong Kong. Chinese policies on national development indicated 
the strategic importance of Hong Kong in China’s opening up to the world market. 
Commercial trade between China and Hong Kong had increased 39 per cent by 
1988.568 Hong Kong was the chief investor in Southern China, with 90 per cent of 
the investment concentrated in the Delta. In 1989, ten years after the start of the 
Open-Up policy, three million people in the Delta were directly employed by Hong 
Kong industrialists (including Taiwanese companies based in Hong Kong), 
representing four times the size of all labour engaged in manufacturing in Hong 
Kong.569  
 
The shortage and expensive cost of the Hong Kong labour force was also one of the 
main factors contributing to the restructuring. The immigration wave from 
Mainland China had stopped, and a new international labour division between Hong 
Kong and Southern China formed in its place. The reconstruction saw the 
restructuring of industries in Hong Kong. Macro-economic trends towards outward 
processing in China resulted in the downsizing of manufacturing units. In 1996, 
manufacturing sectors accounted for just 14 per cent of employment, in contrast to 
42 per cent in 1984. The number of employees per manufacturing establishment 
                                                          
568
 Hong Kong Government, ‘Comprehensive review of the Town Planning Ordinance’ (Hong Kong: 
Government Press 1991). 
569
 J. Kamm, ‘Reforming Foreign Trade’ in E. F. Vogel (ed), One Step Ahead on China: Guangdong Under 
Reform (Harvard University Press, Cambridge 1989) 373; E. G. Pryor, ‘The Role of Hong Kong 
Infrastructure Development in the Modernisation of Southern China with Particular Reference to the 
Pearl River Delta’ (1991) 7(1) Planning and Development; F. Soulard, The Restructuring of Hong Kong 
Industries and the Urbanization of Zhujiang Delta, 1979-1989 (The Chinese University Press, Hong Kong 
1997) 9. 
 276 
had decreased from 33 in 1970, to 20 in 1980, and only 12 in 1996.570 Besides the 
decreasing population employed in the industrial sector, basic planning data 
prepared by the Planning Department in 1989 showed that employees in service 
sectors (including communication, storage, transportation, retailing and 
restaurants) had increased from 45 per cent in 1980 to 63 per cent in 1989. 
Accompanying the employment shift from manufacturing to the third sector, there 
were industry adjustments in the face of the economic growth of China and rising 
production costs in Hong Kong. The garment industry, which had been one of the 
two main industrial sectors in Hong Kong, experienced steady growth in gross 
output and contributed to one quarter of the output of all manufacturing industries 
throughout the 1980s. However, the number of establishments started to drop in 
1987, following a fall in the number of employed persons in 1986. Another 
industrial sector, the electronics industry, also experienced a significant fall: both 
the gross output and employment started to drop in 1988.571  The falls in industries 
mirrored the trend of relocating plants offshore to solve the problem of rising 
production costs by making use of cheap labour and the cheap and abundant supply 
of land in China. Hong Kong’s industries continuously maintained the advantage of 
flexibility in their international commercial networks. As the Industry Department 
pointed out in 1989, it was difficult for industry to diversify into other areas that 
were capital- or knowledge-intensive or had potentially high value-added 
production. 572  Considering the fact that little progress had been made in 
technological upgrades to  both the garment and electronics sectors, Hong Kong 
continued playing its role in the world market as an international subcontractor that 
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was still locked into labour-intensive manufacturing as it had been in the 1960s and 
1970s.573  
 
Economic restructuring had some extensive effects on land-use and related policies 
and legislation. Due to the wave of relocating manufacturing, plus the decisive 
failure of Sino-British talks in 1983, the property boom that occurred in the 1970s 
collapsed in the early 1980s. Despite attaining the world’s highest industrial growth 
rate between 1976 and 1981, Hong Kong’s regime of surplus was transformed into 
a string of deficits. In the 1982-1983 budgets, capital receipts from land sales 
declined from 25 per cent to 6 per cent of revenue.574 Some spatial- and planning-
focused policies were presented to revive industrial investment and save 
consecutive unprecedented deficits. One was to build a friendly investment 
environment for the property industry, which would, it was hoped, also help solve 
the shortage in public facilities in developing areas and reduce the lack of public 
investment by the government. In the meantime, another policy concerned 
creating more available land in suitable locations for property development and 
industrial investors. By providing both clear information and substantial material 
conditions for developers, the Government expected that reasonable spatial 
development, led by the government, and participated in by the private sector, 
would lead to industrial revival. Therefore, several large-scale plans (including 
investment in big public facility projects) were prepared and implemented in the 
1980s and the 1990s by the Government.   
 
Planning in Hong Kong had continuously expanded during the previous two 
decades. Approximately 30 statutory Outline Zoning Plans were implemented in the 
1980s, covering and providing guidance to all the new towns and urban areas. By 
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1991, with the enactment of two amendments to the Town Planning Ordinance, the 
jurisdiction of statutory planning was extended to more remote rural areas outside 
Country Parks (reservation areas), enabling enforcement action to be taken against 
unauthorised development. The town Planning Appeal Board was established in the 
same year. By June 1997, ninety statutory Outline Zoning Plans had already been 
implemented, covering approximately 45 per cent of land in the Hong Kong 
territory, and 95 per cent of existing and planned development areas.575 The plans 
provided definite land use zones to sustain spatial development. 
  
Statutory Plans had to accord with guidance by the Territorial Development 
Strategy. As previously highlighted, the Strategy was proposed in 1980 and 
published in 1984. The aim was to prepare a long-term strategy for development in 
the 1990s and the early years of the 21st century. The preparation was based on 
surveys and analyses conducted in forty-nine areas, comprising of five sub-regions. 
The methodological approach of regional orientating was one of the Strategy’s 
characteristics. The planning authorities were also proud of the application of 
mathematical models in the planning. Despite the ignorance of un-quantifiable 
socio-economic considerations and the fact that only certain quantifiable data were 
included,576 the Land Use and Transportation Optimisation model, whose purpose 
was to identify areas of future growth, gave form to the preparation of the 
Territorial Development Strategy. It was declared a great systematic project by the 
Government. A systematic approach was also applied to other projects in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, including the Study of Harbour Reclamations and Urban Growth 
(1982-1983), the successive Port and Airport Development Strategy project 
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prepared in 1987-1989, the Toward the Twenty First Century: the 1990 White Paper 
of Transportation Policy and the Metroplan in 1991.577  
 
The Metroplan was a new metropolitan development strategy covering only the 
main urban areas in the Hong Kong territory, which were Hong Kong Island, 
Kowloon and Tsuen Wan, Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi areas. It reinforced the shift of 
development focus from new towns to the central area and western harbour. The 
preparation of the Metroplan also responded to the relocation of the international 
airport and large scale expansion of the container port, incorporating a vast 
programme of associated land-based transport infrastructure and building 
construction. The Metroplan aimed to address variations neglected by the Land Use 
and Transportation Optimisation model, and to consolidate uncoordinated 
development into a well-organised and efficient metropolis with a projected 
population of 6.5 million by 2001. It was the first attempt to bring a number of 
qualitative parameters to the forefront that were badly ignored in earlier planning 
studies. In particular, these concerned quality of life, open space, landscape, urban 
design and economic growth.578 The Metroplan reflected the ambitious aims of 
planning professionals who were unsatisfied with the then-current situation and 
were seeking improvement. For example, the Development Strategy had been 
unsuccessful as far as industrial development was concerned. Cheaper land and 
better services on the periphery were inadequate in persuading and attracting 
industrialists to move from inner urban areas.579  
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The Metroplan was seen as a pace-making remedy for the Territory Development 
Strategy, which failed to face the challenges of economic transformation in Hong 
Kong. It was dominated by economic interests and in particular the needs of trade 
and the transport industry. As Dimitriou and Cook highlight, social issues took 
secondary position. 580 The Plan categorised land-use into six categories:  
(1) Areas needing significant changes, with large-scale redevelopment expected.  
(2) Areas needing selective changes, encouraging most of the existing land-use 
to be maintained but re-development in selective areas.  
(3) Areas needing limited changes, with only very limited development needed 
in these areas. Development would be carefully controlled.  
(4) Newly developed areas needing no new development.  
(5) Future development areas, with newly levelled land provided for new 
development.  
(6) Coastlines and rural areas.  
The six categories were not statutory regulations, but guidelines for the 
construction of infrastructure.581 They provided information needed by real estate 
investors. The Metroplan was considered by investors and politicians as a political 
project trying to save the property industry from bursting its bubble of the late 
1980s, although its density guidelines met with opposition from the real estate 
industry.582 One of the plan’s main tasks was an overall reduction in urban densities. 
The population in the metropolitan area was expected to be controlled at under 4.2 
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million.583 Other issues, such as housing, recreation, landscape design and tourism, 
were also addressed by the Plan’s creators.584    
 
Another overall plan was the Rural Planning and Improvement Strategy. The 
proposal of the Strategy was approved in 1989, with the whole plan published in 
1990. The Rural Planning and Improvement Strategy was a reaction to rapid 
changes in rural areas. It represented economic restructuring resulting from China’s 
"Open-Up policy in the New Territories. Since the 1960s, several development plans 
had been designated for the New Territories. The New Territories had played a vital 
role in the development of new towns and of public housing policy. Statutory plans 
had been prepared and applied to the areas of new towns, but did not cover most 
of the rural areas in the New Territories. Affected by the growth of China—Hong 
Kong trade in the 1980s, agrarian land, fishing pools and grazing farms in rural areas 
had been transformed into alfresco storages for cargo, building materials, junk 
yards and lorry parking. Village-style factories, mainly for wood-cutting, rattan 
works, food processing and garages, were sprawling. However, these rapid changes 
to the landscape in the New Territories had caused significant environmental issues, 
such as pollution, floods and safety problems, as well as traffic concerns. In 1987, a 
study unit organised within the Secretariat was appointed to survey the 
environmental problems. The task was to propose a plan to improve living 
conditions in rural areas. The Rural Planning and Improvement Strategy, published 
in 1990, declared a ten-year plan with HK$4 billion of public investment. The 
Strategy set up the following guidelines:  
(1) To set up guidelines for land-use control, pollution control and encouraging 
efficient use of agrarian land. 
(2) To prevent the threat of flooding. 
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(3) Investment in infrastructure, including inter-city highroads, sanitation and 
sewage disposal facilities. 
(4) Provision of community facilities. 
(5) Planning low density areas for development expansion. 585  
Reacting to the Rural Planning and Improvement Strategy, four sub-regional plans 
of The Territory Development Strategy regarding the New Territories were 
amended and the Rural Area Development Control Guidelines published. According 
to the Guidelines, designated areas were applied to land-use control, including a 
Rural Activity Area, Recreation Priority Area, Countryside Conversation Area, and 
an Area for Open Storage Uses. Villages Layout Plans were prepared covering areas 
that were originally left out of statutory Outline Zoning Plans.586 It was clear that 
the purpose for setting up areas for Rural Activity and Open Storage Uses was to 
legalise existing land uses. This was a compromise to the expansion of self-built 
dwellings and small-size industrial activities. The Rural Planning and Improvement 
Strategy was an after-the-fact reparation for the out-of-control situation in rural 
areas.  
 
Reparation work was also undergoing in urban areas. Although urban 
redevelopment was not principally focused on improving living conditions for 
inhabitants, it was urgently requested by the trade and transport industries. Several 
causes put pressure on the government. Firstly, efficient planning in urban areas 
was needed. The relocation of the international airport attracted a general 
movement of industrial land use towards the west of Hong Kong, especially 
Kowloon, Tsuen Wan and Kwai Tsing. The restructuring necessitated by the new 
labour division between Hong Kong and China was also changing the industrial 
landscape. Existing developed areas were preferred by industrialists. At the same 
time, improved environmental legislation created new standards for the design of 
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industrial uses, including lower density and less intensive land use. These factors 
increased the land supply demand. With land reclamation reaching its limit in 
proximity to urban areas, redevelopment was the solution. Redevelopment 
concerns complicated the degrees of leaseholds, property development rights and 
the resettlement of accommodation. Hence, state intervention was needed. 
Secondly, due to the recession, investment in the real estate industry had waned. 
Given this, public investment in development was expected by the private sector. 
 
The Land Development Corporation was established under the Land Development 
Corporation Ordinance of 1987. The state-owned corporation’s participation in the 
market represented recognition of the failure of the previous “positive non-
interventionism” policy. 587  Using public funds, the establishment of the Land 
Development Corporation aimed to marry the private sector with the Government’s 
power to resume land use and make joint venture projects more viable as 
commercial concerns. By 1995, thirty-four projects had been initiated. Five major 
projects had been published, although one of these was dropped because of strong 
objections by local residents that had been upheld by the Town Planning Board. 
According to Cuthbert and Dimitriou, the large areas most in need of 
redevelopment did not coincide with private interests. 588 Since only those areas 
where the locations met the interests of both real estate investors and 
trade/transport industrialists saw development, these other areas were likely to 
deteriorate even further. Despite the deteriorating areas in the private sector, the 
Government tried to carry out the redevelopment of public housing on its own. 
However, the privatisation process launched in 1991 failed miserably. Only the 
most desirable public housing in the best locations provided for wealthy tenants 
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succeeded. Critics argued that the failure of privatisation was actually the net effect 
of the downgrading of housing.589   
 
Redevelopment played a major role in the Metroplan. Although the Government 
declared that the purpose of redevelopment was to improve communities and 
provide better living conditions, the developers in actuality had no obligation to 
resettle original inhabitants. A resettlement arrangement was not the 
consideration of approvals by the Land Tribunals and the Town Planning Board. 
When tenants were forced from their original accommodation, most could not 
afford the high rents in the same area. When the redevelopment authorities 
adopted interventionism to help the property investors with the support of legal 
powers, the Housing Department refused to intervene between tenants and 
developers. According to an investigation in 1991 by the Christian Care for 
Homeless People, more than 20 per cent of homeless people and 33 per cent of 
“cage people” were victims of urban regeneration. 590  As previously noted, the 
infamous housing problem of a large population of cage people attracted 
worldwide attention, and was officially condemned by the United Nations in 1991. 
It had been eighteen years since the launch of one of the largest public housing 
policies in history put forward by a capitalist state, yet an estimated 200,000 people 
were living in no better conditions than squatters during the Shek Kip Mei period. 
This disgraceful phenomenon was exacerbated by the Long-Term Housing Strategy, 
another large-scale plan launched in 1987 and published by the Housing Branch of 
the Secretariat.  
 
                                                          
589
 Alexander R. Cuthbert, Genesis of Land-Use Planning and Urban Development. in Harry T. Dimitriou 
and Alison H. S. Cook (eds), Land-Use/Transport Planning in Hong Kong: The End of an Era (Hants: 
Ashgate Publishing, Surrey 1998) 35, 54. 
590
 Lai Yuen Mei, ‘Behind the Metroplan: Victims of Urban Regeneration’ in Kam Bing Kwong, Chui 
Wing Taki, Lui Tai Lok, Ip Chiu Ping and Hong Kong People's Council on Public Housing Policy (eds), 
Criticism and Comments on Hong Kong Housing Policies (Joint Publishing, Hong Kong 1996) 106. 
 285 
The dominant theme of the new governmental housing policy was a new emphasis 
on the role of the private sector. The government was to resign from the role of 
being the biggest housing provider and leave this role to the market. The 
Government stressed its confidence in the property industry that had made a 
significant contribution to economic growth in the 1970s and early 1980s. The new 
housing policy was also acknowledged as part of the worldwide trend of neo-liberal 
ideology.591 The provision of subsidised loans to help public housing tenants and 
newcomers in the market to buy flats from the private sector was slated to play an 
increasing role in housing policy. Another policy involved selling state houses to 
tenants and using home-ownership schemes in redevelopment programmes. Yet 
the non-interference policy was not actually adopted in either the new housing 
programme or in urban renewal projects. In both cases, financial subsidies and legal 
powers were provided in favour of the developers. In theory, the Government 
announced an official attitude of respecting a laissez-faire approach, but in reality, 
interventions were introduced to retain a so called “free market” for property 
developers. Such interference even included price assessments. Prices lower than 
potential market values were suggested by the Land Development Corporation and 
approved by the Tribunals for compensation to original tenants in redevelopment 
areas,592 while overly steep prices were offered to tenants living in private houses, 
who were encouraged to buy ownership.593 As the largest land owner, the Hong 
Kong government controlled land use and supplied the floor space. During the 
recession, it would limit land supply to prevent the property market from 
collapsing; when the economy was booming, it increased land sales to maximise 
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profits.594 Given this, the Hong Kong government remained a major player in the 
property market. 
          
To conclude this section, aided by the contribution of Chinese factor, both 
politically and economically, the 1980s and the early 1990s in Hong Kong was an 
era in favour of large-scale plans. These plans responded to the restructuring of 
Hong Kong’s economy, and also reacted to the need for a more locally-
representative and accountable political system. Nevertheless, they were 
dominated by economic interests, particularly the needs of trade, the transport 
industry and property developers, on the assumption that what was good for 
industrial interests was also good for common habitants. Big plans led to major 
spatial developments, including the building of the second channel tunnel, the new 
Hong Kong International Airport in Chek Lap Kok, the extension of the underground 
system, the expansion of ports and harbours, and the re-development of some of 
the main urban areas, including the expansion of the west centre of Hong Kong 
Island and the development of the west and the north of Kowloon. Hong Kong’s 
urban landscape had been significantly changed. 
 
 
7.4 Strategy for the new century and the developmentalist state of Hong Kong 
 
7.4.1 The Chinese take over 
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The Sino-British Joint Declaration, signed in 1984, has profoundly influenced land-
use in the recent period. The land issue had been one of the main obstructions 
during the Sino-British negotiations. Land auctions had been the main financial 
income of the Hong Kong Government, and contributed 10 to 20 per cent of annual 
revenue on average. Between 1980 and 1982, the figure had risen to more than 30 
per cent.595 The Chinese Government wanted to restrain the auctions in the final 
years of British rule and monitored expenditures. The Annex III: Land Leases was 
produced as one of the three annexes to the Joint Declaration, focusing on the land 
issue. Both sides agreed on three principal points. Firstly, from the entry into force 
of the Joint Declaration until 30th June 1997, new leases of land could be granted 
by the British Hong Kong Government for terms expiring no later than 30th June 
2047, with conditions that after 30th June 1997 leases would require payment of an 
annual rent equivalent to 3 per cent of the rateable value of the property. Secondly, 
the total amount of new land to be granted in the transition stage would be limited 
to 50 hectares a year. Thirdly, the premium income obtained by the British Hong 
Kong Government from land transactions would be shared equally between the 
British Hong Kong Government and the future Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region Government. All the income obtained by the British Hong Kong Government 
would be put into the Capital Works Reserve Fund for the financing of land 
development and public works in Hong Kong. The Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region Government's share of the premium income would be deposited in banks 
incorporated in Hong Kong and not drawn on except for the financing of land 
development and public works, and approved by the joint Land Commission.  
 
According to the Annex, the Land Commission was in charge of monitoring the funds 
and auctions. Chinese representatives from the Beijing Government joined the 
administrative land use apparatus. The Joint Declaration limited the provision of 
new land, but it clarified the statutory status of leases after 1997, especially in the 
                                                          
595
 Wu Ching-lun, The Economics of Land Sales in Hong Kong. Department of Economics (University of 
Hong Kong, Hong Kong 1986) 61. 
 288 
New Territories. The concern of property developers about an expected increase in 
rent after the take-over was also relieved by the Joint Declaration. The Joint 
Declaration made clear that all leases of land granted or decided upon before the 
Joint Declaration would see all rights in relation to such leases continue to be 
recognised and protected by the future Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. 
Also, all leases granted by the British Hong Kong Government not containing a right 
of renewal that expired before 30th June 1997, could be extended, if the lessee so 
wished, for a period expiring no later than 30th June 2047. No additional premium 
would be added.  
 
The 1997 unification with China changed the formality of the Hong Kong 
government. On 25th January 1997, the Provisional Legislative Council convened its 
first meeting in Shenzhen to elect the President, the future Chief Executive. The 
elections for the first term of the Legislative Council were held on 24th May 1998. 
Under the Basic Law, there were 60 Members in the first term: 20 Members 
returned by geographical constituencies through direct elections, 10 Members by 
an Election Committee and 30 Members by functional constituencies. The President 
would be elected from among the Members. Elections were also held in local 
districts. Eighteen District Councils were established. The main alteration of the 
administrative apparatus occurred on 1st July 2002. The Chief Executive proposed a 
new Accountability System for Principal Officials in his Policy Address. Under the 
Accountability System, the upper echelon of the Government (the Chief Secretary 
for Administration, Financial Secretary, Secretary for Justice and all Directors of 
Bureaux) would no longer be civil servants, but would be appointed on contract 
terms as Principal Officials.596 In the new administrative system, the Secretary of 
Housing, Planning and Land would become the head of the Housing, Planning and 
Land Bureau, and would operate under the leadership of the Chief Secretary for 
Administration. The Bureau would consist of four departments: Building, Planning, 
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Lands and Land Registry. The Planning Department was the successor of the old 
Department established in 1991. It would share the same title, formality and 
functions as its predecessor under colonial rule.  
 
7.4.2 Planning Vision and Strategy for the New Century 
 
The continuous transformation of planning authorities not only resulted from the 
change of regime, but also reacted to Mainland China’s seeking an expanded role 
in the world market. In 1990, a comprehensive review of the Territory Development 
Strategy commenced. Despite the updates in 1986 and 1988, it was the first overall 
review since publication in 1984. 597  The technical work of the Territory 
Development Strategy Review was completed in late 1996, and after some 
extensive public consultation, the Final Report was endorsed by the Executive 
Council in 1998. However, some economic parameters resulted in an imminent 
further review. The 1997 financial turmoil in Asia had devastated economic growth, 
and China's accession to the World Trade Organisation had been leading 
international trade in the Zhujiang Delta into a new stage. A new version of the 
Review, “Hong Kong 2030 Planning Vision and Strategy”, was proposed to respond 
to the main socio-economic issues listed below: 
(1) Cross-Boundary Interactions: The socio-economic linkages between Hong 
Kong and Mainland China had contributed to the dramatic growth of cross-
boundary movements of goods and people. According to the Immigration 
Department's statistics, the number of cross-boundary passengers grew 
significantly. In 1999, some 4.5 million Hong Kong residents, almost three in 
every five residents, had travelled across the boundary to the Mainland. They 
together made a total of 97.1 million trips for various purposes. It was noted 
that the average annual growth rates of passenger departures and arrivals to 
                                                          
597
 Chan Lik-tin and Lo Wai-ming, An Introduction on Hong Kong City Planning (Joint Publishing, Hong 
Kong 1998) 17. 
 290 
and from the Mainland were respectively about 10 per cent between 1992 
and 1999. To facilitate further interaction in economic and social activities, 
consideration was given to the provision of additional cross-boundary links 
(e.g. Lok Ma Chau/Sheung Shui Spur Line and Crosslink projects).  
(2) Responses to the Governments economic/industrial development projects:  
After the shift in sovereignty, the Government established the Commission 
on Innovation and Technology to promote high value-added and high 
technology industries, and tourism development. Service industrial upgrade 
projects were proposed and implemented, including the Cyberport and the 
International Theme Park (Disney). The Review was expected to assist these 
economic projects. 
(3) Responses to undergoing planning and spatial development: Those included 
a number of strategic planning studies such as the Second Railway 
Development Study, the Third Comprehensive Transport Study and the 
Urban Renewal Strategy Study. Due to competition from the growing port 
facilities across the boundary, particularly in Shenzhen, the expansion and 
new location of port facilities would need to be examined in the Review.598  
 
“Hong Kong 2030 Planning Vision and Strategy” was being prepared by the Planning 
Department. It was meant to provide broad concepts and planning directions that 
allow Hong Kong planning authorities to get prepared for possible development 
needs that may arise henceforth.599 Some experiences of failure from the previous 
Review were examined and the new approach adopted. According to the 
Department, the last review was essentially trend-based and demand-led, with the 
recommended strategies very much based on the planners own unilateral wishful 
thinking. Such an approach has been considered inflexible in responding to rapidly 
changing circumstances. In view of planning uncertainties over the long-term and 
to provide necessary flexibility, a “development scenarios” approach was applied 
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to the new Strategy. Moreover, response plans would be suggested for changing 
circumstances. In distinction to the previous Review, the Planning Department 
suggested that Hong Kong and the Zhujiang Delta Region are, in fact, one single 
economic entity. Linkages with the Mainland were the main issue of the new 
Strategy. Hong Kong would be studied in the wider regional perspective in terms of 
the strategic roles that Hong Kong should and could perform in the Zhujiang Delta 
region's further development. In addition to the economic relationship, the issue of 
increasing social interactions between Hong Kong and the Pearl River Delta Region 
were included, such as housing provision, cross-boundary travel patterns, cross-
border commutes, tourism and recreational developments in the Mainland. The 
review also emphasised the necessity of studying the interface between physical 
planning in Hong Kong and Shenzhen. The interaction of the Comprehensive Master 
Plan for Shenzhen, strategic transport links (road and rail) in the Zhujiang Delta 
Region and the development in the territory would also have to be assessed.600  
 
7.4.3 The legislation of Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 
 
The existing Town Planning Ordinance was first enacted in 1939 and lay largely 
untouched until 1991. In 1990, the Government published the Town Planning 
Amendment Bill. According to the Bill, the Planning Department was authorised to 
prepare a statutory plan to be applied in the New Territories, and created to the 
Interim Development Permission Area Plan for this purpose. It was the statutory 
representation of the Rural Planning and Improvement Strategy. They both 
responded to rapid landscape changes in rural areas. The Interim Development 
Permission Area Plan provided statutory means for land use control to regulate the 
growing activities resulting from cross border trade, such as open storage, 
container storage and parking. 601  The preparation of the Interim Development 
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Permission Area Plan met strong opposition from developers and local 
industrialists. 602  As a result, the compromised statutory Plan did not seek to 
“repair” existing land use problems, but allowed the existing uses to be 
unconditionally legalised. However, new development and industrial activities in 
the rural areas would need permission from the Planning Department. Density was 
also stipulated in the Plan. 
 
The Bill was amended and passed in 1991. The 1991 Town Planning Amendment 
Ordinance’s significant changes included the following: 
(1) The Town Planning Ordinance would be applied not only to urban areas but 
to the whole territory of Hong Kong.  
(2) The Town Planning Board was authorised to organise committees (for 
example, the Metro Planning Committee and the Rural and New Town 
Planning Committee) to facilitate the preparation of statutory plans and 
consider planning applications. 
(3) The Town Planning Board was authorised to prepare the Development 
Permission Area Plan as the statutory plan applied in rural areas. 
(4) The Development Permission Area Plan would be the permanent 
replacement for the Interim Development Permission Area Plan. The 
Ordinance also introduced direct enforcement provisions against 
unauthorised development of land use in Development Permission Areas. 
This was particularly aimed at the container storage problem because the 
increase in the numbers of containers deposited on container storage yards 
in Green Belt Zones without planning permission had caused environmental 
degradation and problems such as flooding, pollution, traffic congestion, 
nuisance to nearby residents and damages to the natural environment.603 
The Development Permission Area Plan would have the same statutory and 
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administrative status as the statutory Outline Zoning Plans in urban areas. 
Ongoing unauthorised developments in the Development Permission Area 
Plan’s applied areas were forbidden from being carried out, according to the 
legislation. 
Under the Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance that came into operation in 
1991, the Town Planning Appeal Board was also set up to hear all appeals against 
the Board's decisions to reject the planning applications upon review. Before 1991, 
control over development relied mainly on the Building Ordinance and leases. The 
Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 1991 introduced direct enforcement 
against unauthorised development in areas covered, or previously covered, by 
development permission area plans. 
 
Significantly, this new legislation was the first time criminal enforcement had been 
introduced into town planning, a key factor in terms of jurisprudence in Hong Kong. 
Enforcement powers to prosecute illegal developments were expected to be 
applied to the areas of the Outline Zoning Plans and Development Permission Area 
Plans. High Court Judge Rhind, J. J. confirmed on 21st December 1993 in Tsei Kwei-
king and another; R v. The Attorney General, ex parte (Hct) that the new Ordinance 
had overridden the Melhado precedent, 
“within the embrace of the Ordinance by adding a new sub-paragraph (h) to 
its s.4, but, also, for the first time, gave the Director (of Planning) an array of 
penal weapons to combat unauthorised development. Moreover the Director 
was at last given power to prevent the opening up of new container and 
similar sites by means of adding, as a new paragraph (i) to the same section, 
zones or districts set apart for use for open storage.” 604 
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Before the introduction of the new Ordinance, the only means of development 
control applicable to the non-statutory plans covering rural areas in the New 
Territories was the Buildings Ordinance (Application to the New Territories) of 1987. 
The planning authority had tried to apply the Planning Ordinance to rural areas, but 
were flatly rejected by the Court’s ruling of Attorney-General v. Melhado 
Investment Ltd [1983] HKLR 327. In rural areas, building control had been governed 
merely by implied conditions stipulated in the Crown lease issued by way of block 
Crown leases. Without statutory plan guidance, the Building Ordinance was merely 
a safety measure. The new legislation nullified the effect of Attorney-General v. 
Melhado, which represented the planning authorities’ failed attempt to apply the 
Planning Ordinance into rural areas. Yet despite these legislative changes, the basic 
structure of land use remained largely un-altered, as did the administrative 
structure. In accordance with Town Planning Regulations, the Town Planning Board 
might require the Director of Planning to prepare plans or sketches to carry out its 
functions as laid down in the Ordinance. Headed by the Director of Planning, the 
Planning Department was still the executive arm of the Board, responsible for 
formulating, monitoring and reviewing town plans, planning policies and the 
associated programmes for the physical development of Hong Kong. It dealt with 
all types of planning at the territorial, sub-regional and district levels, as well as 
providing services to the Board. The reasons for the un-alteration largely remained. 
As Cuthbert has suggested, this was due to the fact that public housing remained 
outside the scope of the Ordinance; the redevelopment still remained a private 
sector function, financially backed by the Government but independent of planning, 
and strategic level planning had been somewhat insulated from the planning of the 
statutory Outline Zoning Plans. 605   The absence of a system of democratic 
representation, compensation or appeal against development proposals was still 
absent in the 1991 Ordinance, although the issue of democratic representation in 
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planning had been discussed in the context of a much wider debate over electoral 
reform concerning the 1997 sovereignty shift.  
 
The 1991 alteration initiated a further comprehensive overhauling review of the 
Ordinance. In July of the same year, the Government published the Consultation 
Paper, starting a public enquiry for the preparation of a new Ordinance. It was 
proposed that four categories of disadvantages in the existing planning system 
should be amended by the Paper. These mainly concerned two points: the statutory 
powers of direct enforcement over development control and public participation. 
(1) Some amendments were proposed concerning the preparatory procedures 
for the statutory Outline Zoning Plans, including the following: 
a) While the Town Planning Board was responsible for the preparation of 
statutory Plans, it would also judge any opposition to the Plans. The Board 
would make the final decisions on adopting public opinions. The 
establishment of a higher level administrative body or an independent 
committee would be expected to make the final judgement in debates 
between the Board and the public. 
b) There would be no time limitation on the public enquiry. The Board would 
be able to close cases at its convenience. 
c) Lack of public participation in the process of preparation for the statutory 
plans. A public enquiry would only be allowed after the preparation.  
d) Planning application (Section 16 of the Ordinance): Lack of public 
participation in planning application cases. Public opinions concerning 
application cases might need to be considered by the approving authority. 
(2) Enforcement of development control:  
a) The direct enforcement provisions against unauthorised development of 
land use in Development Permission Areas would not be applied to the rest 
of the areas in the territory. Legal power to prosecute illegal development 
would be expected to be applied in areas covered by the Outline Zoning 
Plans. 
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b) The 1991 Ordinance, like the Rural Planning and Improvement Strategy and 
the Interim Development Permission Area Plan, would tolerate existing 
unauthorised development in rural areas. A “sunset regulation” would be 
needed to set up a time limit for those unauthorised industrial activities 
that existed before the declaration of the Interim Development Permission 
Area Plan. 
c) The existing planning system did not have the statutory means of 
development control. Development control in Hong Kong relied on Building 
Ordinance and leases. In the new Ordinance, developers would be 
requested to submit a Concept Plan. An approved Planning Certificate by 
the planning authorities would be required before the application for 
building permission.  
(3) Other regulations concerning development control: An Environmental 
Impact Assessment, a conversation and setting up urban design areas would 
also be considered in the new legislation.606 
 
In 1996, the Executive Council published the new planning legislation proposals in 
the form of a White Bill for public consultation. Most suggestions noted in the 1991 
Paper were adopted, with the exception of some minor alterations, such as the 
main provisions for enforcement actions against unauthorised development. One 
of the major changes to the proposals in the White Bill was to drop the 
imprisonment sentence but to increase in the maximum level of fines to provide a 
stronger deterrent against unauthorised development. Some other specified 
regulations were proposed by the White Bill, such as a time limitation attached to 
the Plan Certificate. Any modification to statutory Plans would not affect Plan 
Concepts and Plan Certificates. Plan Certificates, designated as the prerequisite for 
applying building permission, had become a developer’s amulet. Other 
amendments concerned planning control in the New Territories. The proposed time 
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limitation on existing unauthorised development in the rural areas of the New 
Territories still met strong opposition. The proposal was abandoned by the White 
Bill. Another proposal abandoned in the Paper was that the direct enforcement 
provisions against authorised development of land use in Development Permission 
Areas would not be applied to the other areas of the territory.607  
 
During the preparation of the White Bill, despite many suggestions submitted by 
grass roots organisations, such as Friends of the Earth, the planning authorities’ 
spontaneous consultation only reached building and planning professional and 
developer organisations. 608 The parties consulted expressed their main concerns, 
demanding improvements in the efficiency of the development approval process 
and more certainty and transparency in the process. They specifically asked for 
more time limits to be imposed on various steps involved in the procedures and for 
less Government intervention.609 The main concerns focusing on more efficiency 
and less intervention were adopted in the Bill. The Town Planning Bill proposing an 
overhaul of the statutory planning system was finally gazetted on 21st January 2000 
and introduced into the Legislative Council in February 2000. A Bills Committee was 
formed in early March 2000 to consider the Bill and the public submissions in the 
Bill. Owing to the complexity of the issues involved, the Bills Committee was not 
able to complete consideration of the Bill within the last term of the Legislative 
Council. The Committee was dissolved in May 2000 after nine meetings. According 
to the Secretary for Planning and Lands, John C Tsang, the planning authorities 
would consult the main stakeholders on the first batch of amendments and 
introduce the Amendment Bill to the Legislative Council in early 2003.610 In the 
Amendment Bill, the Secretariat wished to expedite the development approval 
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process by exempting the need for planning permission from certain minor 
amendments to approved development schemes, and by enabling further 
delegation of powers and functions of the Town Planning Board.  
 
In theory, greater public involvement and a more open planning process allowing 
applications for amendments to statutory plans were still to be promoted. 
However, a reasonable balance between public participation and efficiency was 
expected to be achieved by simplifying the statutory procedures for resolving 
objections to a draft plan, and by substantially shortening the processing time. 
Enforcement control against unauthorised development in rural areas would also 
be expected.611 The Town Planning (Amendment) Bill was eventually introduced into 
the Legislative Council in May 2003. The proposal emphasised that the main objectives 
of the amendment bill were to streamline the plan-making process and planning 
approval procedures, enhance the openness and transparency of the planning system, 
and strengthen planning enforcement control in the rural New Territories. The 
amendment bill was subsequently passed by the Council on 7th July 2004. The Town 
Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 2004 was then gazetted on 23rd July 2004. The 
Amendment Ordinance came into operation in June 2005. From the publication of the 
Amendment’s embryo, the White Bill on Town Planning to the Amendment’s coming 
into force, it had taken 10 years. The legislation had come through various stages of 
public consultation and was seen as a milestone in Hong Kong’s planning history in 
terms of public participation.612  Though its effort to increase the transparency of 
urban planning was emphasised, the urge for opening up all the Town Planning Board 
meetings for public attendance was not adopted in the Amendment Ordinance.613 
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Before the passing of the Amendment, being the highest decision making mechanism, 
the Town Planning Board was often criticised for being dominated by the 
administrative bureaucracy and affiliated with property developers and 
conglomerates.614 However, the legislation of Town Planning (Amendment) Ordinance 
2004 did not change the characteristics of the Board. In its current form, it still 
resembles the Legislative Council before democratisation: though most members are 
non-official members from various sectors of society, they are appointed by the Chief 
Executive. Without further provisions to ensure independence in fulfilling duties and 
exercising power, the appointees are naturally biased towards the proposals favouring 
the government and seldom challenge the administrative authorities. Non-official 
members occasionally speak for their own special interests but since they are a 
political affiliation to the government they do not have to face accountability for their 
actions.615  
 
In short, planning ordinance reform across the 1990s and early years of 2000s was 
merely a reform of technical planning matters and the applied procedure; it did not 
fundamentally change the structure of decision making power. The city state of Hong 
Kong, consisting mainly of English-speaking government officials, entrepreneurs and 
developers, had no intention of sharing their power with the grass-roots. 
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7.5 Zoning in perspective: A comparison of Taiwan and Hong Kong  
 
In Hong Kong and Taiwan, zoning is crucial to detailed urban plans in both areas’ town 
planning systems. It permits and prohibits land uses, and specifies a variety of outright 
and conditional uses of land. Thus in this section, I wish to further explore the 
discussion on zoning, and to compare its practice in Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
 
Zoning in Hong Kong was introduced in 1922 as part of the planning permission 
mechanism and zoning regulations codified in statutory plans, the Outline Zoning 
Plan.616  An Outline Zoning Plan in law has two parts: a zoning map and a set of 
annotated Notes that stipulate land uses permitted in a designated zone and uses that 
may be permitted with or without conditions in the application to the Town Planning 
Board. Uses always permitted belong in Column 1 in a statutory plan, and uses that 
may be permitted belong to Column 2. While uses in Column 1 are stipulated as a 
development right, the uses of the latter require planning permission. The enactment 
of Column 2 for zoning in Hong Kong has led to a flexible approach in the way in which 
zoning plans have been applied to particular developments. The Hong Kong zoning 
shows characteristics of decision-making flexibility, on a case by case basis, involving 
departmental discretion, with executive power belonging to the Town Planning Board 
and conferred by law. Furthermore, the amendment legislation to the Town Planning 
Ordinance in 1991 empowered the planning authorities with further discretions. A 
Development Permission Area was introduced specifically for rural areas in New 
Territories, whilst zoning with regulations on use classes (Uses of Column 1 and 
Column 2) was used in the same way as a statutory Outline Zoning Plan. According to 
Philip Booth, the desire to establish discretionary powers emanated from the tradition 
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of administration in Hong Kong that remains a derivative of British practice. 617 The 
British planning system remains a point of reference for the planning profession in 
Hong Kong. In addition, zoning concerns development rights. Outline Zoning Plans 
identify uses as of right and thus land value is protected. The certainty of land use 
plans stipulated by statutory detailed plans is essential to the prosperity of the land 
market and maintains constant contributions to government revenue streams. 
 
Zoning is central to detailed urban planning in both Hong Kong and Taiwan’s systems. 
As the universal measure of subdividing geographical space for the purpose of 
development control, zoning in Taiwan thus separates utilisations of land and 
activities according to the statutory coloured map, rather than being subject to more 
detailed case-by-case development control procedures as in Britain and Hong Kong. 
Tight regulations are imposed by zoning in urban areas. Zoning in the Taiwanese 
planning system, including the early practice of Chinese urban planning and Japanese 
practice, was originally introduced as a systematic means for protecting the residential 
properties of the ruling classes and claiming land for government bodies. The 
intention of zoning concerned enhancing order, safety and health in cities. A modern 
zoning system is supposed to be developed in accordance with a comprehensive plan, 
but few of the earliest zoning practices were implemented in the absence of a master 
plan. Zoning was presented as part of a rational planning process to meet the purposes 
of public health, safety, convenience and order, but in fact had been carried out as a 
process of urban policing by banishing undesired or disorderly social phenomena from 
protected areas.  
 
Often, zoning has been an exercise in policing power, manifesting the inherent power 
of a colonial state to regulate the health, welfare and safety of the community of 
colonists. In the post-war era of implementing urban plans, zoning powers were 
extended to standards for the plot ratio, floor space, height and density of buildings. 
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Zoning, being the provision of separating urban activities, became the land use 
element of an urban plan. The aim was for zoning practices to secure orderly and 
stable development and to protect city wealth and residential property values. 
Development on urban fringes was also to be managed.  
 
However, a lack of discretion is the main feature of the Taiwanese zoning system. An 
individual public officer of a planning or building authority is not authorised to make 
his own judgment on a particular development case. The officer cannot impose 
conditions on the case. Once zoning is set, development rights are protected by the 
zoning scheme in an urban plan, with administrative powers over planning 
constrained by regulations and the plan. Nevertheless, since the Zoning Section of the 
Enforcement Rules of Urban Planning Act (Taiwan Province) 1976 contains the 
universal directives covering all urban plans in Taiwan (with the exception of 
municipalities such as Taipei City and Kaohsiung City), local government planning 
authorities are not allowed to develop their own regulations on zoning use classes. 
Local governments, including county governments and town offices, have been 
reduced to being merely central government agents. Outside the areas covered by 
urban plans, the Development Permission system was established for the 
development of non-urban areas, even though no discretion was given to the planning 
officers to make decisions on a particular case. As long as private sector developments 
meet the zoning control criteria and requirements, they automatically obtain 
development permission without any other specific condition being demanded. 
Hence, the “Development Permission” system is not exactly a system of planning 
permission, but merely rigid zoning control.  
 
Tight regulations and rigid control do not necessarily mean effective management. 
The reality of over-urbanisation in Taiwan tells a completely different story. The 
common characteristic of Taiwanese cities is mixed use development in almost every 
inch and every corner of urban areas. Most residential zones are full of commercial 
activities, crowded and noisy. The zoning system has failed to control urban 
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expansion. Suburban areas have become high density dormitory cities and in some 
cases such as Taipei metropolitan region, “American dream”-style suburban 
residential areas which are supposed to grow at a reasonable rate have higher 
densities than Taipei city. Meanwhile, zoning has been seen by developers and 
medium-to-small size companies as a rigid system without flexibility, which restrains 
the development of commercial activities. Businessmen with small-sized barber 
shops, guest houses, cram schools, nurseries and cafés have petitioned for a zoning 
system with a more flexible approach. Between 1993 and 1995, associations of these 
trades in Taipei collectively complained that they would not be able to survive if the 
city authorities were serious about clamping- down on building or zoning violations, 
as there was no way of finding an affordable place that was 100 per cent legal in 
accordance with zoning regulations.618  
 
In other words, a good living environment is not guaranteed by enacting the original 
zoning design. Zoning in Taiwan has been defeated in many ways. It failed to 
reasonably manage urban growth, and it had to surrender to the high-density area 
activities’ invasion of lower density zones. In order to face the reality, zoning use 
classes have been regularly adjusted, with trades and activities in commercial zones 
allowed to remain in certain residential zones, and designated characters of an 
existing residential or business zone unable to be preserved (i.e. upzoning). Even 
though mixed-use activities are allowed in most residential and commercial zones, 
zoning code and building regulation violation are a common phenomenon in 
Taiwanese urban areas. 619  Furthermore, upzoning in Taiwan has led to land 
speculation opportunities.620 In contrast to the introduction of Simplified Planning 
Zones and Enterprise Zones in Britain, which aim to stimulate development and 
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reduce the burden of obtaining planning permission for an enterprise,621 Taiwanese 
zoning has become highly inconvenient. Likewise, in contrast to the enactment of 
zoning in Hong Kong, which led to a flexible development control approach, Taiwanese 
zoning has been criticised for tight regulations and rigid control, and only having a 
slight effect on urban management. Though planners and public servants in Hong 
Kong have more room for discretion when implementing zoning than their 
counterparts in Taiwan, the nature of zoning remains the same: administrative powers 
policing urban development. There is no difference in the fundamental principles for 
both sides as regards advocating the ideology of public interest. 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion: The developers’ state 
 
By reviewing the evolution of town planning in Hong Kong and related legislation, one 
can see that the Hong Kong government has been the main developer in the property 
market whilst also being the largest land owner. The government has created one of 
the largest scale public housing situations in the capitalist world, but acts more like a 
commodity provider with a greater belief in the property market and private sector 
than in a social welfare state. It has served the interests of property developers whilst 
itself being a main player in the market. It is a developmentalist state. In terms of 
McAuslan’s ideologies, while the Hong Kong government implements statutory town 
planning in the name of the public interest, its core value stands with the ideology of 
private property rights. Nevertheless, the collective consumption provision, including 
the development of new territories, new towns and new housing, has been a crucial 
component of the expanded reproduction of Hong Kong’s capitalism. Being a 
developmentalist state, which frequently acts as a main developer itself, the Hong 
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Kong government has from time to time had to respond to society’s call for change, 
even though it has never been a democratically-elected governing body.  
 
As previously noted in this thesis, the Hong Kong economy began to grow at an 
average GDP of 10 per cent from 1961 over the following twenty years. Between 
1960– 1970, manufacturing output rose by 275 per cent and labour productivity by 
207 per cent. However, the manufacturing wage index only rose by 71.5 per cent.622 
Accompanying the rapid wealth growth, the number of squatters doubled from 
300,000 in 1954 to 600,000 in 1964.623 Social disturbances and riots in the 1960s 
reflected this social injustice. While some argued that the origins of the riots lay in the 
Chinese Cultural Revolution, I contend that these social movements were actually 
spontaneous and issue-driven. 624  The era of localised politics was born in Hong 
Kong. 625  During the same years, Urban Council elections had become the most 
important channel for the political participation of the rising new generation of the 
middle class. In 1961, the Chinese Reform Club and the Hong Kong Civil Association 
joined forces for the purpose of contesting Urban Council elections with a common 
platform urging constitutional reform and demanding more seats for elected political 
representatives on both the Legislative Council and Urban Council. Though the 
political reform did not represent the interests of the majority of Chinese-speaking 
people, but only the English-educated and most influential sections of society, it had 
the advantage of enabling some residents to undertake public administrative work.626 
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Responding to the needs of the new bourgeoisie who could now collectively voice 
their wishes in the political arena and demand improvements in the infrastructure to 
meet economic growth, it also responded to the spontaneous political campaigns 
participated in by under-represented people demanding public services, with long 
term urban development plans being initiated.   
 
Concerning planning, the city state of Hong Kong placed significant emphasis on fiscal 
costs and financial returns when formulating and implementing urban policies. As a 
result, social and environment factors were often underestimated. The authorities 
were either insensitive or reluctant to acknowledge the potential problems of the 
development process until they were out of control. Reactive crisis management 
became the norm. Sometimes, planning was merely an after-the-fact reparation. As 
previously discussed, the resettlement schemes and extension of the statutory 
planning system to the New Territories are specific cases in point. The reluctance was 
not a result of respecting the free market, nor the consequence of unresponsiveness 
to meet the needs of private interests. Contrary to their supposed non-intervention 
ideology, the government was anxious to ensure continued prosperity, which was 
associated with land development by creating the conditions under which 
development could take place to the best advantage. 
 
Responding to these economic development needs, planning helped reduce labour 
costs and provided flatted factories for manufacturers. Public housing begun in the 
first half of the last century paved the way and cleared the obstacles for property 
developers. The privatised housing programme started in the 1980s was another 
financial incentive scheme supporting the private sector. Public housing tenants were 
evicted because of developments, but compensated for less than market value. Some 
were asked to apply for a mortgage so they could stay after the privatisation of the 
settlement where they lived. The prices were assessed and determined by the 
government, on behalf of and in favour of the developers. The stories associated with 
the privatisation era of the 1980s are similar to those in the public housing era in the 
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1950s: tenants had to bear more financial burdens in order to stay or had to move 
away to a more remote location. 
 
Planning in Hong Kong has been pursued primarily for the benefits of property 
development or fiscal objectives, rather than social welfare. This approach has left its 
footprints in the changing Hong Kong landscape. Satellite towns were constructed in 
the 1960s and 1970s to settle the urban poor so that development could be 
implemented in the old settlements. In the 1990s, developers were encouraged to 
come back to the city. The private sector took over public housing and invested in its 
regeneration. Gentrification came along with privatisation and a new generation of 
urban poor who had to leave the city. In the New Territories, the government did not 
take any action to arrest the degrading environment until 1991. Building and planning 
violations had been tolerated so that low cost and flexibility in Hong Kong’s 
manufacturing and transportation bases could be maintained to compete in the 
economic integration of Hong Kong and Southern China. The changes to the landscape 
in urban areas, new towns and the rest of the New Territories were not the result of 
“natural evolution” driven by economic forces. The state, often serving the interests 
of property development, played an active role in the process. Decision-making on 
planning matters was made by a governing elite that represented property 
developers’ interests, rather than planners whose ideals originated from their 
commitment to professionalism. The ideology of public interest was upheld alongside 
the ideology of private property, together vying for prominence against McAuslan’s 
third ideology, the ideology of public participation. In the case of Hong Kong, the latest 
planning ordinance reform has not fundamentally changed the decision-making 
power structure and reflects the fact that public participation has continued to be 
side-lined.
 308 
Chapter 8: Urban Informal Sectors and Law 
 
Introduction 
 
In the previous chapters of this thesis, through the reviewing of planning legislation 
and the implementation of urban planning in both Hong Kong and Taiwan, 
interventions by states can be seen within the realm of urbanisation. Nevertheless, 
state intention does not guarantee the continuation of urban policies. While a ‘public 
interest’ ideology is proclaimed, development control in Taiwan and Hong Kong has 
met various kinds of resistance, as discussed in previous chapters of this thesis. One 
kind is disobedience. By violating building codes and development control regulations, 
property owners and users challenge the administration’s urban policing. Though 
‘property rights’ ideology is defeated in the arena of administrative laws it appears in 
the form of guerrilla rebellion. This chapter therefore will focus on the violations of 
development controls. 
 
This chapter focuses on illegal buildings constructed under the urbanisation of Hong 
Kong and Taiwan, with the ‘informal sector’ concept also introduced to review the 
appearance and demolition of illegal buildings and related laws. The impact on the 
planning system created by illegal buildings will also be examined. I aim to point out 
that, though it looks like a rebellion against the establishment, the existence of illegal 
buildings in reality eases the administrative state’s crisis of legitimacy, the financial 
burden of city administrations but primarily supports the growth and development of 
cities. While illegal buildings challenge the development control of the planning 
authorities, they are also essential to urban development. They can be seen, neither 
as side effects of urbanisation nor as the periphery of cities. I will also point out that 
in response to the challenge, laws and regulations, in practice, can be arbitrary and 
fluid. The definition of legality is not always straightforward. Violations can be 
tolerated and even considered legal when governments do not have enforcement 
capabilities. Government enforcement, on a large scale, can also result in social unrest 
 309 
that endangers the political legitimacy of the government as a whole. Cases in either 
Hong Kong or Taiwan will be reviewed to support the above argument in the following 
sections. 
 
 
8.1 Building violations and clearance in Taiwan 
 
This section introduces the phenomena of building violations which can be quite 
commonly seen in Taiwan to discuss how legal violation can be accepted when the 
government had to rely on illegal building to ease the burden of a housing crisis. 
 
In Taiwan, despite the efforts to re-distribute land rights and implement urban 
planning, the enforcement of building violations became the main task of planning 
authorities in the 1950s and early 1960s.627 Urbanisation and the shortage of housing 
supply were the causes of the increasing flourishing of illegal buildings, in the form of 
annexes being illegally added or rooftop constructions lacking a building license. For 
the influx of migrants from Mainland China, small scale temporary housing was built 
by government departments to accommodate employees and their families who were 
mostly Mainlanders. According to the 1954 report submitted by the Inspection Group, 
Ministry of Interior,628 departmental temporary residential units were raised mostly 
on vacant plots surrounding government buildings in cities. There had not been large 
scale slums with populations of tens of thousands in Taiwan before, even though a 
few unofficial military quarters had populations in the thousands. These were built by 
military veterans and their families on occupied land designated for parks in Taipei 
City and upon land reserved for public facilities in towns and the countryside. In the 
1950s, military tensions still existed between Taiwan and Mainland China, with high 
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density living conditions appearing close to government department buildings seen as 
a huge disadvantage in a war effort. Air raid and evacuation plans were the driving 
force that pushed forward the delegated legislation on building controls and building 
violation enforcement. The strict regulations on building violations were actually 
initiated right after the Second World War. In 1945, the Temporary Regulations on 
Building Violations Ban was announced by the Taiwan Governor’s Office. It was the 
first building violations regulation introduced in Taiwan by the Chinese Nationalist 
government. 629  In 1949, Taipei City Government announced an assurance that it 
would clamp down on building violations. In 1953, its Public Works Department and 
Police Department jointly set up a task force, the Building Violations Demolition 
Brigade, to implement the clamp down. In 1954, the Taipei City Government and the 
Taipei Defence Command jointly announced a project to widen eleven main roads and 
demolish illegal buildings on those roads. In June of the following year, eight hundred 
illegal buildings on Roosevelt Road were demolished. 630  The policy enforcing 
demolition met severe resistance. The Nationalist Party’s propaganda machine, the 
Central Daily, reported members of military personnel, veterans and their families 
fighting against the police and military police, reporting cases of people being serious 
injured and suicides carried out by the inhabitants.631 
 
In 1956, detailed stipulations were announced by the Ministry of Interior as Principles 
for Managing Building Violations. Other regulations were also published as parts of 
the Directions for Implementing Urban Plans in the same year by the Ministry of 
Interior. According to the above statutory instruments, the prohibition of new 
buildings and constructions was applied to certain inner city areas in nine cities. 
Meanwhile, local governments were ordered to clamp down on building violations. 
The operation of demolishing illegal buildings was executed by the ‘Building Violations 
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Demolition Brigades’ and headed by police authorities. Military police would assist 
when the demolition involved military employees or veterans’ accommodation. 
Priority was targeted at areas crucial for military defence: main routes/roads for 
transportation and evacuation, bridges of military strategic importance, and areas 
where defence lines were located. Between 1957 and 1965, efforts regulating urban 
growth continued. Several regulations and amendments were introduced in order to 
enhance the work on regulating buildings.632 In 1968, a national survey on building 
violations was conducted, and, in doing so, the government sought once again to deal 
with the problem.633  
 
The government’s assurances did not resolve building violations, however. Instead of 
carrying out the clamp-down and demolitions, the policy u-turned more than once. 
The first U-turn happened in 1957 after the introduction of the 1956 Principles for 
Managing Building Violation when Executive Yuan announced Regulations on Building 
Violations. Illegal buildings constructed before 10 February 1958 would be classified 
as old violations, with new violations after that day being demolished as soon as they 
were reported. Concerning so-called old violations, they were still illegal and would 
be dealt later, but they were not deemed a priority. This meant that the existence of 
old illegal buildings would be tolerated and that demolition would not be carried out, 
even when reported. Old violations were not legalised in law but were legal in reality. 
In Taipei, on 22nd June 1958, the Central Daily reported that the city authorities were 
“finished the task of setting priorities by classifying twenty thousand and some illegal 
buildings.” After that, between 1959 and 1960, four large-scale operations 
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demolishing illegal buildings on main streets were carried out. Between 1961 and 
1964, at least two thousand illegal buildings were demolished by five big operations. 
Statistics show that the demolition operations did not suppress the increase in 
building violations. The number of illegal buildings in 1961 remained similar to 1958. 
In 1964, there were 72,056 households, consisting of 292,894 persons living in illegal 
buildings, representing 28.13 per cent of the whole city population. The total floor 
space of illegal buildings accounted for only 6.25 per cent of floor space for all 
buildings in Taipei, meaning that the habitants in illegal buildings endured more 
crowded living conditions.634  In Taiwan Province, the 1968 survey caused serious 
concern to provincial congressmen over the government’s demolition of illegal 
buildings, arguing that the authorities should not “damage common people’s 
livelihood.”635 In response, an official from Taiwan Provincial Government announced 
that there were 33,507 illegal buildings that had not interfered with the 
implementation of city plans and not endangered either public security or traffic 
infrastructure that should be legalised.636  
 
One of the main groups relying on illegal buildings was military veterans and their 
families. In the 1950s, almost a third of soldiers in Chiang Kai-shek’s army were forced 
to retire. Before Taiwan lift its ban on travel to mainland China in 1987, 
Communication between the two sides of Taiwan Straits was strictly prohibited. 
Displaced Mainland veterans had to make a living in a society alien to them, a form of 
demobilisation quite different from the usual sense of discharged soldiers returning 
to their homes. Some ex-service personnel settled for the arrangement of Veterans’ 
Farms or the Veterans Engineering Department, with the rest having to find their own 
way to survive in Taiwanese society with a lump sum pension of merely six months’ 
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salary or less.637  According to field studies by Lu Bing-yi and Chen Yong-long, and 
Huang Sun-chuan, when veterans gave up hope of returning to their homes in 
Mainland China, they gradually settled down in local society and got married to local 
women, mostly from the Taiwanese countryside out of relative poverty. The marital 
combination of disadvantaged minorities from different ethnicities led to the 
expansion of illegal building quarters and an increasing number of building 
violations.638 Various waves of migrants from the countryside also contributed to the 
scarcity of housing. Some stayed with their relatives or employers in the city in 
makeshift annexes, lofts and rooftop structures. Some squeezed themselves in 
clustered areas in illegal buildings, with Taiwanese migrants from the countryside 
living alongside migrants from the Mainland China. Military veterans starting their 
own families was also a factor that resulted in over-crowded living conditions in illegal 
buildings’ clustered quarters and the increase in building violations in the 1960s. 
Similar to what happened in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the enforcement of the 
clearances did not solve the issue of building violations, with building regulations 
defeated by the reality. After the policy on clearing illegal buildings u-turned in 1957 
when old violations were “tolerated”, the same compromise was repeated three more 
times. The definition of old violations was re-drawn in 1968, 1984 and 1996. After the 
surrender of building regulations and enforcement, most of the new violations that 
‘required’ clearing had eventually also become “tolerated violations”. Regulations 
governing building and development have consistently been arbitrary and fluid in 
practice. 
 
To conclude this section, in the case of Taiwan, the phenomena of building violation 
shows that the definition of legality is not always straightforward. Laws and 
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regulations can be arbitrary and fluid. The pressure of housing justice, providing 
reasonable price private housing or public housing, led to a situation in which the state 
had to tolerate building violation, even through the legalisation of such violations. In 
the case of Taiwan, the housing crisis caused more damage to the government’s ruling 
legitimacy than the state’s failing to maintain law and order in building control. 
 
 
8.2 Slum clearance and planning in Hong Kong 
 
This section addresses the cases of laws that govern development control in Hong 
Kong, arguing that they can be understood as arbitrary and fluid here too. This section 
also introduces a series of legislation passed in the 1950s that gave the planning 
authorities power to implement slum clearance and resettlement.   
 
1953 was eventful in terms of urban development in Hong Kong. Research into Hong 
Kong’s urban problems argues that modern public housing schemes in Hong Kong 
started in that year as if it were a Christmas tale. On Christmas Eve, a fire devastated 
the Shek Kip Mei squatter settlement in North Kowloon. 50,000 people were made 
homeless overnight. To cope with this emergency, a resettlement programme was 
required. 639  Before 1954, housing provisions mainly relied on the market. The 
Government’s non-intervention policy had expected that the property industry would 
provide for housing needs. 640  Although the Hong Kong Government had not 
implemented a substantial concrete public housing policy until the Shek Kip Mei great 
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fire, there had been some settlements designated for deprived people from slum 
clearances before and after the Second World War. The earliest slum clearances 
started as a government reaction to social instability. In the 1920s, a series of mass 
strikes challenged British dominance. In November 1921, the Seamen’s Union 
demanded a pay rise to catch up with the economic inflation rate and close the gap 
between Chinese and Non-Chinese seamen, given the latter received much higher 
wages. The breakdown of the negotiation resulted in a huge general strike in 1922, 
with a revolt against foreign domination sweeping through Hong Kong and Canton 
(Guangdong). The armed militia of the union enforced the strike and blockaded food 
supplies by sea and rail. Cooks, bakers, “coolies” and servants joined the strike too, 
with the support of their Chinese relations in Canton. The Order of Martial Law was 
announced and the strike lasted fifty six days. In 1925 and 1926, a larger scale general 
strike lasted sixteen months in Hong Kong, begun as a response to the Shanghai 
Incident on 30th May. A Chinese Union leader was shot dead by a British police officer 
in the Shanghai Settlement. The upheaval escalated when a demonstration of over 
200,000 protestors were confronted by British troops from Hong Kong who fired 
indiscriminately on the Chinese. Hong Kong’s economy quickly deteriorated because 
of the strike. Negotiations went on and resulted in a wage increase, improved working 
conditions, the formation of the Labour Advisory Board and the establishment of a 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs in 1928.641  Faced with social instability, the colonial 
regime maintained its alliance with Chinese elites and failed to tackle the social 
conflicts between the lower classes and the ruling alliance.642 
 
Social policies were needed to smooth the tension between residents and the colonial 
city state. In 1935, the idea of social housing was introduced as part of social welfare 
schemes to tackle the hardship of the lower classes. In 1935, the Housing Commission 
was set up to investigate housing difficulties and unhygienic conditions. The Report 
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was published in 1938 and focused on over-crowding standards, building control 
violations and slum clearances. Nevertheless, the Housing Commission Report 643 
documented that it was impossible to rely on the private sector to provide housing for 
the lower classes. The state was forced to discard its laissez faire policy and intervene 
in the provision of housing.644 The public housing policy met some resistance. The 
Financial Secretary refused to provide funding and preferred high density designs 
using cheap building materials and low standards. Opposition also came from the 
Chinese elites. Lo Man-Kam, a member of the Legislative Council, urged a solution to 
the housing problem by simplifying and speeding up land lease renewal and land sales 
so that private developers would be encouraged to build more housing units.645 Later, 
the Civil War between the Chinese Nationalist Party and Chinese Communist Party on 
the Mainland resulted in two large scale immigration waves between 1945-1947 and 
1949-1952 that brought over one million refugees who set up sheds and huts on 
hillsides and roof tops. Concern for potential fires, natural diseases and public disorder 
saw the Resettlement Division set up under the Urban Service Department to clear 
the slums.646  Nevertheless, as Castells and Smart suggest, development and housing 
in the private sector was one of the major causes that pushed the massive eviction of 
tenement dwellers. Private development needed the government to clear land to 
meet the increasing housing demand.647 Squatter areas were mostly located on the 
periphery of urban built-up areas and were forced to be re-located in more peripheral 
locations when the first squatters were cleared from central areas.  
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Meanwhile, the real estate industry was continually empowered by the government. 
In order to clear and pave land for private property development and public works, 
slum clearances were prioritised by the Planning Branch. In 1951, more than 500,000 
people were considered by the government to be living in slums with crowded and 
poor hygienic conditions. As a result of the expansion and implementation of District 
Plans, more than 100,000 people were driven into Settlements. Different from public 
housing, the Hong Kong government did not build these Settlements. It was rather a 
slum relocation plan that assigned new locations to squatters. As the Colonial 
Secretary explained in a meeting not long after the Shek Kip Mei fire, the purpose of 
the enactment of Emergency (Resettlement Areas) Regulation 1952 was for “[…] giving 
the Urban Council powers to control these areas, but, of course, it was not the intention 
to undertake or finance the construction of resettlement accommodation.”648 People 
licensed by the welfare department had permission to build a house or rent one from 
the Hong Kong Settlers' Housing Corporation in settlement areas. Tenant cards were 
issued to approve squatters. The scale and condition of the buildings were subject to 
special building regulations for settlements. Except for permitted/licensed areas, 
some ‘tolerated areas’ were also assigned by the government, but with worse 
conditions and looser regulations. Squatter clearances during this period were 
intensive. In 1950 alone, 17,060 huts accommodating 106,748 people were 
demolished. One third of the clearances were of previously cleared sites. The 
permitted/licensed and ‘tolerated areas’ had been planned to enhance slum 
clearances but only 45,000 persons moved into these approved areas, accounting for 
only 10 per cent of the whole squatter population. Most people could not afford the 
rent or their accommodation did not meet the building standards, so they collectively 
squatted in illegal settlement areas. Shek Kip Mei was one of these settlements.649   
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The Great Fire initiated the new resettlement policy. The new programme was 
undertaken for strictly economic reasons, rather than for welfare. According to the 
Housing Committee, two reasons drove the programme: 1. To cut the cost to the Hong 
Kong Government of the emergency relief measures that the squatter fire required, 
with resettlement the least costly way; 2. To obtain the proper use of the land 
adjacent to the urban areas that the squatters occupied.650 The Commissioner for 
Resettlement stated clearly why resettlement was adopted:  
“not simply because they need or deserve hygienic and fireproof houses: they 
are resettled because the community can no longer afford to carry the fire 
risk, health risk and threat to public order…… and because the community 
needs the land on which they illegally occupy.”651 
The Hong Kong Government’s argument for acting as the courier to help the private 
property speculation is supported by the fact that the one million squatters resettled 
by 1971 were resettled on land whose size in total was equivalent to only 34 per cent 
of the previously occupied areas. The resettled areas were located on peripheral land 
of much lower value. 652  As Kehl suggests, “government intervention in housing 
through squatter resettlement creates the best condition for the freest play of the 
market in private real estate.”653 Government revenue that heavily relied on land sales 
was also considered a factor contributing to the clearances for private developers. 
Smart, however, emphasises the autonomy of the city state, arguing that, as the land 
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owner, the Government did not release much land for private development despite 
the large requirement for housing.  654The colonial state was not simply a capitalist 
instrument facilitating market operations. The government controlled land supply in 
order to restrict over-supply. By doing so, the government maximised their monopoly 
and boosted land prices.  
 
The settlement policy had been acting to provide low rent accommodation to help 
industrial capitalists maintain low salary labour. The Government also used high-rise 
buildings in settlements to control the release of land and property speculation. 
Settlements of high density were seen as the most cost-effective way to accommodate 
people in terms of land use and finance. Public housing in the 1950s had been one of 
the most important mechanisms for capitalism reproduction. For the Government, 
the settlements not only settled people’s accommodation issue but also settled the 
social security risks (fire, disease and public security) caused by squatters. Mostly, 
settlement reduced the social-political conflicts resulting from the slum clearances.655 
Echoing A. Smart’s argument, Ip also emphasises the autonomy of the colonial state 
but note that sanitary concerns in squatter areas are crucial in gathering an 
understanding of the political and economic interests of the colonial state.656 The 
concept of ‘sanitary syndrome’ was used to explain why the Urban Council was 
involved in clearance and resettlement. The Urban Council, being the government 
body that regulated sanitation, was established in 1936 to succeed its predecessor, 
the Sanitary Board. In the Hong Kong Annual Department Report by the Commissioner 
for Resettlement for the Financial Year 1954-55 of Hong Kong Government, the 
Commissioner addressed the Legislative Council, stating that “…squatter clearance 
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and resettlement was not a welfare operation in any sense.”657 Sanitation was used as 
an excuse and tactic to avoid the controversial debate of the welfare state being 
against laissez faire ideology because public housing was seen as impossible and could 
not gain cross-department consensus.  
 
A series of legislations were passed in the 1950s giving the planning and housing 
authorities of the Executive Council power to administer resettlement.658 In 1958, the 
Resettlement Ordinance was enacted. The purpose of the Ordinance was to 
permanently replace the above Emergency Regulations dealing with the clearance and 
resettlement of squatters. The Ordinance made no substantial changes to the 
previous legislation but merely consolidated all the legislation into one law. According 
to the Regulations and Ordinance, the state had overall power over squatters. It was 
authorised with significant powers to resettle people, including eviction, screening 
and resettling. A system of ‘occupation permits’ was developed for resettlers. A 
Tenant Card or residency permit would be needed to stay in an approved area, with 
the permit able to be taken away if a thirty-day notice was given. The government also 
had the power to assign locations that it deemed suitable for resettlement or 
redevelopment. When a place was chosen, the existing squatters would be asked to 
move. Little compensation was paid since the state had no legal obligation to 
compensate illegal dwellers. 
 
To conclude this section, the slum clearance and resettlement in Hong Kong was not 
resulted from a single cause. Several factors initiated and implemented the course of 
slum clearance and resettlement. Social conflict and instability made social welfare a 
necessity to smooth the tension between Hong Kong residents and the colonial state 
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and to tackle the hardship of the lower classes. Meanwhile, the provision of housing 
had not completely relied on the public sector. With the Hong Kong government 
increasing the sales of land, private developers were encouraged to play a crucial role 
in housing supply as well. In fact, the development and housing in the private sector 
was one of the major causes that pushed the eviction of tenement dwellers. In order 
to clear and pave land for private developers, slum clearances were designated as the 
authority’s main task. Squatters were resettled in peripheral areas with much lower 
value. This made way for the re-development of urban areas that were originally 
occupied by squatters. Hong Kong government’s intervention in resettlement thus 
paved the way for the free-play of the market in private real estate. 
 
 
8.3 Informal housing and law 
 
In this section, examples of urban policy implementation that met with resistance in 
both Taiwan and Hong Kong are discussed. By introducing these examples, I wish to 
argue that, though building control and development control were introduced, the 
authorities often tolerated, even deliberately ignored, violations of building 
ordinance. Through accommodating more people into single accommodation units, 
and selectively executing or ignoring building ordinances, the governments relied on 
informal housing to relieve the pressure of housing provisions. 
 
The execution of urban policing often met politicised resistance, one of the 
consequences being that a strong and collective community developed among 
squatters. The bonding of squatters was strengthened under the pressure of eviction. 
The Rennie’s Mill settlement was a particular case of resistance. At the end of the 
Chinese Civil War, large numbers of political refugees, Nationalist soldiers and their 
families fled to Hong Kong and finally settled in Rennie’s Mill, a barren piece of land in 
a remote location. Some 20,000 refugees turned the inhospitable waste land into a 
settlement. Schools were built, roads constructed and electricity connected. The 
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refugees governed themselves and pledged allegiance to the Nationalist government 
of the Republic of China in Taiwan. The Hong Kong government took no part in the 
development and administration of the village. Subsidies to schools and veterans were 
occasionally sent from Taiwan. The national flags of the Republic of China were raised 
at every corner in the village. It was a Taiwanese military quarters in a British colony 
not far from the border of the People’s Republic of China. The population grew to 
some 30,000 by 1960.659 The 1958 ‘Resettlement Ordinance’ legislation threatened 
the livelihood of the refugees. In 1961, the Hong Kong government announced that 
Rennie’s Mill was to be administered as a ‘resettlement area’. Despite the promise 
made by the Commissioner of Resettlement stating that no removal or resettlement 
would occur, the sense of an unknown future spread throughout the village. The 
villagers believed that the British would eventually take over the Chinese nationalist 
settlement and that any political ceremony representing the Chinese Nationalist 
Party’s stance would be banned. In 1964, the village was classified as a Cottage 
Resettlement Area. In 1988, a New Town Plan was announced that would include 
Rennie’s Mill. Petitions and responses had been sent back and forth between the 
villagers and the government since 1991. In 1992, developers estimated that the land 
on which the village stood was worth 30 billion Hong Kong dollars (around £2.4 billion 
in accordance with the exchange rate at the time).660 In 1996, the national flags of the 
Republic of China were lowered and some 6,500 inhabitants removed. Propaganda 
paintings of “Long Live President Chiang” and “Long Live the Republic of China” 
disappeared with the demolition of the village.  
 
Huts clustered along hillsides, crowded living environments on narrow lanes, steep 
stairs and bad odours were characteristics attributed to Renin’s Mill in 1960, with 
primitive living conditions existing until its demolition. Buildings were un-regulated 
                                                          
659
 Leong Ka Lun, Bread and Gospel: Christianity in Rennie’s Mill in the 50s (Cosmic Light Publishing, 
Hong Kong, 2000). 
660
 Lau Yee Cheon, ‘A Study of Rennie’s Mill: Its Education’ (1998) 3 Historia 357, 379 (Chinese 
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong). 
 323 
but the habitants well organised with their own rules and orders. The distinguishing 
characteristics of the village were observed:  
(1) The old military hierarchy was obeyed.  
(2) Sonority was respected in the community. 
(3) Identities of some Legislators and Representatives of the National Assembly (of 
Republic of China) were kept secret to the outside world but known in the 
community. They were the community leaders. 
(4) Community wardens were well organised as a security force and fire patrol. 
People were highly vigilant about fire since it would pave the way for the Hong 
Kong government’s development plan. 661 
Nevertheless, Squatter settlements, especially ones that had been approved like 
Rennine’s Mill, were presumed by the resettlement authorities to be unorderly,  
“having no self-respect, having no respect for the rights of their neighbours, 
having the defeatist attitude towards dints and disease. Squatters needed to 
be taught to make the best of the simple accommodation provided once they 
were offered resettlement.”662 
The reality was very different from the Hong Kong Government’s description of life in 
squatter settlements. Though It was un-regulated and lawless on appearance, the 
people living there were actually disciplined and self-governed.  
 
In comparison to squatter settlements in Hong Kong, informal veterans’ quarters in 
Taiwan had similar characteristics. In 1997, as a petition to the Taipei government 
asking to stop the clearance of squatters on the designated location of Number 
Fourteen and Fifteen Parks, professional urban planners and scholarly bodies argued 
that clearance was not the best path to urban regeneration for a number of reasons. 
                                                          
661
 Leong Ka Lun, Bread and Gospel: Christianity in Rennie’s Mill in the 50s (Cosmic Light Publishing, 
Hong Kong, 2000); Lau Yee Cheon, ‘A Study of Rennie’s Mill: Its Education’ (1998) 3 Historia 357,379 
(Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong). 
662
 Commission for Resettlement, ‘Hong Kong Annual Department Report by the Commissioner for 
Resettlement for the Financial Year 1954-1955’ (Hong Kong: Government Printer, Hong Kong, 1955) 40. 
 324 
Firstly, in the fifty years of settling in the area, social networks had been established, 
social interconnections built and systems of self-help developed. Secondly, though 
living in poor conditions, squatters had sustained the development of the 
neighbouring modern fashion and tourism industries, including hotels, shops, 
restaurants and entertainment businesses. The veterans’ quarter community also 
provided labour and services to its developed neighbours.663  The description of a 
cross-knit community could also be applied to other military veterans’ quarters. 
Before the clearance of some 14,000 inhabitants on the designated area of Taipei 
Number Seven Park in 1992, veterans and their families were actively mobilised. Fire 
patrols were set up and volunteers walked the beat day and night.664 
 
An orderly self-governed community residing in an unlawful enclave can be seen in 
the cases of squatters’ quarters in both Hong Kong and Taiwan. It was not the absence 
of an urban regulations legal framework that resulted in the illegal settlements. In 
both cases, building controls had been introduced and systematic planning 
implemented. As previously noted in this thesis, the 1938 Report by the Hong Kong 
Housing Commission proves that the state deliberately ignored the infringements of 
over-crowding standards and building ordinance violations, but despite it, the state 
maintained relatively good control over unauthorised land use. By squeezing more 
and more bodies into an accommodation unit, it was the people who were made to 
resolve their own housing problems. The pre-war solution to easing the demand for 
housing was increasing congestion, which relieved the pressure of housing provisions 
for the government. In the 1938 Report, the government admitted that the private 
sector could not be relied upon to solve the housing issue and that, at the same time, 
the government itself was reluctant to commit to public housing. Thus, relaxing 
building controls and an increase in density were deemed to be a solution. The 
designated tolerated areas of squatter settlements proposed in the 1954–55 Report 
by the Commissioner for Resettlement was another step by which the Hong Kong 
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government relaxed the restrictions it had previously made. Rents were cheaper and 
more bodies could be crammed into those buildings. 
 
The evolution of ‘building violation policies’ in Taiwan tells a similar story. The 
government relied on illegal buildings to accommodate people, despite the 
government repeatedly announcing that it was determined to clear all the illegal 
buildings in Taipei for almost half a century. As previously mentioned, in 1945, the 
Temporary Regulations on Building Violations Ban was announced. It was the first 
building violation regulations introduced in Taiwan by the Chinese Nationalist 
government. In 1949, Taipei City Government reassured that it would clamp down on 
building violations. Since then, delegated legislation on building violations was 
introduced or amended at least nine times between 1956 and 1983. In 1968, a 
national survey on building violations was conducted and, in doing so, the government 
reassured again that it would deal with the problem. The most recent time that the 
central government announced its determination to clear away building under 
violation in cities was 1991. Obviously, the strict enforcement of clearances could not 
solve the issue of building violations. Building regulations were undermined 
repeatedly by reality. As mentioned previously, the policy clearing of illegal buildings 
u-turned in 1957, with a new set of Regulations drawing a line between old and new 
violations. Old violations would be tolerated, though still illegal. In the next forty years, 
the same compromise was repeated. The line defining “tolerated old violations” and 
“violations to-be-cleared” had fallen back three more times, re-drawn in 1968, 1984 
and 1996. The ‘original new violations’ stipulated in 1957 later become old new 
violations in 1968, ‘old old new violations’ in 1984 and ‘old old old new violations’ in 
1996. After the surrendering of building regulations and enforcement, most of the ‘to-
be-cleared new violations’ had eventually became ‘tolerated old violations’. Also, with 
the increase in new violations each year and the government’s lack of capacity to clear 
these violations, illegal building has become an issue that remains unresolved.665 
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The practice of establishing substandard regulations that contradicted government 
stipulations that tolerated the reality of poor housing provisions was also a part of the 
housing policy in modern Hong Kong. Responding to the infamous revealing of the 
intolerable living conditions of cage dwellers in the film “Cageman”,666 the Bedspace 
Apartment Ordinance was enacted in 1994. Despite the Hong Kong Community 
Organisations’ Association’s appeal to increase public housing provisions for elderly 
residents and the banning of cage apartments, the government legalised the practice 
of cage dwelling. The legislation covered flats in which 12 or more bedsits were 
occupied under rental agreements. A four-year period of ‘toleration’ was set for the 
owners of cage apartment to improve the sanitation and fireproofing of facilities. In 
1993, the Secretary for Home Affairs addressed the Legislative Council on the 
implementation of the Bedspace Apartments Ordinance: 66 cage apartments were 
licensed that accommodated around 1,200 residents and 29 cage apartments were 
banned.667  According to government statistics, the total number of licensed cage 
apartments was reduced to 48 by 2002. In the same year, the Hong Kong Community 
Organisations’ Association found thirty-three unlicensed cage apartments. The total 
number of cage dwellers was estimated to be 4,000. According to a survey by the 
Community Organisations’ Association in 2002, 88.9 per cent of cage dwellers 
believed that the implementation of Bedspace Apartments Ordinance had not helped 
improve living conditions, with 40.8 percent of the interviewees suggesting that the 
situation had gotten worse since licensing took effect in 1998.668 
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Compared to cage apartments, cubicle apartments had a similar arrangement, 
although with slightly better results. The government uses this distinction to cover 
accommodation units that are not regulated by the Bedspace Apartments Ordinance 
but that are similarly crowded, including flats divided into several rental units and cage 
apartments with less than twelve bedsits. A government survey in 2007 showed that 
53,200 persons were living in cubicle apartments or cage apartments. The majority of 
the dwellers were new migrants from Mainland China in the 1980s and 1990s who 
provided cheap labour to the Hong Kong economy. Regardless of the serious building 
code violations, the government addressed the Legislative Council on the issue:  
“People choose to live in bedspace apartments and cubicles because these 
apartments, apart from commanding a low-rental level, are mostly located 
in convenient urban areas.  People living in these apartments can then travel 
to their workplaces on foot or by relatively low-cost public transport. Hence, 
there is still a demand for this type of private accommodation in the 
market. The Government has no plan at present to displace those in such 
accommodation.”669 
 Violations were tolerated by the government because it could not afford to properly 
accommodate those living in urban areas. On the other hand, eviction or demolition 
would endanger livelihoods and would become a serious social issue. 
 
Not only was it the economically deprived population who relied on illegal buildings 
for accommodation, building violations (illegal extensions and annexes) in Taiwan had 
been a common practice among home owners who sought to increase floor space 
with balconies, forecourts and fire lanes. According to a newsletter dated 27th 
November 2007, the ‘Construction and Planning Agency of the Interior Ministry’ were 
aware that there were some 468,000 cases of disapproved building violations in 
Taiwan, 46.7 per cent of which were in metropolitan areas of Taipei City and Taipei 
County. Expensive house prices were seen as the main cause of building violations. By 
expanding indoor space with balconies, flat owners could add around 20 per cent of 
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floor space to a living room. By extending the building with a forecourt or fire lane, an 
extra room could be achieved. Many cases of building violation were executed by 
developers with the consent of buyers. In 2001, Taipei City Government found that 
there were some seven hundred flats in a new development with illegal balconies 
covered as a part of indoor space and, in 2002, 507 flats were found to have the same 
practice in Taipei County.670 A two bedroom flat of fifty-eight square metres in floor 
space in the development was for sale at that time for NTD$8.9 million (£150,000), 
highlighting that building code violations can add £20,000-£30,000 in value to a flat.  
 
To conclude this section, I wish to adopt the concept of the informal economy, as 
developed by Portes, Castells and Benton, to explain the use of informal housing to 
describe and explain building violations in Hong Kong and Taiwan.671 The informal 
sector of housing plays an important part in the process of socio-economic 
reproduction and performs a productive and essential role in easing the demands of 
collective consumption. It usually operates beyond official recognition and is mostly 
illegal. On the contrary, to be seen as existing on the margins of formal sectors, the 
informal sector is actually at the core of the economy. In the cases of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, illegal settlements and quarters are a common scene in urban areas. In Taiwan, 
as previously noted, more than half of the building violations have occurred in 
metropolitan Taipei. In terms of geography, informal sectors are located in urban 
areas. In terms of economy, urban informal sectors provide flexible and cheap labour 
in the cities. The rural migrants residing in informal sectors have been one of the main 
urban labour forces sustaining development. The economy relies on informal sectors 
in both cases. 
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8.4 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has discussed one form of resistance against state development control: 
building violations. By reviewing the state’s reaction to building violations (including 
toleration), incompetence in cracking down and amending regulations to meet the 
reality, I argue that laws and regulations can be arbitrary and fluid in practice with the 
line of legality having to be drawn and redrawn. Instead of concentrating on the 
legality of building violations, the concept of the informal sector is introduced to 
describe the characteristics of those violations. Informal housing is not sector, to an 
extent, ignored by respective governments. State intervention and non-intervention 
have been an important causal mechanism that resulted in the development of 
informal sectors. On the surface, informal sectors appear unregulated and outside the 
law, even though laws are actually an essential element. Regulatory actions in reality 
facilitated the legal foundation of the informal sectors. Clearance and demolition 
operations were implemented alongside approval of illegal settlements and building 
legalisation. The implementation of compromised regulations created a systematic 
property market along with the existence of informal sectors. Instead of the normative 
assumption that informal sectors are the unorganised activities of self-interested 
individuals, informal sectors are people’s collective reaction to the market in which 
land capital deprives the population of housing. Informal sector is not a disorderly 
world.  On the contrary it is comprised of organised communities. This chapter also 
argues that legality alone cannot differentiate between informal and formal sectors 
since some informal housing is actually legalised, regulated, approved or tolerated by 
the government. For example, the licensed cage apartments in Hong Kong are 
technically legal but considered hazards and a nuisance when compared to the 
building violations of illegal annexes for expensive apartments in middle-class 
residential communities in Taipei, given cage apartments carry heavier risks to public 
safety. In a perverse sense, the riskier arrangement is legal and the other illegal, 
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though tolerated by the state. There is no clear line of legality defining the two sectors. 
The legal boundary of regulated and approved housing is fluid. 
 
While discussing the competing ideologies of private property and public interest, 
McAuslan concludes that “the ideologies and practice of planning laws mirror the 
ideologies and practices of government and society.”672   He emphasises that the 
government operates in a society based on recognition of the institution of private 
property and a market for property: 
[…] the occasional conflicts between those programmers of the government 
which appear to stress the public interest over private property of market 
forces in society which put private property before public interest is reflected in 
the administration of the law of land use planning and control.673  
In the cases of Taiwan and Hong Kong, building violations expose the failure of each 
government’s development control. It cannot, however, be seen as the failure of 
public interest ideologies. Government compromises on the legality of building 
violations were a result of the state’s incompetence to implement its own policies and 
a product of state’s policies being incapable of meeting the reality. The hegemony of 
public interest was not challenged because, for example, in most cases, the 
government compromised due to it not involving a change in regulation. Concerning 
Taipei, the government did not claim that illegal buildings were preferable, it just 
admitted its failure to clear them. While the ideology was justified through ‘public 
interest’, the implementation of planning and control was selective. In the case of 
Hong Kong, there was no consistent standard in terms of planning in either the 
government’s intervention or non-intervention. In order to pave the way for private 
development, slums were cleared in the name of public interest. Meanwhile the 
government made it clear that resettlement was not worthy of a social welfare 
programme but that it had to be done because it was or would endanger public safety. 
Slum dwellers were members of the public but obviously deemed less important than 
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property developers. While public interest was evoked, ‘the public’ was a vague 
concept that lacked definition. In other words, the state’s definition of public usually 
excluded disadvantaged groups and favoured certain private interests.  
 
Public interest ideology was actually used to support the ideology of private property. 
The complexities that resulted from the competition between private property and 
ideologies of public interest does not stop here. By examining the interaction between 
building violations and development control implementation, this chapter concludes 
that while building violations have been used by disadvantaged populations to fight 
against the property market for their own survival, buildings violations did not 
genuinely challenge the ideology of property rights itself nor endanger recognition of 
the institution of private property. On the contrary, by forcing disadvantaged people 
to live in informal housing in a difficult environment, building violations eased 
government responsibility in relation to the burden on housing, development control 
and intervening in the property market. The government has been able to rely on 
illegal buildings to accommodate people. Building violations do not challenge but 
actually support urban development and the property market.  
 
Faced with the issue of ‘development control’ versus ‘building violations’, 
governments appear to stress the public interest over private property. In reality, 
however, the ideology of private property wins over the ideology of public interest in 
the practice of development control. In most cases, the proclamation of public interest 
serves private property interests. As McAuslan argues, “the ideologies and practices 
of planning law mirror the ideologies and practices of government and society”.674 In 
the case of ‘building violations’ versus ‘development control’, it is clear that Taiwan 
and Hong Kong are capitalist societies primarily based on the recognition of the 
institution of private property and the market for property. Both states, whether 
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through planning law, both in ideology and practice, including the ideology of ‘public 
interest’, fundamentally serve the needs of capitalism.
 333 
 
Chapter 9: Conclusion 
 
McAuslan’s planning law interests explored the boundaries between law and other disciplines. 
His emphasis on the competing ideologies in the planning law provided a means for 
professionals, planners, lawyers and administrators to self-examine their roles in the existing 
planning system, with Costas Douzinas, for example, praising McAuslan’s Ideologies of 
Planning Law for changing mainstream perceptions of planning, environmental and land 
law.675 Associated with his academic writing, McAuslan’s advisory works contributed to land 
reforms and related legislation in Tanzania, Uganda, South Sudan and Kenya, as well as 
projects in Asia, the Middle East, the Pacific and Eastern Europe.676 Despite his world-wide 
influence, McAuslan’s achievements, academy and profession-wise, were not well known in 
East Asian newly industrialised countries. Neither Taiwan nor Hong Kong had seen his legal 
frameworks being applied in planning discourses. This thesis is the first writing adopting his 
planning law ideologies to review the evolutions of planning law in Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
With the application of McAuslan’s concept and other theories concerning sanitation 
syndrome, racial factors, power blocs and informal sectors, this thesis contributes to the 
existing planning law discourses in Taiwan and Hong Kong by revealing the existence of a 
racial hierarchy in the early stage of urban planning in Taiwan and Hong Kong, with the racial 
segregation strengthening colonial urbanisation. By challenging the image of conservatism 
and retrogression labelled on the Chinese serving as contrast and justification for colonial 
urban regularisation, this thesis points out the “Chinese” factor, in actuality, was merely a 
stereotype masking economic conflicts between the colonists and the colonised. Also, while 
planning law ideologies reflect the ideologies of government elites, they reinforce the 
institution of private property and the status quo of the society as well. Although the ideology 
of public participation has the potential to become the ideology of opposition against 
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property relations in society, it is bound by the limitations of participatory democracy and has 
the tendency to become populism.         
 
The first chapter of this thesis highlighted Patrick McAuslan’s study of the ideologies of 
planning law, identifying the competing ideologies underpinning land use planning practice. 
Though the ideologies are not always readily apparent, their presence as a source of 
negotiation, debate and competition shows that, at any given point in time, planning law is 
shaped and reshaped by the different needs of society. Planning law is an outcome of social 
processes that are based within the context of societal development, involved with political 
conflicts and driven by socio-economic forces, both domestic and international. With the help 
of McAuslan’s concept, Chapters 2 and 3 reviewed the rise of urban regularisation in Taiwan 
and Hong Kong, finding them to be driven by sanitation syndrome, something considered of 
primary importance for the health of colonists. The fear of folk diseases and epidemics 
formulated the colonists’ perceptions of the local people, and Chinese people in both Hong 
Kong and Taiwan were identified as the carriers of diseases. The colonial administration thus 
sought to regulate and to separate local Chinese people’s habitation practices and their 
bodies from those of foreigners. The emergence of urban regularisation was very similar to 
the emergence, noted by McAuslan, of English planning law from the earlier “nuisance law”. 
That said, the ideologies behind the cases of England and Taiwan and Hong Kong were 
somewhat different. The emergence of urban regularisation in Taiwan and Hong Kong 
showed how the ideology of public interest emerged as part of the institution of public 
planning and tended to confer wide powers on the administrators who were judged to be 
capable of determining what the public interest was. On the other hand, the birth of British 
planning law showed that ideological calls for the maintenance and buttressing of private 
property were the major foundation of planning law. Despite these differences, this thesis 
has revealed that, despite the apparent dominance of public interest ideology in the cases of 
Taiwan and Hong Kong, this ideology was actually adopted to support and protect the private 
interest of colonists, who were only one group within the public body. This was the reason 
why racial segregation was the prepositional measure during the early stage of land use 
planning. In the case of Hong Kong, some laws were deemed applicable only to areas with 
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western inhabitants, with race used as an excuse. Chinese communities’ resistance to urban 
regularisation was overruled or adopted according to the colonists’ interests. In the case of 
Taiwan, urban regularisation generated a spatial structure of racism which provided 
infrastructure in city centres for Japanese settlers. The colonists’ fear of endemic disease was 
reflected in the urban regularisation ordinances. In both cases, urban regularisation was 
introduced in the name of public interest, but actually only served private property interests. 
This finding accords with McAuslan’s observation of British planning law in practice. He 
argued that British courts had a clear and consistent bias: if confronted with a conflict 
between private property ideology and that of the public interest, the property owner would 
usually win. If confronted with a non-landowning citizen, the courts usually supported the 
authorities in the name of public interest.677 In the name of public interest, privileged people’s 
private property was entitled to better protection than the rest of the public, with this 
privilege coming at the cost of others. McAuslan was aware that the public is not a 
homogenous body, comprised of equal individuals with no differences; likewise, this thesis 
argues that the existence of hierarchy in the public appeared in the format of racial apartheid 
in the early stage of urban planning in both Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
 
This thesis supports McAuslan’s analysis of the composition between the public and the bias 
toward the different groups of the public brought about by planning law practices. However, 
it extends the argument further. In Chapter 4, by reviewing the racial factor present in the 
development control of Taiwan and Hong Kong, I argued that spatial apartheid was 
constructed not only for the welfare of individual colonists residing in colonies but served the 
interests of the greater purpose: Colonialism. When a hierarchical racial system was 
established and imposed upon the original inhabitants, it became the nature of the 
governance in colonies, legitimatising the violence caused by imperialism. Colonial 
urbanisation was shaped according to racial segregation. With colonial urbanisation acting as 
the instrument by which the colonial periphery was incorporated into the metropolitan core, 
the colonial urban system was the operational centre that dominated the politics and 
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economics of colonies. It represented colonial power and delivered the economic profits to 
the imperial countries. The racially segregated colonial urban system saw colonists settled 
mostly in towns and local inhabitants settled mostly in rural integrated colonies under the 
global map of imperialism. Furthermore, sanitation syndrome-driven racism had become the 
nature of colonial planning law and development control. The implementation of planning 
and control reinforced the colonial forces’ perceptions of native people, with issues related 
to public health and public order perceived in terms of racial differences, manifesting the 
subjective projection of fear and misunderstanding of local people. The dominant racial myth 
helped shaped the concept of development and modernisation, which were defined in 
Eurocentric terms, and assumed that the process and direction of change was predetermined. 
There was only one direction of modernisation, with European powers at the top, followed 
by Japan, Hong Kong falling behind, and Taiwan at the bottom. Imperialism gave birth to the 
racial hierarchy of nations that still remains today.  
 
This process, by which the betterment and protection of certain people’s property rights was 
built on less privileged people’s losses, still remained in place in Taiwan after the colonists 
had left, and in Hong Kong after racism was no longer a factor in urban planning policy making, 
which was all undertaken in the name of public interest. In Chapter 5 of this thesis, I reviewed 
the failure of systematic planning in Taiwan. Such planning law has ostensibly been a vehicle 
for McAuslan’s public interest ideology, which has translated into legal and planning 
measures that confer wide power on administrators and planners whose visions were held 
up as all inhabitants’ common goals. Yet, in practice, certain groups of people have always 
been excluded from being part of the “public”, with their public interest clearly different from 
the public interest claimed by the planning authorities. This notion can be also seen in the 
zoning plans for Shanghai and Nanking: there was a hierarchy within the public, leading to 
residential zones being sub-categorised according to the wealth of people. The authoritarian 
state, led by Chinese Nationalists, had more independent, autonomous political power over 
the private sector, manifesting in the evolution of planning laws and planning led by strong 
state intervention. Nevertheless, the public interest could not be identified and acted upon 
by the planners, public servants or the state, on the basis of their own views and assumptions 
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as to what was right and wrong. In various instances, such as the cases of Wuchi and Control 
Yuan v Chang Jin-sen, authorities called for McAuslan’s third ideology, the ideology of public 
participation. Yet, in the main, the planning authority served the interest of certain groups 
and administered on this basis; they were inclined to maintain and preserve the status quo of 
the planning system against radical changes. The issues underlying planning law and planning 
administration ideologies were the ideology of society and the preservation of the private 
property system, especially the private property of certain special interests.  
 
The fierce competition between ideologies exists not only in practice but also in law itself. 
Taiwan is not a common law country, but McAuslan’s first ideology, the tradition which seeks 
to protect private property, can be seen in the Constitution. The Chinese Nationalist 
Constitution guarantees private property protection. The relationship between the 
Constitution and private property was upheld when building the Republic of China, a capitalist 
nation-state. Meanwhile, the Constitution also reflects the ideology of the public 
administration approach and sets the limitation of property rights in order to attain “a well-
balanced sufficiency in national wealth”.678 The appearance of McAuslan’s second ideology in 
the Chinese Nationalist Constitution was not derived from the experience of the regime’s 
social welfare administrative practices in China, but is the result of political compromise 
between the Nationalist Party and Communist Party. The Chinese Nationalists had to include 
Sun Yat-sen’s principle on the equalisation of land ownership in the Constitution to sustain 
the regime’s legitimacy and win over public support. Land reform in China and Taiwan 
reflected competition between the first and second ideologies. The implementation of 
redistribution was an extension of the struggle between the Communists and Nationalists. 
However, the ideology of private property often had the upper hand in the history of 
Taiwanese land policy and planning, as illustrated by the land reform cases in Taiwan and the 
analysis of Taiwanese political factions – the power bloc comprised of the biggest land owners 
– discussed in Chapter 6. The development of land use and related laws were constructed by 
political and economic forces beyond planners’ control. The successful land reform carried 
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out in the late 1940s was driven by the Taiwanese landlords’ fear of agrarian rebellion by the 
Chinese Communist Party, consolidating the Nationalist government’s political legitimacy. 
The failed urban land reform was further proof that the political complexity of power blocs 
dominated land policy and development decisions. Though the competition between private 
and public interest ideologies can be seen during the conflicts between various political 
economic forces and development control was implemented in the name of public interest, 
it was the members of the power blocs who decided what the public interest was. They were 
people who had arrived in their positions because they represented certain special interests, 
with their urban policy visions reflecting the ideology of the governing elite and refusing to 
challenge the existing private property system. 
 
Competition between the first and second ideologies appears in a different form in Hong 
Kong. The zoning plans and as-of-right uses limited development rights but also created a 
certain degree of certainty for the developers. Contractual planning (leasehold control) was 
one of the mechanisms stipulating balance between minimising constraints on development 
to maximise profits and imposing constraints to minimise external costs and any adverse 
effects. Though the government created one of the largest-scale public housing projects in 
the capitalist world, it also acted as the main player in the property market and served the 
interests of property developers. In terms of the competition between public interest and 
private property ideologies, although the Hong Kong government implemented statutory 
town planning in the name of public interest, it placed significant emphasis on fiscal costs and 
financial returns when formulating urban planning plans, and the city state was either 
reluctant or insensitive to acknowledging social and environment factors until they were out 
of control. While reactive crisis management became the norm for Hong Kong’s planning and 
development control, the government’s core values always stood with the ideology of private 
property rights. The review of the failure of development control in both Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, as discussed in Chapter 8, points toward the same conclusion. In the case of building 
violations in Hong Kong, there was no consistent standard of planning professionalism in 
either the government’s intervention or non-intervention. Slums were cleared in the name of 
public interest, but in reality to pave the way for private development. Slum dwellers were 
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members of the public but obviously not as important as property developers. While public 
interest was advocated, the “public” was a vague concept, and it was left to the state to 
decide who exactly the public were. The same situation occurred in Taiwan. While public 
interest ideology was stressed, the implementation of building and development control was 
selective. Indeed, public interest ideology was actually proclaimed to support the ideology of 
private property in both Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, when faced with the issue of development control 
versus building violations, both Taiwan and Hong Kong’s governments appeared to stress 
public interest over private property. Yet in reality, the ideology of private property trumped 
the ideology of public interest when practicing development control. In most cases, the 
proclamation of public interest ideology served private property interests. As McAuslan has 
stated, “the ideologies and practices of planning law mirror the ideologies and practices of 
government and society”, 679  with both Taiwan and Hong Kong functioning as capitalist 
societies based on recognition of the institution of private property and a market for property. 
Both states’ planning law ideologies and practices, including the selective adoption of public 
interest ideology, served the needs of capitalism. 
 
With building violations being discussed in this thesis, the “informal sector” concept was also 
introduced to aid further reviews of the relations between building violations and planning 
law. By examining the characteristics of building violations in Taiwan and Hong Kong, it was 
concluded that while urban informal sectors challenged the development control of the 
planning authorities, they were also critical to urban development. They could be seen neither 
as side effects of urbanisation, nor as the periphery of cities. Both states’ reactions to building 
violations, including their incompetence in cracking down, amending regulations that 
pandered to the violations and the respective government not enforcing slum clearance on a 
large scale to avoid social unrest that endangered the political legitimacy of the government 
as a whole all highlight that laws and regulations were arbitrary in practice, with the line of 
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legality having to be redrawn again and again. Thus, legality alone did not define the informal 
sectors. State intervention and non-intervention was an important causal mechanism that 
resulted in the appearance of informal sectors. Informal sectors appeared unregulated and 
outlawed; however, regulatory actions forced upon building violations actually facilitated the 
legal foundation of informal sectors. Instead of the assumption that informal sectors were 
unorganised activities of self-interested individuals, in reality, informal sectors were people’s 
collective reaction to the property market. Building violations were used by disadvantaged 
populations to fight against the property market for their survival. While the collective 
reactions could be seen as a potential challenge to the status quo of the planning system and 
property relations, nevertheless, building violations did not endanger recognition of the 
institution of private property. Informal sectors actually supported and even enhanced the 
system because those sectors also eased housing responsibilities and the financial burden of 
city administrations. Informal sectors primarily supported the growth and development of 
cities. 
 
The above discourse can be extended further to the issue of state legitimacy. State legitimacy 
is a structural variable determined by the socio-political process that imposes order to social 
relations, with this current examination of the characteristics of the developmentalist states 
of Taiwan and Hong Kong highlighting that “development” had been the central source of 
state legitimacy that the governments of Taiwan and Hong Kong could claim. With building 
violations (informal sectors) easing the administrative crisis of legitimacy by alleviating 
housing problems, supporting the status quo of property relations and not challenging the 
hegemony of development, building violations actually enhanced the legitimacy of both 
states. Do legal violations actually enhancing state legitimacy? It may seem ironic, but it is the 
reality in Taiwan and Hong Kong. 
 
This thesis has also shown that decision making on planning matters was made by a governing 
elite that either believed in the developmentalist state or represented certain power blocs 
and property developers’ interests, rather than planners whose ideals originated from their 
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commitment to professionalism. At the same time, the ideology of public interest was upheld 
alongside the ideology of private property, together vying for prominence against McAuslan’s 
third ideology, the ideology of public participation. In the case of Hong Kong, the latest 
planning ordinance reform has not fundamentally changed the decision-making power 
structure and reflects the fact that public participation continues to be ignored. In the case of 
Taiwan, public participation is merely a formality with little effects. The ideology of public 
participation, as McAuslan argues, “sees the law as the provider of rights of participation in 
the land use planning process not by virtue of the ownership of property but by virtue of the 
more abstract principles of democracy and justice” and denies that “the public interest can be 
identified and acted upon by public servants on the basis of their own views and 
assumptions”. 680  The ideology can be hostile to the existing administrative planning 
framework, run by professionals, public servants and politicians who “do run it and claim the 
legitimacy in so doing by virtue of official qualifications, official appointments or official 
elections”.681 This thesis agrees that the ideology of public participation has the potential to 
become the oppositional ideology to the status quo, which is “the existing state of property 
relations in society, the existing capitalist system with its emphasis on private property and a 
functioning market for that property”.682 Public interest and private property ideologies are 
the ideologies of the status quo, and the planning system based on the two ideologies is 
irreconcilable with the ideology of public participation.  
 
This thesis further contends that planning laws in Hong Kong and Taiwan, created by the 
developmentalist states, have the tendency to strengthen the status quo, and that the 
opposition should see these laws as an arena in which they can meet their opponents. In 
Taiwan, the backroom politics of up-zoning decisions manipulated by local political factions 
resulted in land speculation. Notables from local factions, allied with the Chinese Nationalist 
Party, together built a new Taiwanese republican nation-state. Differing from the old Chinese 
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Nationalists who used to implement the redistribution of land ownership in rural Taiwan, the 
localised new party dominated the property market. While politicians were benefiting from 
the non-transparent planning system, campaigners against high-priced housing challenged 
the existing property relations and demanded housing as a basic human right. This conflict 
gave birth to the practice of public participation in the planning system. Though Taiwanese 
people still have no effective channel within the planning mechanism to voice their opposition 
to individual cases of development, except for those legally required by the Environment 
Impact Assessment, zoning plan reviews have at least become more transparent. As in 
Taiwan, the participatory mechanism also came very late to Hong Kong. The colonial 
government’s democratisation effort in the decade before the Chinese take-over promoted a 
more transparent and open planning process. However, it was not until the Town Planning 
(Amendment) Ordinance 2004 that public consultation provisions for planning applications 
were stipulated. Before the legislation, public views could only be obtained through informal 
enquires conducted by the relevant District Offices. Nevertheless, in both Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, the status quo of planning is currently being challenged by the developing ideology of 
public participation. This ideology is sceptical or hostile to the professionals, public servants 
and politicians running the planning system who claim legitimacy in doing so by virtue of 
official qualifications, official appointments, or official elections.  
 
The ideology of public participation is a prospective challenge to the status quo, but is it really, 
as McAuslan concludes, a genuine threat to the system and structure of society, challenging 
the existing state of property relations in society and the operations of the capitalist 
system ?683  According to McAuslan, the mechanisms ensuring accountability of decision-
making need to offer the possibility of debating the appropriateness of advocated decisions, 
and of prompting reform to the process when planning decisions are made within central and 
local governments. This would serve to increase the possibilities of the public accountability 
of officials, general public awareness of policy issues and the possibility of successful 
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challenges to government decisions by a whole range of individuals and groups.684 According 
to McAuslan’s proposal, planning professionals’ authority would be challenged, politicians’ 
power questioned and people empowered – yet the fundamental property relations would 
still be upheld. The societal status quo would remain. Changes made within the urban 
planning process are quoted in McAuslan’s book but there is no sign of revolutionary change 
to the existing state of property relations. The same applies to the cases of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. With increasing demand for public participation and advocation of participatory 
democracy, there is more room for people to become involved in the decision-making 
process, in order to voice their opinions about what is in the genuine public interest. However, 
these voices express only that their definition of public interest is different from that of 
professionals and bureaucrats, and does not challenge the ideology of public interest itself. 
Nor do they threaten the ideology of private property, because requests to participate in the 
planning decision-making process are also requests to preserve people’s private property. 
With public participation being the vehicle to uphold the public interest and private property 
ideologies, and with the ideology of private property being the core value of the 
implementation of urban planning in the name of public interest (as discussed in Chapters 6, 
7 and 8), the ideology of private property has the upper hand in the competition between 
these three ideologies. This conclusion reflects the reality of the contemporary democratic 
political system and represents the system’s character. Contemporary democracy is built on 
the recognition of private property rights and the operation of capitalism. The task of 
democracy is not to change the existing class structure in a capitalist society but to maintain 
the order of private ownership. The proposal of participatory democracy is still a capitalist 
democracy and merely a reform within the current system with the potential “to safe guard 
the long-term interest of society and its environment against exploitation for short term gain 
and to reduce inequalities, not merely of opportunity but of material conditions of life”, as the 
Royal Town Planning Institute of Britain proclaimed in 1976.685 It also has the tendency to 
prompt the move towards a populist state, as is evident in contemporary Taiwan. While 
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democracy does not guarantee a progressive society, neither does the ideology of public 
participation and participatory democracy. 
 
The above conclusion does not affect the fact that, if there is to be effective social progress 
and transformation, urban planning is a key instrument in seeking such a goal. However, 
planners must be cautious about relying too heavily on the flawed notion of apolitical 
professionalism as the key to planning success. This is why this thesis did not stop at the 
description of the competing ideologies, but also examined the way in which states operate 
in the planning process, by observing the evolution of planning laws in both Hong Kong and 
Taiwan, and the factors behind this evolution. In both cases, planning is not apolitical. On the 
contrary, both states dominated the planning process from the beginning. Nevertheless, state 
domination does not guarantee planning success, with planning all too often merely an-after-
the fact reparation of the existing situation. The original blue prints for urban planning did not 
work as expected, and crisis management became the norm, because socio-economic and 
political factors were ignored or under-estimated by planners. At certain stages of 
development in Hong Kong, the state served the interests of developers. In Taiwan, the state 
was the vehicle for land speculation. The law reflects the socio-political context and the state 
has quite often chosen not to enforce regulations. Informal sectors have been left free to act 
as a buffer so that social crises can be dissolved and industrial production costs minimised. It 
is a myth that lawyers and planners are apolitical professionals, neutral and above the 
struggle for spatial and social justice, or to expect that their contribution of professionalism 
alone can formulate a rational and egalitarian town and country planning system. The status 
quo of the planning system and the related laws need to be broken, with legal and planning 
professionals also becoming activists in a wider social forum. 
 
Throughout the historical period addresses in this thesis, planners’ conceptions of 
modernisation were defined in Eurocentric terms, assuming that the process and direction of 
change was predetermined, and that there was only one direction, one form of 
modernisation. By reviewing urban legislation processes and the socio-political forces behind 
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these, this thesis argues that modernisation is not an autonomous process of change which 
occurs through introducing ideas and measures from more “advanced” societies, but a 
restructuring of society into conformity through conflict between economic forces, both 
domestic and foreign. 
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